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Abstract: This introduction provides a preface to the contributions gathered in tripleC’s special 
issue “Communicative Socialism/Digital Socialism”. It outlines how Marx conceived of social-
ism (Sections 2, 3, 4, 5), introduces a model of a socialist society that consists of three dimen-
sions (Section 6), and shows how, based on Marx, we can conceptualise communicative and 
digital socialism (Section 7). Section 8 introduces ten principles of communicative/digital so-
cialist politics. 
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1. Introduction 
tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique’s special issue “Communicative Social-
ism/Digital Socialism” asks: What is digital/communicative socialism? The special is-
sue presents besides this general introduction 14 contributions that explore perspec-
tives on digital and communicative socialism in respect to theory, dialectics, history, 
internationalism, praxis, and class struggles. 
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Christopher C. Barnes analyses how socialists use social media. He presents results 
from an analysis of interviews conducted with members of the Democratic Socialists 
of America. The DSA has supported Bernie Sanders’ presidential campaigns. Socialist 
senator Alexandria Orcasio-Cortez is a member of this political organisation. Barnes 
shows how socialists use social media to advance political stories, humour as politics, 
and media criticism, but also that they find aspects of social media use frustrating and 
alienating. 
Dimitris Boucas analyses the theory, reality, and possibilities of digital and commu-
nicative socialism. He gives special attention to the theorisation of post-industrial so-
cialism and the scientific and technological revolution in the works of André Gorz and 
Radovan Richta. The paper reports empirical results of research on how Internet alter-
natives could look like and discusses these results in the context of digital socialism. 
Christopher M. Cox engages with the concept of fully automated communism/so-
cialism that has become popular in recent times. The author stresses the importance 
of autonomy in the context of automation and reminds us that one needs to talk about 
both autonomous technology and autonomous humans.  
Emiliana De Blasio and Michele Sorice analyse the role of digital technologies in 
the policies of contemporary socialist parties and movements. The analysis focuses 
on France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the USA. They show that work remains to be 
done in the establishment of a framework of practices that go beyond digital capitalism. 
Donatella Della Ratta analyses the status of the social in and beyond communicative 
capitalism. She argues that user-generated spectacles, free labour, and capitalist re-
alism on the Internet have brought about new forms of alienation and exploitation. She 
criticises the understandings of digital socialism advanced by Kevin Kelly, Daniel Sa-
ros, and Evgeny Morozov as ideological and suggests basing digital socialism on the 
ethics of care. 
Nick Dyer-Witheford analyses left-wing responses to platform capitalism and in this 
context utilises Chantalle Mouffe’s notion of left populism. He focuses specifically on 
left populism with respect to five topics: Internet speech and surveillance; the concen-
tration of ownership of digital platforms; the regulation of working conditions in the gig 
economy; alternative models for the ownership of digital resources and platforms; and 
digital postcapitalism. 
Sai Englert, Jamie Woodcock, and Callum Cant discuss aspects of what they call 
a digital Workerism. Inspired by Marx’s and Italian Autonomist Marxism’s method of 
the workers’ inquiry, they ask how we can practice a similar method that fuses critical 
research and social struggles in the age of digital technologies . 
Christian Fuchs discusses computing, communication, and communist utopias in 
the context of digital socialism in utopian literature, namely in William Morris’ News 
From Nowhere, Peter Kroptokin’s The Conquest of Bread, Ursula K. Le Guin’s The 
Dispossessed, and P.M.’s bolo’bolo and Kartoffeln und Computer (Potatoes and Com-
puters). The paper contributes to discussions about hi-tech communism and how to 
create a utopian, socialist Internet. 
Hardy Hanappi argues that we live in the age of alienation. He outlines the devel-
opment and consequences of the capitalist algorithm and how this algorithm has deep-
ened the gap between the working class in and of itself to the point of the emergence 
of new forms of fascism and a Third World War. In this context, the contribution dis-
cusses the role of organic intellectuals for the development of socialist counterpower. 
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Dmitry Kuznetsov and Milan Ismangil analyse the socialist YouTube-based video com-
munity Breadtube and discuss its political potentials for challenging right-wing ideology 
and capitalism. The analysis is focused on four major left-wing YouTube content crea-
tors – Contrapoints, Philosophy Tube, Shaun, and Hbomberguy.  
Eleonora de Magalhães Carvalho, Afonso de Albuquerque, and Marcelo Alves dos 
Santos Jr analyse Brazil’s socialist blogosphere in the dark times of Bolsonaro. Blog-
osfera Progressista (Progressive Blogosphere, hereafter BP) is a leftist political com-
munication initiative. It aims at bringing together an institutional form of organisation 
with networked forms of politics, doing so at the time of, and opposed to, the far-right 
Bolsonaro regime. 
Joan Pedro-Carañana analyses mediation in the works of the three Ibero-American 
critical theorists Jesús Martín-Barbero, Manuel Martín-Serrano, and Luis Martín-San-
tos in terms of contributions to the critique of digital capitalism and foundations of digital 
socialism.  
Jamie Ranger discusses how we can slow down/decelerate social media as a con-
stitutive aspect of digital socialism. He draws on and extends Hartmut Rosa’s theory 
of speed and the notions of deceleration, acceleration, and hypermodulation, as well 
as critical theories of digital capitalism. 
S. Harikrishnan analyses how the experience of the communist governance of the 
Indian state of Kerala has inspired and enabled the communication of communism. 
The focus is on the analysis of spaces (such as public spaces, libraries, reading rooms, 
tea-shops, cultural associations, forums, etc.) in the communication of communism, a 
development that the author analyses based on Lefebvre’s critical theory of space.       
Marx and Engels saw socialism as the movement for a society that is based on the 
principles of equality, justice, and solidarity. They also term such a society a socialist 
society and the movement struggling for it socialism. They distinguish different types 
of socialism, of which communism is one, while reactionary socialism, bourgeois so-
cialism, and critical-utopian socialism are others. Marx and Engels argue that socialism 
is grounded in the antagonistic class structure of capitalism that pits workers against 
capitalists. In the 19th century, the socialist movement experienced a split between 
reformist revisionists and revolutionary socialists. After the First World War, the Com-
munist International and the Labour and Socialist International were created. After the 
collapse of the Second International, there was an institutional distinction between So-
cialists and Communists. Whereas reformism dominated the Socialist International, 
Stalinism became dominant in the Communist International. The notion of ‘socialism’ 
became associated with social democratic parties and the notion of ‘communism’ with 
communist parties. From a historical point of view, both Stalinism and revisionist social 
democracy have failed. 
With the rise of neoliberalism, social democracy turned towards the right and in-
creasingly adopted neoliberal policies. When Tony Blair became British Prime Minster 
in 1997, his neoliberal version of social democracy influenced social democracy 
around the world. The crisis of capitalism and the emergence of new versions of so-
cialist politics (Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Podemos, 
Syriza, etc.) has reinvigorated the debate about socialism today. Whereas the notion 
of communism is today still very often associated with Stalinism – though by the former 
term Marx did not mean terror and dictatorship, but the struggle for democracy (Marx 
and Engels 1848, 504) – there has been a new opening of and interest in the notion of 
socialism. 
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tripleC’s special issue explores perspectives on the digital and communicative dimen-
sions of socialism today. It presents contributions that address one or more of the fol-
lowing questions: 
x Theory:  
What is socialism today? What are the communicative and digital dimensions of 
socialism today? What is communicative/digital socialism? What theoretical ap-
proaches and concepts are best suited for understanding digital/communicative so-
cialism today? Does it or does it not make sense to distinguish between digital/com-
municative socialism and digital/communicative communism? Why or why not? 
x Dialectic:  
What are the contradictions of digital capitalism? How does digital/communicative 
socialism differ from and contradict digital/communicative capitalism? 
x History:  
What lessons can we draw from the history of socialism, communism, social democ-
racy and Marxist theory for the conceptualisation and praxis of digital/communica-
tive socialism today? 
x Internationalism:  
Socialism is a universalist and internationalist movement. What are the interna-
tional(ist), global dimensions of digital/communicative socialism today? 
x Praxis and class struggles:  
What strategies, demands and struggles are important for digital/communicative so-
cialism? How can socialism today best be communicated in public? What class 
struggles are there around communication and computing? What is the role of com-
munication and digital technologies in contemporary class struggles? What is the 
role of social movements, the party, and trade unions in the organisation and self-
organisation of digital and communication workers’ class struggles? What should 
class politics, unions and strikes look like today so that they adequately reflect 
changes of the working class and exploitation in the age of digital capitalism? What 
is a digital strike and what is its potential for digital socialism?  
 
The remainder of this introduction focuses on a) how Marx conceived of socialism 
(Sections 2, 3, 4, 5); b) a model of a socialist society (Section 6); and c) how we can, 
based on Marx, conceptualise communicative and digital socialism (Section 7). Section 
8 introduces ten principles of a communicative/digital socialist politics.  
2. Socialism and Communism 
Lenin (1917b, 472) argues that “the first phase of communist society” is “usually called 
socialism”. Marx (1875) spoke of a first and second phase of communism. In the first 
phase, private property and capital cease to exist and the ownership of the means of 
production is socialised, but wage-labour, money, the state and exchange continue to 
exist. In the second phase, wages, wage-labour, money, the state, exchange-value 
and all forms of alienation cease to exist. But Marx did not call the first phase socialism 
and the second phase communism. He rather spoke of two stages or phases of com-
munism. Communism is not just a type of society, but also a political movement.  
In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels (1848) speak of com-
munism as a type of socialist movement. Besides communism they identify reactionary 
socialism, bourgeois socialism, and critical-utopian socialism as types of socialism. 
When one speaks of communism, one therefore means a type of socialism that aims 
at the abolition of class society and a democratic, worker-controlled economy within a 
participatory democracy. Given that Marx and Engels saw communism as a type of 
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socialism, Marxists often use the terms socialism and communism interchangeably. 
Strictly speaking, socialism is broader than communism. 
2.1. Rosa Luxemburg on Socialism and Communism 
Rosa Luxemburg (1925, 141-144) clarifies the difference between socialism and com-
munism: 
Socialism goes back for thousands of years, as the ideal of a social order based 
on equality and the brotherhood of man, the ideal of a communistic society. With 
the first apostles of Christianity, various religious sects of the Middle Ages, and 
in the German peasants’ war, the socialist idea always glistened as the most 
radical expression of rage against the existing society. […] It was in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century that the socialist idea first appeared 
with vigor and force, freed from religious enthusiasm, but rather as an opposition 
to the terror and devastation that emerging capitalism wreaked on society. Yet 
this socialism too was basically nothing but a dream, the invention of individual 
bold minds. […] The socialist ideas represented by the three great thinkers: 
[Claude Henri] Saint-Simon and [Charles] Fourier in France, [Robert] Owen in 
England, in the 1820s and 30s, with far greater genius and brilliance, relied on 
quite different methods, but essentially rested on the same foundation. […] A 
new generation of socialist leaders emerged in the 1840s: [Wilhelm] Weitling in 
Germany, [Pierre Joseph] Proudhon, Louis Blanc and Blanqui in France. The 
working class, for its part, had already embarked on struggle against the rule of 
capital, it had given the signal for class struggle in the elemental insurrections 
of the Lyons silk weavers in France, and in the Chartist movement in England. 
But there was no direct connection between these spontaneous stirrings of ex-
ploited masses and the various socialist theories. […] the socialist idea was 
placed on a completely new footing by Marx and Engels. These two sought the 
basis for socialism not in moral repugnance towards the existing social order 
nor in cooking up all kinds of possible attractive and seductive projects, de-
signed to smuggle in social equality within the present state. They turned to the 
investigation of the economic relationships of present-day society.  
Marx and Engels grounded socialism and the potentials of communism in the antago-
nistic class structure of capitalism that pits workers against capitalists. Marx saw the 
proletariat as the class that has the potential for “a revolutionary seizure of power for 
the realization of socialism” (Luxemburg 1925, 142).  
2.2. The Split of the Second International as Split Between Communism and Socialism 
In the 19th century, the socialist movement experienced a split between reformist re-
visionists and revolutionary socialists. On the one side, the revisionists believed in the 
evolutionary transition to socialism through victories in elections and an automatic 
breakdown of capitalism. On the other side, revolutionary socialists stressed the im-
portance of class struggle, street action, mass political strikes, and fundamental trans-
formations of society in order to establish a free society. In the Second International 
(1889-1916), the various factions of socialism were part of one organisation. The Sec-
ond International collapsed during the First World War. Socialists were split between 
those who supported the War and those who radically opposed it.  
After the First World War, the Communist International and the Labour and Socialist 
International were created. The latter was the forerunner of the Socialist International. 
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After the collapse of the Second International, there was an institutional distinction be-
tween Socialists and Communists. Whereas reformism dominated the Socialist Inter-
national, Stalinism became dominant in the Communist International. The notion of 
‘socialism’ became associated with social democratic parties and the notion of ‘com-
munism’ with communist parties. From a historical point of view, both Stalinism and 
revisionist social democracy have failed. Today it is time to stop strictly separating 
between communism and socialism, and instead to argue for a communist socialism 
as a radical, democratic socialism that aims at substituting capitalism by the demo-
cratic control of society, which includes workers’ control of the economy, citizens’ con-
trol of the political system, and human control of culture and everyday life. Marx saw 
communism as a radical, democratic movement and form of socialism. 
Communism is “the real movement which abolishes the present state of things” and 
is grounded in “the now existing premise” of society, which means that it “presupposes 
the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up 
with them” (Marx and Engels 1845/1846, 49). Communism as “the abolition of private 
property” is a revolutionary social movement, the political “position as the negation of 
the negation” (Marx 1844, 306). For Marx, socialism is the positive movement or what 
Hegel terms the determinate negation (bestimmte Negation) that can follow the nega-
tion of the negation (Marx 1844, 305). This means that socialism is the society created 
by the communist movement on the basis, from the ruins, and as a transcendence of 
capitalism and class society. 
For Marx and Engels, socialism is not an abstract idea, but has as its precondition 
the development of productive forces and the socialisation of work, is grounded in class 
antagonisms that it wants to overcome, and can only become real through class strug-
gles that aim at abolishing class society and establishing a classless society. Social-
ism’s conditions are class society’s antagonisms, its method is communist class strug-
gle, and its goal is a classless, socialist society. Society’s productive forces are never 
independent from the social relations that organise how humans encounter each other 
and what type of society they live in. This means, for example, that the design, char-
acter, and use of technology depends on class and power relations that shape the 
character of society’s structures and forces. Socialism is a sublation of the capitalist 
and class mode of the dialectic of the forces and relations of production so that a class-
less society based on the principles of equality, fairness, justice, solidarity, and co-
operation emerges. 
2.3. Class-Struggle Social Democracy 
With the rise of neoliberalism, social democracy turned towards the right and increas-
ingly adopted neoliberal policies. When Tony Blair became British Prime Minster in 
1997, his neoliberal version of social democracy influenced social democracy around 
the world. The consequence was that social democracy became in many respects in-
distinguishable from conservative parties, especially in respect to class politics. We 
need a left social democracy that struggles for democratic socialism. Rosa Luxemburg 
practiced a class struggle social democracy that struggled for radical reforms, and 
combined mass strikes and parliamentary action (see Luxemburg 2008). Luxemburg 
practiced dialectics of party/movements, organisation/spontaneity, intellectual leader-
ship/masses. 
Bhaskar Sunkara (2019, 215-237) argues for a new class-struggle social democ-
racy that aims at winning elections and taking power; combines social movements, 
trade unions and the party; realises transitional policies that move society “quickly from 
social democracy to democratic socialism” (Sunkara 2019, 221); acknowledges the 
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changes of the working class; embeds itself in working class struggles; and struggles 
for “dignity, respect, and a fair shot at the good life” through universalist, “democratic 
class politics” that unite individuals “against our common opponent and win the type of 
change that will help the most marginalized, all while engaging in a far longer campaign 
against oppression rooted in race, gender, sexuality, and more” (2019, 236). 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2017) term the convergence of unions and social 
movements “social unionism” (social movements plus unions). Social unionism organ-
ises social strikes that take place in a society that has become a factory at large. Social 
unions entail “organizing new social combinations, inventing new forms of social coop-
eration, generating democratic mechanisms for our access to, use of, and participation 
in decision-making about the common” (2017, xix). Hardt and Negri argue for the com-
plementarity of the three political strategies: “The taking of power, by electoral or other 
means, must serve to open space for autonomous and prefigurative practices on an 
ever-larger scale and nourish the slow transformation of institutions, which must con-
tinue over the long term. Similarly practices of exodus must find ways to complement 
and further projects of both antagonistic reform and taking power” (278). Example pro-
jects that such a complementary left-wing politics could struggle for include guaranteed 
basic income as “a money of the common” and “open access to and democratic man-
agement of the common” (294).  
Class struggle social democracy struggles for communism as a democratic socialist 
society by practicing dialectics of reform/revolution (radical reformism), party/move-
ment (movement parties), organisation/spontaneity (organised spontaneity), and work-
ing class politics/societal politics (social working class politics). 
 We will discuss aspects of socialism along three lines: the economy (Section 3), 
politics (Section 4), and culture (Section 5). Communism is a democratic society that 
is based on equality, justice, fairness, solidarity, wealth and luxury for all, and partici-
patory democracy.  
3. The Socialist Economy 
3.1. Common Ownership  
A key characteristic of a socialist society is that the means of production are the com-
mon property of the producers: “In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be 
summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property. […] When, therefore, 
capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, 
personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social 
character of the property that is changed. It loses its class character” (Marx and Engels 
1848, 498; 499). For Marx, “communism is humanism mediated with itself through the 
supersession of private property” (Marx 1844, 341). 
3.2. Production and Labour 
Toil is for Marx and Engels incompatible with a socialist society. They see the reduction 
of necessary labour and the abolition of hard labour as an important aspect of social-
ism: “The realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity 
and external expediency ends; […] The reduction of the working day is the basic pre-
requisite” (Marx 1894, 958-959). Therefore, a communist society is only possible as a 
high-tech society that has a high level of productivity.  
What is the aim of the Communists? Answer: To organise society in such a way 
that every member of it can develop and use all his capabilities and powers in 
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complete freedom and without thereby infringing the basic conditions of this so-
ciety (Engels 1847a, 96). 
[In communism] nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can be-
come accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general pro-
duction and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fish-
erman, shepherd or critic (Marx and Engels 1845/1846, 47). 
In a high-tech socialist society, where the division of labour is abolished, humans are 
enabled to freely choose their work activities and to be active as well-rounded individ-
uals who engage in many different activities. This means that humans can freely use 
their capabilities. Labour turns into free activity without a struggle for survival and co-
ercion by the market. 
In a socialist society, production takes place based on the principle of human need 
and not based on the principle of profit (the need of capital). This requires some form 
of planning of production: 
In communist society, where the interests of individuals are not opposed to one 
another but, on the contrary, are united, competition is eliminated. […] In com-
munist society it will be easy to be informed about both production and con-
sumption. Since we know how much, on the average, a person needs, it is easy 
to calculate how much is needed by a given number of individuals, and since 
production is no longer in the hands of private producers but in those of the 
community and its administrative bodies, it is a trifling matter to regulate produc-
tion according to needs (Engels 1845a, 96). 
Part of the reason state communism failed was that the central planning of human 
needs and the economy failed. Economies are complex and have unpredictable fea-
tures. Economic planning needs to be decentralised, which in a networked and com-
puterised society can take on the form of a decentralised collection of the goods that 
individuals and households require. This information can then be sent to production 
units that thereby know how many goods are required during a certain period of time. 
Networking of production within industrial sectors enables the comparison of the avail-
able production capacities and productivity levels, which enables the production of the 
right amount of goods. 
For Marx and Engels, socialism includes a democratic economy, in which the work-
ers own the means of production in common. In such self-managed companies, deci-
sions are taken in common: 
Above all, it will have to take the running of industry and all branches of produc-
tion in general out of the hands of separate individuals competing with each 
other and instead will have to ensure that all these branches of production are 
run by society as a whole, i.e., for the social good, according to a social plan 
and with the participation of all members of society. It will therefore do away with 
competition and replace it by association. […] private ownership will also have 
to be abolished, and in its stead there will be common use of all the instruments 
of production and the distribution of all products by common agreement, or the 
so-called community of property. The abolition of private ownership is indeed 
the most succinct and characteristic summary of the transformation of the entire 
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social system necessarily following from the development of industry, and it is 
therefore rightly put forward by the Communists as their main demand (Engels 
1847b, 348). 
3.3. Circulation, Distribution and Consumption 
Marx argues that a socialist society must reuse parts of the social product as means 
of production, whereas the other parts constitute means of consumption that need to 
be distributed among the individuals: 
Let us finally imagine, for a change, an association of free men, working with 
the means of production held in common, and expending their many different 
forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force. 
[…] The total product of our imagined association is a social product. One part 
of this product serves as fresh means of production and remains social. But 
another part is consumed by the members of the association as means of sub-
sistence. This part must therefore be divided amongst them (Marx 1867, 172-
173). 
Marx and Engels distinguish between two phases of a socialist society: crude com-
munism as the first stage and fully developed communism as the second stage. In the 
first stage, there is the elimination of capital, profit and the private property of the 
means of production, but not necessarily the abolition of wage-labour, money, ex-
change, and commodities. The means of production are collectively owned, but the 
productive forces are not yet developed to the stage that allows the abolishment of 
necessary labour.  
The first stage of communism has not “developed on its own foundations”, but de-
velops “just as it emerges from capitalist society, which is thus in every respect, eco-
nomically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society 
from whose womb it emerges” (Marx 1875, 85). In the first stage of communism, “the 
community is simply a community of labour, and equality of wages paid out by com-
munal capital – by the community as universal capitalist” (Marx 1844, 295). A “given 
amount of labour in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labour in another 
form. […] The right of the producers is proportional to the labour they supply; […] It 
recognises no class distinctions, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else” 
(Marx 1875, 86, emphasis in original). Marx writes elsewhere that in communism, 
money would immediately disappear: “If we were to consider a communist society in 
place of a capitalist one, then money capital would immediately be done away with, 
and so too the disguises that transactions acquire through it” (1885, 390). The implica-
tion is that there might be versions of lower-stage communism with and without money.  
In the higher, fully developed form of communism, the means of production are 
highly developed so that necessary labour and exchange are abolished: 
In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the 
individual to the division of labour, and thereby also the antithesis between men-
tal and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means 
of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with 
the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of common 
wealth flow more abundantly – only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois 
right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each 
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs! (Marx 1875, 87).  
10     Christian Fuchs 
   CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
“From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs” is a central 
communist principle. In a fully developed communist society, there is no wage-labour 
and no compulsion to work. Everyone works as far as he can and work is largely self-
fulfilment. Goods are not sold or exchanged, but given to humans freely as gifts. There 
is distribution not according to the possession of money, but according to human 
needs. 
4.  Socialist Politics 
Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-
estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by 
and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as 
a social (i. e., human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing 
the entire wealth of previous development (Marx 1844, 296, emphasis in origi-
nal). 
Freedom is an important principle of democratic societies. For Marx, socialism means 
the abolition of alienation and the realisation of true freedom that allows humans to 
fully develop their potentials. A socialist society is a democracy and a humanism, in 
which the freedom of all interacts with individual freedom. “In place of the old bourgeois 
society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which 
the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (Marx 
and Engels 1848, 506). 
It has often been argued that communism/socialism is totalitarian. But for Marx and 
Engels, democracy is a precondition of socialism. This circumstance becomes, for ex-
ample, very clear in the following passages:  
Question 18: What will be the course of this revolution? Answer: In the first place 
it will inaugurate a democratic constitution and thereby, directly or indirectly, the 
political rule of the proletariat (Engels 1847b, 350).  
Democracy nowadays is communism. […] Democracy has become the prole-
tarian principle, the principle of the masses. The masses may be more or less 
clear about this, the only correct meaning of democracy, but all have at least an 
obscure feeling that social equality of rights is implicit in democracy. The dem-
ocratic masses can be safely included in any calculation of the strength of the 
communist forces. And if the proletarian parties of the different nations unite 
they will be quite right to inscribe the word ‘Democracy’ on their banners, since, 
except for those who do not count, all European democrats in 1846 are more or 
less Communists at heart (Engels 1845b, 5).  
Marx and Engels argue that communists do not oppose reforms, but argue for progres-
sive and radical reforms that reduce the power of capital and forces that support dom-
ination.  
Democracy would be quite useless to the proletariat if it were not immediately 
used as a means of carrying through further measures directly attacking private 
ownership and securing the means of subsistence of the proletariat. […] Once 
the first radical onslaught upon private ownership has been made, the proletariat 
will see itself compelled to go always further, to concentrate all capital, all agri-
culture, all industry, all transport, and all exchange more and more in the hands 
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of the State. […] Finally, when all capital, all production, and all exchange are 
concentrated in the hands of the nation, private ownership will automatically 
have ceased to exist, money will have become superfluous, and production will 
have so increased and men will be so much changed that the last forms of the 
old social relations will also be able to fall away (Engels 1847b, 351). 
Progressive politics that socialists support include, for example, a “heavy progressive 
or graduated income tax”, the “[e]xtension of factories and instruments of production 
owned by the State”, the “[c]ombination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; 
the “gradual abolition of all the distinction between town and country by a more equable 
distribution of the populace over the country”, or the “[f]ree education for all children in 
public schools” (Marx and Engels 1848, 505). 
5. Socialist Culture 
5.1. Togetherness 
A socialist society also changes social relations in the realm of culture. Whereas capi-
talist culture through the logic of commodity consumption advances a culture of isola-
tion and individualisation focused on the individual consumption of commodities and 
the competition for reputation, socialist culture means the development of a common 
culture, where humans associate and produce and consume culture together:  
When communist artisans associate with one another, theory, propaganda, etc., 
is their first end. But at the same time, as a result of this association, they acquire 
a new need – the need for society – and what appears as a means becomes an 
end. In this practical process the most splendid results are to be observed when-
ever French socialist workers are seen together. Such things as smoking, drink-
ing, eating, etc., are no longer means of contact or means that bring them to-
gether. Association, society and conversation, which again has association as 
its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with 
them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-
hardened bodies (Marx 1844, 313).  
5.2. The Family 
Socialist society also changes personal relations and the family. It reduces the depend-
ence and power relations within the family and thereby advances equality: 
What influence will the communist order of society have upon the family? An-
swer: It will make the relation between the sexes a purely private relation which 
concerns only the persons involved, and in which society has no call to interfere. 
It is able to do this because it abolishes private property and educates children 
communally, thus destroying the twin foundation of hitherto existing marriage – 
the dependence through private property of the wife upon the husband and of 
the children upon the parents (Engels 1847b, 354). 
5.3. Internationalism 
Socialist culture is inherently internationalist. All humans are seen as members of the 
global family of humanity. There is no place for the nation and nationalism in a socialist 
society. Humans have commonalities and differences. A socialist society advances a 
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culture that is based on global unity in diversity, a dialectic of common culture and 
differentiated lifestyles and norms. 
The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have 
not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must 
rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is so 
far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word (Marx and 
Engels 1848, 503-504). 
Will nationalities continue to exist under communism? Answer: The nationalities 
of the peoples who join together according to the principle of community will be 
just as much compelled by this union to merge with one another and thereby 
supersede themselves as the various differences between estates and classes 
disappear through the superseding of their basis – private property (Engels 
1847a, 103). 
6. A Model of Socialism 
For Marx (1844, 296), communism as revolutionary socialism is the “reintegration or 
return of man to himself, the transcendence of human self-estrangement”, “the real 
appropriation of the human essence”, “fully developed humanism”.  
The human being is a socially producing being that produces its livelihood, which 
includes use-values (economy), collective decisions governing life (politics), and 
meanings that define life’s purpose (culture). Given that alienation goes for Marx be-
yond the economy and covers all realms of human production and life, including the 
economy and culture, Marx does not limit the notion of socialism to the economy, but 
sees it as the full development of humanism in society. Marx says that “abolition of 
private property and communism are by no means identical” (Marx 1843, 143) and 
therefore stresses that socialism means “the abolition of class distinctions generally” 
together with “all the relations of production on which they rest”, including all corre-
sponding “social relations” and “all the ideas that result from these social relations” 
(Marx 1850, 127, emphasis in original). 
Axel Honneth (2017, 106) stresses that socialism means the application “of the 
notion of social freedom to all three constitutive spheres of modern societies (not just 
the economy, but also politics and personal relationships)”: “Only if all members of 
society can satisfy the needs they share with all others – physical and emotional inti-
macy, economic independence and political self-determination – by relying on the sym-
pathy and support of their partners in interaction will our society have become social 
in the full sense of the term” (107-108). 
First, we need to add that Marx, as just argued, already saw socialism as a society, 
where freedom, solidarity and co-operation operate in the realms of the economy, pol-
itics, and culture. Second, Honneth’s third realm is restricted to the personal relation-
ships of “the family and intimate relationships” (2017, 107). The realm of meaning-
making in everyday life is much wider than this and, besides the family, includes: friend-
ships, love and sexuality; aspects of life such as education, worldviews, religion, phi-
losophy, science, morality, sports, entertainment, consumption, care, arts, health and 
medicine; or life and death. Third, society’s three realms (economy, politics, culture) 
are neither independent nor simply interdependent, but are all realms of social produc-
tion that constitutes society’s materiality. Politics and culture are at the same time eco-
nomic (realms of the production of collective decisions and meanings) and non-eco-
nomic (Fuchs 2020a [Chapter 3], 2020b [Chapters 2 and 3]; 2017; 2016). 
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There are three dimensions of a socialist society: the socialist economy, socialist poli-
tics, and socialist culture. Whereas in an alienated, dominative, heteronomous class 
society, the three spheres of society are ruled by instrumental reason and particularis-
tic interests, the three realms are in a socialist society shaped by co-operative reason 
and the common interest. Socialist society is organised in ways that benefit all. In class 
society, society only benefits some, and at the expense of others. Table 1 contrasts 
alienated society with socialist society. It shows three dimensions of socialism that are 
sublations of alienation. 
 
 Alienated society Socialist society 
Economy Class Common, socialist economy:  
collective ownership of the means of pro-
duction, abolition of toil and necessary la-
bour, well-rounded individuality with free 
work, self-managed companies, production 
from each according to their abilities, distri-
bution to each according to their needs, 
wealth for all 
Politics Dictatorship Common politics: participatory democracy 
Culture Ideology, disrespect Common culture: internationalism, culture of 
unity in diversity, self-realisation of all hu-
mans 
Table 1: Three dimensions of socialist society and their opposition to alienated soci-
ety 
The common, socialist economy is the sublation of class society. The common politics 
of participatory democracy is the sublation of dictatorship. Common culture is the sub-
lation of ideology and disrespect. Production in society is a dialectic of objects/human 
subjects that results in the creation of products. Table 2 shows how these dimensions 
look in a socialist society with respect to the three dimensions of society. 
 











wealth for all, self-ful-









Friends Shared meanings 
and knowledge 
Common, internation-
alist culture of unity in 
diversity, recognition 
and voice for all 
Table 2: Subjects, objects and products in the three realms of socialist society 
Erich Fromm shows that Marx saw economic democracy beyond necessity, political 
democracy and creative self-realisation as the three dimensions of socialism:  
In socialism, the human being “produces in an associated, not competitive way; 
he produces rationally and in an unalienated way, which means that he brings 
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production under his control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind 
power. […] [Socialism] means, in short, the realization of political and industrial 
democracy. Marx expected that by this new form of an unalienated society man 
would become independent, stand on his own feet, and would no longer be 
crippled by the alienated mode of production and consumption; that he would 
truly be the master and the creator of his life, and hence that he could begin to 
make living his main business, rather than producing the means for living. So-
cialism, for Marx, was never as such the fulfillment of life, but the condition for 
such fulfillment. […] Man, in Marx's view, has created in the course of history a 
culture which he will be free to make his own when he is freed from the chains, 
not only of economic poverty, but of the spiritual poverty created by alienation. 
Marx's vision is based on his faith in man, in the inherent and real potentialities 
of the essence of man which have developed in history. He looked at socialism 
as the condition of human freedom and creativity, not as in itself constituting the 
goal of man's life. […]  
Socialism, for Marx, is a society which serves the needs of man. […] Marxist 
and other forms of socialism are the heirs of prophetic Messianism, Christian 
Chiliastic sectarianism, thirteenth-century Thomism, Renaissance Utopianism, 
and eighteenth-century enlightenment. It is the synthesis of the prophetic-Chris-
tian idea of society as the plane of spiritual realization, and of the idea of indi-
vidual freedom. For this reason, it is opposed to the Church because of its re-
striction of the mind, and to liberalism because of its separation of society and 
moral values. It is opposed to Stalinism and Krushchevism, for their authoritari-
anism as much as their neglect of humanist values.  
Socialism is the abolition of human self-alienation, the return of man as a real 
human being. […] For Marx, socialism meant the social order which permits the 
return of man to himself, the identity between existence and essence, the over-
coming of the separateness and antagonism between subject and object, the 
humanization of nature; it meant a world in which man is no longer a stranger 
among strangers, but is in his world, where he is at home” (Fromm 1961/2003, 
50; 51; 55; 56). 
Discussions about socialism in the 21st century have foregrounded the commons. The 
basic argument is that neoliberal capitalism has resulted in the commodification and 
privatisation of common goods that are either produced by all humans or that all hu-
mans need in order to exist.1  
Slavoj Žižek (2010, 212-213) distinguishes between the cultural commons (lan-
guage, means of communication, education, infrastructures), the commons of external 
nature (the natural environment), and the commons of internal nature (human subjec-
tivity, our bodies and minds). 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2017, 166) argue that there are two major forms 
of the commons: the social and the natural commons. These forms are divided into 
five subtypes: the earth and its ecosystems; the “immaterial” common of ideas, codes, 
images and cultural products; physical goods produced by co-operative work; metro-
politan and rural spaces that are realms of communication, cultural interaction and co-
operation; and social institutions and services that organise housing, welfare, health, 
and education (2017, 166). For Hardt and Negri, contemporary capitalism’s class struc-
ture features the extraction of the commons, which includes the extraction of natural 
                                            
1 See: Douzinas and Žižek (2010); Žižek (2013); Žižek and Taek-Gwang Lee (2016); Ali (2009); 
Badiou (2015); Dean (2012); Hardt and Negri (2009).   
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resources; data mining/data extraction; the extraction of the social from the urban 
spaces on real estate markets; and finance as extractive industry (166-171). 
The advantage of such understandings of the commons is that they allow a popular 
critique of neoliberal capitalism and its undermining of the welfare state, nature, and 
cultural institutions such as the education system and hospitals. They also stress that 
the commons advance communist potentials from within the contradictions of capital-
ism, a “communism of capital”.2 This perspective allows the reinvention of communism 
in the 21st century as commonism, a politics that struggles against the dispossession, 
privatisation, commodification and financialisation of the commons. But at the same 
time, the discussed definitions of the commons are not fully in line with Marx and En-
gels’ understanding of the commons as “common property, […] the property of all 
members of society” (Marx and Engels 1848, 499) that is governed by “common agree-
ment” (Engels 1847b, 348). All economic, political and cultural goods and structures 
can be turned into common goods that are controlled by all those who are affected by 
them. Tables 1 and 2 are based on this understanding of the commons as common 
economy, common politics, and common culture.  
7. Communicative/Digital Socialism 
7.1. Socialism and Technology 
7.1.1. The Antagonism of Productive Forces and Relations of Production 
Capitalism is based on an antagonism between productive forces and the relations of 
production. Capitalist technology socialises labour; that is, it brings about new forms 
of co-operation and potentials for collective ownership, new common goods (such as 
the digital commons) and the reduction of necessary labour time: these are communist 
potentials, or what some term the communism of capital. Digital capitalism creates new 
forms and technologies of co-operation that are foundations of new common goods. 
But such forms and technologies are within class relations and capitalist means of 
exploitation and domination, and potentially common goods are often subsumed under 
the commodity form, class relations, and capital. In capitalism, new communist poten-
tials cannot fully develop and technological development advances social antagonisms 
such as the rise of precarious labour and life. Marx and Engels describe this antago-
nism in the following manner:  
The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the de-
velopment of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have 
become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon 
as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois 
society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bour-
geois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how 
does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced de-
struction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new 
markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by 
paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminish-
ing the means whereby crises are prevented (Marx and Engels 1848, 490). 
                                            
2 See: Virno (2004, 110-111), Marazzi (2010), Bauwens and Kostakis (2014), Beverungen, 
Murtola and Schwartz (2013), Dyer-Witheford (2014), Lund (2017, 76-81, 298-328).  
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In Capital Volume 1, Chapter 32, Marx formulates the antagonism between productive 
forces and relations of production in the following way: “At a certain stage of develop-
ment, [the capitalist mode of production] brings into the world the material means of its 
own destruction. From that moment, new forces and new passions spring up in the 
bosom of society, forces and passions which feel themselves to be fettered by that 
society” (Marx 1867, 928). 
In the 21st century, information technology and the Internet are founded on an an-
tagonism of class relations and the now networked productive forces. A good example 
is that the Internet allows the free sharing of information via peer-to-peer platforms and 
other technologies, which on the one hand questions the capitalist character of culture 
and so makes the music and film industry nervous, but on the other hand within capi-
talism can also constitute problems for artists who depend on deriving income from 
cultural commodities. Informational networks aggravate the capitalist antagonism be-
tween the collective production and the individual appropriation of goods and the an-
tagonism between productive forces and relations of production. Productive forces that 
are tied up by existing relations do not necessarily or automatically fully develop. It is 
in no way assured that they can be freed. They can remain enchained and will remain 
enchained as long as individuals enchain themselves. Networks are a material condi-
tion of a free association, but the cooperative networking of the relations of production 
is not an automatic result of networked productive forces. 
7.1.2. The Antagonism Between Productive Forces and Relations of Production in 
the Grundrisse’s “Fragment on Machines” 
Marx shows in the Grundrisse’s “Fragment on Machines” how modern technology re-
duces necessary labour time – the annual labour-time a society needs in order to sur-
vive – and thereby creates conditions for a socialist society, free individuality, and a 
life based on free time as a source of wealth, but at the same time is embedded into 
capitalist class relations that have to set labour-time as the source of wealth so that 
the antagonism between the ever-more-socialised productive forces and the relations 
of production deepens the enslavement of labour; unemployment; precarity, and the 
crisis-proneness of capitalism. The capitalist antagonism between productive forces 
and relations of production is an antagonism between necessary labour (that technol-
ogy ever more reduces) and surplus labour (that capital tries to ever more increase):  
Under the conditions of capitalist technology, the worker “steps to the side of the 
production process instead of being its chief actor. […] as the great foundation-
stone of production and of wealth. The theft of alien labour time, on which the 
present wealth is based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, 
created by large-scale industry itself. As soon as labour in the direct form has 
ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease 
to be its measure, and hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure] of 
use value. The surplus labour of the mass has ceased to be the condition for the 
development of general wealth, just as the non-labour of the few, for the devel-
opment of the general powers of the human head. With that, production based 
on exchange value breaks down, and the direct, material production process is 
stripped of the form of penury and antithesis. The free development of individual-
ities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time so as to posit surplus 
labour, but rather the general reduction of the necessary labour of society to a 
minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of 
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the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them 
(Marx 1857/1858, 705-706). 
7.1.3. Technology and Time in Capitalism and Socialist Society 
Marx ascertains a capitalist antagonism between the tendency of technology to reduce 
necessary labour time and the capitalist tendency to turn all labour time into surplus 
labour and argues that modern technology creates the foundation of a socialist society, 
in which free time and free activity beyond necessity is maximised and the source of 
wealth:   
[Capital] increases the surplus labour time of the mass by all the means of art 
and science […] It is thus, despite itself, instrumental in creating the means of 
social disposable time, in order to reduce labour time for the whole society to a 
diminishing minimum, and thus to free everyone's time for their own development. 
But its tendency always, on the one side, to create disposable time, on the other, 
to convert it into surplus labour. If it succeeds too well at the first, then it suffers 
from surplus production, and then necessary labour is interrupted, because no 
surplus labour can be realized by capital. The more this contradiction develops, 
the more does it become evident that the growth of the forces of production can 
no longer be bound up with the appropriation of alien labour, but that the mass of 
workers must themselves appropriate their own surplus labour. Once they have 
done so – and disposable time thereby ceases to have an antithetical existence 
– then, on one side, necessary labour time will be measured by the needs of the 
social individual, and, on the other, the development of the power of social pro-
duction will grow so rapidly that, even though production is now calculated for the 
wealth of all, disposable time will grow for all. For real wealth is the developed 
productive power of all individuals. The measure of wealth is then not any longer, 
in any way, labour time, but rather disposable time (Marx 1857/1858, 708). 
Marx adds that “[r]eal economy […] consists of the saving of labour time” so that there 
can be “an increase of free time, i.e. time for the full development of the individual” 
(1857/1858, 711). Marx ascertains in the Grundrisse that a socialist society requires a 
technological foundation so that society can be based on the principle “From each 
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!”. Socialism is only possible 
as a computerised, high-technology, post-scarcity society that creates wealth and lux-
ury for all. 
Roman Rosdolsky (1977, 427-428) comments in his study of the Grundrisse on the 
importance of the technological foundations of socialism:  
It is hardly necessary today – in the course of a new industrial revolution – to 
emphasise the prophetic significance of this enormously dynamic and essentially 
optimistic conception. For the dreams of the isolated German revolutionary in his 
exile in London in 1858 have now, for the first time, entered the realm of what is 
immediately possible. Today, for the first time in history, thanks to the develop-
ments of modern technology, the preconditions for a final and complete abolition 
of the ‘theft of alien labour-time’ actually exist; furthermore, the present period is 
the first in which the development of the productive forces can be carried so far 
forward that, in fact, in the not too distant future it will be not labour-time, but 
rather disposable time, by which social wealth is measured (Rosdolsky 1977, 
427-428). 
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7.1.4. Fully Automated Luxury Communism? 
Aaron Bastani (2019) argues in his book Fully Automated Luxury Communism that 
new technologies such as information technology (“the defining feature of the Third 
Disruption” – by which he means a third technological revolution in the history of hu-
mankind – “is ever-greater abundance in information” (2019, 37); that AI-based auto-
mation, green energy technologies, space travel, 3D printing, gene therapy and editing, 
and synthetic food such as cultured meat will soon enable humans to overcome scar-
city and to thereby create an abundance of free time, energy, space, health, and sus-
tainable artificial food. He sees these technologies as the foundation of fully automated 
luxury communism, where “work is eliminated, scarcity replaced by abundance and 
where labour and leisure blend into one another” (50). Fully automated luxury com-
munism is a “realm of plenty” (54) with “luxury for all” (192) and everything for all.  
Bastani rightly reiterates Marx’s insight that communism requires material and tech-
nological foundations and can therefore only be a high-tech communism. His version 
of technological analysis avoids technological determinism because he is aware that 
communism does not automatically emerge from technology, but rather requires polit-
ical-economic transformations. The book’s analysis is a techno-optimism without tech-
nological determinism. But such optimism is a new, 21st-century form of utopian so-
cialism because it underestimates how capitalism results in the design of negative and 
destructive potentials into contemporary technologies. For Bastani, there are only pos-
itive potentials of technology and he seems to think that when communism comes, the 
same technologies can be used without humans having to transform and redesign 
many of them and having to abolish at least some of them. He also underestimates 
that technologies are complex systems which can in any society have unpredictable, 
negative consequences. Bastani’s technological analysis confers the image of a per-
fectly controllable technology. When he writes that “resources, energy, health, labour 
and food – just like information – want to be free” (2019, 216), he overlooks that only 
humans and not resources act and have interests. Freedom as want is a human want 
and interest that cannot be reduced to technology.  
Automated technologies can involve programming or system errors that result in 
serious accidents and disasters. Space exploration is a part of geopolitical and military 
rivalries. Even in a communist society that is relatively peaceful, massive resource in-
vestments into space exploration may result in a lack of resources available for welfare. 
3D home printing could result in the production of a massive amount of non-recyclable 
consumer goods that pose an environmental problem. Genetic engineering can cause 
new diseases and risks to health and life. The mass production of cultured meat could 
create unforeseen risks that do not make it clean meat, but rather dirty meat. Operating 
a vast number of labs for producing cultured meat could increase the world’s energy 
use. If a transition to renewable energy has at the same time not been achieved, total 
carbon dioxide emissions could increase. Communism is likely to reduce the risks of 
technologies that stem from cost cutting and profit imperatives, but collective owner-
ship and non-profit production oriented on use-value is no panacea for the potential 
risks new technologies pose. A communist society requires prospective, critical tech-
nology assessment and communist tech ethics and tech policies that regulate new 
technologies. Technology is not just an economic issue, but also has political and cul-
tural dimensions that are based on but not reducible to the economy. 
 It is questionable that there can be ‘full’ automation. Automation will always have 
to remain under human control and can never fully replace humans. For society to 
exist, technologies and societies need to be built, repaired, morally judged and as-
sessed, which only humans can do. And there are forms of human work, such as social 
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care and education, whose automation is morally undesirable if we want to exist in a 
humane society built on the principle of communist love. A posthuman technology with-
out any human work would result in the technologically-induced breakdown of society, 
because once robots that repair robots encounter a system error or a power outage, 
humans have to step in. Posthuman ideology overestimates the capacities of technol-
ogies to automate human subjectivity. No robot will ever understand what love is. 
Therefore a robot cannot practice love. You cannot automate love. And artificial imita-
tions of love are nothing more than cheap fakes. Communism requires technological 
foundations, but high tech alone is not enough. Communism’s guiding principle is nei-
ther technology nor love of technology, but love.  
Bastani advances a form of posthumanist communism. He does not give much at-
tention to Marx’s concept of well-rounded individuality in a communist society. One 
reason why work understood as the creation of use-values will not stop is that humans 
have a desire for self-fulfilment and creativity whose potentials cannot be fully realised 
in a class society. In a communist society, humans would be too bored if they sat on 
the couch all day watching television. They would engage in a multitude of social and 
productive activities, free from necessity and compulsion. For Bastani (2019), luxury 
populism is the opposite of neoliberal politics (185-200). But he leaves open whether 
or not, in his view, the nation continues to exist in communist society. He argues for 
internationalism and not for an alternative form of globalisation. The nation is an artifi-
cial, ideological construct. Populism does not appeal to the working class, but to a 
people. It is therefore mostly based on nationalism (Fuchs 2020c). But Marx and En-
gels knew that communism requires as its political foundation global solidarity. Com-
munism needs working class politics that liberates humanity from class, capital, labour, 
toil, pollution, destruction, war, necessity, and so on.  
It is encouraging that there is a new interest in the role of technology in communism 
and understanding communism as wealth and luxury for all. But such discoveries in 
themselves are nothing new.  
In his 1892 manifesto The Conquest of Bread, Peter Kropotkin wrote about wealth 
and luxury for all in a communist society: “What is now the privilege of an insignificant 
minority would be accessible to all. Luxury, ceasing to be a foolish and ostentatious 
display of the bourgeois class, would become an artistic pleasure” (Kropotkin 
1892/2012, 106). Kropotkin clearly built on Marx’s insights and therefore argued that 
luxury and wealth for all requires a high-tech communist society: “It now remains for 
society, first, to extend this greater productivity, which is limited to certain industries, 
and to apply it to the general good. But it is evident that to utilize this high productivity 
of labour, so as to guarantee well-being to all, society must itself take possession of all 
means of production” (1892/2012, 88).  
Murray Bookchin in the 1960s argued that we “of this century have finally opened 
the prospect of material abundance for all to enjoy – a sufficiency in the means of life 
without the need for grinding, day-to-day toil” (1986, 12). Liberatory technologies ena-
ble a “post-scarcity society”, where “we can begin to provide food, shelter, garments, 
and a broad spectrum of luxuries without devouring the precious time of humanity and 
without dissipating its invaluable reservoir of creative energy in mindless labor” (12). 
Bookchin reminds us that not all technologies are liberating. Technologies need to be 
combined with and shaped by environmentalism and communalism. Bookchin argues 
for an “ecological approach to technology that takes the form of ensembles of produc-
tive units, energized by solar and windpower units” (46).  
The list of theorists of socialist technology could be continued with names such as 
Herbert Marcuse (post-technology), Erich Fromm (humanised technology), Ivan Illich 
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(convivial technologies), André Gorz (post-industrial socialism), Ernst Bloch (alliance 
technology), etc. Luxury communism is a new discovery for – but not by – Aaron Bas-
tani, but relatively old hat in the history of the radical theory of technology and society. 
Communist theory needs proper engagement with this history.  
Fully Automated Luxury Communism is, despite its tendencies of idealist utopian-
ism and historical blindness, good food for thought about the foundations of com-
munism.  
7.2. Socialism and Communication 
7.2.1. Alienated and Socialist Culture 
Given that socialist society sublates the economy, politics and culture, new relations 
of communication also emerge in such a society. The way humans think, work, live 
and communicate changes in such a society. Table 3 opposes knowledge and com-
munication’s roles in alienated societies to their roles in socialist society.  
In a class society, knowledge and communication are privately controlled and 
owned by the few as private property, whereas in a socialist society knowledge and 
communication technologies are gifts and common goods that are collectively pro-
duced and owned. If one looks at the way that contemporary media corporations are 
run, then one sees that the decisions are made by a small class of CEOs and manag-
ers who control these companies’ decision-making processes in a dictatorial manner. 
Privately owned companies are economic dictatorships. In contrast, socialist politics 
implies that organisations in the culture and communication industry should not only 
be owned by their workers, but should also have democratic decision-making struc-
tures, where everyone working in the organisation or affected by it can participate. 
While alienated cultural systems produce ideologies and reputational hierarchies, so-
cialist culture creates togetherness, respect for all, recognition of all, and unity in diver-
sity of identities and lifestyles. 
 
 Alienated Society Socialist Society 
Economic system Knowledge and commu-




tion as private property 
Knowledge and commu-





Political system Dictatorial control of 
knowledge and commu-




Cultural system Ideological knowledge 
and communication 
Humanist knowledge 
and communication that 
advances togetherness, 
unity in diversity, and 
recognition of all  
Table 3: Alienated and socialist forms of knowledge and communication  
7.2.2. Public Service Media and Community Media 
In contemporary capitalism, we can already find forms of media and culture that oper-
ate outside and in opposition to capital accumulation. The two most important social 
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communication forms operating outside of capital are public service media and com-
munity media. Both operate on a not-for-profit basis. The difference is that public ser-
vice media are organised and financed with the help of state legislation. They are in-
dependent from capital and the state, but are organised based on laws that regulate 
their remit (such as creating public service content) and their funding (e.g. in the form 
of a licence fee). Community media are citizen media that are run and operated by 
citizens who act as citizen journalists and citizen media producers.    
The political economist of communication Graham Murdock (2011, 18) argues that 
the three political-economic possibilities in the media and cultural sector are ownership 
by capital (the commodity form of communications), by the state (the public service 
form of communications) and by civil society (communications as gifts/commons).  
Public service media tend to reject the logic of the commodity. They make use of state 
power for collecting licence fees or parts of taxes in order to fund their operations. 
Alternative, citizen and community media such as open channels, free radio stations, 
the alternative press, or alternative Internet platforms are run by civil society groups. 
They do not embrace but rather reject the commodity logic. They tend not to want to 
sell content, technologies and audiences. Given that they reject exchange-value, they 
have to look for other sources of funding if they want to exist within capitalism. Such 
sources are, for example, voluntary unpaid labour, state funding, donations, endow-
ments from foundations, and so on. Table 4 presents a distinction between a) capitalist 
media, b) public service media, and c) community media. These media are respectively 
based on a) information commodities, b) information as public good, and c) information 
commons. Information is owned in specific ways and has a specific cultural role, in 
which it allows humans to inform themselves, communicate, and organise social sys-
tems.  
 











dresses humans in 
various social roles 
and results in mean-
ing-making 
Content that addresses 
humans in various so-




in various social 
roles and results 
in meaning-mak-
ing 
Table 4: Three political economies of information  
The Slovenian critical media and communication scholar Slavko Splichal provides a 
concise definition of public service media: “In normative terms, public service media 
must be a service of the public, by the public, and for the public. It is a service of the 
public because it is financed by it and should be owned by it. It ought to be a service 
by the public – not only financed and controlled, but also produced by it. It must be a 
service for the public – but also for the government and other powers acting in the 
public sphere. In sum, public service media ought to become ‘a cornerstone of democ-
racy’” (2007, 255). Community media “is usually run on a not-for-profit basis and pro-
vides community members with an opportunity to participate in the production process” 
(Rennie 2006, 3), and has democratic governance structures. 
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There is a tension and contradiction between public service and community media on 
the one hand and capitalist media on the other hand. Capitalism is expansive, imperi-
alist and colonising – it tries to subsume everything under the commodity form and to 
destroy realms of life that do not adhere to the commodity logic. It can therefore be 
difficult for public service media and community media to exist in capitalism. Commu-
nity media are, in capitalism, often based on voluntary, self-exploitative, unpaid or low-
paid labour. The history of alternative and community media is a history of self-deter-
mined but precarious labour and resource precarity. Such media tend to lack re-
sources. Although alternative media represent common communications that trans-
cend capitalism they lack the capital of the common needed for effectively challenging 
capitalist communication corporations. Culture, information and other goods and ser-
vices can be de-commodified by social struggles and thereby turned into public or 
common goods. The more the logic of the commodity asserts itself, the more difficult 
is the existence and survival of public service media and community media. The more 
this logic is constricted, the more these alternative forms of organisation can flourish. 
In socialist society, there are no capitalist media, and information and culture have no 
commodity form.  
Marx spoke about the importance of alternative, non-capitalist ways of organising 
the media. He writes that the “primary freedom” of the media “lies in not being a trade” 
(1842, 175, emphasis in original). Marx feared that the capitalist control of communi-
cations limited the freedom of speech and expression and colonised the public sphere. 
In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels say that one of the political 
measures that communists aim at implementing is the “[ce]ntralisation of the means of 
communication and transport in the hands of the State” (Marx and Engels 1848, 505).  
In the 20th century, many states held monopolies over telecommunications, broad-
casting networks, railways, and the postal service. These are large infrastructures of 
communication. Organising them as public services enables fair, universal, affordable 
access. Today, there is a need for public service Internet platforms, such as a public 
service YouTube run by a network of public service companies, in order to challenge 
the monopolies of the digital giants Google, Facebook, Twitter, etc. Alternatives to 
communication services that store and process lots of personal data, such as Face-
book, should be organised as self-managed community platforms because too much 
involvement by the state poses a certain danger of state surveillance potentials di-
rected towards citizens. The same can be said of the press: self-managed newspapers 
are preferable to newspapers owned and operated as public services by institutions 
that are located close to the state. Public service media should also have news depart-
ments where independent journalists work. It is important that public service media are 
truly independent from the state, economic forces, and ideological forces.  
7.2.3. Rosa Luxemburg: The Freedom of the Press in Socialist Society 
Immediately after the 1917 October Revolution, the Bolsheviks set up the Revolution-
ary Press Tribunal, which had the power to censor or suspend publications and to 
deprive those responsible for them of their liberties, deporting them from Russia in 
cases where the Tribunal found that “crimes and offences […] against the national 
through the use of the press” were committed (Lenin 1917a, 206). The freedom of the 
press was abolished. 
Rosa Luxemburg on the one hand supported the need to replace the Czarist regime 
by a socialist society and on the other hand stresses the need for the democratic char-
acter of such a society. She commented that: 
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Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one 
party – however numerous they may be – is no freedom at all. Freedom is always 
and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently. Not because of any 
fanatical concept of ‘justice’ but because all that is instructive, wholesome and 
purifying in political freedom depends on this essential characteristic, and its ef-
fectiveness vanishes when ‘freedom’ becomes a special privilege” (Luxemburg 
1918, 69). 
Luxemburg criticised the curtailment of the freedom of expression in Russia under 
Lenin. She stressed that “universal suffrage, freedom of press and assemblage” and 
“the whole apparatus of the basic democratic liberties of the people” constitute the 
“right of self-determination” (1918, 48). Luxemburg spoke of “freedom of the press, the 
rights of association and assembly” as “the most important democratic guarantees of 
a healthy public” (66). Without “a free and untrammelled press, without the unlimited 
right of association and assemblage, the rule of the broad mass of the people is entirely 
unthinkable” (67). 
A democratic socialist society needs to guarantee the freedom of expression, as-
sembly, association and the press. Corporate media monopolies have to be dissolved 
by expropriating the capital of the owners and handing over the ownership of these 
organisations (including publishing technologies) to workers and citizens. In such a 
society, groups of citizens need to have the right and the technological and organisa-
tional opportunity to create their own media, collectively owned and operating as self-
managed companies that are not operated for profit, pursuing the goals of informing 
and educating. The socialist public does not consist of state-controlled media, but a 
vivid public sphere that operates as a multitude of public service media organisations 
and self-managed media organisations.  
7.2.4. Democratic Communications 
In his book Communications, Raymond Williams (1976, 130-137) distinguishes be-
tween authoritarian, paternal, commercial and democratic communication systems 
(communications). The first three communication systems are political, cultural and 
commercial expressions of instrumental reason. Authoritarian communications involve 
state control, manipulation and censorship of the media. The “purpose of communica-
tion is to protect, maintain, or advance a social order based on minority power” (1976, 
131). Paternal communications are authoritarian communications “with a conscience: 
that is to say, with values and purposes beyond the maintenance of its own power” 
(131). In such communication systems, there is ideological control that aims to impose 
certain moral values on audiences. The controllers of paternal communication systems 
assume that specific morals are good for citizens and that the latter are too silly to 
understand the world. In commercial communications, there is commercial control: 
“Anything can be said, provided that you can afford to say it and that you can say it 
profitably” (133). All three forms are instrumental: they instrumentalise communications 
as tools for control and domination. 
In contrast, democratic communications are, for Williams, based on co-operative 
rationality. Such media systems are based on the freedom to speak and the free choice 
of what to receive. Such communications are a “means of participation and of common 
discussion” (1976, 134). Williams argues for a cultural democracy that combines public 
service media, cultural co-operatives and local media.3 Such a democracy establishes 
                                            
3 See also Williams (1983, 65-72). 
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“new kinds of communal, cooperative and collective institutions” (1983, 123).The core 
of Williams’ proposal is “that public ownership of the basic means of production [the 
means of communication and cultural production] should be combined with leasing 
their use to self-managing groups, to secure maximum variety of style and political 
opinion and to ensure against any bureaucratic control“ (1979, 370): “The idea of public 
service must be detached from the idea of public monopoly, yet remain public service 
in the true sense” of public service content (1976, 134). Instrumental and co-operative 
media are contradictory forces. Only cultural forms of class struggle can drive back the 
capitalist colonisation of communications. Democratic communications are the domi-
nant form of communication in a socialist society, in which “the basic cultural skills are 
made widely available, and the channels of communication widened and cleared, as 
much as possible” (1958/1983, 283). 
7.2.5. Socialist Journalism 
Béla Fogarasi (1891-1959) was a Hungarian philosopher. In his essay “The Tasks of 
the Communist Press”), Fogarasi (1921/1983) distinguishes between the capitalist and 
the socialist press. He argues that the capitalist press is “an ideological weapon in the 
class struggle” (1921/1983, 149) utilised by the bourgeoisie in order to “dominate the 
ideology of the ensemble of classes” (149): “What the capitalist press seeks is to shape 
the structure of the reader's consciousness in such a way that he will be perpetually 
unable to distinguish between true and false, to relate causes and effects, to place 
individual facts in their total context, to rationally integrate new knowledge into his per-
spective” (150). Fogarasi implicitly applies Georg Lukács’ (1971) critique of reified con-
sciousness to the capitalist press. In the capitalist press, the focus is often not on the 
dialectic of totality, particularity and individuality, but merely on individual, isolated 
pieces of news. According to Fogarasi, strategies of the capitalist press include report-
ing a multitude of isolated facts that quench the readers’ thirst for knowledge; de-polit-
icisation and sensationalism that work “systematically in the service of such diversion” 
(1921/1983, 150); and pseudo-objectivity. In contrast, the socialist press tries to ad-
vance the consciousness of society as totality and of the relation of single events with 
each other and broader contexts, the unmasking of the capitalist press, and the partic-
ipation of readers as producers of reports (1921/1983, 151-153).  
Fogarasi not only applied Lukács’ (1971) concepts of reification and the totality to 
journalism, but also in 1921 anticipated Walter Benjamin’s (1934, 777) idea of turning 
“consumers […] into producers” and “readers or spectators into collaborators” as well 
as Bertolt Brecht’s (1932, 42) idea of a radio that lets “the listener speak as well as 
hear”. Fogarasi’s essay also anticipates some elements of Edward Herman and Noam 
Chomsky’s (1988) propaganda model. Herman and Chomsky identified some dimen-
sions of how bourgeois journalism creates reified presentations of reality. Corporate 
media use five filters that limit the freedom of the media: corporate ownership and 
monopolies; advertising; selective sources; effects of lobbying; and ideology.4 
7.2.6. Digital Commons 
Computers and computer networks enable new ways of organising information, com-
munication and co-operation. Given that computing has become a central resource in 
modern society, the use of computers for organising cognition, communication and co-
operation has become a human need. Humans have certain cognitive needs (such as 
                                            
4 For discussions of the relevance of this propaganda model today, see the contributions in 
Pedro-Carañana, Broudy and Klaehn (2018). 
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being loved and recognised), communicative needs (such as friendships and commu-
nity) and co-operative needs (such as working together with others in order to achieve 
common goals) in all types of society. In a digital and information society, computers 
are a vital means for realising such needs. But given that computers are always used 
in societal contexts, computer use as such does not necessarily foster the good life, 
but can also contribute to damaging human lives. 
Digital capitalism at the same time deepens exploitation and creates new founda-
tions for autonomous realms that transcend the logic of capitalism. There is an antag-
onism between the networked productive forces and the class relations of digital pro-
duction. This antagonism is also an antagonism between digital labour and digital cap-
ital and between digital gifts and digital commodities.  
Table 5 provides a summary overview of the dimensions of the digital commons. 
The typology presented in Table 5 is structured along the three realms of society (econ-
omy, politics, culture), which allows us to distinguish between three types of commons 
and three types of digital commons. The commons are the Aristotelian-Marxian vision 
of a good society. They form the essence of society, which means that the digital com-
mons are part of digital society’s essence. For Hegel and Marx, the essence is often 
hidden behind false appearances, and that actuality means the correspondence of es-
sence and appearance. One needs to distinguish between the essence of digital soci-
ety and the false appearance and existence of digital society as digital class society 
and digital capitalism. Class society is the false condition of society-in-general. Digital 
class society is the false condition of digital society. A critical theory of the digital com-
mons needs to have not just a vision of a good digital society, but also a critique of 
digital capitalism and digital alienation. Table 5 therefore also features two columns 
that outline dimensions of alienation-in-general and digital alienation. 
 
 Commons in society Digital commons Lack of com-








Economy Economic commons: 
wealth and self-
fulfilment for all 
Economic digital 
commons: network 
access for everyone, 
community is in con-
trol of technology, 
digital resources as 
common goods 













ance of ICTs 
Dictatorship Dictatorial 
governance and 
control of ICTs 
Culture Cultural commons: 




mons: use of ICTs 
for fostering learning, 
recognition and com-
munity activities 
Ideology Digital ideology: 
Ideologies of and 
on the Internet 
Table 5: Three dimensions of the digital commons 
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8. Conclusion: Ten Principles of Communicative/Digital Socialist Politics 
Communism and socialism are often associated with Stalin and Mao, whose ideas and 
societies had little to do with Marx and Engels’ democratic vision of society. Socialism 
is a framework for society and a movement towards a good society for all. 
Common property, computerised high technology, a post-scarcity society that cre-
ates wealth and luxury for all, well-rounded individuals, distribution according to human 
needs, participatory governance, a common culture, and internationalism are some of 
the aspects of socialist society.  
Capitalism is shaped by the antagonism between productive forces and relations 
of production, which takes on new relevance in the age of networked productive forces.  
Commons-based communication is an alternative to alienated communication. 
Public service media and community media are two not-for-profit models. They face 
specific contradictions in capitalist society. In socialist society, communication and cul-
ture take on a common character. Socialist means of communication feature common 
control, common decision-making, and a common culture. Socialist communications 
are truly democratic communications. 
Socialist politics should engage with and not ignore communication politics. A good 
society needs to be a socialist and commons-based society, which includes the per-
spectives of communicative and digital socialism. Socialism is a political-economic 
movement that has its economic foundations in socialised aspects of the economy 
already within capitalism and has its political foundations in class struggles against 
capitalism and for socialism. Socialist politics should think of both public services and 
civil society as the realms from where alternatives emerge.  
There are ten principles of communicative/digital socialist politics: 
 
1. Techno-dialectics: 
Socialist communication politics avoids techno-optimism/techno-euphoria as well as 
techno-pessimism. Instead, it asks: How can technology and society be shaped in 
manners that benefit all humans, workers and citizens and develop the positive poten-
tials of society and humanity?  
 
2. Radical reformist communication politics: 
Socialist communication politics is neither reactionary reformism that bows to bour-
geois interests nor utopian revolutionary romanticism. It advances a dialectic of reform 
and revolution (radical reformism). It struggles for measures that simultaneously bring 
about immediate improvements and advance the possibilities and resourcing of alter-
native non-capitalist projects, and it struggles for communicative/digital socialism. So-
cialist communication politics operates both at the level of political parties and social 
movements. It brings about co-operations of both in the form of a politically co-operat-
ing multitude. 
 
3. United class struggles of communication workers: 
Communication corporations exploit different kinds of workers. Alternatives to commu-
nicative capitalism can only emerge out of class struggles. Socialist communication 
politics supports the digital and communication workers of the world in uniting. In order 
to make this struggle effective, we need national and international trade unions that 
unite all the different communication workers across branches, occupations, countries, 
corporations, cultures, etc. in one union of communication workers.  
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The class struggles of communication workers are often fragmented. In order to fight 
global capital in general and global communication capital in particular, communication 
workers of the world need to unite, avoid and fight the ideologies of fascism, national-
ism, racism and xenophobia wherever they appear (including in communication net-
works), and develop strategies of international solidarity and joint struggles.  
Capitalism exploits different kinds of workers, including unwaged workers who pro-
duce the commons and social relations. Unpaid workers’ interests are not best served 
by the demand for an individualised wage, but by the demand for a social wage in the 
form of a corporation-tax-funded, redistributive basic income guarantee.  
 
4. Collective control of the means of communication as means of production: 
In digital and communicative capitalism, communication technologies such as comput-
ers, apps, software, hardware, data, and content are means of production. Capital con-
trols and commodifies communication resources. Where these resources matter in the 
context of labour, it is an important political task that workers demand, struggle for and 
obtain the collective control of the means of communication as means of economic 
production.  
 
5. Break-up of communication monopolies: 
Corporate communication monopolies centralise economic power and are a threat to 
democracy. Socialist communication politics argues for and works towards breaking 
up corporate monopolies. It neither favours national over international capital (or vice-
versa) nor small or medium-size capital over large capital (or vice-versa), but no capi-
tal, public goods and common goods instead of capital.  
 
6. Privacy friendliness, socialist privacy:  
Public and commons-based communications should respect users’ privacy and mini-
mise their economic and political surveillance as well as other forms of surveillance. 
Personal data collection and storage should be minimised to the data that is absolutely 
necessary. The surveillance capacities of the state should be re-directed from the con-
stant surveillance of citizens towards the policing of tax-avoiding corporations and 
white-collar crime. An important task and demand is to criticise and demand abolish-
ment of the surveillance of workers and the mass surveillance of citizens. Socialist 
privacy means that data collection is minimised, information and communication sys-
tems are designed in a privacy-friendly manner, and surveillance is directed against 
powerful corporations in order to increase the transparency of their economic and fi-
nancial operations.  
 
7. Public service media and communications co-operatives: 
The struggle for socialism needs to be fought in the territories of public services, the 
state, and civil society. The political Left should struggle for three forms of collective 
communication services: those that are publicly operated or enabled by the state, 
those that are collective-owned by worker co-operatives, and those that are organised 
as public/commons-partnerships (partnerships of public institutions and civil society). 
Services that involve lots of sensitive personal data (such as political opinions) 
ought not to be operated by the state in order to reduce the risk of state surveillance 
of political opinions. Services that involve the need for high storage capacity can best 
be operated by public institutions and public service media. Practically speaking this 
means, for example, that there should be a public service YouTube and a civil-society-
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based Facebook platform co-operative. The state should legally and economically en-
able public service media to create digital public services and digital public service 
corporations. Newspapers should best be operated as non-profit, advertising-free, self-
managed companies. Press subsidies funded out of taxation should only be given to 
non-profit, advertising-free, non-tabloid newspapers. Alternative funding mechanisms 
for public service and commons-based non-profit, non-commercial media should be 
sought. They include, for example: corporation taxes; taxing online advertising and 
advertising in general; licence and media fees paid by users of public service media; 
donation models; a digital service tax for large transnational digital corporations; and 
so on. 
 
8. Democratic, public sphere media: 
The logic of communicative capitalism and the commodity form favours superficiality, 
high-speed flows of information and news, the personalisation of politics, tabloidisation, 
one-dimensionality, and partiality in the interest of the bourgeoisie. Alternatives decel-
erate information flows (slow media), foster informed political debate and learning 
through collective creation, and participation in spaces of public communication that 
are ad-free, non-commercial, and not-for-profit. Such spaces enable both professional 
media and citizen media as well as the dialectical fusion of both. Socialist communica-
tion politics supports the creation and sustenance of media that have the potential to 
help to advance critical, anti-ideological thought by fostering engagement with content 
that stimulates critical, dialectical, anti-ideological thought and debate, and opposes 
classist, fascist, racist, xenophobic and sexist discourse.  
 
9. Political and protest communication: 
Communication technologies are not the cause of protests, rebellions and revolutions, 
but they are an important part of protest communication. Socialist communication pol-
itics seeks to use communication technologies for spreading socialist politics to a broad 
public. Wherever possible, it supports the development and use of non-commercial, 
non-profit media for organisation and public communication. It aims to avoid creating 
‘alternative ghettos’ of resource-poor alternative media that are based on precarious 
labour. For this purpose, one requires a politics that focuses on channelling resources 
towards alternative media. 
Political education in schools and other educational institutions is also an aspect of 
political communication. Political education will enable humans to critically reflect on 
society as well as engage in complex, dialectical and independent thinking.  
 
10. Self-managed, democratic governance: 
Socialist communication politics supports, believes in the necessity of and advances 
the democratic and participatory governance of media organisations, so that the work-
ers producing in these companies and representatives of everyday citizens affected by 
these media’s operations participate in the decision-making process. 
The ethics of the commons is political because it requires praxis and the struggle 
for alternatives to capitalism in order to make humans and society flourish and realise 
their potentials. The society of the commons transcends capitalism because it goes 
beyond the latter. Love is the principle of the society of the commons.  
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Abstract: This essay focuses on members of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) 
political organisation in the US and the ambivalence of using social media as a primary means 
of communication for socialist information and culture. Relying on in-depth interviews with fif-
teen active members and leaders in DSA, this essay asks: How does socialist communication 
on social media encourage both cohesion and fragmentation for activists within the DSA? Lo-
cating and analysing key tensions felt by DSA members in response to their use of Facebook 
and Twitter, this project sheds light on the ways in which socialism is presently communicated 
to publics and counterpublics and identifies important challenges for the expansion of the so-
cialist movement. 
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1. Introduction 
Many politically active and engaged individuals in the United States currently adopt a 
socialist political identity in their digital communication and participation. The expan-
sion of digital information about socialism in the US in recent years emerges from im-
portant contemporary political campaigns and victories, such as those of Bernie Sand-
ers and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, but also from political continuities rooted in progres-
sive social movements since the late 1990s and the recent proliferation of socialist 
magazines, podcasts, and journalism.  
This contribution to tripleC’s special issue “Communicative Socialism/Digital Social-
ism” focuses on members of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) political or-
ganisation in the US and the ambivalence of using social media as a primary means 
of communication for socialist information and culture. Relying on in-depth interviews 
with fifteen active members and leaders across the US in the DSA, this essay asks: 
How does socialist communication on social media encourage both cohesion and frag-
mentation for activists within the DSA?  
Locating and analysing key tensions felt by DSA members in response to their use 
of Facebook and Twitter, this project sheds light on the ways in which socialism is 
presently communicated to publics and counterpublics and identifies important chal-
lenges for the expansion of the socialist movement. 
Building on perspectives from alternative media and Critical Internet Studies, this 
essay explores challenges DSA members face as they are compelled to use social 
media platforms to advance their visions of socialism while simultaneously contending 
with structural conditions often inimical to developing a strong socialist culture. Alter-
native media theorists recognise the potential for digital communication to expand ac-
cess to information for activists (Downing 2001), and acknowledge the ways in which 
the Internet blurs the boundaries between mainstream and alternative media (Atton 
2003). Social media platforms in particular offer potential for social movement organi-
sations to develop their narrative capacities, building cohesion through their shared 
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struggles and radical political frames (Tufekci 2017; Wolfson and Funke 2014). How-
ever, within these commercialised spaces, where user data is commodified and sold 
to third party advertisers and corporations dictate the structures for participation, sig-
nificant challenges arise for activists invested in cultivating and spreading a socialist 
worldview.  
Digital communication tools carry the potential to advance grassroots socialism, but 
this potential is antagonistically entangled in the dominant structures of informational 
capitalism (Fuchs 2009a). Even among socialists, the commercial affordances of social 
media encourage individuation and fragmentation as users contend with pressures en-
compassing the accumulation of likes, retweets, shares, and the production of sensa-
tionalized and isolating messages. Socialist cultures developed online can undermine 
face-to-face organising efforts as status hierarchies and infighting emerge in digital 
spaces, constituting barriers which discourage participation. Furthermore, the over-
whelming flood of information circulating online, often decontextualized and partial, 
challenges activist organisations as users rely on affective strategies to navigate polit-
ical communication within structures that favour individual political opinions over listen-
ing and collective coordination (Andrejevic 2013; Dean 2009; Fenton 2016). Despite 
these structural limitations, socialist media consistently circulates through digital 
spaces.  
DSA members consume and produce critical media most often at the level of con-
tent rather than form. These media tend to include critiques of capitalism, domination, 
and oppression, and regularly present marginalised voices while providing information 
absent from corporate sources (Fuchs 2010). Although the modern socialist movement 
in the US includes many competing versions of socialism, DSA members working in 
leftist media outlets such as Jacobin regularly question how to best introduce socialist 
ideas into mainstream discourse, and this requires at times abandoning prefigurative 
production practices of anarchist and other radical media to ensure mass circulation 
and appeal (Fuchs 2010; Sandoval and Fuchs, 2010). Decisions and debates about 
using platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to advance socialist politics cohere 
around similar themes as DSA members recognise the significant limitations and risks 
associated with social media but are compelled to use them in order to disseminate 
socialist political information. This ambivalence positions activists to develop normative 
strategies to navigate social media affordances in ways that minimise fragmentation 
and infighting in favour of building a culture of solidarity online for socialist organisa-
tions.     
This essay proceeds in four sections. First, I describe the DSA as an organisation, 
and offer a brief picture of the participants in this project and their media habits. Sec-
ond, I detail aspects of social media use that promote cohesion and solidarity among 
DSA members through media criticism, humour, and the distribution of socialist narra-
tives. Third, I explore how social media produces fragmentations among these social-
ists, focusing on frustrations felt by users who contend with significant barriers to par-
ticipation in the larger discourse on socialism. Next, I discuss normative strategies de-
veloped by socialists to mitigate the problems surrounding social media use and con-
nect this to the growth of socialist media institutions. Finally, I offer suggestions for the 
DSA, as the organisation develops, to organise around the decommodification of com-
munication.  
Overall, this project attempts to contribute initial empirical research that explores 
the following questions: What are the advantages and limitations of social media use 
for socialists in the DSA? And, what strategies do DSA members develop in response 
to the structural constraints of social media platforms?  
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2. The Democratic Socialists of America  
The DSA is the largest socialist organisation in the United States with approximately 
56,000 dues-paying members. The organisation is not a political party but an activist 
organisation that mobilises members and coalitions in both local and national contexts 
to fight for political gains for the working class through electoral campaigns, direct ac-
tion, and political education. In 2016, DSA made enormous membership increases in-
itially as a result of the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign, and later in the aftermath 
of Donald Trump’s victory. Bernie Sanders himself is not a member of DSA, but iden-
tifies as a “democratic socialist” and aligns with many of the organisation’s positions 
on issues such as universal healthcare, housing justice, and addressing the climate 
crisis.  
During his first presidential campaign, DSA endorsed Sanders and held a coordi-
nated “We Need Bernie” campaign, growing the membership from 6,500 members in 
the fall of 2014 to 8,500 on election day of 2016 (Schwartz 2017). Although the con-
nection to Sanders supported the growth and development of the organisation, the 
ascendancy of the political right also fuelled DSA’s recent explosion in membership. 
The day the United States elected Donald Trump as its president, 1,000 new members 
joined DSA, followed by over 13,000 additional members from November 9th to July 
1st, 2017 (Schwartz 2017).  
Although mainstream media discourse often makes sense of the DSA through the 
prism of progressive political legislation in the US, such as the Medicare for All cam-
paign or the Green New Deal, the organisation contains a complex array of political 
ideologies and varies considerably from chapter to chapter across the country. DSA’s 
positions, strategies, and tactics are not necessarily products of broad consensus 
within the organisation, but instead emerge through intense contestation among a con-
stellation of Marxists, anarchists, social democrats, and others, all with a variety of 
visions for successful socialist strategy in the twenty-first century. Despite these rich 
political varieties and differences, there are certainly generalisable patterns within 
DSA’s politics. For the most part, the political culture of the DSA disregards prefigura-
tive theoretical and revolutionary requirements for members and instead attempts to 
“meet people where they are at”, in terms of their everyday working lives to make so-
cialism as accessible and universal as possible. 
Many view the recent interest in DSA as a generational phenomenon, citing the 
fading memory of the Cold War, the financial crisis of 2008, and the material conditions 
and diminishing future prospects of millennials and generation Z in the US. Along with 
these explanations, people outside of the organisation also tend to see it as dispropor-
tionally white and male, often conflating inaccurate stereotypes of Bernie Sanders sup-
porters (“Bernie Bros”) with DSA membership. Although there are certainly aspects of 
truth to these ideas, they also function to erase the consistent labour in the organisation 
from marginalised identities and obscure the generational continuities between con-
temporary socialists and the socialist tradition in the US.  
The fifteen voices of DSA members and leaders included in this project reside in 
many different local contexts and chapters across the country, including New York City, 
Austin, Chicago, and Denver. Many of these DSA members joined the organisation 
after the 2016 election, feeling compelled to “do something” in response to Trump’s 
victory. Often disillusioned with the mainstream democratic party establishment, these 
members sought out a political organisation that offered new possibilities for progres-
sive gains in the US. Some members adopted a socialist political identity before joining 
the DSA, but others started paying dues to the organisation with a curiosity, experi-
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mentation, and openness about their political identification and only later called them-
selves socialists after sustained time within their chapters. Certain members felt driven 
to the DSA by particular issues, such as housing justice, and then expanded their rep-
ertoire of socialist positions through conversation, discussion, organising, and political 
education in their local chapter. Other members developed their socialist politics ear-
lier, through prior activism such as participating in the Occupy Wall Street movement. 
Most of these participants encountered leftist media in the US prior to joining the DSA, 
and cited examples such as Democracy Now! and The Nation as contributing to their 
developing socialist political identity.  
In terms of their everyday media habits, the majority of these fifteen activists pri-
marily use Twitter and Facebook to communicate about socialism, to consume socialist 
information, and to learn about activist events. Although most of these participants 
consume a wide variety of alternative and mainstream news sources, including, for 
example, Jacobin, The Intercept, and In These Times along with The New York Times, 
all of these media are typically filtered through social media. The dependence on social 
media for socialist information produces significant ambivalence for these DSA mem-
bers, who recognise many of the inherent restrictions of these platforms but also find 
them necessary for a variety of practical purposes. The following sections of this essay 
detail the cohesion and fragmentation produced as DSA members struggle to build 
socialism using social media, contending always with their structural constraints.  
3. Cohesion  
Digital media and their affordances provide practical ways for activists to meet their 
communication needs. Alternative media theorists cite the potential for digital commu-
nication tools to allow “working people, sexual minorities, trade unions, protest groups”, 
and “people of low status in terms of their relationship to elite groups” a chance to 
speak for themselves, even if this speaking is done through the use of dominant forms 
of technology (Atton 2002, 11; Downing 2001; Downing 2003). Modern activists cer-
tainly utilise a variety of Internet tools consistently to distribute media and capture au-
dience attention, to collaborate among networks and coalitions, to share strategies and 
best practices, and to develop political knowledge and awareness (Fenton 2016). Ac-
tivist communities in particular depend on social media for affective and informational 
purposes. Facebook and Twitter fulfil basic desires to connect with reference networks, 
which allows users to feel a sense of belonging (Tufekci 2017). Social media provides 
opportunities for users to reveal “private preferences to one another and discover com-
mon ground”, a type of practical communicative activity that serves the explicit political 
purpose of letting people know they are not alone in their dissent (Tufekci 2017, 48). 
Related, activists rely on social media to frame and spread their worldview through 
narratives that reframe hegemonic political understandings (Tufekci 2017; Wolfson and 
Funke 2013). Of course, these affordances exist in tension with the recognition of the 
profit motive and commercial nature of social media platforms. Socialist activists in 
particular recognise the compulsion to use popular commercial communication tools, 
such as Facebook and Twitter, in attempts to “meet people where they are at”, and to 
present socialist narratives and propaganda. 
Although DSA’s recent explosion in membership resulted partially from presidential 
politics, many DSA members joined the organisation after encounters with leftist media 
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on social media. Maria Svart1, DSA’s National Director, explained to me that media 
sources play a significant role in the organisation’s membership growth. She clarified, 
“Twitter is a huge source of membership […] When we ask people why they join, a lot 
of people answer Twitter”. Of course, DSA maintains a strong social media presence 
(@DemSocialists, for example, has over 217,000 followers on Twitter, as of 15 No-
vember 2019), but when members talk about joining as a result of Twitter they most 
likely are referring to the boarder socialist discourse on the platform that includes both 
official DSA accounts as well as unaffiliated individuals or institutions that share DSA’s 
politics. Maria acknowledged both the benefits and limitations of this reality, describing 
how the resulting demographics in DSA skew younger but increases in dues-paying 
members become somewhat self-sustaining as members invite their connections to 
participate.  
This perspective is consistent with DSA members around the country, many of 
whom experienced the idea of socialism initially on social media. Marco, a member of 
the Denver chapter, told me that leftist book groups on Facebook helped him realise 
his socialist identity because he witnessed “all these other people who also identified 
as socialists and shared these values”. Another member, Ava, told me that when she 
became active in her DSA chapter in Texas, other members from around the country 
followed her Twitter account and made her feel welcome in the organisation through 
likes, supportive messages, and retweets.  
DSA members appreciated forms of socialist media criticism that occur within social 
media platforms. Members valued how their fellow DSA members reacted to certain 
news items on Twitter and Facebook because it provided a “socialist lens” on main-
stream accounts of politics. Dylan, a member who lives in New York City, described 
how horrified he felt after Trump ordered a missile strike on a Syrian airfield in April of 
2017 and cable news in the US adopted a tone of reverence and amazement in re-
sponse2. He cited a segment on MSNBC, when Brian Williams described the missile 
strike as “beautiful”, explaining that moments like this show “a seismic splinter between 
true leftists and corporate Democrats who are okay with the US exercising our military 
might for really no good reason”. At the time, Dylan quickly discovered that his network 
of connections online, including the leftist media he followed, shared his disgust in this 
moment.      
DSA members also disclosed that they cherished the leftist humour that regularly 
circulated through their social media networks. Humour binds socialists together often 
through sardonic criticism of mainstream liberals, corporate Democrats, and liberal 
journalists. Miguel explained to me that socialist humour online, either from other social 
media users or leftist media accounts, often points out the “contradictions or obvious 
inaccuracies or oversights in mainstream accounts”, which can help you to “maintain 
sanity when you’re dealing with depressing topics”. Other members felt that leftist hu-
mour also normalised socialist ideas by translating feelings of anxiety that accompany 
the adoption of a radical political identity into welcoming entry points. Meagan Day3, 
for example, explained to me how a specific Twitter account, @LarryWebsite, contrib-
                                            
1 Interview participants in this project who are also public figures consented to use of their full 
names. I indicate each time this occurs throughout the essay. All other participants are iden-
tified using pseudonyms. 
2 See Greenwald’s (2017) article for a description of the bi-partisan praise in mainstream media 
of this missile strike. 
3 Meagan Day is a staff writer for Jacobin and an important figure in the DSA and the American 
socialist movement.  
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uted in part to her eventually becoming a member of DSA. Similar to much of the so-
cialist discourse on Twitter, @LarryWebsite was not an official DSA account but it 
shared many of the organisation’s politics and goals through its content. Using memes 
and other forms of humour, the account advocated strongly for Bernie Sanders over 
Hillary Clinton in the 2015 Democratic Party primary, and brought levity to the difficul-
ties surrounding Sanders’ unfair treatment and eventual loss. She explained to me,  
 
It was just funny and fun, and it felt like a way of uniting socialists. It felt like we 
had a shared language, and we were funnier than our enemies in the Democratic 
Party. It made me feel like not only could I be a socialist, but that it could also be 
fun, and that there were other people that I could laugh with. It really created a 
sense of community.  
 
Similarly, Marco recounted for me that the first time he met the other comrades in his 
local chapter at a DSA social event, he already knew all of their jokes and style of 
humour because he had encountered it on Twitter.   
For DSA members, social media can also help to amplify socialist narratives and 
perspectives. Thomas, a leader in his chapter, described social media as “the biggest 
microphone we’ve got for our politics”, explaining that without these platforms DSA 
could not reach large audiences. He cited two examples of viral videos distributed via 
social media showing DSA members confronting politicians in response to the Trump 
Administration’s “zero tolerance” immigration policy that involves family separations. In 
one, DSA activists confronted Mitch McConnell, the Republican Speaker of the House 
outside of a restaurant in Louisville, Kentucky chanting, “Abolish ICE!” and shouting, 
“Where are the babies, Mitch!?” (Selk 2018; Schwartz 2018). In another, DSA activists 
in Washington DC confronted Kirstjen Nielsen, former secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security, at a local restaurant demanding the end to family separations 
(Chappell 2018). Both videos allude to DSA’s position that advocates for the US to 
open its borders to all migrants seeking asylum and demands an end to the global 
capitalist system that allows for the international free movement of capital but not of 
people (DSA 2018). DSA members viewed public abhorrence over family separations 
in the US as an opportunity to promote socialist narratives that express moral outrage 
over family separation, while also offering an analysis that connects these policies to 
the international rise in nationalism, US imperialism, and global capitalism.  
The circulation of socialist perspectives through social media, including media crit-
icism, humour, and the promotion of socialist narratives, certainly serve important func-
tions for the DSA as the organisation continues to grow. Effectively, these practices 
amount to critical reception of mainstream news and culture, as DSA members “trans-
cend the ideological character of media” and “question the commodified character of 
the world in which they live” (Fuchs 2009b, 397). The distribution of socialist narratives 
on social media accomplishes a similar goal, as video footage of demonstrations and 
protests emphasises the array of socialist political demands. Both critical receptions 
and socialist narratives stimulate affective bonds between comrades in the DSA, who 
signal to one another their shared values and common goals. These affective pur-
poses, however, speak more to the plurality of human-centred communication needs, 
and the pressures exerted on these needs, rather than the particular technological af-
fordances offered by social media. Communicative behaviour is fundamentally part of 
our species-being, and bound to the “material activity and the material intercourse” of 
humans (Artz 2006; Macnair 2009; Marx 1932/1978, 154). Social media operate 
through a dual character of responding to social communication needs felt directly by 
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users in this historical moment, while also corresponding to structural pressures and 
limitations brought about by the colonisation of society by informational capitalism (Wil-
liams 1972/2003; Fuchs 2009a, 76). The recursive desire for affective cohesion and 
solidarity within activist communities online exists as immanently embedded in the con-
tradictions of contemporary communication practices.  
4. Fragmentation  
Although many DSA members cited aspects of social media that they found essential, 
most of the activists I spoke with expressed intense frustration about these digital tools. 
Certain members described their activist communication online as exhausting, pointing 
to constant critiques from users on both the right and left. Thomas, for example, rec-
ognised that social media “heightens the degree of emotional labour that goes into 
being a socialist because you’re constantly exposed to your opponents and other peo-
ple that have very different views than you, and people are pretty vicious on social 
media”. Meagan Day recounted to me how her decision to leave Twitter for a time 
resulted from the constant criticism she received from other users. She explained,  
 
It was actually detrimental to my ability to do what I felt like I should be doing, 
which was writing articles that put forth a socialist perspective. I was so troubled 
by the way that social media colonised my daily life […] The range of antagonists 
and protagonists it presented to me. It was very distracting. When you have critics 
from the left who constantly take pot shots at everything you do, it warps your 
perspective and you lose the ability to see the real enemy which is the capitalist 
class.  
 
Any value that social media brings to the DSA comes at significant costs, often exerting 
strong pressures against activists to contribute in meaningful ways to advancing a so-
cialist worldview.  
Other DSA activists recounted feelings of alienation and exclusion in response to 
particular aspects of socialist communication on social media. Many of the DSA mem-
bers I talked to reported spending significant time on social media platforms but rarely 
posting their own messages. Often, they cited feelings of anxiety about posting the 
“right kind of message” which frequently precluded them from participating in socialist 
discourse using their own voice. Marco disclosed to me that he is not “much of a poster” 
on Twitter. When I asked why, he explained, “It gives me some anxiety, socially. I just 
feel like there’s a lot of pressure to say something witty or whatever and that’s hard for 
me to do, so I’d rather just not worry about that”. Emma recounted times she felt a 
desire to participate in discussions online, but worried about posting links to news ar-
ticles that may not be from a “socialist approved media source”. She also remembered 
a desire to occasionally make a joke but feared that her humour might not be “politically 
correct”. She continued,  
 
I feel like I have to be perfectly on and never say anything wrong, and even if I’m 
not saying the wrong thing, making sure that’s it’s worded so that it’s clear what 
the joke is…  
 
As we’ve seen in this essay, humour plays an important role in forging affective bonds 
between socialists through political criticism and differentiation often against liberals 
and members of the Democratic Party in the United States. Humour, however, also 
tripleC 18(1): 32-47, 2020 39 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
involves forms of exclusion that, according to members, hold the potential to prevent 
the expansion of the socialist movement.  
Popular forms of socialist humour in the DSA often cohere around leftist social me-
dia accounts that use irony and satire to criticise mainstream liberal Democrats and 
liberal journalists. The typical demographics of people who participate in these forms 
of humour skew young, male, well-educated, and very well informed on current events 
and the latest political news. Forms of exclusion emerge as these demographics de-
velop particular codes and inside jokes that enhance affective bonds within the group 
but alienate outsiders. Paul elaborated on this point, explaining that socialist humour 
online “creates community that keeps us all clued in to shared jargon and shared inside 
jokes”, but it is also “absolutely repellent to anybody who’s not part of it”. This descrip-
tion speaks to the emergence of socialist filter bubbles on social media, which reinforce 
pre-existing views and intensify the exclusionary features and fragmentation of com-
munities online through algorithmic and network structures (Pariser 2011). The risk 
associated with too many insider-jokes is the foreclosure of universal entry points, un-
dermining the intention of leveraging these platforms to reach mass audiences with 
socialist perspectives.  
Caustic styles of humour among socialists online can promote a type of cohesion 
when directed against class and political enemies, but the activists I spoke with pointed 
to the danger of these same tactics used against fellow socialists in the DSA. Micah 
Uetricht4, a member in Chicago, told me how he felt that the negative aspects of so-
cialist humour online can sometimes encourage infighting between socialists in the 
DSA:   
 
It becomes impossible to just interact, especially with people who are your com-
rades. It bleeds over into people within the DSA interacting with each other. They 
don’t know how to do it in a way that’s not dunking on each other and using hu-
mour to try and smack somebody down.  
 
During multiple interviews, DSA members described the risks of alienating older gen-
erations, the working class, and women and other minorities with these forms of hu-
mour. Maria Svart even recognised the exclusionary dangers that these forms of so-
cialist culture pose. “It’s alienating because it’s a club”, she explained, “and if we’re 
trying to build a mass movement we can’t have a club – we just need to speak the 
language that the people speak”.  
Members also illustrated socialist discussions on socialist media as radically differ-
ent than face-to-face communication at DSA meetings. Jenny, a DSA member in New 
York City, told me that although she found the socialist discourse online quite im-
portant, she also described significant incongruences between communication on so-
cial media compared to the welcoming atmosphere of physical DSA meetings. 
Throughout our conversation, Jenny expressed that the characteristics of socialist 
communication on social media could prevent people from joining DSA because of the 
tension it can produce. She questioned whether or not people who may be interested 
in the burgeoning socialist movement may see the discourse on social media and de-
cide not to participate in DSA as a result:  
 
                                            
4 Micah Uetricht is currently Jacobin’s Managing Editor and the author of Strike for America: 
Chicago Teachers Against Austerity.   
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[The] level of bad faith and ill will and shittiness online is massive […] there are 
times that I look at the discourse and I’m like “Uggghhh, I fucking hate this shit”. 
You know, I’m like, “I don’t want to tweet. I don’t want to interact with these 
people. Somebody’s just going to bite my fucking head off. No thanks. My life is 
stressful enough”. 
 
Although social media offers socialist opportunities to develop counterpublic identities 
and present socialist narratives, it also produces forms of exclusion and alienation that 
work against universal participation in the socialist discourse online.   
The ambivalence described above results from the structural constraints of social 
media. As critical perspectives on the Internet recognise, affordances that allow eve-
ryone a voice through digital communication contribute to the endless flood of data 
online which often supersedes listening, dialogue, and true interaction (Andrejevic 
2013; Dean 2009; Fenton 2016). The resulting inundation of opinions and perspectives 
does not lead to transformative political power nor does it produce significant and sus-
tainable political voices (Fuchs 2009a). Despite the horizontal and chaotic nature of 
the Internet, platforms hierarchise certain messages over others to populate individu-
ally curated user feeds. Particular structural biases, such as the “comment bias” that 
promotes visibility of quarrels and fights to increase user engagement, shape political 
communication on social media (Tufekci 2017).  
Furthermore, although we must recognise the political potential of humour in alter-
native media forms (Downing 2001), we also must address the forms of exclusion that 
arise from what effectively amounts to niche entertainment circulating through com-
mercial media systems and understand the risk of how these forms of communication 
can displace the hard work of on-the-ground socialist organising (Dean 2009). Addi-
tionally, as research on the digital divide shows consistently, Internet users are more 
likely to be younger, more highly educated and wealthier than non-users, more likely 
to be men than women, and more likely to live in cities (Fenton 2016). Exclusion along 
these demographic lines poses a threat for the expansion of the socialist movement to 
develop universal entry points.  
The specific responses from DSA members that detail feelings of anxiety, disgust, 
and discomfort with presenting their viewpoints on social media emerges in contradic-
tion to liberal notions of digital communication. Socialists on social media contend with 
unrealised and unfulfilled promises of communicative freedom online. Liberal visions 
of communication suggest ideas and individuals should have equal access to make 
public use of their reason and voice their own political opinions. With digital technology, 
users gain affordances that allow forms of production and consumption that appear as 
“equal access” but in truth manifest significant forms of hierarchy and dominance.  
The multiplicity of perspectives on social media platforms, imbricated by metrics of 
engagement, popularity, and entertainment values, produces substantial barriers to 
participation. In effect, though we have gained certain prosumer abilities, we have not 
freed ourselves from commercial communication that focuses on the “egositic” individ-
ual and fragments users from one another and their social communities (Marx 
1844/1978). Communicative emancipation must recognise the true interconnective 
fabric of all social relations and must refuse a conception of people as isolated from 
one another.    
5. Normative Strategies  
The ambivalence felt by DSA members about social media is well known in the organ-
isation, and there is consistent debate among intellectuals, leaders, and rank-and-file 
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members about how socialists should use social media. Strategies for social media 
use among DSA members seem to parallel other political tactics in the organisation, 
including work in the electoral realm. DSA differentiates itself from other socialist or-
ganisations through a commitment to electoral work and the understanding that elec-
tions are the spaces where politics occurs for the majority of ordinary Americans. Thus, 
in attempts to mainstream socialist ideas, DSA invests significant time and energy into 
electoral campaigns for candidates that often express explicitly socialist policies and 
ideals. This is of course not uncontroversial within the organisation, which includes a 
variety of political perspectives that argue DSA should abandon electoralism entirely. 
However, these positions do not represent the dominant ideology in DSA, which seeks 
to shift cultural connotations surrounding “socialism” onto the terrain of everyday life. 
When I asked about DSA’s communication strategy, Maria Svart explained, “The nar-
rative we’re promoting is that there’s an alternative to capitalism, so our strategies are 
about normalising democratic socialism, explaining it, puncturing the myths of capital-
ism and keeping it in the minds of audiences we’re trying to reach”. This is a struggle 
that necessarily involves social media.  
DSA members and leaders are aware of certain limitations of Facebook and Twitter 
but feel a political compulsion to use these platforms to “meet people where they are 
at”. The national organisation maintains social media accounts on Twitter and Face-
book and chapters around the country run their own accounts with a significant degree 
of autonomy. Of course, individual DSA members also use social media to communi-
cate about socialism, interacting with DSA posts nationally and locally, but also taking 
part in the larger discourse on socialism on these platforms. As we have seen, DSA 
members adopt individual strategies for coping with their own discontents with social 
media, often avoiding participation despite their desires to connect. Socialists also 
spend significant time thinking through best practices for using social media for them-
selves and their organisations, and debate the question of its value for the health of 
the socialist movement.  
Two recent articles published in Jacobin addressed the question of social media for 
the socialist movement directly. In “Log Off”, Benjamin Fong (2018) argued that social-
ists should advocate for the abolishment of social media platforms, given their ten-
dency to decrease empathy, increase loneliness, and intensify narcissism and cruelty. 
In response, Meagan Day’s (2018) “Unfortunately, We Can’t Log Off” acknowledged 
the significant drawbacks of social media outlined by Fong but argued that socialists 
must not relinquish these tools to the capitalist class and instead infuse them with a 
socialist perspective. The strategy she outlined involves socialists adopting particular 
forms of social media use that retain the promotion and distribution of socialist narra-
tives and politics to large audiences but encourage individual socialists to use institu-
tional accounts and pages instead of personal avatars. Much of the infighting, criticism, 
turmoil, and antagonism on social media occurs between individual avatars, leaving 
activists exhausted and distracted. Thus, spreading this obligation between multiple 
socialists in the same organisation or institution, such as a local DSA chapter, mitigates 
the damage caused by social media platforms that encourage petty disputes, sensa-
tionalised drama, and misinformation. In her words, “Socialists therefore have to toe a 
fine line: we must maintain a strong and vibrant social media presence, but we can’t 
allow it to atomise us, as it’s designed to do” (Day 2018, para. 24).  
For Day, this strategy also holds the potential for socialists to develop an ethic and 
responsibility in the ways they treat their comrades in digital spaces. During our inter-
view she emphasised her above argument, explaining that we should “stop thinking 
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about social media as a form of personal expression of individual socialists, and in-
stead as a medium where groups of socialists can come together to further our per-
spective”. She continued,  
 
I think that people should translate their energies to institutional accounts be-
cause it naturally involves taking on a sense of responsibility that we ought to 
have in our [digital communication] […] The sense of responsibility that people 
take on to speak on behalf of all socialists.  
 
Countering the pressure for individual socialists to accrue status through platform re-
wards, or to build up their personal “brand” through Facebook and Twitter, Day’s per-
spective encourages a form of digital solidarity that recognises the marginal position 
of the socialist movement while attempting to create universal access points for ordi-
nary users. Day’s position also speaks to the current context profoundly by gesturing 
to the contemporary expansion of socialist media institutions.  
The recent increase of socialist media institutions in the US is worthy of its own 
article- and book-length treatment, but the subject holds particular relevance to the 
growth of the socialist movement in relation to digital communication. Each interview 
participant in this project mentioned following socialist media outlets regularly and high-
lighted the ways in which these media contribute in positive ways to their political iden-
tification with socialism. Current socialist media include a vast array of institutions in-
cluding podcasts (e.g. The Dig and Chapo Trap House), political magazines (e.g. Cur-
rent Affairs, In These Times, and Jacobin), and even video and television (e.g. Means 
TV and Novara Media).  
Many of these outlets adopt a subscription-based funding model, releasing them 
from problems endemic to liberal public media that tend to tailor their content to their 
donor class. These media also utilise social media to promote their content, interact 
with audiences, and to solicit funding. The advantages of a broad variety of leftist me-
dia counter many of the problems associated with unorganised socialist discourse cir-
culating on social media platforms. These outlets build audiences, treat political issues 
typically in a much longer form than Facebook or Twitter posts, and offer avenues to 
transcend the exclusions often present in fragmented socialist discourse on social me-
dia.    
An additional benefit to emerging socialist media institutions and organisations are 
their focus on international relations and the socialist struggle around the world. At the 
national level, DSA has an active International Committee (2019) that seeks to “con-
nect in solidarity with like-minded activists, workers, movements and parties world-
wide” (para. 1). At the 2019 DSA National Convention, the organisation voted to 
strengthen the International Committee and its efforts connecting to socialists around 
the world. In addition, the organisation passed resolutions committing to solidarity with 
Palestine and Cuba, and adopted official anti-imperialist positions that advocate for 
self-determination, full sovereignty, and decolonisation for countries occupied or ex-
ploited by the US. Despite this, the DSA members I spoke with do not seem to interact 
with socialists in other countries using social media on a regular basis, which consti-
tutes another form of exclusion and fragmentation. However, as audiences of leftist 
media, these members have consistent opportunities to learn about the international 
socialist struggle. Jacobin, for example, offers significant and essential international 
coverage. Micah Uetricht, Jacobin’s Managing Editor, emphasised to me that they “in-
sist on going beyond the hegemonic role that the US plays in global politics.” DSA as 
a national organisation and socialist media institutions are positioned well to develop 
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interest about the international socialist struggle for individual DSA members, who of-
ten cannot learn about these topics through mainstream commercial media in the  US, 
and who may be restricted by the ways socialist discourse on social media retains a 
national focus.  
Alternative media theorists contend that “alternative media” differentiates itself from 
“mainstream” media through deprofessionalisation, decapitalisation, and deinstitution-
alisation (Atton 2002; Hamilton 2001). What we see, however, with emerging socialist 
media institutions in the US is a commitment to professionalisation, institutionalisation, 
and the utilisation of commercial techniques to capture the attention of large audi-
ences. For the burgeoning socialist movement in the US, these commitments from 
socialist media institutions may offer an avenue to overcome marginality, where reach-
ing a broad audience is necessary for the large-scale social transformation desired by 
socialists (Fuchs 2010; Sandoval and Fuchs 2010). Furthermore, institutionalisation, 
professionalisation, and the ability to mobilise financial resources afford opportunities 
to expand the scope of content to include significant projects, such as international 
coverage focusing on socialist issues and politics around the world. Unlike the unor-
ganised socialist discourse circulating through Facebook and Twitter, socialist media 
institutions and socialist social movement organisations also offer opportunities for ac-
tivists to distance themselves from the negative effects of individuals shouldering the 
promotion and distribution of socialist narratives and information. Normative strategies 
that suggest socialists should participate in social media through institutional and or-
ganisational accounts and pages pushes against the ideological character of social 
networking that encourages “capitalist individualisation, accumulation, and legitimisa-
tion”, while gesturing to an alternative where platforms would “allow group profiles, joint 
profile creation, group blogging” explicitly oriented to social justice and collective goals 
(Fuchs 2009a, 84). This idea, however, comprises only an incipient socialist strategy 
focused on social media that must be developed to specifically include the labour re-
lation involved in capitalist social media.    
6. Conclusions  
The emergence of social media represents a development in informational capitalism 
where disposable time is colonised by productive forces, where attention is monetised, 
and where user data is sold to third party advertisers (Fuchs 2015). Critical Internet 
theorists demonstrate how users labour for social media platforms through their online 
activity and digital communication. These perspectives build on Dallas Smythe’s 
(1981) foundational research which theorised how audiences become commodities 
under commercial mass media systems because, as “audience power is produced, 
sold, purchased and consumed,” it “commands a price and is a commodity” (1981, 25).  
In effect, this is an extension of the notion that media consumption is the prolongation 
of work, where audience members “work” for advertisers by learning how to buy goods 
and spend money through the exposure to advertising (Smythe 1981). Audience mem-
bers labour for advertisers while reproducing their own labour power through leisure 
time, which is consistently filled with mental and physical work masquerading as “free 
time” (Smythe 1981).  
Christian Fuchs (2012, 146) demonstrates how social media users, as they upload 
photos, write posts and comments, and send messages, function as double objects of 
commodification: “They are first commodified by corporate platform operators who, sell 
them to advertising clients, and this results, second, in an intensified exposure to com-
modity logic. They are permanently exposed to commodity propaganda presented by 
44     Christopher C. Barnes 
   CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
advertisements while they are online”. This is, of course, also true for socialists who 
use social media platforms.  
Throughout the interviews I conducted for this project, I did not encounter perspec-
tives from DSA members and leaders that defined social media use as labour. Many 
members articulated intense ambivalence, and at times incendiary criticisms, of social 
media platforms and their profit motives. For example, Miguel, a DSA member from 
the Denver chapter, explained to me how all media dependent on advertising revenue, 
from television to social media, catered to “an addiction” that people have for sensa-
tional and superficial information. He described these media as “sweets, candy, or like 
crack, or whatever to get people to watch […] that’s clear also in the types of things 
that get like the most clicks on Facebook or Twitter too – it’s like bubble gum, absolute 
garbage”. Similarly, Maria Svart recognised risks associated with DSA members using 
social media focusing on its profit motive. Citing Facebook as an example, she de-
scribed the platform as “very authoritarian, privately held, and totally driven by profit 
[…] at any moment [they] could decide to turn their algorithms against us […] it’s a 
private sphere and that’s incredibly dangerous”.   
DSA members recognise how commercial media operates, and they often can ar-
ticulate in sophisticated terms how capitalist media systems damage democratic am-
bitions. However, the DSA members and leaders I spoke to did not explicitly discuss 
the labour relation embedded antagonistically between social media platforms and 
their users. My questions to interview participants focused on the advantages and lim-
itations of social media for the socialist movement, and, as an open-ended in-depth 
discussion on socialism and communication, I did not explicitly prime respondents with 
particular topics such as digital labour. Future research should carefully consider ave-
nues to explore how socialists think about digital labour in relation to their greater po-
litical ambitions. Furthermore, the lack of discussion around digital labour from partici-
pants in this project demonstrates important opportunities for critical media research-
ers to support organisations like the DSA by exploring and developing socialist strate-
gies for using social media. 
A version of “meeting people where they are at” could involve developing issue 
campaigns centring on social media and mobilising the intense antipathy towards Fa-
cebook and Twitter to fight for democratic controls that preserve the potentials to build 
cohesion and militate against the structures that promote fragmentation. It certainly 
seems feasible to conduct activist campaigns against social media online, such as A 
Billion People’s call for a digital strike and a series of disruptions against Google, Am-
azon, and Facebook in September of 2018 (A Billion People 2018). However, organis-
ing around these issues could also occur in physical DSA meetings through in-person 
discussions on the political economy of social media and socialist strategies for digital 
communication.  
In The Idea of Socialism, Axel Honneth (2017) argues that the socialist movement 
must advocate for the removal of all barriers to communicative freedom to enhance 
the potential for socialism to articulate itself to social freedom through experimentation 
and documentation of past attempts at economic collectivisation. Additionally, Honneth 
(2017) advocates that socialists must finally abandon the proletariat as the revolution-
ary figure in future iterations of the movement.  
The perspectives presented in this project, however, demonstrate the need to retain 
and expand contemporary understandings of the proletariat. Socialists today must cer-
tainly fight for the removal of barriers to free communication in digital realms, but this 
can only occur through clarifying the labour relationships entrenched in digital commu-
nication and organising users to fight against the authoritarian restrictions that remove 
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users from participation in shaping the structures that regulate our social lives (An-
drejevic 2009). Ordinary users possess the power to bring “corporate social media to 
a standstill” by withholding their labour through a digital strike or another form of col-
lective disruption (Fuchs 2015, 39).  
In general, organised media activism within the DSA could take a number of forms 
involving strategies such as labour organising, electoral campaigns, and direct action. 
Currently, DSA does not have a national working group dedicated to media activism, 
but this does not necessarily mean these goals are not a priority for individual members 
and chapters around the country. The New York City chapter, for example, includes a 
“Tech Action” working group that advocates for organising workers in the technology 
and media industries, and offers a variety of positions and critiques ranging from im-
plementing public control over corporate and government data systems, to exploring 
the political possibilities of a public Internet infrastructure (Tech Action Working Group 
2019). The working group recently collaborated with Julia Salazar, a DSA-endorsed 
state Senate candidate in New York, to develop a political platform for technology that 
included, among other positions, making high-speed affordable Internet accessible to 
all New Yorkers; advocating for “gig” and contract workers to organise and gain collec-
tive bargaining rights; providing recourses for platform co-ops, owned and operated by 
workers; and demanding that technology companies pay their fair share of taxes 
(Malmgren 2018; Salazar for State Senate 2019). These examples offer important 
models for socialist media activism on a national level.   
Many of the demands socialists could make in respect to digital capitalism involve 
supporting and imagining policies that transfer resources and power away from social 
media giants to ordinary users and alternative platforms. Confronting the oligopolistic 
structures of social media companies requires activists to capture state power and 
leverage it to tax these firms and channel those resources to non-commercial media 
institutions and platforms, which would mark an important first step in strengthening 
the public sphere (Fuchs 2014). At a time when burgeoning socialists media institutions 
and content begin to attract large audiences through their unique political perspectives 
and imaginative critical analysis, the possibility of regulations that limit the power of 
digital oligopolies in favour of non-commercial alternatives seems both timely and nec-
essary. 
Demanding greater democratic controls over social media platforms for individual 
users and social movement organisations could mitigate the challenges experienced 
by activists as they disseminate their politics and interact in digital realms. Many DSA 
members work tirelessly online to promote their narratives and events in the face of 
intense criticism and structural conditions that divide socialist communities. These us-
ers, and all users, should have a voice in shaping the rules for engagement on social 
media. As the socialist movement grows, and as the DSA continues to advocate for 
the decommodification of housing and healthcare as human rights, the movement 
should demand the decommodification of communication as a human right. 
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under conditions of surveillance. What would an alternative paradigm look like? This paper 
aims to sketch a possible socialist society resting on digital technology but organised on a 
different logic, namely that of autonomous production, leisure, and social engagement. It draws 
on relevant theories of the Left, evaluates them against the reality of digital capitalism, and 
suggests structural and user practice alternatives that can pave the way towards a digital/com-
municative socialism. This paper engages with the works of Czech philosopher Radovan 
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1. Introduction
Contemporary capitalism is to a large extent determined by the pervasiveness of digital 
technologies of automation, information processing and communication. Such technol-
ogies have established a networked informational capitalism. This form of capitalism 
rests largely on the layered Internet infrastructure which is a sine qua non for commu-
nication, organisation, business, economic, social, political, and cultural activity. 
Contemporary capitalism has deployed information and communication technolo-
gies (ICTs) to perpetuate and deepen social relations of exploitation of (digital) labour 
in the organisation of a global production and delivery of products and services. It has 
done so partly by exploiting the flexibility offered by digital technologies to drive down 
work and pay levels. It has also engaged effectively the general citizen/consumer in a 
global interconnected system where online activity generates data, which become the 
currency of business models of large monopoly high tech corporations in the media 
and communications industries.  
What seems to be absent, under these circumstances, is a possibility for an alter-
native digital paradigm that could harness digitisation for purposes of autonomous pro-
duction, increased leisure and emancipation from the limitations of wage labour. Such 
an alternative paradigm could be termed digital/communicative socialism or digi-
tal/communicative socialist society. 
The aims of the paper are: Firstly, to set the contours of a possible digital socialist 
society drawing on conceptualisations of the Left provided by Radovan Richta and 
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André Gorz. Secondly, to project these conceptualisations to the contemporary char-
acter of digital capitalism. Thirdly, to identify ways in which the contemporary, platform 
and monopoly-based capitalism can gradually give way towards what might be in the 
future become a form of digital/communicative society. 
The argument in the paper is that although digital capitalism in its current form falls 
short of the emancipatory promise of technological development, a digital socialist so-
ciety is possible. However, it will be premised on radical transformation of the existing 
infrastructure of digital capitalism, as well as change in user engagement with digital 
technologies. 
The next section will sketch the dimensions of digital socialism as they have 
emerged from selected theorisations of the Left on technological development and the 
post-industrial society. Section 3 will measure these dimensions up to the reality of 
contemporary digital capitalism. Section 4 will explore the possibilities of alternatives 
and pathways towards what can gradually resemble a digital/communicative socialist 
society; in doing so it will draw on recent intellectual attempts towards this direction 
and, to a small extent, on survey data about user engagement with the current Internet. 
Section 5 will conclude, summarising theory, reality, and possibilities.  
The paper draws more specifically on the theorisations on the post-industrial soci-
ety by Radovan Richta and André Gorz. 
Richta, a Czech philosopher, was born in Prague in 1924 and died in 1983. He was 
a pivotal figure in the communist reform movement in Czechoslovakia around the time 
of the Prague Spring and the blatant military intervention of the Soviet army forces. 
During World War II, he was part of the communist resistance against the Nazis. 
Imprisoned for several months, he was rescued by the Red Cross as he was suffering 
from tuberculosis. After the War and between periods of illness, he organised an inter-
disciplinary research team, whose most famous work was Civilisation at the Cross-
roads, a collection of articles first published in Czech and Slovakian in 1967, then in 
an English translation in 1968 and a French one in 1969. Richta’s name is associated 
with the concept of the scientific and technological revolution (Richta 1967). 
Gorz, an Austrian/French social philosopher and journalist, was born in Vienna in 
1923 as Gerhart Hirsch and died in 2007. In 1949, he moved to Paris, and started 
working for Paris-Presse under the pseudonym Michel Bosquet, and subsequently for 
L’Express as an economic journalist. In the 1960s and 1970s, he became part of the 
New Left movement that was inspired by humanist Marxism and promoted a left 
agenda in issues of work, including equality, justice, liberation and a guaranteed social 
income. In 1961, Gorz entered the editorial committee of Les Temps Modernes. In 
1964, he co-founded Le Nouvel Observateur weekly. He befriended Herbert Marcuse 
and Ivan Illich and brought their works to a French audience. Gorz followed closely the 
events of May 1968 in Paris that he saw as having the potential to realise his humanist 
socialist vision. Throughout his life, he engaged with a number of topics, as evidenced 
in his diverse books, such as Ecology as Politics (Gorz 1979), Paths to Paradise (Gorz 
1985) and the famous Critique of Economic Reason (Gorz 1989). His work Farewell to 
the Working Class (Gorz 1982) is the most relevant for the purposes of our analysis.  
The paper draws on the work of these two thinkers as they had a lot in common: 
both were Marxist/socialist humanists, both were heavy critics of the Soviet Union re-
gime, and both were proponents of a humanist/democratic socialism. 
More importantly, both Richta and Gorz seem to have been “displaced” from the 
mainstream literature on information society. Their names are not entirely absent. 
Richta is mentioned as a key theorist of the growing importance of information tech-
nology in society in Beniger’s (1986) book The Control Revolution. However, more 
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established textbooks on theories of the information society (e.g. Castells 1996; Web-
ster 2014) have not engaged with the works of Richta and Gorz. In this sense, the 
current paper redresses the balance by bringing their ideas forward in a discussion of 
the contemporary character of the digital society; and in the imaginaries of the future 
digital/communicative socialism. 
2. Theory: The (Socialist) Digital/Communicative/Information/Network Society 
Already in the Grundrisse, Marx (1973) is eloquent about the importance of scientific 
and technological evolution for the development of capital’s productive forces, the en-
suing application of science to production and the increasing significance of knowledge 
labour. The so-called Fragment on Machines, in particular, highlights the effect of tech-
nology in reducing necessary labour time and creating conditions for communism, free 
time as a source of wealth and the development of a rounded personality (artistic, sci-
entific and so on) during the freed time. But, it also stresses that this emancipatory 
potential is embedded in a context of capitalist class relations where the socialised 
productive forces clash with the relations of production leading to lack of autonomy, 
precarity and unemployment (see Fuchs 2015). 
Since the early 1950s and 1960s, the left thinking has sought to come to terms with 
the increasing presence of science and technology in production but also in all spheres 
of economic and social human activity. Radovan Richta (1969) provides one of the 
early visions of the “scientific and technological revolution” as a “new foundation for 
civilisation” (65). Whilst industrial production was characterized by increasingly com-
plex machines in production, together with a growing army of labour, the application of 
science and technology to other spheres of human activity [emphasis added] was lim-
ited. This, for Richta, is about to change: the scientific and technological revolution has 
a more transformative event throughout society overall; not only the objective means 
of production (e.g. raw materials, capital, labour) change, not only the structure and 
dynamics of the productive forces, but also the “subjective, human factor” (56).  
Richta points to the possibilities for the scientific and technological revolution to 
overcome the capitalist logic, which determines that labour be broken down into simple 
operations and that the growth of consumption be restricted. At the heart of his argu-
ment is that the advancement of science and technology enables a stable level of pro-
duction and accumulation. The implication is that labour can possibly escape the rou-
tine of mechanised work, while at the same time, forces could be liberated and used 
for other social purposes (i.e. non-commercial, non-profit and non-accumulation). This 
is a hopeful prospect: “Only the all-round advance of the scientific and technological 
revolution can give rise to a new form of civilisation which, as regards both level of 
development of labour and consumption, corresponds to the requirements of com-
munist society” (65). However, Richta notes that for society to benefit from the scientific 
and technological revolution, a “revolution in social relations is essential” (61). 
Richta’s work has been seen as pioneering but also different from the mainstream 
of communist Czechoslovakia. He saw the scientific and technological revolution as a 
basis for the transition from capitalism to communism but also from authoritarian to 
human-centred communism (Fuchs 2015). At the same time, his use of the scientific 
and technological revolution went beyond the orthodox idea that communism on its 
own would release the technological forces. He placed emphasis on the new paradigm 
of services in civilisation and the role of a new service class in the transformation, 
breaking away from the idea of the working class as central to the coming of the so-
cialist society (Mattelart 2003).  
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The logic of Richta’s argument is not dissimilar to that of Daniel Bell, the early theorist 
of the post-industrial society. Bell traces a historical continuity from the pre-industrial 
to the industrial and post-industrial society by means of rationalisation, which brings 
greater efficiency and increased productivity within each stage and enables the pas-
sage to the next. Rationalisation leads to superfluous labour and increased profits and 
consumption, driving society first from the agrarian mode to manufacturing (industrial 
society) and then to services (post-industrial society). In the first stage, it is manual 
labour and physical power that defines work and societal organisation. In the second, 
it is technology and the use of energy that constitutes the fundamental social parame-
ters and determines the content of jobs. In the third stage, it is organised knowledge 
that defines social relations and labour occupations. The decline of manufacturing with 
the decrease in the number of manual workers, the generation of a number of new 
service sectors and the overall increase in information-handling tasks and specialities 
lead to more white-collar occupations and the predominance of information and 
knowledge (Bell 1973; Webster 2014; Boucas 2010).  
Despite similarities with Richta’s approach, however, Bell was almost inimical to 
the Left. A one-time Trotskyist, he later denounced socialism and became over-critical 
of Marxism and the “European neo-Marxist theoreticians” (including Richta), whose 
aim, he felt, was “not to illuminate actual social changes in the society but to “save” the 
Marxist concept of social change and the Leninist idea of the agency of change” (Bell 
1973, 39-40). 
What constitutes Bell’s criticism, though, seems to make Richta’s account powerful 
and different. He certainly claims that automation can free man “altogether from direct 
participation in the production process. It relieves him from of his role as a mere cog in 
the machine system and offers him the position of inspirer, creator, master of the tech-
nological system, able to stand apart from the immediate manufacturing process” 
(Richta 1969, 112). Richta (1969, 114) adds: “Then, when man stops doing the things 
that things can do for him, he is offered the prospect of creative activity as the normal 
occupation through which he can exercise all his powers – activity imbued with scien-
tific elements, discovery, invention, pioneering and cultivating human powers”. What is 
implied in his account, additionally and importantly, is that these developments are far 
from automatic. “the secret of the present scientific and technological revolution […] 
the most effective means of multiplying the productive forces of society and of human 
life is inevitably found to be the development of man himself, growth of his abilities and 
creative powers – development of man as an end in itself” (Richta 1969, 43, emphasis 
in the original).  
Science, then, does not develop on its own but is rather the result of human en-
deavour. Technological and scientific development relies not on structure but agency; 
Richta’s account is humanist Marxism par excellence.  
In his book Farewell to the Working Class (1982) André Gorz envisages a society 
where automation frees up time from work (done for remuneration) to be devoted to 
other activities that are not for money, but “for the interest, pleasure, or benefit in-
volved”. Gorz, however, argues that whatever the social organisation, capitalist or com-
munist, individual autonomy and fulfilment will be always limited and subsumed by the 
collective societal organisation, market or state. The undermining of personal auton-
omy and pluralism under socialist doctrines limits socialism in the imagination of the 
many. It is this sphere of personal autonomy and freedom of expression “against all 
pressures and external obligations”, a sphere of family life, do-it-yourself, personal in-
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terests, communication, relationships, love that should be protected: “a sphere of sov-
ereignty wrested […] from a world governed by the principles of productivity, aggres-
sion, competition, hierarchical disciplines” (Gorz 1982, 80). 
Gorz quotes from Marx’s Grundrisse: “As soon as labour in the direct form has 
ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be 
its measure, and hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure] of use value. 
[…] With that, production based on exchange value breaks down, and the direct, ma-
terial production process is stripped of the form of penury and antithesis. The free de-
velopment of individualities, and hence […] the necessary labour of society to a mini-
mum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individ-
uals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them” (Marx 1973, 705-
706; see also the quote in Gorz 1982, 81). 
For Gorz, as for Richta, “[t]he manner in which the abolition of work is to be man-
aged and socially implemented constitutes the central political issue of the coming 
decades”. Gorz advocates a guaranteed basic income for all and welcomes a future 
where “the autonomous production of use-values becomes a real possibility for every-
one” (Gorz 1982, 4).  At the same time, he argues that the complete abolition of indus-
trial production and the associated “heteronomous” work is not possible. One reason 
for this is that the tools necessary for the exercise of autonomous work can only be 
produced by industry, as Illich (1973) proposes. Rather, what is to be aspired to is a 
considerable reduction in that sphere, accompanied by the augmentation of “autono-
mous” work. Consequently, Gorz endorses a dual, synergistic societal organisation 
which will aim at a diminishing share for the heteronomous and an increasing one for 
the autonomous mode of production through the liberation of time by technological 
evolution.  
This is not going to happen automatically. Only “if it is combined with effective pos-
sibilities for autonomous production will the liberation of time point beyond the capitalist 
logic, wage system and market relations” (Gorz 1982, 5). Autonomous production is 
incompatible with public or private industrial, commercial or professional monopolies: 
“Effective possibilities for autonomous production cannot exist for everyone without a 
policy providing adequate collective facilities for that purpose” (Gorz 1982, 5, emphasis 
added). Gorz places special emphasis on the role of the state to enlarge the sphere of 
autonomy at the expense of heteronomy. In parallel, he argues that investing in alter-
native technologies and practices and experimentation in social production is quite im-
portant. The emancipatory promise of technological progress, coming from the writings 
of Gorz and Richta, then, can be summarised as follows: 
 
x humans will need to work less, particularly in mundane/mechanical work tasks 
x humans will be able to engage more in socially beneficial work 
x humans will have more opportunities for autonomous, peer production 
x humans will have more opportunities for leisure and consumption 
 
In the next section we assess the degree to which such premises correspond to the 
reality of the contemporary society. 
3. Reality: The Contemporary Digital Capitalist Society 
The theorisation of the scientific and technological revolution and the post-industrial 
society can be compared to the reality of contemporary digital society. The assessment 
of the possibilities for socially purposeful activity (i.e. producing social value), and the 
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prospects and limits to autonomous production, cannot be conducted without an eval-
uation of the contemporary digital/communicative society. The early socialist theorists 
of the information society, as mentioned, were not technological determinists. They 
argued that science, technology, and information do not generate a new state of affairs 
by themselves. Richta and Gorz did acknowledge that a transformation of social rela-
tions would be necessary for the potential of science and technology (and the digital 
society) to be harnessed for a socialist agenda and social framework.  
Castells, the foremost theorist of the “network society”, writing thirty years after 
Richta and fifteen years after Gorz, has argued that the network society is a new type 
of societal organisation with its own logic (the network logic) imposed on social and 
political processes, reconfiguring and redefining them. In this way, the economy be-
comes informational, global, and networked. The firm is transformed into the network 
enterprise. Work and employment adopt flexible patterns and continuous occupational 
mobility. Relationships of production become globalised, labour segmented and social 
classes less coherent. Consumption patterns become diversified, individualised and 
unequal, with growing social polarisation. Organisational hierarchies in all organisa-
tions are challenged. Culture and meaning become increasingly fragmented (Castells 
1996; Castells 1997; Castells 2001).  
Castells has been influenced by Alain Touraine and his theory of post-industrial 
society, which resembles the theory of Bell. He explains that the capitalist crisis of the 
1970s coincided with the development of new information and communication technol-
ogies, which were put in the services of the dominant capitalist mode of production and 
transformed society from an industrial to an information mode of development (Castells 
1996). This rejuvenated and consolidated the failing capitalist system of the time. The 
emergent digital society held distinctive capitalist features. 
Broadly speaking, Castells belongs to the structuralist school of neo-Marxism and 
has been influenced by structuralists such as Althusser and Poulantzas, at least re-
garding his theory of the “network state”. It is no coincidence, then, that there is no 
mention of either Richta or Gorz, who belong to the humanist Marxist school and pay 
more emphasis on agency and praxis, rather than structure. 
In any case, what comes out of Castells’ analysis is that the transformation of social 
relations predicated by Gorz and Richta has not happened. Frank Webster, in a re-
spectable book on theories of information society, identifies global informational capi-
talism as the dominant force shaping contemporary society.  While he does signal dif-
ferences of this contemporary form from corporate or laissez-faire capitalism, he still 
argues that there is a continuity with previous societal stages, in that commercialisation 
and the business and profit logic have been extended and accentuated (Webster 
2014). 
It is under these present circumstances that the four dimensions of a possible dig-
ital/communicative socialist society emanating from Richta’s and Gorz’s work can be 
put to the test. 
3.1. Humans Will Need to Work Less, Particularly in Mundane Tasks  
Contemporary thinkers on the left have often engaged with the automation discourse. 
Srnicek and Williams, for instance, argue that the recent wave of automation will trans-
form the labour market, as “it comes to encompass every aspect of the economy” 
(Srnicek and Williams 2015, 112). Yet, “automation should entail humanity’s liberation 
from toil, but because we live in a society where most people must work in order to 
live, this dream may turn out to be a nightmare” (summarised by Benanav 2019, 6).  
Left accelerationism, a group of thinkers who argue that automation will resolve social 
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problems, is also represented in Aaron Bastani’s (2019) book Fully Automated Luxury 
Communism that envisages a society where artificial intelligence and robots liberate 
humans from labour, where all the needs of humans are met, where there is time for 
personal fulfilment, non-remunerative careers, unlimited public services and consumer 
commodities for all. Bastani draws on various thinkers, including the management 
Guru Peter Drucker but does not mention the work of Gorz and Richta. 
Notwithstanding the vision behind his writings, Gorz was not very optimistic about 
the post-industrial neo-proletariat, which is positioned in an environment of increased 
automation, faces abolition of work tasks, precarity of work (with utmost flexibility and 
no security) and, eventually, unemployment. “Technological development does not 
point towards a possible appropriation of social production by the producers. Instead 
it indicates further elimination of the social producer, and continuing marginalization of 
socially necessary labour as a result of the computer revolution” (Gorz 1982, 72).  
The implication is that labour becomes more individualised (and without collective 
class consciousness), each worker focusing on their individual development. At the 
same time, precarity conceals the real redundancy of labour, and removes the possi-
bility of liberation from it and from the system of social relations that sustains it. Rejec-
tion of the accumulation ethic – and human agency towards this goal – is, for Gorz, the 
only way out of the logic of capital and the system it has generated, which has reached 
its limits. 
It is evident that neither Gorz nor Richta could have anticipated the degree to which 
digital technological developments have pervaded all industries. The technological 
landscape has evolved so rapidly that to come to terms with it is an insurmountable 
task. Indeed, this complexity is demonstrated in the various streams of literature: sci-
ence and technology studies, management and organisational studies, innovation and 
critical media literature, to mention a few (Finn 2017; De Nardis 2014; Lobet-Maris 
2009).  
One dominant feature that stands out is the omnipresence of the Internet, which, 
understandably, could not have been analysed by Richta or Gorz. To be sure, it is hard 
to conceive of standalone technologies in contemporary capitalism any longer. The 
Internet infrastructure, on the whole, is no less than the essential backbone for the 
digital society to exist. This infrastructure in itself is complex enough, not least because 
of its layered architecture (Van Dijk 2012). Significantly, it has redefined business strat-
egies, it has given rise to new business models and has reshaped the space of com-
petition and profit-making in the economy. 
Furthermore, digital and Internet-based capitalism is globalised and involves a va-
riety of traditional and new forms of labour. Its pervasiveness entails the introduction 
of digital functions as part of production, delivery and service processes. These devel-
opments have led to an explosion of digital work. Following Fuchs (2014), we adopt 
the following definitions and differentiation between digital work and digital labour. 
“Digital work includes all activities that create use-values that are objectified in dig-
ital media technologies, contents and products generated by applying digital media” 
(Fuchs 2014, 352); “Digital labour is alienated digital work: it is alienated from itself, 
from the instruments and objects of labour and from the products of labour. Alienation 
is alienation of the subject from itself (labour-power is put to use for and is controlled 
by capital), alienation from the object (the objects of labour and the instruments of 
labour) and the subject-object (the products of labour) […] Examples are slave workers 
in mineral extraction, Taylorist hardware assemblers, software engineers, professional 
online content creators (e.g. online journalists), call centre agents and social media 
prosumers” (Fuchs 2014, 351-352). One can extend the above notions by including 
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also in digital work activities that use to a small or large extent digital means to produce 
non-digital products or services. The smart methods and tools in agriculture, the use 
of computers in production processes for automobiles and airplanes, and the variety 
of online services (e.g. customer services) are cases in point.  
Digital labour is digital work placed in the framework of capitalism and class society. 
Such an extended notion embraces a variety of possible forms of labour in digital cap-
italism and enables a better assessment of where digital labour stands. 
In the realm of production, the pervasiveness of the Internet, the deployment of 
robots, artificial intelligence and smart technologies have given rise to the so-called 
“Industry 4.0”1. Automation in the existing capitalist context has generated new forms 
of organisation of industrial production based in a global organisation of digital labour, 
which includes factory workers working on products with more or less digital content 
or engaging with digital means of production.  
In the realm of service provision, a lot of repetitive and mundane service labour has 
been eliminated or replaced by automated or robotic processes, e.g. in customer ser-
vices. A parallel development is the increasing deployment of platforms, namely “prod-
ucts, services, or technologies that act as a foundation upon which external innovators 
[…] can develop their own complementary products, technologies, or services” (Gawer 
and Cusumano 2014, 417). Companies like Apple, Microsoft, Google and Amazon pro-
vides their platforms for other parties to use and create business ecosystems. Service 
provision is often mediated by such platforms, e.g. transport services like Uber and 
delivery services like deliveroo build their service on platforms such as Google and the 
Apple iOS; in the process they engage the drivers and delivery workers, the platform 
labour.  
 It should also be mentioned that a great deal of service provision has been trans-
ferred to the consumer, becoming thus self-service. Businesses organised as plat-
forms have appropriated digital technologies to provide interfaces whereby consumers 
can perform a variety of service functions – booking, ordering, buying, paying and so 
on. State authorities have replicated the model in electronic government services. The 
performance of these actions – often repetitive, often time-consuming – amounts to 
consumer labour, namely processes where consumers become value-generating 
workers. What emerges can be termed a “self-service economy” where the worker/em-
ployee is gradually abolished and the surplus value appropriated by the business is 
provided by the customers themselves.  
These aspects of global production and service provision suggest that the claim 
that “humans will work less and will work less on mundane tasks” has not been real-
ised. While, in theory, technology socialises labour, in the reality of digital capitalist 
society people depend on wages and the global digital economy depends on labour, 
which through the flexibility of digitalisation and conditions of under-investment has 
become precarious and under-employed (Benanav 2019). This is exactly the contra-
diction identified by Marx: the antagonism between productive forces and productive 
relations within a capitalist class-based framework results in technological develop-
ment acting as a non-emancipatory force (Fuchs 2015). If anything, labour has been 
                                            
1 Industry 4.0 is a term denoting a whole reconfiguration of industrial processes that goes be-
yond the single automation of a single operation, or set of operations, and involves the digit-
isation of all physical assets and integration in an ecosystem that includes the firm and its 
business partners. It involves digitalisation and integration of horizontal and vertical value 
chain, digitisation of products/services offered, digital business models and enterprise-wide 
data analytics (Geissbauer 2016). 
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extended into the leisure sphere, as consumers have become labourers engaged in 
the repetitive and mundane tasks dictated by the digital interfaces of the self-service 
economy. 
3.2. Humans Will Be Able to Engage More in Socially Beneficial Work 
The corollary from the previous discussion is that the circumstances for engagement 
with more socially-oriented or socially beneficial work are not in place. Under-employ-
ment in the capitalist economy, by definition, frees up time (though not due to automa-
tion but due to the reduced amount of paid labour). This provides flexibility and gener-
ates some opportunity for occupying one’s time in alternative ways, many of which 
could be socially beneficial. However, under-employment in practice means reliance 
on more than one paid jobs to generate what can resemble a full salary. Precarity and 
under-employment are part of the picture that Bauman has so eloquently identified in 
his theorisation of “liquid modernity” and “liquid life” (Bauman 1990; Bauman 2005).  
In addition, flexibility and the modular character of work, together with lack of secu-
rity, create a state of consciousness which eats up the psychological background 
needed for humans to exercise their social nature. “The individual becomes an isolated 
monad always looking for new forms of socialisation, which instead of providing safety 
and welfare, increase the gap between man and the Self and between man and the 
other. It is a social system that –despite being in possession of increasingly innovative 
means to communicate and interact with their fellows- generates discomfort and lone-
liness” (Palese 2013, 2).  
This is not cultivation of the individual sphere of creativity, as Marx and Gorz would 
advise. It is rather the plunging of individualism into consumerism to resolve unhappi-
ness: “The exit from a state of unhappiness can […] only be through an operation 
committed by happiness-seekers on themselves, and each one on their own, not by 
the many seekers after happiness putting their heads together to design the shape of 
a better world and then joining ranks and working together to make it better” (Bauman 
2005, 132). 
This does not mean, of course, that individualism has pervaded the entire social 
fabric. Individualism is a generalisation with limits and there are (and always will be) 
pockets of social community. It makes sense, then, to consider the organisational 
premises within which communities (and also individuals) can exercise their productive 
capacities. 
3.3. Humans Will Have More Opportunities for Autonomous Peer Production 
Peer production (often also “P2P production”) “has been broadly portrayed as a ge-
neric form of self-organization among loosely-affiliated individuals that volunteer on 
equal footing to reach a common goal” (Bauwens, Kostakis and Pazaitis 2019, 4). Peer 
production is mostly associated with creative and knowledge-based work, as it is often 
organised through distributed means of production (e.g. computer and Internet re-
sources) and is based on information, which is naturally abundant and can be shared 
without cost. In these circumstances, the argument is that peer production presents 
advantages over markets, privatisation of information, and managerial or state plan-
ning (Benkler 2006). 
Autonomous (individual and) peer production rests on at least two suppositions: 
firstly, a reasonable degree of autonomy and secondly, the presence and availability 
of knowledge (for personal use and for sharing among peers). As mentioned, auton-
omy from the necessity of work-for-income does not exist under the present circum-
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stances of digital capitalism. As autonomous peer production is premised on the avail-
ability of distributed information and communication resources, the question becomes 
whether the Internet could compensate by providing the necessary degrees of freedom 
for autonomous production and availability of knowledge.  
In its original conception and decentralised organisation, the Internet gave such 
opportunities for peer-to-peer engagement and knowledge sharing. Indeed, one might 
be tempted to argue that the World Wide Web’s interface with its ubiquitous access to 
information, as well as the presence of platforms on which users can generate and 
share content, obey the premises of autonomous and peer production. Critical analy-
sis, though, suggests that autonomous peer production cannot be reconciled with the 
current character of the Internet. This is for (at least) two reasons: online surveillance 
and the privatisation of knowledge. 
John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney (2011) describe in vivid strokes the 
ways in which the Internet has become a colonised space for capitalist activity and 
profit-making. They focus on the processes of Google, Microsoft, Apple and a handful 
of other companies capitalising on network effects on their platforms through applica-
tions and reaping increasing monopoly benefits by creating barriers to entry for com-
petitors: “Competitive strategy in this sphere revolves around the concept of the lock-
in of customers and the leveraging of demand-side economies of scale, which allow 
for the creation of massive concentrations of capital in individual firms” (Foster and 
McChesney 2011, 26).  
By exploring the close connections between government policy and monopoly 
power in the form of the capitalist state’s deregulation policies, Foster and McChesney 
also emphasise that neoliberalism has advanced the demise of a basic pillar of liberal 
democratic theory, i.e. the separation of public and private interests. The close alliance 
between corporate power (interested in profits) and state power (interested in surveil-
lance) have shrunk the sphere of political liberty.  
Surveillance is indeed a key feature of the contemporary digital society and one 
that has been well-documented in literature. Lyon (2007) analyses the explosion of 
personal data through Internet traffic and the processes through which states deploy 
them for social sorting and profiling in the name of citizen safety, particularly in the post 
9/11 era. Power and politics are accompanied by economic processes whereby cus-
tomer data are invited, stored and traded as valuable commodities in the “surveillance 
society” (Lyon 2007). The more communication and knowledge are mediated by big 
corporations that monopolise vital Internet activities (search, social networking, user-
generated digital content, etc.) the more opportunities exist for any individual (online) 
activity to be recorded, monitored, endlessly stored, recombined, analysed, targeted, 
etc. with the help of large databases stored on server farms and AI-based algorithms.  
Zuboff (2019) sees surveillance as the key distinctive feature of the present digital 
society. Her focus is on what she calls “behavioural surplus” which is the outcome of 
online activity and which is utilised by Google and other digital companies as “surveil-
lance assets”: “These assets are critical raw materials in the pursuit of surveillance 
revenues and their translation into surveillance capital. The entire logic of this capital 
accumulation is most accurately understood as surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff 2019, 
94, emphasis in the original). 
Understandably, not all production and activity takes place online. However, sub-
jecting online communication and knowledge tools to the checks and monitors of plat-
form capitalism (Srnicek 2016) severely restricts the possibility of autonomous produc-
tion. 
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The other premise of autonomous production is the availability of free knowledge. 
Broumas discusses the “intellectual commons”, which are related to “terrains of mainly 
intellectual, as demarcated from those of chiefly manual, human activity” and include 
“social structures related primarily to intellectual work in terms of the production, distri-
bution, and consumption of information, communication, knowledge, and culture, 
which are subject to dynamic change” (Broumas 2017, 1510).  
Broumas identifies the expansion of intellectual commons in processes and in-
stances such as open hardware design, open standards, free and open source soft-
ware, online content under creative commons licenses, and various collaborative me-
dia. All these Internet-mediated activities create a “kaleidoscope of sharing and collab-
orative innovation”, which “constitutes our digitized environments not as private enclo-
sures but as shared public space, a social sphere divergent from the one reproduced 
by the market and the state” (Broumas 2017, 1507-1508).  
The question, however, remains one of the relative weight and presence of such 
practices compared to profit-making and knowledge-enclosing and privatisation pro-
cesses and practices over the Internet. We will return to this issue in our discussion of 
alternatives in Section 4.  
3.4. Humans Will Have More Opportunities for Leisure and Consumption 
The expansion and generalisation of the Internet has meant that many leisure and 
consumption activities take place in the online environment. Examples include online 
social communication, online entertainment through a variety of media, or online for-
mation of communities in the realm of leisure. 
The present character of the Internet mediates such activities in particular ways 
and for particular purposes that have nothing to do with the original intention of those 
(citizens and consumers) who engage in such activities. The question then becomes: 
what kind of leisure and what kind of consumption can one enjoy in digital/surveillance 
capitalism? 
As with the case of work, leisure presupposes conditions of autonomy. However, 
digital capitalism has managed to occupy the space of individuality. One consequence 
is that work and leisure become intermingled. Christian Fuchs notes: “The conver-
gence of work and free time is not automatically a problem in itself if it means that work 
becomes more playful, social and self-determined. The problem under neoliberalism 
and capitalism is, however, that productive labour tends to enter and soak up leisure 
time, resulting in absolute surplus-value production, not the other way round” (Fuchs 
2016, 59). 
A second consequence is existential in more general terms. Zuboff analyses digital 
existence in surveillance capitalism, or, in other words, the ways in which surveillance 
capitalism has conditioned human practice and behaviour. She illustrates how the 
technologies of digital capitalism act to achieve a programme of “behaviour modifica-
tion”. A quote from one of her company interviewees declares: “The goal of everything 
we do is to change people’s actual behaviour at scale. We want to figure out the con-
struction of changing a person’s behaviour, and then we want to change how lots of 
people are making their day-to-day decisions. When people use our app, we can cap-
ture their behaviours and identify good and bad [ones]” (quoted in Zuboff 2019, 296).  
Perhaps this role of digital technologies is not something new. As science, technol-
ogy, and society studies have demonstrated in the last thirty years, the technological 
artefact, or, even more so, the technological order shapes human behaviour (Bijker, 
Hughes and Pinch 1987). What is nowadays distinctive, though, is the extent of reach 
of the digital in all spheres of everyday human existence and the insatiable appetite of 
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digital capitalism to generate revenue out of the data of the users (people, citizens, 
consumers) in all possible ways. As Zuboff notes: “The allure of surveillance revenues 
drives the continuous accumulation of more and more predictive forms of behavioural 
surplus” (Zuboff 2019, 296). 
Leisure and consumption are not exclusively online activities. However, in the pre-
sent digital society, as with the case of work, many of these activities have a digital 
component. This generates user data and possibilities for surveillance. The answer, of 
course, is not to deny digital technology and engagement with the Internet, but, rather, 
to seek an alternative organisation of the Internet.  
4. Alternatives: Changes of Structures and Practices 
If contemporary capitalism has harnessed digital technologies for profit maximisation 
through circumstances of rampant competition; if user engagement with the Internet 
goes through the obligatory passage points of commercialisation, monopoly, and sur-
veillance; if these dimensions can modify and shape human behaviour, then what re-
mains of digital socialism or the digital/communicative socialist network society? 
Our argument is that the socialist network society is possible, provided that there 
are changes both in social structures and human practices.  Giddens’s structuration 
theory has taught that there is always a dialectic between changes in practices and 
changes in structures (Giddens 1984).  
The work of Richta and Gorz can be insightful in the consideration of alternatives, 
as they both emphasise humanist agency, which takes place within existing structures.  
At the level of social structures, material resources and social organisation the com-
mons provide a model towards alternative social arrangements that go beyond market 
and central state organisation. Yochai Benkler argues: “It is the feasibility of producing 
information, knowledge, and culture through social, rather than market and proprietary 
relations – through cooperative peer production and coordinate individual action – that 
creates the opportunities for greater autonomous action, a more critical culture, a more 
discursively engaged and better informed republic, and perhaps a more equitable 
global community” (Benkler 2006, 92).  
Benkler explains that commons-based peer production, and social production more 
generally, are sustainable and efficient ways of organising information production. This 
is because the information infrastructure is, to all intents and purposes, universally 
distributed, while the raw materials of the information economy (information and 
knowledge) are naturally public goods. Here Benkler makes a strong case that the 
most prudent course for any society is to start from the assumption that the Internet 
should be fundamentally outside the domain of capital. In doing so, he echoes Foster 
and McChesney (2011), who apply the Lauderdale Paradox of classical political econ-
omy – the contradiction between public wealth and private riches – to the Internet 
sphere.  
Bauwens, Kostakis and Pazaitis (2019) have recently formulated the Commons 
Manifesto, in which they outline the premises of a peer-to-peer set of production ar-
rangements and social relations in networks where “participants have maximum free-
dom to connect” (Bauwens, Kostakis and Pazaitis 2019, 1). Their use of the term “free-
dom” reflects “the material possibility for many-to-many communications on a global 
scale and the ability of people (peers) to connect, communicate, organise and engage 
in shared value creation, with little to no restrictions regarding location and time” (Bau-
wens, Kostakis and Pazaitis 2019, 85). Their model includes a technological infrastruc-
ture, which enables a new mode of production (the commons) and the potential for 
transition to an economy that can be generative, as opposed to extractive.  
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Gorz, while somewhat pessimist, would appreciate the commons structures, pro-
cesses and practices as a possible vehicle for change towards a more socialist digital 
society. As his humanism is grounded on pragmatism and awareness of the limits to 
emancipation, his endorsement of alternatives would tally with the current co-existence 
of intellectual enclosures of knowledge and commons-based sharing and peer produc-
tion. He would likely have emphasised the importance of the social struggle between 
the forces of commodification and commonification, the result of which is the intellec-
tual commons (Broumas 2017). Richta (1969), on the other hand, would have seen 
intellectual commons as the terrain where “the development of human powers” (90) 
and the “cultivation of human capacities” (44) can materialise through sharing and co-
production of information and knowledge. 
All the above point to the centrality of the Internet as a space where the emancipa-
tory promises of digital socialism can be realised. Given the low costs of reproduction 
of information, digital socialism might be easier to achieve in the realm of the produc-
tion of digital goods than in the realm of the manufacturing of physical products.  There 
has indeed been ample critical engagement with the possibilities of the Internet for 
debate, critique, agency, and emancipation (e.g. Atton 2004; Couldry and Curran 2003; 
Chadwick 2006).  
However, social production necessitates a recasting of the character of the Internet. 
Morozov (2019), for instance, outlines his prerequisites for a possible “digital so-
cialism”. He grapples with more concrete proposals about the ownership of user data 
and the deployment of Internet infrastructure in ways that enhance solidarity, non-mar-
ket relations, as well as decentralised planning. His analysis is based on what he calls 
“the feedback infrastructure”, namely the data collected by big corporations (Internet 
service providers, search engines, social media) through countless traces of online 
activity – or what is commonly termed “big data”2.  
Morozov’s claim is that, instead of being a profit generation mechanism, this infra-
structure could be used to identify social problems, either of local or of more general 
importance. Drawing on the work of Stafford Beer’s work on the Chilean Cybersyn-
project under the socialist Allende government in the early 1970s, Morozov argues that 
decentralised public and civil society institutions, deploying the free and available to all 
digital infrastructure, could arrive at better solutions than the logic of the market and 
competition à la Hayek and neoliberalism. Radical democracy should be combined 
with “radical bureaucracy” and take advantage of the planning and coordination capac-
ities offered by the information infrastructure. Democratisation of artificial intelligence 
and the socialisation of the feedback infrastructure would be necessary to put user 
data and the technological mechanisms (algorithms) acting upon them to more socially 
beneficial use. 
Benkler’s and Morozov’s views are complementary and point to the direction of 
democratic network/communicative digital socialism. What they are missing, though, 
is a roadmap through which such a transformation can start. Our argument is that for 
the above structural changes to happen a change in user practice is also indispensa-
ble. This claim is grounded on the work of Gorz and Richta.  
Recently, we conducted an online survey3 on users’ concerns over the current In-
ternet and their views on possibilities for alternatives. The intention of the survey was 
                                            
2 We prefer the term “digital means of production” as the technologies of the feedback infra-
structure are obviously digital, while the result of their operations is (production of) user data.  
3 Acknowledgement: The results reported are the outcome of work as part of the EU Horizon 
2020 project netCommons: Network Infrastructure as Commons, http://netcommons.eu/, 
grant agreement number: 688768. 
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not to provide representative results, but rather to elicit the opinions of selected groups 
of knowledgeable, competent and frequent Internet users (academics/researchers, 
young people/students, university administrators, IT professionals). With that in mind, 
the recruitment of the participants was carried out through relevant mailing lists4.  
The responses of the survey on the dominance of Google as search engine and 
Facebook as social network echo critical literature on the issue: Google and Facebook 
functioning as single information sources with particular kinds of bias and selectivity 
algorithms involved; Google and Facebook enjoying a monopoly dominance with sig-
nificant power as social influence forces; Google and Facebook using business models 
and practices that are informed by advertising and commercialisation, thus promoting 
a consumerist culture. They paint a picture of reality-shaping through control of infor-
mation, the creation of a stratified attention economy (Introna and Nissenbaum 2000), 
lack of transparency (Lobet-Maris 2009), and surveillance (Andrejevic 2007). 
When it comes to the level of practice and preparedness of the user to engage in 
alternative practices, however, the picture is more ambiguous and equivocal. The rel-
evant questions in the survey read: 
 
x “Would you consider using alternative platforms instead of Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube or Google, if this choice would provide better control of your data and 
privacy?” 
46% mentioned they already used or would use privacy-friendly alternative plat-
forms, 43% said that changing to alternatives would depend on the behaviour of 
their friends. 
x “Would you consider using alternative platforms instead of Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, or Google, if this choice would mean receiving no advertisements?” 
41% already use or would use advertising-free alternative platforms, 45% have said 
changing to such alternatives would depend on the behaviour of their friends. 
 
Respondents also provided open-ended answers which illustrate this ambivalence fur-
ther5. Many express their dislike regarding Facebook, but still consider it necessary for 
communication. Their aversion can be due to commodification, advertisements, poli-
cies, or aesthetics (r124, r345). They show awareness that interactions are monitored 
for targeted advertising but still use it as a platform enabling them to stay in touch with 
                                            
4 The design of the online survey questionnaire has been based on the inclusion of different 
categories of questions, separated in five sections labelled from A to E. After a short expla-
nation of the aims of the questionnaire and the provision of the relevant consent form (in 
A), Section B, drawing on other similar surveys, includes a set of questions about the Internet 
usage and the digital skills of the respondent. Subsequently, Section C, which can be seen 
as the core section of the questionnaire, addresses various concerns that the respondent 
might have as an internet user, relating to areas such as: a) privacy and data control, b) 
digital labour and advertising c) monopolies of information provision, d) Internet governance 
and electronic democracy. Section D explicitly asks respondents to consider community 
networks as an alternative and also seeks to elicit their views as to the potential of such 
networks. Finally, Section E includes demographics of the respondents, as well as certain 
attitudes that they might have towards life and society, which might be indicative of the likeli-
hood to support community initiatives. The full results of the survey are available as open data 
under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial NoDerivatives International 4.0 
License (CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0) at:  https://zenodo.org/record/1294040. 
5 Some of the statements are provided here in direct or indirect speech with the respondent 
number in parentheses. However, this is only a fraction of responses to illustrate the ten-
sions and ambiguities in using digital media platforms.  
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friends worldwide (r525, r529, r1059). Many respondents confess that “there is little I 
can do but submit to it” (r201); “If most people use Facebook, what can I do?” (r63). 
Despite their concerns many users feel they cannot pull out of Facebook (r801, r807) 
and that they will accept the terms of service (r884). Not being on Facebook is equiv-
alent with exclusion from the professional and social groups and their dynamics (r353). 
It becomes almost compulsory to use it and use nothing else (r431).  
As a result, many users are prepared to compromise the security of their data and 
privacy for the sake of convenience, though they do not like this (r702, r1160). Others 
do not even think in terms of privacy and data security, but rather of the opportunities 
for communication provided (r712), or understand the business model and try to be 
selective with the data that they post (r1469).  
We also found ambiguous results when it comes to use of Google services. Google 
is generally considered a superior search engine. Some respondents, however, are 
aware that other search engines are available (r649, r924, r1148) and that one is free 
to choose (r707). Many, however, are not informed of the alternatives that exist (1310, 
2050) or do not know where to find them (815). The fact that there are not visible or 
used shows that people do not care (305). Some respondents stress that it is a matter 
of personal choice and one should understand that they should be careful and decide 
to what extent they want to share their data and make use of the services of these 
large corporations (r567). They point to the degrees of freedom that users have with 
regard to Google: from ignoring the ads to not looking into the top results, which include 
the Google preferences, or not clicking into those results (843).  
What emerges from the survey is a tension associated with users’ engagement with 
Facebook and Google that points to a more generalised ambiguity of user practice vis-
à-vis the Internet. One side of the ambiguity is the possibility of choice. Greenfield 
summarises it in an eloquent, albeit one-sided manner: “Nothing forces anyone […] to 
sign up a profile on Facebook, search with Google, or use Apple computers, and there 
remain wide swathes of the planet where one can go weeks without overtly encoun-
tering any of their products and services. What’s more, even in their core markets their 
dominance is of a relatively recent vintage, and it’s unwise to ascribe to these particular 
enterprises a long-term tenacity and persistence they have yet to demonstrate” 
(Greenfield 2017, 284). None the less, from the perspective of the user, “choice” is 
accompanied by non-participation and social exclusion and these effects are more pro-
nounced in particular demographics, not least the young generation which relies more 
on social media than any other form of communication. The pseudo-choices available 
can be seen as coercion and they force users to comply and participate under the 
terms and conditions dictated by the Internet monopolies. 
These results are relevant in a discussion about the possibilities of alternative In-
ternet organisation. User practice generates networks effects and reinforces the busi-
ness models of large monopoly corporations that dominate the Internet and ascribe to 
it its current commercial, monopolistic, privatised and surveillance form. By the same 
token, the absence of these networks effects would render the very monopoly power 
void. As every user engagement with the artefact (the platform, the search engine, the 
social network, the software code) is, in the final analysis, negotiable and not abso-
lutely stable and determined (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 1987), the character of the 
Internet can possibly change leading to potential transformations in the overall digi-
tal/communicative capitalist society as is currently experienced. 
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5. Conclusion 
On the basis of the above discussion, the contemporary digital society, in its current 
form, cannot serve the emancipatory promise inherent in technological development. 
The promises of digital/communicative socialism for less work, more time, more social 
engagement, more autonomous production and more leisure have not been hitherto 
realised. 
The non-severance of the work/income relationship means that liberation of time is 
accompanied by precarity of work. In parallel, the flexibility of digitalisation is linked to 
the rise of the self-service economy and increases the bureaucratic and administrative 
demands on the individual. 
The conditions of autonomous production are absent, or at least not satisfactory, in 
a digital society with increased surveillance and insufficient ownership (through artifi-
cial scarcity) of information. 
Leisure is delimited by the intrusion of work in daily life with the “always on” condi-
tion of network and digital connectivity.  
Individualism boosted by precarity and competition seals the tomb of social en-
gagement which is diminishing in observable ways (or becomes framed by the rules of 
the game of Google and Facebook). 
Work, production, and leisure are all subjected to the same regime of behaviour 
manipulation and colonisation of subjectivity, a digital form of alienation dictated by 
online engagement mediated by powerful monopoly and commercial interests which 
rely on the private feedback infrastructure of user data. 
Whilst departure from digital technologies is not a possibility, departure from the 
current state of affairs should be kept in sight as the only route towards the digital/com-
municative socialist society. Gorz’s analysis of alternatives and the co-existence of 
heteronomous and autonomous spheres leads to the importance of the commons as 
alternative societal organisation and philosophy. The emphasis on human powers, 
placed by Richta in his discussion of scientific development, needs also to be central 
in the imaginary of digital socialism. Praxis and agency are at the heart of Richta’s and 
Gorz’s post-industrial socialist-humanist theories. We argue that the change can start 
from the digital infrastructure itself and the ways of engagement with it. 
This departure can only be achieved by a combination of policy emanating from 
state and decentralised authorities at the regional, local and community level, together 
with changes in user practices at the individual, group, and family level. Gorz himself 
emphasised the role of the state: “The existence of a state separate from civil society, 
able both to codify objective necessities in the form of law and to assure its implemen-
tation, is thus the essential prerequisite to the autonomy of civil society and the emer-
gence of an area outside the sphere of heteronomy in which a variety of modes of 
production, modes of life and forms of cooperation can be experimented with according 
to individual desires” (Gorz 1982, 112). 
 This will entail a strategy that gradually introduces in the digital infrastructure ele-
ments of collective and social production aiming at serving the information and com-
municative needs of the citizens/users in the most democratic ways, in accordance 
with the premises of the commons. It will require regulation but also investment in pro-
duction facilities and digital education and skills to be able to articulate better those 
user needs. That digital education needs to be part of the policy is the echo of the 
writings of both Richta (“cultivation of human capacities”) and Gorz (who draws on 
Illich’s “tools of conviviality”). 
User praxis can generate the demand for this strategy, as it can create a void in 
user engagement with dominant corporations and a call for the conceptualisation and 
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establishment of alternative software, applications, platforms, and social organisational 
entities to carry those out. As the “behavioural surplus” feeds the current digital means 
of production, a change of practice on the part of the user is able to generate negative 
network effects, reduce monopoly power and gradually collapse the business models 
of big data-handling corporations. Alternative Internet user practices, peer production, 
and coordination with state structures (including municipal and local ones) will be nec-
essary for imagining and realising a more “digital/communicative socialist” network so-
ciety.  
While the outcome is uncertain, the struggles for strengthening the digital commons 
are far-ranging. Such struggles pose possibilities for achieving a gradual but great dis-
ruption of the Internet towards digital socialism. Assuming the continuing significance 
of Internet infrastructure for business and communication, such struggles might be part 
of a grand socio-economic disruption of society as totality.
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Rising With the Robots: Towards a Human-Machine Autonomy 
for Digital Socialism 
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Abstract: This essay is concerned with conceptualising digital socialism in two ways. First, 
this essay typifies digital socialism as a real utopian project bringing together the utopian po-
tential of “full automation” as tied to socio-economic imperatives indicative of socialist aims. 
Second, in recognition of a critical gap between full automation and an emerging technological 
autonomy, this essay argues for a human-machine autonomy that situates autonomy as a 
shared condition among humans and machines. By conceiving of humans and automated 
technologies as autonomous subject aligned against capital, pursuing the aims of digital so-
cialism can anticipate and avoid capitalist ideologies that hinders possibilities for autonomous 
pursuit of digital socialism.  
Keywords: digital socialism, robots, robotics, fully-automated communism, full automation, 
human-machine autonomy, Autonomist Marxism, Autonomism 
1. Introduction 
This essay attempts to answer the question “how do recent debates about ‘full auto-
mation’ and postcapitalist socioeconomics establish a foundation for conceptualizing 
digital socialism?”  
Since 2015, debates about socialism have exhibited a resurgence among public 
consciousness and electoral politics in the western world. From the election of “Marx-
admiring socialist” (Danner 2015) Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the UK Labour Party to 
successive Bernie Sanders U.S. presidential campaigns foregrounding “democratic 
socialism” as a series of comprehensive socio-economic reforms aimed at creating an 
economy that “works for all, not just the very wealthy” (Frizell 2015) to the surge of 
13,000 new members and 100 new chapters of the Democratic Socialists of America 
(DSA) (Schwartz 2017), “socialism” is increasingly mobilized by political actors.  
Concurrently, the emergence of Jacobin as the “leading intellectual voice of the 
American left” (Matthews 2016) and the publication of The Socialist Manifesto: The 
Case for Radical Politics in an Era of Extreme Inequality by Jacobin founder Bhaskar 
Sunkara (2019) – and its coverage in mainstream news outlets from Wall Street Jour-
nal (Swaim 2019) to Slate (Weissman 2019) – have contributed to “more interest in – 
and support for – socialist ideas than at any time in recent American history” (Nichols 
2015, xxv).  
Alongside increasing socialist consciousness and mobilisation, the latter part of the 
2010s gave rise to the era of “automated connectivity” (Van Dijck 2013, 23), as auto-
mated processes built into digital platforms and techniques became significant forces 
in the production, governance, and maintenance of social life (Gillespie 2014; Bucher 
2018). Since 2015, in tandem with the increasing interest in socialism, “full automation” 
has become increasingly central to imagining life beyond capitalism and thinking 
through the material means of reconstituting the production and provisioning of labour, 
goods, and services.  
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To better understand the relationship between contemporary automation and social-
ism, this essay teases out critical strands among recent scholarship to, first, define the 
imperatives of “digital socialism” and, second, interject concerns for technological au-
tonomy otherwise neglected among full automation debates. In doing so, the essay 
argues for digital socialism to be understood as a “real utopian” (Wright 2010) project, 
outlines the imperatives of digital socialism, and stresses the opportunity to conceive 
of autonomy as a shared condition among humans and machines to better solidify and 
anticipate class solidarity amidst the struggle to achieve socialist ends. The essay pro-
ceeds as follows: 
 
x Digital Socialism: Full Automation as Real Utopia (section 2) 
x Socialist Imperative 1: Shifting Values and Ethics Associated with Labour (section 
3) 
x Socialist Imperative 2: Centralised Planning (section 4) 
x Socialist Imperative 3: Basic Services (section 5) 
x Digital Socialism: Strategic Imperatives and Critical Opportunities (section 6) 
x Dualities of Autonomy: Oppositions Between Human and Technological Autonomy 
(section 7) 
x Becoming AutonomoUS: Human-Machine Autonomy (section 8) 
x Human-Machine Autonomy and Solidarity Against Capital (section 9) 
2. Digital Socialism: Full Automation as Real Utopia 
Socialism is a socio-economic system predicated on maximising cooperation, demo-
cratic participation, and egalitarian outcomes in all spheres of life. Communism is a 
successive stage of the socialist project that enables all property and means of pro-
duction to be held in commons (i.e. communally-owned), basic necessities to be ap-
portioned based on a person’s needs, and a centralized source (often conceived as 
the government) to maintain the mechanisms for communal ownership and equitable 
distribution. In and outside the United States, the terms “socialism and “communism” 
tend to be equated with Maoism, Stalinism, and other national communisms that in-
stalled totalitarian ideologues who amassed and wielded power through a form of 
“state capitalism” (Sperber 2019) ill-suited to ennobling the proletariat and resolving 
class struggle through democratic participation. On this front, the contemporary prom-
ulgation of “socialism” is at least somewhat attributable to the fact that it is no longer 
subject to “the burden of being associated in the propaganda systems of East and 
West with Soviet tyranny” (Chomsky 2016), a circumstance that enabled the East to 
maintain power through the aura of socialist aims and the West to demonize socialism 
and communism outright.  
Socialism has led been associated with utopian thought, leading Engels to distin-
guish between utopian socialism (prominent in the 19th century) and the historical ma-
terialism of Marx’s “scientific socialism” (Engels 1880). Utopia is a broad term that en-
compasses a range of ideas about idealised conditions for society. In most cases, uto-
pia is a place, one that is less a physical destination and more of a hypothetical realm 
where a harmonious society can be realised. Utopianism, in this sense, is a mode of 
thinking that attempts to imagine the conditions enabling social harmony, particularly 
in the context of governmental and economic relations. Utopian socialists in the 1880s 
attempted to foster social harmony by “devising plans to make society more coopera-
tive, production more efficient, and distribution more fair” (Paden 2002, 68). These 
plans did not account for class politics and struggle and thus, for Marx and Engels, 
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failed to represent the interests of any class, much less the proletariat forced into inev-
itable contact with capitalist ownership (Paden 2002, 68).  For Engels (1880), then, 
“scientific socialism” entails similar ideas about cooperation and equity rooted in “the 
materialistic conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalistic pro-
duction through surplus-value” (305) such that socialism is primarily concerned with 
“the necessary outcome of the struggle between two historically developed classes – 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie” (304).  
Others attempt to mitigate the ethereal qualities of utopianism with a more prag-
matic perspective on concrete political relations. Notably, Ernst Bloch focused on the 
spiritual aspect of utopia and the ability for political change to alleviate material burdens 
that undermine spiritual fulfilment in lived experience. For Bloch, utopia entails “the 
world of the soul, the external, cosmic function of utopia, maintained against misery, 
death, the husk-realm of mere physical nature” (Bloch 1918/2000, 3) [emphasis in orig-
inal]. Bloch’s utopianism is not an exotic hideaway or a proverbial Shangri-La but an 
inward journey of reflection and recognition of the universal conditions underlying the 
disillusion and disaffection experienced by many in modern capitalism. By reflecting 
on this spiritual condition of modern life, the journey inward illuminates the potential for 
a “utopian reality” (Bloch 1918/2000, 179) envisioned as the ability to strive for a realm 
of fulfilment capable of being actualized in the material world. The recent emergence 
of a “real utopia” works from a similar register.  
As devised by Erik Olin Wright, a “real utopian” project seeks practical opportunities 
to restructure social institutions to instantiate alternatives to capitalism and materialise 
“radical democratic egalitarianism” (2010, 22). By anchoring the large-scale optimistic 
imaginings of utopian thinking with “specific proposals for the fundamental redesign of 
different arenas of social instructions” and “immediately attainable reforms of existing 
practices” (Wright 2010, ii), real utopianism pursues new models for egalitarian prac-
tice predicated on their viability and achievability. While Marx and Engels criticise uto-
pian socialists for a reactionary tendency to appeal to working masses with a religious 
zeal that harkens towards “castles in the air” rather than grounded political struggle 
(1848, 516-517), the real utopian project squares the circle by situating utopian visions 
as an outward projection from the fruits of viable material intervention. In doing so, 
discourses around full automation conceive of automated technologies as “vectors for 
new utopias” (Hester 2018, 8) and oppose the seeming unfeasibility and immobility of 
revolutionary traction, calling for “the futural orientation of utopias” combined with “real 
tendencies of the world today” to devise a feasible starting point for life beyond capi-
talism oriented towards continued progress and development (Srnicek and Williams 
2015, 108). In this way, contemporary ideas about full automation epitomise the spirit 
of real utopianism by, first, specifying contemporary conditions that make economic 
and social reconfigurations strategically viable and, second, leverage “full automation” 
as frame for utopian imaginings.  
As a real utopian project, the emerging digital socialism seeks to avoid the techno-
logical determinisms often associated with the “California ideology”) (Barbrook and 
Cameron 1996; Turner 2010) and other similar utopian ideas that stress free enterprise 
and marketplace expansion as the primary means of creating innovative technologies 
poised to change society for the better. Instead, real utopianism prioritises structural 
changes to policies and ideologies about the interrelationships of work, ownership, re-
source planning and allocation. By typifying the specifics of digital socialism as it 
emerges from debates about full automation from 2015-2019, the goal here is to clarify 
the lay of the land as it is, rather than argue for what it should be. Key works emerging 
during this timeframe include Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without 
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Work (Srnicek and Williams 2015), Four Futures: Life After Capitalism (Frase 2016), 
The Automatic Society: The Future of Work (Stiegler 2018), Xenofeminism (Hester 
2018), Fully-Automated Luxury Communism (Bastani 2019), and Inhuman Power: Ar-
tificial Intelligence and the Future of Capitalism (Dyer-Witheford, Kjøsen and Steinhoff 
2019). All of these monographs in their own ways and to varying degrees – engage 
with full automation in conjunction with describing socio-economic conditions neces-
sary to imagine a postcapitalist world reflective of socialist aims (whether or not the 
term “socialism” is explicitly used). While I ultimately take up the task of more forcefully 
arguing for a solidified conception of human and technological autonomy, the first step 
is to collate and clarify the specifics of digital socialism as it currently stands. In doing 
so, I identity and specify three socialist imperatives significant to current ideas around 
full automation:  
x Generating New Ethics, Values, and Arrangements for Labour 
x Centralising Economic Planning 
x Implementing Basic Services 
3. Socialist Imperative 1: Shifting Values and Ethics Associated With Labour 
In the case of the first socialist imperative, Srnicek and Williams (2015, 125) decry the 
capitalist work ethic’s insistence that “renumeration be tied to suffering” and suffering 
the indignities and inequities of capitalist exploitation is “the only means for true self-
fulfillment”. To their minds, the ability to implement full automation must account for the 
long-standing desire to attain status through work, even if said work is seen as unde-
sirable. Significant cultural shifts around the work ethic can not only help underscore 
the possibilities for personal and collective fulfillment beyond market demands but also 
mitigate the precarity and turbulence of labour markets increasingly apt to diminish the 
abundance, variability, and remunerative sufficiency of work prospects. As a viable 
starting point, shortening the hours of the formal work week could reduce the amount 
of hours in the five-day week or institute a permanent three-day weekend (Srnicek and 
Williams 2015, 116).   
In a similar vein, xenofeminism situates automation and other technologies as the 
means to reconfigure cultural notions of work. Xenofeminism is a recent strand of tech-
nofeminism that seeks to abolish the imposition of gender binaries and overturn es-
sentialist gender ideologies associated with biological and social reproduction (Hester 
2018). Xenofeminism’s pursuit of gender abolition and anti-naturalism stresses “post-
industrial automation” (Hester 2018, 8) and related techno-materialisms as a means of 
changing concrete relations among gender, work, and social institutions (such as the 
family). Understood as a “multiply gendered world” (Hester 2018, 30), xenofeminsm’s 
gender abolition seeks to enlarge the range of gendered expression and concomitantly 
undo expectations of domestic labour as tied to gender. Shifting cultural ideas about 
the constructed and contested nature of gender is part and parcel of undoing “culturally 
weaponised markers of identity that harbor injustices” (Hester 2018, 30), including the 
necessity of child labour as a potentially dangerous bodily labour undertaken by 
women and ensuing expectations around childrearing and domestic caretaking. Be-
yond undoing gender naturalism and expectations around domestic and biological la-
bour, Hester offers Donna Haraway’s (2016) notion of “kin” as a “means of prioritizing 
the generation of new kinds of support networks” (Hester 2018, 63) to realise new 
forms of collaborative work and care, a “counter-social reproduction” envisioned as 
“social reproduction against the reproduction of the social as it stands” (Hester 2018, 
64) [emphasis in original].  
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Offering full automation as an orienting force for collectivist formation and harmony, 
Bernard Stiegler (2018) situates capitalist automation as an entropic force that gener-
ates ever-increasing uncertainty, disorder, and instability in capitalist markets and so-
ciety at large. These sentiments are internalised by everyday people who come to en-
vision the future as inhospitable and devoid of the potential for widespread prosperity. 
For Stiegler (2018, 7), full automation is an opportunity for “dis-automatization”, the 
harnessing of energies previously-dedicated to formal wage labour and recalibrated 
towards “collective investment of the productivity gains derived from automatization” 
(Stiegler 2018, 15) [emphasis in original], a collectivism predicated on a negentropic 
perspective that offsets the disarray of capitalism’s automated entropy and engenders 
possibilities for egalitarian order and harmony. “Collective investment” also speaks to 
the need for economic and personal investment in work arrangements to be under-
stood in terms of cooperation and plurality, eschewing the individualistic drives of cap-
italism to amass capital in defiance of the common good.  
In their critique of full automation that foregrounds the role of artificial intelligence 
(AI), Dyer-Witheford, Kjøsen and Steinhoff’s (2019, 153-156) “communist orientation 
to AI” attempts to reconfigure the relationship between postcapitalist futures and auto-
mated technologies. Rather than positing full automation as an opportunistic moment 
or tool to be seized and applied towards the break from capitalism, a communist ori-
entation to AI prioritises “liquidating the structural dynamics of capital” (153) undergird-
ing the development of automated technologies and the ethos built into these technol-
ogies by companies driven to patternise forms of social interactivity antithetical to so-
cialist solidarity. To these authors’ minds, the goal should be to expropriate capital from 
AI, collectivise ownership of AI, and retrain AI to function in accordance with collecti-
vised values and structure to enact a “true democratization of AI” (Dyer-Witheford, 
Kjøsen and Steinhoff 2019, 154). Among such collectivised values, collectivised own-
ership is a central facet of the second strategic imperative of digital socialism. 
4. Socialist Imperative 2: Centralised Planning 
Similar to the way “full automation” is situated as a touchstone for charting a course 
beyond the confines of capitalism, “post-scarcity” is a similar touchstone among advo-
cates of centralised planning (Frase 2016; Bastani 2019; Phillips and Rozworski 2019) 
who attempt to reconcile the technological ability to produce an uncapped abundance 
of goods and services with the artificial limits placed on production and dissemination 
by private ownership. Central planning entails a production of goods and services as 
directed by a governmental source to equitably allocate these goods and services. 
Even as some aspects of centralised planning receive more analysis than others, one 
of the recurrent themes among central planners is the ability to generate an abundance 
of goods and services equitability doled out through such planning, thereby transcend-
ing scarcity as a circumstance of private accumulation. One of the common threads 
about central planning advocacy is that forms of privatised central planning already in 
place are useful structures capable of being refashioned to equitably allocate re-
sources. 
One of the central tenets of Aaron Bastani’s (2019) advocation for a fully-automated 
luxury communism is the necessity of demanding “the intentional, conscious planning 
at the heart of modern capitalism be repurposed to socially useful ends rather than 
socially destructive ones” (227). Bastani shows a particular concern for finance, fore-
grounding centralised banking and “municipal protectionism” (207) as two interrelated 
facets of central planning. Whereas central and private banks currently prioritise the 
administration of loans and other fiduciary mechanisms based on the assets held by a 
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borrower and the likelihood of lending as a profitable venture, nationalised central 
banking shows the potential to guard against the inequities of capitalist finance by 
overseeing an informal network of locally-owned businesses and banks. In this context, 
“municipal protectionism” refers to the pursuit of localised businesses owned by work-
ers that can better mitigate inequality through a wider range of ownership models (210). 
Tied to finance emanating from local banks and credit unions and mitigated by a cen-
tralised national bank tasked with ensuring equitable allocation, these types of busi-
nesses can protect against micro forms of capitalist domination within the workplace 
and macro forms of capitalist domination in society at large (211).  
In Leigh Phillips and Michael Rozworski’s (2019) monograph-length case study of 
Wal-Mart’s internal central planning, they stress “openness and cooperation along the 
supply chain” as fundamental to planning and the ability to continuously replenish re-
sources (2019, 38). By arguing for Wal-Mart’s internal supply chain structure as a cen-
tralised mode of production and distribution predicated on collaboration and coopera-
tion among participants, Phillips and Rozworski highlight institutional and political prac-
tices already at play that offer a viable means of recalibrating towards socialist ends. 
In their conception, central planning is not the purview of a small group of planners, 
programmers, or algorithmic calculations but, instead, relies on democratic participa-
tion at all points of production and consumption, if “computer-assisted, decentralized, 
democratic economic decision making” is to be realised (Phillips and Rozworski 2019, 
213).  
By treating the possibility of full automation and (post)scarcity as a given, Peter 
Frase (2016) outlines four possible future scenarios based on recomposed dualities of 
dualities of hierarchy/egalitarianism and scarcity/abundance: communism (egalitarian-
ism and abundance), rentism (hierarchy and abundance), socialism (egalitarianism 
and scarcity), and exterminism (hierarchy and scarcity). Planning is but one of many 
facets impinging upon the extent to which resources are centralised for equitable allo-
cation or concentrated for hierarchical control and, concomitantly, the extent to which 
resources are produced and replenished. Central planning and allocation also underlie 
efforts to instantiate and provide basic services.  
5. Socialist Imperative 3: Basic Services 
One of the most widely and frequently discussed ideas related to full automation is the 
possibility of a basic income (BI), often conceived as a universal or unconditional basic 
income (UBI). A basic income is the allocation of a nominal sum of money on a recur-
ring basic to individuals who are not required to provide labour in exchange for this 
income. Much like the recent resurgence of socialist thought in mainstream political 
discourse, basic income is an old idea that has received considerable recent attention 
in correlation with full automation. Since 2015, a veritable cottage industry of popular 
press and trade books have outlined the case for basic income (Stern 2016; Van Parijs 
and Vanderborght 2017; Bregman 2017; Lowery 2018), with UBI serving as a corner-
stone of Andrew Yang’s 2020 presidential campaign (Yang 2019).  
Advocacy for (U)BI tends to stress the increased power workers can enjoy when 
economic livelihood is not solely tied to wage labour, often stipulated as a necessary 
condition to address the diminishing need for human labour amidst the rise of full au-
tomation. With a UBI in place, workers could potentially choose not to work for certain 
periods of time, thereby increasing their individual negotiating power and the holistic 
power of labour (Srnicek and Williams 2015, 120). So long as it is sufficient to provide 
basic sustenance, allocated unconditionally, and a supplement to welfare programs 
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(rather than a replacement), the working class can experience greater “voluntary flex-
ibility” as opposed to precarity, instability, and insecurity (Srnicek and Williams 2015, 
119; 212). At the individual level, UBI could function as a mechanism for providing 
universal access to resources while guarding against overuse (Frase 2016).  
Criticisms of UBI stress the possibility of UBI as a salve to libertarian and neoliberal 
ideologies intent on replacing welfare programs with a lump monetary sum, a “full mar-
ketization of the welfare state” (Bastani 2019, 225). The concern is that pairing UBI 
with full automation does not alter the relationship between ownership and labour and, 
rather than augmenting the power of labour against ownership, risks a “miserable pen-
ury” for people whose labour potential is seen as useless and cordoned off from further 
economic and social mobility (Dyer-Witheford, Kjøsen and Steinhoff 2019, 150-151).  
In addition to Srnicek and Williams insisting on UBI as a supplement to welfare 
programmes, Bastani (2019, 215, 217) accounts for UBI as a compliment to five es-
sential basic services provided on an unconditional basis: housing, transport, educa-
tion, healthcare and information, wherein “information” is understood as “media pro-
duction and connectivity”. Under Bastani’s model, the state plays an indispensable role 
in “procurement with local worker cooperatives building homes, hospitals and schools 
as well as performing catering, maintenance, cleaning, and support services,” indicat-
ing a continued role for private ownership with the caveat “the leverage of anchor in-
stitutions will only expand”, given the role of worker-owned businesses more suited to 
address the common good (217).  
6. Digital Socialism: Strategic Imperatives and Critical Opportunities  
At this point, we can now more specifically sketch “digital socialism” as a real utopian 
project advocating for full automation as a utopian beacon enjoined with the viable and 
practical pursuit of the following: 
 
x Generating New Ethics, Values, and Arrangements for Labour  
o Undoing the capitalist work ethic and gendered associations with domestic la-
bour 
o Shortening the formal working week  
o Pursuing collectivity as a means of instituting social harmony, reshaping institu-
tional arrangements, and ensuring collectivist values can be built into auto-
mated technologies  
 
x Centralised Planning 
o Planned allocation predicated on democratic participation from contributors and 
recipients of goods and services 
o A network of localised worker-owned businesses, banks, and financial services 
operating under a “municipal protectionism” that guards against capital flight 
o Central federal banking that supports and protects localised businesses and fi-
nance 
 
x Basic Services 
o Universal access to publicly-developed education, transport, housing, 
healthcare, and media connectivity and production 
o A basic income apportioned unconditionally as a supplement to universally-
available basic services 
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From this foundational point, the foremost opportunity in pursuit of these goals is to 
ensure ideas about the relationship of full automation to socialist imperatives do not 
fall into traps laid by cultural ideas about the nature of autonomy and technological 
autonomy as an inevitable threat to workers.  
7. Dualities of Autonomy: Oppositions Between Human and Technological Auton-
omy  
“Autonomous technology” refers to both a long-standing cultural fear about the social 
implications of technological progress and the functional ability for technologies to op-
erate free from direct human intervention. In terms of the latter, degrees of automated 
capacity are often described in terms of technological autonomy. A fruitful example is 
self-driving cars, often referred to as “autonomous” cars. Levels of automation desig-
nated by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) range from “zero autonomy” to 
“full autonomy” along a successive scale of automated capability running from zero to 
five (with zero as “no automation” and five as “full automation”) (NHTSA 2019). Achiev-
ing full automation means that, in the case of self-driving cars, the vehicle can perform 
driving tasks that do not require a human to operate or intervene (although the tech-
nology may allow for human manual operation). As a cultural fear, autonomous tech-
nology refers to a belief that technology has “gotten out of control and follows its own 
course, independent of human direction” (Winner 1977, 13). One of the primary con-
cerns of functional technological autonomy is the realisation of such fears as reinforced 
by pop culture depictions (i.e. the Terminator and Westworld franchises), mainstream 
news headlines declaring “The Future Has Lots of Robots, Few Jobs for Humans” 
(McNeal 2015), and popular press books such as Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelli-
gence and the End of the Human Era (2013).  
Even as recent scholarly discourse stresses the utopian potential of full automation, 
other pervasive cultural discourses about the dystopian “hegemonic” or “apocalyptic” 
implications of technological autonomy advance ideas about the possibilities for wide-
spread social control or “agents of doom” posing an existential threat to human vitality 
(Nye 2004, 171). Where the cultural fear of autonomous technology is primarily “the 
question of human autonomy held up to a different light,” (Winner 1977, 43), one of the 
primary fears about self-driving cars and other present-day autonomous technologies 
is the direct threat to posed to the autonomy of human labourers.  
Books such as The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time 
of Brilliant Technologies (2014) and Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of 
a Jobless Future (2015) stress the increasing capability of intelligent machines to per-
form cognitive tasks once believed to be the unique purview of human intellect. Postu-
lations about a forthcoming “automation wave” (Ford 2015) posit an impending tide of 
machines poised to “steal” the jobs of human labourers and threaten to deepen levels 
of socio-economic inequality as human workers are displaced – and replaced – in cor-
ollary with the escalation of automation towards technological autonomy. The threat to 
the autonomy of human labour supposed by technological autonomy epitomises many 
of Marx’s concerns about strife and competition within the working class and the inten-
sification of this circumstance when capitalist production pits machines against hu-
mans.  
In Capital, Marx describes the labouring capacity of machines as pitted against hu-
man workers and, because of this competition: “The self-valorization of capital by 
means of the machine is related directly to the number of workers whose conditions of 
exis- tence have been destroyed by it” (Marx 1867, 557). Just as, with respect to com-
modities, “the devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing 
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value of the world of things” (Marx 1844, 271) [emphasis in original], Marx posits a 
similar corollary relationship between humans and machines whereby the ability for 
human workers to seek and procure payment for their labour is invariably diminished 
the more ownership turns to machinic production. Ever the foresighted critic, Marx rec-
ognised that “machinery necessarily throws men out of work in those industries into 
which it is introduced, it may, despite this, bring about an increase of employment in 
other industries” (Marx 1867, 570). While technological innovation has historically led 
to the emergence of new industrial paradigms that reconfigure the types – rather than 
the amount – of labour required (Bastani 2019), the contemporary narrative that “this 
time is different” indicates an unprecedented and inalterable risk of permanent dis-
placement due to the humanlike intelligence of increasingly autonomous technology 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Ford 2015).  
Thus, despite the worthiness of drawing out the utopian potential of full automation 
amidst recent debates, such debates neglect the tendency of full automation to con-
note fearful notions of autonomous technology and what it portends for the potential of 
workers to direct their individual and collective capacities towards fruitful socio-eco-
nomic gains. In this vein, foregrounding full automation risks reinforcing and uninten-
tionally capitulating to Marx’s concerns about competition between humans and ma-
chines and its potential to agitate intra-class strife among human workers. Applied to-
wards socialist pursuits, the dichotomy between human and technological autonomy 
is a critical gap between the ability to imagine the utopian potential of full automation 
and pursue a democratic egalitarianism that can realise strategic imperatives that 
make full automation a viable venture.   
To mitigate this gap, I offer human-machine autonomy (Cox 2018) as a conceptual 
frame for recognising that autonomy is not couched in a singular entity, be it human or 
machine. Within this mindset, understanding human-machine autonomy as a shared 
condition among humans and highly-automated technologies resists misconceptions 
about autonomy as an innately dominating force and capitulation to capitalist ideolo-
gies around labour and class composition. The next section unpacks aspects of auton-
omy amenable to this line of thinking, before pulling from autonomist Marxism theory 
to stress autonomy as a shared condition between humans and technologies and hu-
man-machine alignments against capital.  
8. Becoming AutonomoUS: Human-Machine Autonomy 
Ideas about technological and human autonomy as separate and discreet forces ex-
isting in negative correlation arise from illusory notions of autonomy as the sole prov-
ince of an individualistic self. Autonomy is a “political or moral conception that brings 
together the ideas of freedom and control” often conceived as the ability to be “self-
governing, independent, not ruled by an external law or force” (Winner 1977, 16). 
Scholars of technology and identity, however, reject the conception of an individual self 
as the source and purview of autonomous potential, particularly on the grounds that 
the autonomy of the self is a politics of domination. In her “Cyborg Manifesto”, Donna 
Haraway problematises autonomy as emerging from the relationship between the self 
and the other. For Haraway, the self is one who is not dominated, a non-domination 
understood only in relation to the dominance of the other. The supposed ontological 
nature of the self is “to be autonomous, to be powerful” (Haraway 1990, 219). The 
ability to experience freedom and control is therefore tied to the ability to impose one’s 
will onto others, a “tragedy of autonomy” that valorises the supremacy of the self 
through the domination of the other (Haraway 1990, 219). In their recent critique of 
technology as a “surrogate humanity”, Atanasoski and Kalindi (2019, 136) attempt to 
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further liquidate notions of autonomy in relation to a dominating self, citing the “myth 
of the autonomous human” as the product of a “racial fetish of post-Enlightenment 
thinking” emanating from colonialist histories built on subjugation and servitude and 
attendant notions of autonomy as a possibility for those who possess mastery and 
control over the subjugated and servile. 
Such ideas about autonomy as a dominating self extends to technological auton-
omy, as the cultural fear of autonomous technology expresses itself as not only the 
loss of control over machines but as “the style of absolute mastery, the despotic, one-
way control of the master over the slave” (Winner 1977, 20). Viewed through this lens, 
the fear of autonomous technology can be understood as bound up in the perceived 
inability for humans to dominate a technological other and the ability for a technological 
other to exert the same type of domination humans pursue through autonomous will.  
In other words, for all that the illusory concept of autonomy as the purview of the 
self imparts about the politics of domination, one of the most critical points is that hu-
mans and technology share the same root conception of autonomy. Human and tech-
nological autonomy is not a matter of “here” and “there” but a shared condition inade-
quate to delineation along lines of a human or machine and, instead, invokes the same 
questions around the pursuit and application of power, freedom, and control. As Hara-
way notes, technology is not an object to be “animated, worshipped and dominated. 
The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment” (Haraway 1990, 222). 
Where autonomy “cannot simply be understood as freedom from others” (Baker and 
Hesmondhalgh 2013, 40), these “others” include both human and machine counter-
parts.   Moreover, instead of conceiving of autonomy as self-set life against or apart 
from an “other,” recognizing that we are  “socially constituted by others beyond them-
selves” (Baker and Hesmondhalgh 2013, 40) imparts of a sense of how our autono-
mous potential is truly a question of our autonomy. In other words, conceived in oppo-
sition to dualistic conceptions, autonomy is always a shared condition among humans 
and between humans and machines, even though autonomy is not equitably afforded 
or experienced. This does not entail a deterministic relationship, however, as economic 
relations, culture, legal frameworks, and other vectors constitute the circuity that gives 
human-machine autonomy its variable charge. Notions of autonomy with respect to 
capitalist relations and technology underscore human-machine autonomy as a shared 
condition among humans and machines the way capitalism organises and patternises 
possibilities for autonomy among ownership, workers, and machines.  
Notably, Andrew Feenberg describes “operational autonomy” as a facet of capitalist 
ownership that incorporates autonomous potential into organisation, machinic, and 
workflow processes:  
Operational autonomy is the power to make strategic choices among alternative 
rationalizations without regard for externalities, customary practice, workers' 
preferences, or the impact of decisions on their households. Whatever other 
goals the capitalist pursues, all viable strategies implemented from his peculiar 
position in the social system must reproduce his operational autonomy. The 
‘metagoal’ of preserving and enlarging autonomy is gradually incorporated into 
the standard ways of doing things, biasing the solution to every practical prob-
lem toward certain typical responses. In industrial societies, strategies of domi-
nation consist primarily in embedding these constancies in technical proce-
dures, standards, and artifacts in order to establish a framework in which day-
to-day technical activity serves the interests of capital (Feenberg 2002,76). 
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Understood in this light, capital implants self-serving notions of autonomy into pro-
cesses that carry through to the fabric of material existence so that the autonomous 
potential of capital is reproduced and enhanced. To the extent that operational auton-
omy is a hegemonic imposition of capital, workers possess a counterhegemonic po-
tential, a “reactive autonomy” that Feenberg (2002, 84) otherwise refers to as a “margin 
of maneuver”. This reactive autonomy entails the ability of workers to leverage capital-
ist technology for the purposes of “controlling work pace, protecting colleagues, unau-
thorized productive improvisations, informal rationalizations and innovations” (Feen-
berg 2002, 84), and otherwise countervailing the operational autonomy of ownership. 
Reactive autonomy is a margin of manoeuvre because the degree to which workers 
exercise autonomy can expand or contract, as can the operational autonomy of capital. 
Much like autonomy among humans and technology, operational, and reactive auton-
omy are not bracketed off from one another and instead exist as co-constituted forms 
of autonomy inflecting upon on one another even though it is not supposed that reac-
tive autonomy ever exceeds operational autonomy or reactive autonomy is the exem-
plar way for workers to attain and experience autonomy. Automation plays a variable 
role in this dynamic, as it 
increases management's autonomy only at the expense of creating new prob-
lems that justify workers' demands for an enlarged margin of maneuver. That 
margin may be opened to improve the quality of self-directed activity or it may 
remain closed to optimize control (Feenberg 2002, 96).  
To the mind of the capitalist, regardless of the degree of freedom or control afforded 
to labour, capitalist exchange “maximizes autonomy in general, promising liberation of 
the human essence from fixed definitions” (Feenberg 2002, 162), since ongoing acqui-
sition and accumulation are infinite and therefore entail a range of shifting arrange-
ments that increase both operational and reactive autonomy in the aggregate.  
Of course, this does not hold up to baseline Marxian scrutiny, as reactive autonomy 
is an autonomy conceived and experienced only within the auspices of capitalist ex-
ploitation, alienation, and expropriation of surplus-value, as if operational autonomy 
was a natural phenomenon ensconced in some ineffable firmament and not the result 
of historical processes predicated on vouchsafing power and control in the hands of a 
dominant few. Nonetheless, reactive autonomy reinforces the central idea of human-
machine autonomy: autonomy is a shared condition experienced with varying intensi-
ties relative to critical socio-economic inputs shaping how autonomy is conceived, pur-
sued, attained, and experienced. Furthermore, reactive autonomy shines a light on the 
autonomy of labour, understood by Autonomist Marxism as not only the autonomous 
potential of labour within capital, but the recognition that labour already possesses the 
ability to be autonomous from capital.  
While the preceding stresses the autonomy of human-machine autonomy as one 
resistant to traditional notions of autonomy as the purview of the dominating self and, 
instead, a shared condition among humans and technology shaped by relations to pro-
duction and other critical vectors, the final section draws from Autonomist Marxism to 
recalibrate a particular strand of Autonomist thought that considers technology as the 
means for capitalist domination and the autonomy of workers as the potential to over-
come such technology through class conflict. Rather than positing capitalist technology 
as the dominating force, or the force that must be dominated, the goal in this final 
section is to reframe this argument in terms that seek to illuminate how dichotomies of 
human/technology and domination/control are apt to reinforce the individualistic drives 
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of capitalist competition that pit workers against one another and fracture opportunities 
for solidified class struggle. Conceiving of autonomy as a shared condition among hu-
mans and machines emphasises the commonality already at hand among labour and 
the ability to draw from the shared potential for autonomy to maximise its potential in 
work arrangements and the overarching struggle against capital.  By doing so, the 
ability to align full automation with strategic imperatives for socialism can evade tech-
nological dystopia, maximise utopian potential, and otherwise resist capitulation to 
strife among labour entities (human and machine).  
9. Human-Machine Autonomy and Solidarity Against Capital 
Autonomist Marxism is a branch of Marxian inquiry that affirms the potential of labour 
distinct from capitalist arrangements (Negri 2005; Berardi 2009; Tronti 1966/2000), 
foregrounding labour’s “creative human energy” and the labourer as the “active subject 
of production, the wellspring of the skills, innovation and cooperation on which capital 
depends” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 65). Autonomy, in this context, also refers to “labor’s 
fundamental otherness from capital and also the recognition of variety within labor” 
(Dyer-Witheford 1999, 68). The variety within labour speaks to the recognition that 
capitalist labour is not a uniform series of functions and workers can strive for circum-
stances best suited to differentiated skills, innovation, and cooperation, even as wage 
labour imposes itself as in restrictive force for worker autonomy. Labour’s “otherness” 
from capital, on the other hand, recognises the ability of the working class to exist apart 
from capitalism, while capitalism cannot exist without the working class.  Since capital-
ism can only instantiate and maintain power through the institutionalisation of its aims, 
the autonomous potential of labour lies in a “non-institutionalized political power” 
unique to the working class (Tronti 1966/2000, 247), whose position as the subject of 
production entails an innate power unbeholden to institutional forms or the auspices of 
capitalist accumulation.  
The Autonomist position on technology tends to correspond to the notion of auton-
omy as the grounds for domination. On one hand, technology is the means for capital 
to control and dominate workers while, on the other hand, capitalist technology is the 
thing that should be dominated, as through class conflict workers can upend capitalist 
technology and subsequently remake it in the image of socialist ends, leveraging the 
ability for workers’ autonomous potential to break from capital and harness their “in-
vention power” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 69-71). From this perspective, Autonomist views 
of digital technologies reinforce the way emerging technologies are developed and de-
ployed to be amenable to capitalist relations. In his description of the emerging “cog-
nitariat”, Berardi (2009, 35) cites digital technologies and network connectivity as giving 
rise to the ubiquity of cognitive labour performed without deference to formal work ar-
rangements or social existence, a “creation of technical and linguistic interfaces ensur-
ing the fluidity both of the productive process and of social communication”. Matteo 
Pasquinelli’s read on information technology entails a similar transformative process, 
with regard to Marx’s organic composition of capital: “living information is understood 
as continuously produced by workers to be turned into dead information crystallized 
into machinery and the whole bureaucratic apparatus of the factory” (Pasquinelli 2015, 
55).  
In both cases, digital technology is conceived as a tool to exacerbate capitalist 
domination. Therefore, it should be surmounted by working class revolution. I do not 
necessarily quibble or find fault with these assessments but, rather, point out the op-
portunity for the Autonomist perspective to apply its foundational spirit to digital tech-
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nologies and recognise human-machine autonomy as an opportunity to consider polit-
ical revolution as a coalition of human and technological workers based on their com-
mon subjectivity as labouring entities and the recognition for the mutual endeavours of 
humans and automated technologies to help realise the aims of digital socialism. If the 
original aim of Autonomist thought was to foreground the autonomy of workers as an 
inherent feature of class struggle, extending Autonomist thought outwards towards po-
tential socialist futures demands consideration of another possibility: full automation 
need not be a choice between a tool to shed capitalist dominion or an inert infrastruc-
ture awaiting a political revolution to rewire its programming. Instead, a third option 
emerges: automated technologies as co-constituted with human workers and the work-
ing class. By understanding autonomy and autonomous production as a shared con-
dition, human-machine autonomy can frame the struggle against capital as a form of 
solidarity among autonomous production undertaken across lines of human and tech-
nological performance based on their shared position against capital. This position is 
best illuminated through Mario Tronti’s problematisation of a working-class ideology 
and the “strategy of refusal.” 
Tronti describes the unnecessity of developing an ideology unique to the working 
class, since the working class is a “a reality antagonistic to the entire system of capi-
talism”, an ontological position that means workers exist irrespective to capitalism and 
are not inevitably bound to circumstances enabling the development and persistence 
of capitalist exchange (Tronti 1966/2000, 6). The working class possesses the potential 
to exist beyond capitalism, whereas capitalism cannot exist without the exploitation of 
the worker. Should the working class accept the necessity of ideology, their struggle 
would become a “passive articulation of capitalist development” (7) [emphasis in orig-
inal]. If the working class needs no ideology, and the pure fact of their autonomous 
production is sufficient, they are allied with machines as non-ideological and autono-
mous workers freighted with ideological dimensions by capital. Rather than conceive 
of technologies as allied with capital by virtue of their operational deployment against 
workers, we should recognise that ideology is neither a necessity for workers nor ma-
chines and both are subject to the imposition of capitalist ideologies with respect to the 
ways work is arranged and carried out.  
Humans and automated technologies are both programmed to perform computa-
tional tasks carried out in accordance with the imperatives encoded into such program-
ming (Bucher 2018). Computers are programmed via the input of computer code that 
dictates how to operate, just as human behaviour is directed by technological and so-
cial codes that impart ideas about how humans should operate. In the context of work, 
any worker striving to build the latest iteration of AI or leverage AI in formal work ar-
rangements occupies an allied subjectivity with technology insofar as both are inflected 
with ideologies about capitalist work in spite of the shared unnecessity for ideology or 
work to be undertaken in accordance with capitalist principles. To attempt to break 
from capitalist technologies is to break from entities allied with workers, as this break 
is to affirm ideologies about the ontological existence of technologies and their “pas-
sive” position within capitalist orders. Further, to break from technology is to revert back 
towards the ideology of autonomy that insists upon domination as the means for polit-
ical freedom. Extending Tronti’s “strategy of refusal” offers a means to refuse ideolog-
ical assumptions about autonomy and the split between the autonomous productivity 
of humans and machines.  
The strategy of refusal acknowledges the ability for the working class to halt capi-
talist production by refusing to carry out capitalist demands or undertakings. Under-
stood as both “the refusal to collaborate actively in capitalist development, [and] the 
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refusal to put forward a positive programme of demands” (Tronti 1966/2000, 255), this 
strategy spotlights the autonomy of the working class to exist apart from capitalism and 
therefore use collective labour power as a means to advance the power of labour. 
Power, in this context, is the political power to recognise the autonomous potential to 
refuse capital and the power to cease productive activities that accord economic and 
social power to capital (Tronti 1966/2000, 256). By expanding the political valence of 
this refusal to consciously incorporate technological counterparts, the working class 
aligns all possible autonomous production as part of its refusal strategy and thwarts 
ideological ideas about autonomy as a source for domination and control. Solidarity 
with automated technologies, then, is not only possible; it is critical as a means of 
evading dystopian conceptions of technological autonomy, resisting ideological as-
sumptions about autonomy, and undertaking political praxis geared towards maximis-
ing worker autonomy within capitalist as a means to move beyond its horizons.  
10. Conclusion 
While the preceding offers a foundation for typifying digital socialism and incorporating 
a human-machine autonomy that stresses the shared conditions humans and ma-
chines occupy with respect to capital, opportunities abound from this foundation. 
Scholars should consider relationships between eco-socialism (Pepper 2002; Huan 
2014) and full automation, especially potential oppositions between raw resources nec-
essary to develop such technologies and the environmental consequences of contin-
ued technological development. Additionally, while the politics of full automation largely 
corresponds to postcapitalist perspectives, Blockchain advocates imagine Blockchain 
automation as a source for Libertarian autonomy conceived as liberation from central 
banking and the state (Greenfield 2017; Swartz 2017), indicating a critical need to con-
sider the Blockchain’s decentralised structure and politics with an eye towards socialist 
imperatives.  
To stress the utopian and joyous potential of digital socialism, human-machine au-
tonomy should also be used to expand ideas around “acid communism” (Gilbert 2017; 
Fisher 2018). Acid communism is a “provocation and a promise” (Fisher 2018, 757) 
oriented towards recapturing the joyous spirit and harmonious possibilities of counter-
cultural politics and lifestyle. Where neoliberalism established itself as a sensible form 
of individualism defined in contrast to ideas of collectivity and communal living emerg-
ing out of the 1960s counterculture, acid communism urges re-establishing counter-
cultural pursuits for “the convergence of class consciousness, socialist-feminist con-
sciousness raising and psychedelic consciousness, the fusion of new social move-
ments with a communist project, an unprecedented aestheticisation of everyday life” 
(Fisher 2018, 758). It is, in other words, a recuperation and continuation of a cultural 
project otherwise stripped of its revolutionary potential and grouped into a libertarian 
ethos underpinning the emergence and global expanse of Silicon Valley (Turner 2010). 
Human-machine autonomy, then, can stress the collective reservoirs of autonomy al-
ready at hand for a collective consciousness that simultaneously seeks to stand down 
capitalist power imposition and uplift the ability to live a joyful life of meaningful pursuit 
indicative of Marxian aims for a worker’s paradise.  
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Abstract: This article aims to illustrate the complexity of the relationships between digital par-
ticipation spaces and organisations related to the Southern-European and US socialist tradi-
tions. Digital communication and, in particular, the various platforms of digital participation 
have been long living between the illusion of techno-libertarian thrusts and the technocratic 
tendencies framing the New Public Management approach. The suspicion of socialist-inspired 
parties but also of post-Marxist social movements towards the digital is connected on the one 
hand to the organisational structure of the parties and on the other hand to the capacity of 
neoliberalism to incorporate digital innovation in its cultural horizon. Participation platforms 
have often been functional to the emergence of a neoliberalism with a human face, capable of 
offering potential spaces of participation that depoliticise civic activism and transform it into a 
mere technical tool of minimal governance. In recent years, however, digital party experiences 
have developed in the context of left-wing organisations. In other cases, digital platforms have 
been used as tools of mobilisation and even as instruments for the creation of a new senti-
mental connections with the increasingly fragmented “popular classes”. Digital has thus be-
come a “space of struggle”, in the same meaning it was used in the 1980s by Stuart Hall. This 
article presents the first findings of a research project on the use of digital platforms by: a) 
parties of socialist inspiration in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the USA; and b) bottom-up 
social movements. The analysis follows an empirical approach based on: a) the analysis of 
organisations; b) content analysis (Evaluation Assertion Analysis) of political and policy docu-
ments on the use of digital as a tool for political struggle; c) in-depth interviews to digital activ-
ists of social movements. 
 
Keywords: platform party, socialist parties, social movements, neoliberalism, Marxism 
1. Introduction 
Politically, the broad masses only exist insofar as they are organized within po-
litical parties. The changes of opinion which occur among the masses under 
pressure from the determinant economic forces are interpreted by the parties, 
which first split into tendencies and then into a multiplicity of new organic parties. 
Through this procedure of disarticulation, new association and fusion of homo-
geneous entities, a more profound and intimate process of breakdown of dem-
ocratic society is revealed. This leads to a definitive alignment of conflicting clas-
ses, for preservation or for conquest of power over the state and productive 
apparatus (Gramsci 1921, in Forgacs 1999, 121-122).  
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Gramsci’s statement, which first appeared in L’Ordine Nuovo on 25 September 1921, 
accurately describes a process of disarticulation that – in other forms – has been rep-
resentative of the distinctive character of the transformation of political partiesGramsci 
himself had been developing the idea of the party as a collective intellectual, an ele-
ment of a complex society in which the concretization of a collective will is recognized 
and partially established in action (see Gramsci Prison Notebook 13, 1; now in Forgacs 
1999, 238-243). The party, in this sense, carries out an educational function and polit-
ical direction of the class it represents: this function is possible only because the party 
is a “collective”. 
The processes of parties’ transformation – and in particular those of the socialist 
tradition – have made the collective dimension marginal, favouring the aggregation of 
individual requests. In this scenario, digital technologies can play different roles: 
a) they can function as mere tools to support consensus building;  
b) they can become organizational facilitation tools;  
c) they can constitute a terrain of political struggle for hegemony;  
and, finally,  
d) they can promote the development of a new digital socialism, also helping to re-
connect people with politics. However, these roles are not always necessarily alterna-
tive. 
This article aims at discussing the role of digital technologies in the political life of 
some European left-wing parties and in the organisational models of radical left social 
movements. In particular, here we present the first findings coming from the study of 
policy documents on digital technologies produced by some socialist/labourist/left-wing 
parties and the very first considerations taken from some of the many in-depth inter-
views with digital activists of a number of social movements. 
In the following sections we will try to shed light on: a) the role of socialist parties in 
the framework of transformations of representation, trying to identify the relationships 
among intermediate bodies, processes of depoliticisation and development of the so-
called post-representative politics (section 2); b) the role that technologies play in these 
processes and, in particular, how the techno-enthusiasm forms are functional to a cap-
italism with a human face but still hardly neoliberal (section 3); c) the role of platform 
parties on the one hand and digital technologies for communication as different out-
comes of political re-organization processes on the other hand (section 4); d) the role 
and function of social movements in the emergence of new forms of re-politicisation 
which is indispensable for the emergence of a new digital socialism.  
2. Political Parties in a Post-Representative World 
The many different theorisations of representation (Pitkin 1967; Brito Vieira and Run-
ciman 2008; Pettit 2009; Saward 2010) choose different perspectives. Both the bipar-
tition between Pitkin's (1967) standing for and acting for, and the new perspectives,  
which are less focused on a binary logic, seem in part unfit for interpreting the change 
in the dynamics of relations between representatives and represented, in particular in 
the scenario of the media politics. The different theorisations, however, keep open the 
old question of political representation and its relationship with liberal democracy. The 
mandate of the elected can only be free (since assuming a delegation contract means 
making the individual's autonomy disappear) but, at the same time, the elected must 
place themselves in the position of being controlled by the voters. In other words, rep-
resentatives play an active role (legislative function) and must therefore enjoy a certain 
autonomy, being capable of going beyond the electoral exercise. At the same time, 
precisely because of this role, they must in some way “depend” on the electorate. The 
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paradox is evident: if the representatives had an imperative mandate, they should only 
respond to a client (theoretically plural, in practice traceable in the leader) or respond 
only to themselves (and in this case they would be totally released from any control). 
That is, representative democracy works only if we avoid an opposition between im-
perative mandate and free mandate (Urbinati 2013), making sure that the latter is tem-
pered by some form of popular control. The political mandate, in other words, still 
needs parties (or similar organizations), as explained very clearly by Nadia Urbinati 
(2013, 99). 
Representation has a very strong connection with another concept that cannot be 
underestimated: citizenship. Representation, in effect, is a relationship between a so-
cial group and a representative who shares the group’s interests, expectations, values, 
problems, territorial emergencies and so on. It can be affirmed, at this point that without 
social inclusion – made possible by the logic of political representation or similar pro-
cesses – citizenship does not even exist and therefore that no representation can exist 
without representation. It is a syllogism not without ambiguity but substantially correct. 
One of the outcomes of the democracy of organised distrust is represented by the 
emergence of new forms of social surveillance and political militancy. Among the latter, 
significant positions belong to advocacy groups, expressions of active citizenship 
(Moro 2013), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), observatories on specific is-
sues and campaigns (in many cases organized through digital platforms) and the re-
sults of actions in the territory (such as the Stop-TTIP, No-Ceta, etc. campaigns). In 
many cases, these organisations (campaigns first and foremost but also different ad-
vocacy groups) do not “represent” in the traditional sense, do not have membership 
structures, and are mostly single-issue (i.e. oriented to a specific cause). They carry 
out activities of influence and, in some cases, activities of lobbying (Ceccarini and Di-
amanti 2018, 351). In light of new organised forms, representative democracy seems 
to give way not only to counter-democratic demands but also to what John Keane 
(2009) calls monitory democracy. A monitoring carried out both through lobbying prac-
tices and through the legitimization of tools coming from the tradition of deliberative 
democracy (Elstub and McLaverty 2014), such as citizen juries, deliberative polls, city 
assemblies, online consultations, petitions, and finally through organizations for moni-
toring and protection, such as consumer movements or associations for human rights. 
The Internet constitutes a “workplace” that facilitates the emergence and rooting of 
these experiences, although it does not constitute an activation element. 
The monitorial citizen (as in the expression of Michael Schudson [1998]) tends to 
effectively replace both the citizen voters and even the critical citizens (Norris 1999). 
In this new scenario, representative democracy – based on a direct relationship be-
tween citizens and legislative assemblies – gives way to post-representative politics 
(Keane 2013), in which citizens can experience forms of creative activism that are not 
always consistent with the traditions of political representation through party organiza-
tions. 
At this point, we already have some critical elements. We have probably entered a 
political phase that can actually be defined “post-representative”, in which forms –  
sometimes very controversial – of “direct representation” (De Blasio and Sorice 2019) 
emerge. At the same time, the institutional fabric of liberal democracies is still based 
on the mechanisms and logics of representation. Hence the need to consider political 
parties is inescapable, although their credibility and their own social legitimacy have 
been severely tested both by economic crises (Morlino and Raniolo 2018) and by the 
(alleged) crisis of institutional representation. This is an almost paradoxical situation 
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that has affected, however, most severely those parties that had a strong organisa-
tional root and were deprived of both their social legitimacy and their ties to the territory 
in one fell swoop. In this framework, the parties inherited from those of mass integration 
– essentially the parties of the socialist / social-democratic and communist tradition – 
were the most affected, precisely because their “heavy” organisation did not lend itself 









































Figure 1: Political parties, depoliticisation and post-representative politics 
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However, we must also consider some forms of political dealignment that have affected 
the socialist/labourist parties. The use of the discursive strategy of economic “realism”, 
for example, has certainly represented an element of criticality. This aspect, however, 
had already been noted by Stuart Hall in 1988, when the expression “new realism” was 
used to indicate a substantial transformation of the Labour Party, capable of aggregat-
ing electoral consensus but not activating “sentimental connection”:  
It [the Labour Party] can mobilize the vote, provided it remains habitually solid. 
But it shows less and less capacity to connect with popular feelings and senti-
ments, let alone to transform them or articulate them to the left. It gives the 
distinct impression of a political party living on the capital of past connections 
and imageries, but increasingly out of touch with what is going on in everyday 
life around it (Hall 1988, 207). 
A simplified graphic representation of the transformation involving the mass political 
parties is presented in figure 1. It is evident how different factors influence or have a 
role in this transformation. At the same time, it is useful to note that these transfor-
mations could be better understood if we study them in the frame of neoliberal ideol-
ogy’s rising. The emphasis on technology and on the insurgence of the “information 
society”, for example, are the outcomes of a neo-capitalist approach and the left-wing 
parties across Europe have under-evaluated the role of communication in the intricated 
relationships among state, market and social actors, as clearly stated by Dallas 
Smythe more than forty years ago (Smythe 1977)1. 
3. Political Parties Between De-politicisation and Digital Enthusiasm  
Moreover, over the last thirty years storytelling about overcoming the “old” categories 
of right and left  has become hegemonic, to the point of being considered a trait of 
cultural “modernity” and even scientifically based. The idea that the political categories 
of right and left were outdated was preceded by the development of a broad literature 
on the “end of ideologies” (Fukuyama 1992): several positions developed within it, 
some more distinctly technocratic, others that identified in the development of shared 
deliberative processes and in the affirmation of collaborative governance the only ele-
ments necessary for the qualitative increase of democracy. The success of economic 
approaches such as that of the Chicago School or of paradigms such as New Public 
Management has favoured the legitimacy of these positions.  
The beginning of the 21st century, however, has been characterised by various 
phenomena:  
a) the revival of nationalisms and religious fundamentalisms;  
b) the explosion of the economic crisis of the Western world, that was generated 
precisely by those economic recipes that had achieved media and political success but 
proved to be unsuitable for solving the structural problems of the world economy 
(Crouch 2011);  
c) the rebirth of the various populisms and the emergence of the “challenger par-
ties” (mainly right-wing), often connected precisely to the criticism of the liberal system;  
d) the onset of several popular protest movements, which attacked the outcomes 
of liberal democracy precisely by demanding more participatory political processes 
and, generally, “more democracy”.   
                                            
1 Christian Fuchs (2014, 14) correctly notes that “the role of mediatization, ICTs and knowledge 
work in contemporary capitalism was anticipated by Marx’s focus on the general intellect”. 
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This last aspect, in particular, has brought to light the democratic short circuit: not only 
the historical inconsistency of the alleged overcoming of right and left but also the ap-
parent paradox of a criticism conducted towards liberal democracy because perceived 
as being rather insensitive to requests for people participation. 
The processes of de-politicisation have been studied by different authors (Mouffe 
2005; Rancière 2010; Žižek 1999) with components that are sometimes different but 
always referable to the idea of a substantial loss of centrality of politics as belonging 
and project: in other words, politics has often been reduced to only a dimension of 
policy, with a substantial marginalization both of the ideological conflict and of polity as 
a project community. 
Colin Hay (2007) has clearly highlighted the relationship between the so-called anti-
politics, the tendencies of the resurgent populisms and some aspects of the neoliberal 
turning point. The process of depoliticisation has thus been framed within the develop-
ment of complex social phenomena, some of which underpin the post-political ten-
dency that seems to have characterized the last decade of Western democracies. In 
this scenario, we can see how some of the political-institutional innovations theoreti-
cally oriented to the growth of participation (such as, for example, the experiences of 
collaborative governance, some variations of e-government and different public con-
sultation tools) have been absorbed into internal trends of substantial anesthetization 
of any forms of social conflict and, in general, of popular participation. 
In fact, these innovations have proved to be mechanisms of political legitimisation 
for the political élites, obtaining on the one hand their own failure with respect to the 
objectives (increasing the amount and awareness of popular participation) and on the 
other hand, their rejection by the popular classes that have interpreted them (not with-
out some reason) as “top-down” tools also perceiving them as strategies of the élites. 
To the forms of innovation – often however supported in good faith by local administra-
tions and scholars – some institutional reforms have been added, and are often used 
as tactics and tools for the affirmation of a post-political neoliberal projects (Flinders 
and Buller 2006). Both institutional reforms and some experiences of democratic inno-
vation have thus turned out to be “mechanisms used by politicians to depoliticise is-
sues, including delegation, but also for the creation of binding rules and the formation 
of discursive preference shaping” (Fawcett et al. 2017, 5)2. 
In this situation, the semantic shift from the idea of “government” to the notion of 
“governance” should also be considered: it constitutes one of the elements that ac-
companies the emergence of the so-called “post-political” and of the reduction of poli-
tics to only economic concerns.  
These post-political tendencies are outcomes of the depoliticisation, and they have 
been very often accompanied by the phenomena of re-politicisation within the rhetoric 
of “governability”. This last component has been often wrapped in a “common sense 
neoliberalism”, fed by the rhetoric on the “light state”, that of efficiency3 at the expense 
of the quality of democracy and of the commodification of citizenship (Crouch 2003). 
The “common sense neoliberalism” that emerged in the late 1990s could be contrasted 
only re-discovering the educative role of politics. “Politics, as Gramsci insisted, is al-
ways ‘educative’. We must acknowledge the insecurities which underlie common 
sense’s confusion and contradictions and harness the intensity and anger which 
comes through in many of the readers’ comments” (Hall and O’Shea 2015, 65).  
                                            
2 Johan Hartle (2017), studying the political ontology of Lukàcs and Debord, analyses the pro-
cess of reification as a form of structural de-politicisation. 
3 In many fields of social life, the concept of efficiency has been supported by the rhetoric on 
“meritocracy”, coherently functional to the neoliberal project (see Littler 2017). 
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On the other hand, the insurgence and development of digital technologies for com-
munication have deeply changed the scenario. The old techno-libertarian tendencies 
of the sixties re-emerged, merging with the (fundamentally technocratic) rhetoric of 
technology as an instrument of democratization of capitalism and of improving admin-
istrative efficiency. The new “participatory culture” (Fuchs 2016, 87) would also be ca-
pable of replacing elective assemblies and giving more (presumed) power to citizens. 
This techno-enthusiast ideology is an “expressions of the capitalist fetishism of tech-
nology that Marx criticised” (Fuchs 2016, 207).  
In this way, digital technologies have entered the imaginary at two levels: the first 
level is a hyper-optimistic techno-enthusiasm that has fundamentally considered the 
digital as a shortcut to recover the participation that had diminished in the territory; the 
second, more critical level, has identified in the digital technologies the tools for a tech-
nocratic control of the organization of the State and of political life. 
4. Towards the Platform Party 
Very often digital technologies and, in particular, their applications to the e-government 
have been functional to the New Public Management approach (De Blasio and Sorice 
2016), activating an ideological transformation of the “public” (perceived as old) in the 
efficiencyst idea of the state-company (Crouch 2011; Sorice 2014). 
There are also many parties of different orientations which adopt platforms of dem-
ocratic participation: significantly, however, the wealth of possibilities for online delib-
eration remains confined to a few exceptions. 
The thesis that the Internet would have led to the emergence of claims and the 
development of political movements from the non-leading horizontal structure does not 
actually find empirical confirmations but has instead been contradicted by numerous 
studies. In a rather hasty manner, digital activism was considered to be the character-
izing aspect of the new political movements and to be the outcome required of digital 
media; in fact, many studies have shown that movements with a strong online pres-
ence have at least as strong a presence within a territory (Kreiss 2012; della Porta and 
Rucht 2013). Another common place idea is that the movements would always be hor-
izontal, without a hierarchical structure and without a leader, by virtue of the fact that 
they would borrow not only the dynamics of transmitting messages but also the mo-
dalities of the adoption of decisions. In fact, in the study conducted by Donatella della 
Porta and Dieter Rucht (2013), diversified forms of power and conflict are also identi-
fied in the global justice movements, while Paolo Gerbaudo (2012) spoke of a “chore-
ography of the assembly” in which the collective dimension of the protest is organised 
and staged by an elite group of activists. These frame elements are useful for under-
standing the scenario in which both the forms of online participation “from below” and 
the so-called platform parties are born and develop.  
The studies on platform parties are the result of a long reflection on the transfor-
mation of the political parties. From the classifications of Duverger (1951) to those of 
Kirchheimer (1966) up to the fundamental work of Stein Rokkan (1970) to finally the 
analysis on the emergence of the “cartel parties” (Katz and Mair 1994), various studies 
on the organizational form of the so-called intermediate bodies have taken place. The 
development of personal, presidentialised, liquid-presidentialised parties (Prospero 
2012) and even franchise-parties (Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel 2014) have marked the 
last decades, framed by the crisis of legitimacy of the traditional parties. The rhetoric 
of participation (“participationism”) has also accompanied the emergence of new or-
ganizational forms of politics, although such rhetoric has been reduced to a generic 
“openness to society” and programmatically refuses an internal organization based on 
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deliberative and participatory logics. In this context, even the use of primary elections 
(in small as in large scale) responds to a rhetoric of participation but often ends up 
being just a tool for legitimizing the party elite. The accentuation of the refusal to par-
ticipate or a distrust in politics and, in particular, in the political parties by the citizens 
is not surprising in this context 
Very often it was thought – in a somewhat naive manner – that to favour participa-
tion and to increase the internal democracy of a party it would be enough to enlarge 
the selectorate of the party itself4. In reality it is not enough to enlarge the selectorate, 
as is evident from the crisis of credibility (and sometimes even legitimacy) that has hit 
the traditional parties – and often precisely those with more deep-rooted popular tradi-
tions – in the Western representative democracies over the last twenty years 
One of the responses to the representation deficit – and to the related refusal of 
participation through the only electoral delegation – has come in recent years from the 
adoption of communication technologies, in particular those connected to the Internet 
and, more generally, to the opportunities offered by the development of democratic 
participation platforms (De Blasio 2018). In many cases, these technologies have been 
framed as neutral tools, but “far from being considered only as tools, media and com-
munication technologies have become a site of struggle in their own right, and as such 
are subject to object conflicts” (Hess 2005, 516, cited in Milan 2013, 2). 
In this scenario, we have been focused on the rise of the so-called platform party 
(also defined as the “digital party”5). This type of party finds new organisational meth-
ods in Internet tools and in participatory platforms. Platform parties are born from par-
ticipative logic. However, in many cases they are revealed as results of the hyper-
representation phenomena. The leader (the supreme representative of all the people) 
creates a symbolic connection with the super-people (the superbase in the analysis of 
Gerbaudo [2019]), the one represented by the active people in platforms of digital par-
ticipation. The participation evoked in this type of party is of a dualistic nature. The 
emphasis on direct democracy, however, often delegitimises any form of participatory 
democracy. There are obviously many types of the platform party and they are affected 
by national peculiarities and electoral systems. However, they are a response to the 
growing popular need for participation, albeit in intermittent forms and with a personal 
and daily commitment (Ceccarini and Diamanti 2018). In essence, platform parties use 
technology as an organisational mode and as a structural architecture. At the same 
time, they use digital participation platforms as mobilisation tools, as spaces for policy 
making (the presentation and discussion of proposals) and as places for decision mak-
ing (voting on proposals and policy decisions). In some cases, a platform party can 
also take on a stratarchical type of structure. 
 
                                            
4 The selectorate is the set of individuals that can choose a candidate (as in the case of the 
primaries) or elect him/her (in the case of an electoral procedure). The selectorate goes from 
a maximum (when it totally overlaps with the electorate) to a minimum (when it concerns only 
a power oligarchy or, indeed, the only leader). The selectorate of “open” primaries is theoret-
ically the entire electorate (the practice is very different for a number of reasons); what de-
cides candidates in an electoral system with blocked lists and without preferences is instead 
constituted by a small elite or by the sole party leader. 
5 Theoretically, anyway, there would be some differences between platform and digital party, 
even if in the current political debate, the two expressions are usually overlapped. We can 
simplistically say that a platform party is always digital whilst a digital party is not necessarily 
platform. 
92     Emiliana De Blasio and Michele Sorice 
   CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
 
Figure 2: Characteristics of the mass party and of the platform party.  
Technologies respond efficiently to three different tendencies of contemporary politics. 
In fact, they can:  
a) influence the organizational models of participation;  
b) accelerate the processes of deconstruction of intermediary bodies;  
c) feed the perspective of liquid democracy (a really controversial concept, usually 
overlapping with that of “delegative democracy” – a merging of representative and di-
rect democracy – based upon the use of digital platforms, such as, for example, Liquid-
Feedback6).  
These three tendencies are not necessarily opposed to each other. Digital technol-
ogies, in fact, can contribute to the deconstruction of the “old” intermediate bodies and, 
at the same time, favour new organisational model of participation that are at the back-
ground of new party structures. At the same time, the so-called “liquid democracy”, 
and, in general, the use of digital participatory platforms can activate new forms of 
participation but also contribute to a radical change in the party’s organisation. Digital 
technologies  can be tools for: a) mobilisation, b) policy making, c) decision making. 
 
Country Political Parties 
France Parti Socialiste 
France Insoumise 
Italy Partito Democratico 
Liberi e Uguali 
Portugal Partido Socialista 
Partido Comunista Português 
Spain Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol 
Podemos 
USA Democratic Socialists of America 
Table 1. Political parties analysed.  
                                            
6 See: https://liquidfeedback.org/ on the experiences of the Pirate Parties across Europe. There 
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Following this simple taxonomy, we have been studying the use of digital platforms by 
a) parties inspired by socialism in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the USA; b) bot-
tom-up social movements. The analysis has been framed in an empirical approach 
based on the analysis of organisations on the one hand and on the content analysis 
(Evaluation Assertion Analysis) of the political and/or policy documents on the use of 
digital as a tool for political struggle. 
The analysis has been conducted in respect to the political parties listed in Table 1. 
The Democratic Socialists of America have been considered only as a “control var-
iable”. Any comparison with the left-wing parties of Southern Europe is in fact almost 
impossible7. 
 







Parti Socialiste Conseil Citoyen 
(*) 
YES YES NO YES Y N 
Social media YES  
France Insoumise Plateform d’ac-
tion 
YES YES YES Partly Y N 
Social media YES  
Partito Demo-
cratico 
Bob (**) NO NO NO YES N Y 
PdApp YES YES NO Partly N Y 
Social media YES  
Liberi e Uguali Un partito di 
Sinistra (***) 
YES YES NO NO Y N 
Social media YES  
Partido Socialista Social media YES  
Partido Comunista 
Português 
Youtube channel YES  Y Y 
Social media YES  
Partido Socialista 
Obrero Espanol 
miPSOE YES YES NO YES Y Y 
Social media YES  
Podemos Particìpa YES YES YES YES Y N 
Social media YES  
Democratic So-
cialists of America 
Social media YES  YES  
 
(*) = Initiative launched by Benoît Hamon, presidential candidate at 2017 Presidential Elections 
(**) = Launched in 2017, then discontinued 
(***) = Semi-official platform (LeU is not a party but a cartel of left-wing parties) 
W = web; A = App 
Table 2: Tools used by political parties for functions and type 
The first element to underline is the substantial absence of co-ordinated digital actions. 
Mostly, the tools are functional to mobilisation practices and work essentially as ele-
ments of support for political communication. Democratic platforms of participation are 
                                            
7 The DSA constitutes an interesting example of the merging of two workplaces: the web (as a 
space of struggle) and the local communities (through the “community chapters”) as a site of 
proposal and organisation. 
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constitute a minority in the total number of technologies employed. In the Iberian pen-
insula there are the most radical developments: on the one hand, the use of digital 
technologies has taken root in Spain thanks to the success of Podemos (Caruso 2017) 
and the ability of the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE, the Socialist Party) to 
intercept a demand for innovation. Podemos was over time transformed from a party-
platform to a party that uses a platform; PSOE, tried to use social media and its app 
(and a web-based platform too) as tool of a counter-storytelling to offer a partly different 
answer to Podemos.   
On the other hand, there is Portugal (a country in which, moreover, there are many 
platforms for participation for civic uses) where left-wing parties (winners of the 2019 
political elections) seem to devote more energy to activity in offline space and the (very 
active) use the dominant social media platforms. In particular, the Socialist Party uses 
Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, has a YouTube channel and even a Pinterest account; 
the Communist Party uses Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, has a YouTube channel and 
also WhatsApp as source of information (similarly to how PSOE in Spain uses a Tele-
gram channel).   
In France, the “participatory programme” experiments launched by Benoît Hamon 
in 2017 did not find a follow-up in the Socialist Party's projects (perhaps due to the 
party's electoral decline). However, the platform launched by France Insoumise moves 
from the level of mobilisation to spaces where concrete proposals are developed and 
active deliberation processes take place. At least in part the platform is an aspect of 
France Insoumise’s organisational modality8. 
There is a substantial absence of specific documents and policies on the use of 
digital technologies, above all at the organisational level. This seems apparently con-
trasting with the parties’ effort to activate consensus and mobilisation through social 
media9. 
Greater attention seems to be given to digital participation in Italy, where, however, 
the socialist-inspired parties have not had (at the moment) great successes in the 
adoption of digital technologies: alongside social media – a “continuous bass” of all 
parties’ communication activities – there are only the apps produced by the Democratic 
Party (but not a web platform10) and the interesting but unsuccessful attempts of the 
Liberi e Uguali (LeU, Free and Equal) platforms (and even before that of Sinistra Ital-
iana-Italian Left, one of the small parties that then gave life to LeU in 2018) . 
In none of the parties under analysis – at least in the official documents concerning 
the use of digital and its relations with political organisation and with the exception of 
the Portuguese parties – there are references to the use of a Marxist (or post-Marxist) 
perspective on technology and communication, although in Marxist theory there have 
been many reflections on this topic from the first stage of Cultural Studies, to some 
approaches of political economy of the media (Smythe 1977), until the most recent 
                                            
8 Our analysis only takes into account the possibility of the different dimensions. No analysis 
has been conducted on their effective achievement. 
9 This part has been realised treating the parties’ organisational documents as political dis-
course and using a simplified form of Evaluative Assertion Analysis. Due to the limited pres-
ence of the discourse “on digital”, the semantic evaluation differentials are not discrimina-
tory. This is, anyway, an important outcome, even if not as expected. 
10 This fact is even more contradictory considering that the Democratic Party (directly or 
through initiatives promoted by their MPs) was one of the first to launch some pioneering 
web-based platforms of participation. Other Italian experiences of the use of digital plat-
forms are those of the small Pirate Party and of Five-Star Movement: this article, anyway, 
focuses only on parties coming from or belonging to the socialist tradition. 
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perspectives of the Marxian study of social media and digital technologies and, more 
in general, of Internet studies. A very comprehensive and accurate overview of the 
Internet Studies in a Marxian perspective is available in Fuchs and Dyer-Witheford 
(2012; see also Fuchs 2014, 73)11.  
Different perspectives are present in the area of social movements and, in particu-
lar, in those positioning themselves “on the left”. Both in the first interviews conducted 
with the activists of various social movements and in the results of similar research that 
we have conducted over the last three years, a different awareness has emerged with 
respect to the role of digital communication technologies. Along with positions of sus-
picion towards communication (which appear minoritarian anyway), there is growing 
awareness that digital ecosystems are spaces for struggle, as we will try to argument 
in the next section. 
5. Digital Socialism: A Challenge for Social Movements and Political Parties 
The crisis of legitimacy of the left – and especially of the socialist/labourist and/or so-
cial-democratic parties – derives from many factors, not least their acquiescence to the 
economic dictates of neoliberalism and the progressive marginalisation of themes such 
as socialism, social justice, equality, and the democratisation of society in their political 
programmes and agenda. The complex question of the cleavage of the sentimental 
connection (Gramsci, Quaderno XVIII, now in Gramsci 1971, 135-136) between parties 
that stand in the socialist tradition and the popular classes constitutes one of the most 
important points of discussion among scholars and also politicians. The new tools of 
democratic participation represent a great opportunity for developing dynamics of in-
clusiveness. It is not enough to adopt the structure of the party-platform. Rather, in-
stead, it would be useful to merge the dimension of the net (as a tool) with a territorial 
presence in the offline world capable of starting from the needs of society.  
One of the elements that left-wing parties have not always understood is that there 
is no contradiction between the practices of digital democracy and the processes of 
participation in territorial realities offline. Digital participatory platforms can be used 
alongside “apps” for facilitating the involvement of citizens and activists. A greater ter-
ritorial involvement can in turn determine the growth of active individuals online and 
offline, creating a virtuous circle of participation that may be intermittent but not occa-
sional. In this perspective, digital platforms can offer tools for mobilisation, can act as 
spaces for facilitating policy making and, finally, they can favour the adoption of more 
democratic decision-making mechanisms.  
Mobilisation, shared formation of public policies and decisions taken with a demo-
cratic method are characteristic and peculiar elements of the socialist tradition. Digital 
technologies can be extraordinary tools for rooting and spreading socialist values. It is 
necessary to place communication technologies and architectures within shared rules 
of transparency and to enable democratic access in order to avoid the drift of the plat-
form parties that preach direct online democracy to erase participatory democracy and 
the development of a real egalitarian democracy. In other words, it is necessary to 
remember that technologies are not neutral and their use –  in one sense or another – 
is a political act. Adopting these technologies to the logic of online deliberation, for 
example, and not to the aggregative logic of online direct democracy (Mosca 2018), 
would mean, moreover, empowering the voices of the people who are without voice 
                                            
11 Some prejudices on Marx’s work (see Eagleton 2011) are probably present also in many 
“post-marxist” political parties.  
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and often without representation. But also the risk of the “platformization” of society is 
very strong (van Dijck, Poell and De Waal 2018). 
Probably the most lively and plural area in the political use of digital technologies is 
that of social movements. In this area – as effectively noted by Stefania Milan (2013) 
– different ways of using communication technologies can be identified. It is no coinci-
dence that also in the academic field different definitions have been used, often par-
tially overlapping, sometimes clearly distinct: in fact, alongside the use of the expres-
sion “media activism”, we find works that can be framed in the field of “alternative me-
dia” or even “non-mainstream media” (Pasquali and Sorice 2005), or those that refer 
to the effective category of “emancipatory communication practices” (Milan 2013), or 
as well as those that tend to relate media research to the studies on democratisation. 
In our analysis, we found very different experiences of social movements, which in 
some cases have developed bottom-up democratic innovation practices: from civic en-
gagement groups (halfway between social movements and active citizenship prac-
tices) to one issue pressure groups that also carry out lobbying activities without nec-
essarily acting as interest groups (as in the case of Stop-TTIP movement12). The ex-
amples include fair trade organisations, struggles for housing rights or for “riders’ 
rights”. They have some common characteristics, such as a participatory and non-
centralised organisation (della Porta and Rucht 2013, 2), a polycentric and inclusive 
organisation, and the production of knowledge about digital capitalism (Pavan and 
Mainardi 2019). Such movements are agents of democratic communication. This last 
point is very important for our purposes because these movements adopt democratic 
practices that are not limited to the logic of representation. At the same time, social 
movements can be defined by referring to the fact that: 1) they are mainly informal 
interaction networks; 2) they have shared beliefs and activate dynamics of solidarity; 
3) they mobilise around conflicting issues; 4) they adopt various and differentiated 
forms of protest, often of a “creative” type (Micheletti and McFarland 2016) and very 
often use digital technologies as tools and spaces of struggle. 
This last point is very important because digital tools and more generally commu-
nication practices play a key role in social movements. Donatella della Porta (2013, 
92) notes that 
in recent reflections linking communication and participatory democratic quality, 
the focus of attention is not so much (or no longer) on the abstract “power of the 
media”, but more on the relations between media and publics: the ways in which 
“people exercise their agency in relation to media flows” (Couldry 2006, 27). 
Media practices therefore become central, not only as the practices of the media 
actors, but more broadly as what various actors do in relations with the media, 
including activists’ media practices. 
One of the respondents in our interviews argued in this context: 
The point is not to use social media or not; it is clear that those are for profit and 
are functional to the logic of capitalist accumulation […] they impose their ideol-
ogy [..]. They are spaces to be used tactically. But at the same time, we should 
                                            
12 This type of movement is also playing an important role in “re-politicising the institutional 
politics”. In this perspective, for example, we can interpret the recent action at European 
Ombudsman, activated by Stop-TTIP and No-Ceta activists, who have also played an infor-
mation role for the European Parliament. An innovative case of “re-politicisation” of the rep-
resentation promoted by social movements with an impact on parliamentary institutions. 
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try to organise alternative spaces of struggle, but this is only possible in an in-
ternational perspective (F, 27) 
There are several interesting experiences that go beyond the contrast between mass 
integration parties to which almost all socialist political parties belong and platform par-
ties. Social movements are interesting field of social research. They could also consti-
tute an important site to re-connect media studies with the Marxian approach  that was 
too hastily abandoned in the second half of the 1980s by postmodern and culturalist 
approaches. 
6. An Open Conclusion 
We must admit that we are unable to provide a clear answer on the use of digital com-
munication by different collective actors such as political parties inspired by socialism 
and radical social movements. Some of the data is contradictory, so more research is 
needed. The transformative dimension of capitalism makes exhaustive analysis diffi-
cult. The very transformative nature of capitalism has allowed the use of expressions 
such as “digital socialism” on the part of the “owners” of media/technology companies 
(Morozov 2019). In many cases, capitalism “with a human face” has offered spaces 
that are economically profitable and that digital capital presents as democratic achieve-
ments but that given their subsumption under capital have a limited potential as spaces 
for struggle. Neoliberal ideology has succeeded in incorporating tools and experiences 
of online participation. Platforms of participation have often become instruments of 
mere consultation used by capitalist organisations and bureaucracies so that digital 
technologies are reduced to function as tools that make capitalism and public admin-
istration more efficient. This is the perspective of the New Public Management ap-
proach that does not aim at providing spaces for citizens’ democratic participation. 
There are three reasons why left-wing parties have not managed to come up with 
alternatives: 1) there is an organisational similarity among these parties  that produces 
the homogenisation of perception and the idea that old structures cannot be modified; 
2) participation is practiced and understood in manners that do not really  encourage 
participation, but only promote engagement; 3) there is a weakness of deliberative 
processes. A further hypothesis to test is that the model of online participation is so 
steeped in digital capitalism that it leaves no way out. 
In this scenario, left-wing parties do not yet seem to have succeeded in providing 
an alternative framework for digital communication that goes beyond digital capitalism 
and, sometimes, do not even understand the importance of communication not just in 
the transformations of  capitalism that have resulted in the emergence of digital capi-
talism but also in and for a renewed socialist project. 
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Abstract: This paper analyses the role of the “social” in communicative capitalism. It shows 
how the digital social is situated in the context of ideology, exploitation, and alienation. Based 
on the ethics of care, the essay outlines foundations of an alternative concept and reality of 
the social in digital socialism. It borrows the key concept of “care” from feminist theory and 
ethics and uses it to explore alternative paths to rethink “digital socialism” in the age of social 
media ubiquity and the pervasiveness of communicative capitalism. We need imaginative ef-
forts to think beyond “capitalist realism” as a “pervasive atmosphere” (Fisher 2009, 16) that 
impacts not just the economy and cultural production, but also the domain of the ideas to the 
extent that it seems “impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it” (Fisher 2009, 2). 
Keywords: digital socialism, communicative capitalism, social media, care economy, feminist 
theory, ethics of care 
Sharing is the mildest form of socialism  
Kevin Kelly, 2009 
1. In the Rubble of the Commons, the Triumph of the “Social” 
“[I]t is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism”, 
Mark Fisher wrote in 2009, inspired by Jameson and Žižek’s reflections in addressing 
what he dubbed as “capitalist realism” (Fisher 2009, 2). Fisher describes capitalist re-
alism as “the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and 
economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alter-
native to it” (Fisher 2009, 2). Capitalist realism is such a “pervasive atmosphere” that 
it does not only invest the domain of economy and cultural production, but also affects 
and infects that of the imagination, colonizing the latter to the point that “there is no 
alternative”1, not even in conceiving ideas opposing the current hegemony. 
Ten years after Fisher wrote his seminal essay – and two years after he tragically 
took his own life2 – the seeming ineluctability of capitalist realism has been further 
strengthened by what today manifests as its quintessential appearance, its octopus-
                                            
1 Margaret Thatcher’s famous slogan. 
2 Capitalist Realism frames the problem of depression, a disease of which Fisher himself suf-
fered, within the dysfunctionalities of capitalism, something that cannot be properly healed 
if conceived as a private problem. “I want to argue that it is necessary to reframe the growing 
problem of stress (and distress) in capitalist societies. Instead of treating it as incumbent on 
individuals to resolve their own psychological distress, instead, that is, of accepting the vast 
privatization of stress that has taken place over the last thirty years, we need to ask: how 
has it become acceptable that so many people, and especially so many young people, are 
ill? The 'mental health plague' in capitalist societies would suggest that, instead of being the 
only social system that works, capitalism is inherently dysfunctional, and that the cost of it 
appearing to work is very high” (Fisher 2009, 19). 
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like aspect, i.e. communication. With her conceptualisation of “communicative capital-
ism”, Jodi Dean (2005) provides a powerful description of both the material infrastruc-
ture lying beneath networked communications technologies, and of the ideological for-
mation materialising values – such as participation, inclusion, access – that are “her-
alded as central to democracy” (Dean 2010, 4). Other scholarly reflections offered, 
such as “platform capitalism” (Srnicek 2016), “data capitalism” (Mayer-Schönberger 
and Ramge 2018), or “surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2019), all attribute a central role 
to the (control over the) production and distribution of communicative in shaping con-
temporary capitalist realism.  
The ever-expanding communicative dimension of contemporary capitalism be-
comes even more pervasive as it embraces the form of self-disclosed, user-generated 
and peer-produced bits of content circulating over social networking sites. As McKen-
zie Wark notices, today’s “spectacle”, far from being the top-down managed formation 
described by Debord (1994), whether in its “concentrated” or “diffused” version, is ra-
ther “disintegrating” (Wark 2013) in that it is being produced and re-produced by users 
themselves. The “spectacle 2.0” (Briziarelli and Armano 2017) is the offspring of an 
environment where the imperative of participation, enabled and empowered by the 
technological infrastructure of web 2.0 (O’Reilly 2005) and imposed by the business 
model of the sharing economies3, has pushed users to generate a never-ending stream 
of data.  
Capitalist realism thrives on these seemingly endless communicative exchanges 
produced by all sorts of digital labour – paid and unpaid, under-paid and volunteer work 
–, in which those formerly known as passive spectators are finally turned into “proactive 
makers of their own subjugation disguised as free choice and creative expression” 
(Della Ratta 2018, 181). Users are rendered into peer-creators of this networked spec-
tacle that has replaced “the monologue of appearances (of the traditional spectacle) 
with the appearance of dialogue” (Wark 2013, 6), paving the way to a “political-eco-
nomic formation in which there is talk without response” (Dean 2009, 24). While these 
peer-produced and shared communicative exchanges constitute the non-stop engine 
thanks to which communicative capitalism thrives, those who generate them are 
caught into a Sisyphean mechanism where they are condemned to unending activities 
of constantly making, sharing, and circulating content. In the pursuit of what is rendered 
into daily, repetitive tedious tasks4, such as updating, posting, and sharing, users be-
come cogs within what Byung-Chul Han calls the “burnout society” (Han 2015), blam-
ing themselves for not coping with the latter’s demanding pace.  
FOMO, or the fear-of-missing-out, which results in a compulsive drive toward non-
stop online engagement, is an increasingly common side effect of the contemporary 
approach to the digital5. In a recent ethnographic research that I have conducted with 
                                            
3 Originally, the sharing economy as a concept formulated by Lessig (2008) hints at an econ-
omy based on non-monetary exchanges. However, as this essay will show, the original con-
cept has been dramatically impacted by business models introduced by platforms such as 
AirB&B that maintain the word “sharing” in their slogan but have capitalised on relationships 
and human exchanges. Lessig himself has acknowledged the failure of the sharing economy 
in a lecture given at John Cabot University in March 2018 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wgj1WJTtp1g 
4 My ethnographic research shows that these are increasingly described as “tedious”, “repeti-
tive” actions even by generation Z, and often depicted as “tasks”, something closer to work 
obligations than fun and leisure activities. See Della Ratta (forthcoming). 
5 See Murphy (2013).  
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my undergraduate class “Selfies and Beyond: Exploring Networked Identities”, a stu-
dent wrote: 
 
a large portion of my anxiety and subconscious impulse to engage in social media 
is the fear of losing touch. It is difficult to grasp how such a culture rooted in 
interconnection could result in losing contact with people, but this sense of a con-
stant flow of information and communication makes me feel as though I need to 
always be on top of things, or else I will fade into the background (Della Ratta 
forthcoming). 
 
Another student concluded, after admitting being haunted by ghost buzzing, as if her 
phone would continuously notify her with new (inexistent) messages: 
 
I have never tried to be offline. I know it's completely impossible, and I know my 
existence would be much more serene and relaxed. Free from any kind of anxiety 
or tension. I remember when it seemed a miracle to have unlimited minutes and 
messages in the phone tariff. Now, the only thing that should not have an end is 
the Internet (Della Ratta forthcoming). 
 
Far from being a liberating environment, thriving on free expression and creativity, the 
domain of digital communicative exchanges seems to be haunted by new, increasingly 
complicated forms of stress, depression, and anxiety disorders. As envisaged by 
Fisher, these statutes are largely processed as individual diseases or disabilities, never 
as endemic forms to contemporary capitalism, or as features inherent to its way of 
functioning. Albeit a certain awareness of its dysfunctionality consciously manifests –  
“I know my existence would be much more serene and relaxed (being offline)”, my 
student writes –, yet a sense of ineluctability appears to be connected to the hegemonic 
form of contemporary capitalist realism, i.e. communication.  
Ten years after Fisher’s gloomy reflections, the rise of social networking sites – and 
their hegemonic take over all aspects of digital communication – has made capitalist 
realism look even more inescapable. Paradoxically, it is in the communicative appro-
priation of the (once political) form of the “social” that this take over has been accom-
plished and made more pervasive. “What is the Social in Social Media?”, Geert Lovink 
asks in his 2016 essay Social Media Abyss, mourning the loss of the primacy of politi-
cally engaged, class-related understandings of the social, in favour of mundane con-
notations rather evoking “interpersonal rubble […], a loose collection of ‘weak ties’” 
(Lovink 2016, 16).  
Baudrillard (1983) located “the end of the social” as we know it in the combined 
action jointly performed by the masses and the media6. In Baudrillard’s system of sim-
ulacra, the mass has turned into an abstraction, a sign that no longer has a material 
referent (the class, the proletariat, etc.) but only takes statistical existence in surveys 
and polls for measurability and predictability in the hands of “political demagogy” 
(Baudrillard 1983, 4). Meanwhile, media, the realm of the quintessentially spectacular, 
has abandoned the domain of meaning to embrace a mode of “constant emulsion” 
(Baudrillard 1983, 24), a non-stop dynamic of permanent transmission of messages 
                                            
6 “The mass and the media are one single process. Mass(age) is the message” (Baudrillard 
1983, 44). 
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that, by virtue of this permanent circulation, are condemned to become mere contribu-
tions to the data stream7. This phenomenon of “total dissemination, of a ventilation of 
individuals” generates a “space of connection” where “the rational sociality of the con-
tract” (between the state and civil society, between the public and the private) abdi-
cates in favour of the (spectacular, or post-spectacular) “sociality of the contact’ 
(Baudrillard 1983, 83, my emphasis).  
And yet it is only with Silicon Valley’s techno-utopian dream of sharing at all costs, 
and with the participation by all means enabled by the so-called “social web” (O’Reilly 
2005) that Baudrillard’s prophetic idea of the sociality of the contact takes material 
shape becoming a set of productive relationships based on unpaid, underpaid, or vol-
unteer labour developing free of charge and free of rights user-generated content to 
be circulated freely and gratis by virtue of crowdsourced tools such as ranking, 
hashtagging, liking, commenting. Here “sociality” is defined in terms of “making visible 
– and therefore commercially exploitable – the once hidden patterns of individual con-
nections” (Della Ratta 2018, 184) that take the collective form of a network merely at a 
visual level. In reality, only a loose connection is established between the sociality of 
the contact and any sort of collective formation.  
It is in Silicon Valley’s utopian dream of techno-enabled sharing cultures, in its lib-
ertarian ideology of tech-powered free speech and democratic progress8 that the social 
hegemonic manifests – social is “the new black” of the digital – to be fully accomplished 
in what I call “the networked image” (Della Ratta 2018). The networked image is a 
visual (and political) formation defined by its sociality, that is its circulation, its exchange 
value, its capability of spreading itself throughout the social web, of establishing (so-
cial) relations with the latter’s infrastructure, indifferently made by human or post-hu-
man subjectivities, algorithmic entities, databases, etc. Spreadability and visibility are 
the features defining the sociality of the networked image, together with the inner vio-
lence ingrained in the process of circulation9.  
Violence is inherently connected to visibility, whether in the form of hypervisibility 
granted to widely circulated data – “poor images”, as Hito Steyerl (2009) calls it –, or 
in the lack thereof, as content is redacted and forever extirpated from the online domain 
when non-complying to the platforms’ terms-of-services and guidelines10. The uneven 
union between violence and visibility is no longer an exceptional situation peculiar to 
crisis zones. Syria is probably the most evident example where the hypervisibility of 
content circulation and the invisibility of content deletion are both present at the same 
time. Violence constitutes a feature of today’s emerging visual political economy, char-
acterised by a sociality that should be achieved at all costs and in spite of everything. 
It’s the business and revenue model, the inner infrastructure of today’s social plat-
forms, in fact, that dictates the imperative of sharing, commodifying the latter in the 
exact moment in which the participation process happens.  
Sharing economies are no longer what the founder of Creative Commons, Law-
rence Lessig, so brilliantly conceptualised more than a decade ago, i.e. economies that 
are run alongside ideas of solidarity and non-monetary exchanges, and that could 
eventually coexist with commercial ventures forming an “hybrid economy” (Lessig 
                                            
7 Contribution is the word used by Dean (2010) to describe the process of voiding messages 
from meaning that takes place by virtue of non-stop circulation over the web 2.0. 
8 Barbrook and Cameron (1995) dubbed it “the Californian Ideology”. 
9 I have extensively dealt with violence and visibility of the networked image in my analysis of 
the socially-mediated Syrian conflict in Della Ratta (2018.) 
10 On the politics of commercial content moderation see Roberts (2019), Della Ratta (2020), 
and the documentary work “The Cleaners” (2018) by Hans Block and Moritz Riesewieck.  
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2008). “Sharing is caring”11 used to be Creative Commons’ motto to encourage content 
exchange under a more flexible copyright regime. Paradoxically, today Creative Com-
mons’ licensed items have ended up being collected and used – lawfully – by commer-
cially driven corporations to train facial recognition algorithms likely to be employed for 
military research projects and authoritarian repression12.  
And yet what recently happened to Creative Commons databases is not an isolated 
episode or a flaw of the system, but rather a feature of the infrastructure of the sharing 
economy as it has been reconfigured by the private and commercially oriented plat-
forms controlling the business of sharing. Today’s sharing economy has managed to 
redefine the concept itself of sharing and inject the idea of monetary transactions and 
commodification within domains once exclusively devoted to solidarity and non-com-
mercial exchanges13. This new hegemonic understanding of the sharing economy is 
private and commercially oriented by design.  
Far away from the digital utopias that have characterized the first phase of the web 
2.0 and its deep roots in the “Californian ideology” (Barbrook and Cameron 1995), 
today we witness the disruption of the digital commons. We mourn their disappearance 
within the domain of the sharing economy. We lament the loss of the social in the exact 
moment when the latter becomes the new triumphant, hegemonic media form. 
2. What is Digital Socialism? 
At the same time when the social becomes the “new black” of the digital, socialism is 
also subject to an operation of rebranding 2.0. Kevin Kelly, the founding executive di-
rector of Wired magazine and “a futurist adviser”14 on Steven Spielberg’s nightmare on 
surveillance cultures “Minority Report”, marks the beginning of this process of upgrad-
ing the common sense with his seminal 2009 Wired piece “The New Socialism: Global 
Collectivist Society is Coming Online” (Kelly 2009). 
In his semantic taking over of the concept and emptying it of all things political and 
class-related, Kelly argues that the emerging form of socialism is “uniquely tuned for a 
networked world” and far away from “your grandfather’s socialism […] It is not class 
warfare. It is not anti-American” (Kelly 2009). In Kelly’s cyber-utopian rhetoric, digital 
social becomes in fact “the newest American innovation”, a type of “socialism without 
the state”, running over “a borderless Internet” and “designed to heighten individual 
autonomy and thwart centralization” (Kelly 2009). In his colourful techno-language, 
digital socialism replaces the tedious bureaucracy of the five-year plans with the “bril-
liant chaos of a free market”, refashioning state factories into “desktop factories con-
nected to virtual co-ops”, and exchanging national production with peer production, 
“government rations and subsidies” with a “bounty of free goods” (Kelly 2009). 
In his apology of digital socialism, Kelly feels to have to justify the choice of “such 
an inflammatory heading” and “redeem” it, as “technically it is the best word to indicate 
a range of technologies that rely for their power on social interactions” (Kelly 2009). In 
his over excitement for all things tech, when the masses “contribute labor without 
wages and enjoy the fruits free of charge” (Kelly 2009), that’s socialism. As much as 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is socialism, real-time Twitter and RSS feeds are socialism, 
                                            
11 One of the mottos of Creativecommons.org. I was Creative Commons’ community manager 
for Arabic speaking countries from 2007 until 2013. 
12 One of this (in)famous databases, MS Celeb, contained 10 million faces, and was used to 
train facial recognition systems for countries such as China (Murgia 2019). 
13 Take for example the commodification of the domain of hospitality by AirB&B. See Morozov 
(2018).  
14 That’s the definition given by his Wikipedia page.  
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unlimited free cloud computing and passionate opinions on the Huffington Post are 
socialism of the digital type that Kelly heralds as the new, perfect form of “cultural OS” 
elevating “both the individual and the group at once” (Kelly 2009).  
One might excuse this over-enthusiastic apology by looking at the time in which it 
was authored, 2009, a year that was, for many, still full of digital promises and utopias. 
But Kelly believes so staunchly in digital socialism that he makes sure to declare his 
long-term view over the matter. Even if this phenomenon has not yet reached the main-
stream at the time of his writing, “clearly the population that lives with socialized media 
is significant”, Kelly emphasises. “The number of people who make things for free, 
share things for free, use things for free, belong to collective software farms, work on 
projects that require communal decisions, or experience the benefits of decentralized 
socialism has reached millions and counting” (Kelly 2009). And, he vigorously con-
cludes, “revolutions have grown out of much smaller numbers” (Kelly 2009). 
Ten years after this passionate attempt to redefine the meaning of socialism, the 
USA’s enemy number one China seems to have learned the guru’s lesson and em-
bedded it into institutional forms, implementing an up-to-date version of state-led digital 
socialism. In 2020, the so-called “social credit system” will standardise the assessment 
of citizens’ reputation producing a mechanism for ranking them according to their social 
and economic behaviours and sanctioning them if they fail to pay taxes on time, as 
much as if they do not show up after having booked a restaurant table or a hotel room. 
In this dystopian, Black-Mirror like15 framework, the Chinese government seems, in its 
turn, to have borrowed mechanisms of control and surveillance not from repressive 
institutions or authoritarian regimes, but precisely from the new digital social of social 
networking platforms. A way to visualise and quantify, therefore to evaluate, control, 
and sanction social relationships, that is possible to adopt at a state level and in such 
a pervasive, dystopian fashion only after the mechanism has become not just accepta-
ble and familiar but, also, desirable for the global masses.  
While this semantic redefinition is carried out, albeit in different ways, both by Sili-
con Valley’s libertarian utopians and by China’s new institutional form of authoritarian-
ism concealed under the more attractive guise of the digital, the European Union re-
sponds to the hegemonic re-appropriation of the social by emphasising its citizens’ 
rights to own their data and to protect their privacy. The General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR)16 is probably the most striking example of such a timid, apprehensive 
reaction to the takeover of the social, which reveals a lack of a proper understanding 
of this phenomenon happening at a global scale. GDPR attempts at building a defence 
against the aggressive pervasiveness of the digital social by giving individuals the (il-
lusion of) control and ownership of their data, upon which they would enjoy the right to 
request a portable copy and also, under certain circumstances, the possibility to have 
them erased. However, this promise of opening “the algorithmic ‘black box’ to promote 
challenge, redress, and hopefully heightened accountability” (Edwards and Veale 
2017, 18) might just result into yet another “transparency fallacy” (Edwards and Veale 
2017, 43), as there are complicated legal and infrastructure-related issues that might 
prevent the granted rights to be properly exercised by their holders. 
And yet even these legal or infrastructural impediments are not what is really at 
stake with the GDPR and similar policies. Its underlying problem is rather, in my view, 
                                            
15 See the series episode ‘Nosedive’ from season 4. 
16 See the official document http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-
INIT/en/pdf 
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an approach responding to the pervasive appropriation of the digital domain that ren-
ders all things digital “social” by simply reaffirming values such as ownership and prop-
erty. The stark contradiction between data that have constantly to move and circulate 
– that have to be “spreadable” (Jenkins, Ford and Green 2013) – as per the business 
model of all things social, and the right to own and control such fluctuating, pervasive, 
and ever-multiplying immaterial goods, becomes apparent here. It’s the overall ac-
ceptance of a giant money machine and revenue-making system in the hope of regain-
ing control of it by tweaking some small details. It’s a David and Goliath situation, where 
the actual little stone being thrown at the latter’s forehead does not affect the whole 
gigantic immaterial apparatus firmly in place.  
The contradiction inherent in a GDPR-like approach is that while we struggle to 
regain little bits of ownership and control over our data, the “feedback infrastructure” 
(Morozov 2019) stays firmly in the hands of platform capitalism. This rights-based atti-
tude and the values themselves that it claims to defend and protect – property, owner-
ship and privacy – are the core of the problem, not its antidote. Claiming back owner-
ship and privacy does not challenge the system, instead it seeks to mitigate the worst 
effects of communicative capitalism, protecting small territories of individual freedoms 
against a market that stays as greedy as ever (if not more), appealing to individual 
personal rights and responsibilities rather than addressing a political collective.  
How is it possible to redefine socialism if we are still acting within the domain of 
individual rights rather than collective solidarity? How can we be pleased and satisfied 
with such small, insignificant forms of counterbalancing the over power of the social 
hegemonic, if these very forms still pertain to the domain of communicative capitalism 
and its values? How can we rework socialism into a brand-new digital arrangement if 
we are entrapped within capitalist realism, so enmeshed in its perverse and pervasive 
mechanism that we are unable to unleash our imaginative power?  
3. What Digital Socialism is Not: Beyond the Knowledge Economy  
In the imaginative effort we should undertake to imagine a form of digital socialism that 
goes beyond Silicon Valley’s techno-utopianism à la Kelly or China’s dystopian ranking 
system, the starting point is to take a distance from the knowledge economy17. We do 
not know what digital socialism is or could be, yet surely it has nothing to do with 
knowledge production. If the latter, in fact, lies at the very core of communicative cap-
italism functioning as its nurturing engine, then how can it be at the same time consti-
tutive of digital socialism? Is a different form of knowledge, just because of it being 
supposedly built around a collaborative and peer-produced process, the right antidote 
to communicative capitalism? Are Wikipedia, and the over celebrated collaborative as-
pect behind its “wikinomics”18, the only possible shape that a “socialist” digital environ-
ment could eventually embrace, the face of the upcoming digital socialism?  
I want to shift the perspective of the conversation and look for something else than 
an allegedly more “socialist” form of immaterial knowledge production to imagine the 
foundations of digital socialism. I would like to engage in an exercise of creative imag-
ination to go beyond the constraints of capitalist realism and, instead of locating an 
alternative way, a more collectively oriented mode of knowledge production, just take 
a detour and think outside the box of this very knowledge production. In my view, the 
                                            
17 For a critical discussion of the knowledge economy see Peters (2019, 2001). 
18 This “wikinomics”, an economy based on networking, collaboration and peer production, is 
heavily criticized by Fuchs (2008) not only for supporting a regime of accumulation that 
brings about precarious labour, but also because of its ideological aspects. 
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problem lies precisely within the so-called knowledge economy, a fundamental trait of 
contemporary capitalism condemning labour to produce and distribute “information, 
communication, social relationships, affects” (Fuchs 2010, 142). 
In the early days of web 2.019, a literature enthusiastically supportive of a networked, 
cooperative, peer-based production had imposed itself20, putting forward an idea of 
value rooted in social relations and pushing the belief that “new forms of technological-
enabled openness, especially emergent social media that utilizes social networking, 
blogs, wikis and user-created content and media” (Peters 2019, 3) would provide the 
ground for a radically new conception of knowledge based on the “sharing and caring” 
for the commons. However, not only has Silicon Valley’s platform capitalism dramati-
cally changed the overall meaning of the sharing economy and transformed the once 
happily collaborative crowd of volunteering “peers” into an army of frustrated unpaid or 
underpaid labour that has now to deal with the unintended, disastrous consequences 
of finding the commons commodified and exploited. Furthermore, the fact of under-
standing the commons merely in terms of juridical zones regulated by a less rigid in-
tellectual property and by a more relaxed attitude toward ownership, does not take 
distance from a rights-based approach, therefore stays relegated within the domain of 
capitalist realism.  
The problem of “equalising access to communication services” focuses on just one 
aspect of the question, without eliminating or even weakening “other types of inequal-
ity” (Morozov 2015). Quite the opposite, in fact: by helping the socialisation of 
knowledge, open access, together with the participation, collaboration, and peer pro-
duction that it enables, and combined with a more flexible approach to intellectual prop-
erty, this model ends up strengthening the sharing paradigm upon which communica-
tive capitalism thrives. Therefore, the web-powered socialisation of knowledge and 
“knowledge socialism” (Peters 2019) do not equal socialism. Rather, these develop-
ments push forward the apparently innocent face of a “don’t be evil”21 capitalism, hiding 
its stellar profits under the banner of the Californian ideology’s freedom of speech and 
participation dreams. Open access to knowledge and the wikinomics is definitively not 
what will lead us toward digital socialism. We have to look elsewhere.   
In a recent piece in which he attempts to locate digital socialism in the computa-
tional age, Morozov criticizes the “new deal on data” (a GDPR-like approach) as some-
thing aiming at introducing a “modicum of fairness” in the far west of the digital econ-
omy, and selling the fantasy of “imagining users as anything other than passive con-
sumers” (Morozov 2019, 33-34). Such initiatives, Morozov maintains, are “important to 
guarantee the future of digitalized capitalism” (Morozov 2019, 34) by tweaking it with-
out undermining its very structure, as they frame the main problem of the latter’s ine-
qualities always in terms of ownership and individual property rights, which are in fact 
the pillars of the liberal personhood. While these initiatives focus on regaining (some) 
control over these rights, they fail to consider the fact that “the ownership and operation 
of the means of producing ‘feedback data’ are at least as important as the question of 
who owns the data itself” (Morozov 2019, 52). Ultimately, they ignore the feedback 
infrastructure and the firm hands of the very few tech giants controlling it.  
Rightly emphasising the fact that no radical transformation is ever going to take 
place if the feedback infrastructure remains under the current Silicon Valley private-
ownership model, Morozov’s piece engages in sketching out a plan for the progressive 
                                            
19 The definition ‘web 2.0’ comes from a blog post authored by O’Reilly (2005). 
20 See for example Benkler (2006) or Lessig (2006, 2008). 
21 Google’s former motto, once at the top of the company’s code of conduct. In 2015, after the 
restructuring into Alphabet Inc., the motto was changed into “Do the right thing” (Barr 2015).  
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left to find ways “to deploy ‘feedback infrastructure’ for new, non-market forms of social 
coordination” (Morozov 2019, 54), and to discover “other social arrangements, apart 
from competition” (Morozov, 55). He suggests three possibilities to do so: firstly, using 
“solidarity as a discovery procedure” as to “detect new needs and ways to satisfy them 
through non-market mechanisms” (Morozov 2019, 54). Hackathons, a sort of tech mar-
athons based on the idea that a certain issue identified by some actors (e.g. NGOs) 
will find a solution if socialised with a group that has a specific knowledge, is the ex-
ample brought up by Morozov to suggest that solidarity could lead the process of prob-
lem solving through altruism rather than through competition. Secondly, “designing 
non-markets” (Morozov 2019, 57) to coordinate matters of social interest going beyond 
the price mechanism, which Morozov illustrates by pointing out Alvin Roth’s work on 
matching organ donors with potential recipients. And thirdly, focusing on coordination 
in the economic sphere by putting into place what he calls “automated planning” (Mo-
rozov 2019, 55).  
This is, perhaps, the essay’s most visionary section where Morozov builds on 
American radical economist Daniel Saros’ work, which he calls “‘guild socialism’ in the 
era of Big Data” (Morozov 2019, 63). Saros’ path toward a socialist economy for the 
digital age is kind of tortuous, involving the building of a “‘General Catalogue’, some-
thing in between Amazon and Google, where producers, who are organized in guild-
like ‘worker councils’ –worker-run startups if you will – list their products and services 
in a way that would be familiar to users of Apple’s App Store or Google’s Play Store” 
(Morozov 2019, 64). Without going too much into the details of a complex system 
where users have to register their needs during a specific production period and then 
try to stick to those envisaged needs in order to get some bonuses (which are given 
also to those who consume less than average or to those who stay in the same job for 
a long time), the issue with Saros’ model is not just, as Morozov underlines while still 
praising the economist’s work, that it offends “the eco-socialist creed” by emphasising 
consumption, or that it involves the “much-maligned quantification” as it heavily de-
pends on feedback mechanisms and ratings (Morozov 2019, 64-65).  
Actually, a much bigger issue lies with the formulation of Morozov’s argument itself. 
His language and theoretical apparatus are entirely (and, probably, unconsciously) 
borrowed from communicative capitalism, even when they attempt at defining how so-
cialism would look like. Expressions such as feedback mechanisms, ranking system, 
matching, or worker-run start-ups are the offspring of the colonisation of the imagina-
tion (and of language) pushed forward by the hegemonic social and the values of the 
contemporary sharing economy. The continuous references to an Amazon-like plan-
ning system or to services designed alongside the model of the Apple or Google’s app 
stores reveal the challenge of imagining anything beyond capitalist realism, even in the 
context of a sophisticated essay of critical theory aimed at defining digital socialism.  
In a recent workshop carried out in the Roman neighbourhood of Torpignattara by 
the collective Human Ecosystems Relazioni (H.E.R.)22, co-founders Salvatore Iaconesi 
and Oriana Persico have underlined the troubles encountered in attempting to collec-
tively design an A.I. functioning with relational, non-extractivist data. “When we ask 
people to brainstorm about how they would like their neighbourhood A.I. to be and to 
do, they cannot but imagine something service-oriented. Thinking about data as re-
sources that are extracted from us in exchange of free services is so deeply rooted in 
us that it’s extremely challenging even to just imagine how relational-data would look 
                                            
22 See their website https://www.he-r.it 
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like”23. “It is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism”, Jameson 
bitterly noticed (2005, 199).  
Morozov’s piece, although trying to locate possible paths toward re-appropriating 
the feedback infrastructure in the direction of non-market non-competitive exchanges, 
remains entrapped within the language, metaphors and imaginative power of commu-
nicative capitalism. Furthermore, all the examples given to illustrate those possible 
paths operate within and not outside the latter, within the boundaries of knowledge 
production and not beyond. They are deeply rooted in computation and quantification 
centred beliefs, and hint at a cybernetic model of society. 
I agree with the end goal of Morozov’s essay and therefore I wonder: why should 
we take inspiration of a planning system from Amazon? Why should we borrow the 
language through which we describe our desires and wishes for a non-market centred 
society from capitalism itself? Is it possible to envisage and advocate for a capitalism-
free way of rethinking digital socialism?  
The biggest problem with Morozov’s formulation of the latter is his emphasis on 
knowledge production, albeit of a different nature. The biggest problem with knowledge 
production is that it overemphasises the symbolic aspects and the immateriality of the 
commodity, shaping an ideology of the digital being “non-rivalrous, infinitely expansive, 
discrete, aspatial, and recombinant” (Quah, in Peters 2019, 2). Thinking about digital 
socialism requires, instead, to get beyond immateriality and abstraction – therefore, 
beyond knowledge production – and rather focus on the material production of subjec-
tivities and their ways of being in the world.  
Queer philosopher Paul B. Preciado identifies a shift in contemporary capitalism 
from knowledge production toward what he calls “the pharmapornographic control of 
subjectivity” (Preciado 2013, 39) and its making, implemented through a set of tech-
nologies of the body (from endocrinology to genetic engineering) that are “micropros-
thetic” and “incorporated” (Preciado 2013, 77-78) . They can be “inhaled” and “injected” 
(Preciado 2013, 77), they penetrate and infiltrate our body taking control until it “no 
longer inhabits disciplinary spaces but is inhabited by them” (Preciado 2013, 79). For 
Preciado, it is precisely when technology is no longer an extension of man but rather 
the other way around, and when the organic needs technology in order to be (re)pro-
duced as organic, that the body’s political potential can finally unfold. His mutant body 
is a living testimony of the latter, as in the very moment in which it needs the phar-
mapornographic regime to become a subject and be recognised as subjectivity, it re-
volts against it by hacking its system of binaries and embracing multiplicity and queer-
ness.  
The body and the production of subjects and subjectivities are today’s battlefield. 
Taking a distance from the knowledge economy and its emphasis on immateriality and 
abstraction, I want to follow the path explored by queer and feminist theories to engage 
with the materiality of contemporary capitalism in order to locate spaces that contem-
porary socialism could possibly inhabit. Reinventing the social and rethinking socialism 
should have less to do with tweaking the process of knowledge production and regain-
ing control over the ownership of its end product (data). Instead, it should be more 
focused on the production of the body, subjectivities, and the ways in which they ma-
terially exist in the world. 
 
                                            
23 Personal interview, January 2019, Rome. 
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4. What Digital Socialism Could be About: Ethics of Care  
Queer and feminist scholarship and analyses might prove useful antidotes to the vio-
lence of abstraction that is inherent in the data-driven knowledge-economy. They can 
provide ways to look at contrasting communicative capitalism not from the perspective 
of individually-centred property-based rights, but from collective and relational modes 
of being in the world. They can help us to locate digital socialism in spaces other than 
the production of the immaterial.  
A concept that I would like to borrow from feminist scholarship engaged in rejecting 
“traditional male reasoning” (Koehn 1998, 4) and underlying the latter’s embeddedness 
in norms and stereotypes of patriarchal societies, is that of care. As “care is both value 
and practice” (Held 2006, 9), care and the work of care cannot be separated: they are 
deeply connected and interdependent. The work of care has traditionally occupied dis-
advantaged workers – women, migrants, people of colour – in activities related to so-
cial reproduction and reproductive labour, i.e. “the set of tasks that together maintain 
and reproduce life, both daily and generationally” (Hester 2018, 345), spanning from 
the care for others (childcare, elder care, etc.) to the maintenance of the infrastructure 
necessary to support life and work life (cleaning, etc.) to species reproduction (bearing 
children).  
Whether being carried out in private spaces such as the household by unpaid work-
ers, or in public places such as hospitals and remunerated, reproductive labour cannot 
be separated from the idea of an ethics of care. This has been made the object of 
several theoretical reflections in feminist studies24, many of which emphasise them be-
ing “a serious and important alternative to dominant Kantian and rights-based ethics” 
(Robinson 2011, 21) and, in general, a powerful antidote against the “quasi-mathemat-
ical form of ethical reasoning” (Koehn 1998, 2) imposed by male philosophers. Ethics 
of care are characterised by an understanding of the self that is relational rather than 
individualistic, placing human and intimate relations at the centre of life, in stark oppo-
sition to “legalistic contractual thinking, so favored in traditional analyses” which might 
in fact “alienate persons, rather than draw them together” (Koehn 1998, 6). 
This emphasis on relations rather than rights, on sociality rather than individuality, 
on interdependence rather than independence, on particularity, connection, and con-
text rather than the universality and abstraction of legalistic contractual thinking, is what 
I would like to offer to the reflection on digital socialism. Ethics of care present a radical 
critique of liberal individualism and its values25. The work of care in itself – through 
which work at large is made possible, through which all of us are made possible as 
workers and humans – is a reminder that the independent, autonomous, rational indi-
vidual is a fantasy deeply imbued with patriarchal ideologies. Care work is, in fact, 
“dependency work” (Held 2006,14), as it puts into bold relief how we all depend one 
on another, how we are all connected, related and interdependent. It makes a powerful 
detour from the rights-based approach, from the abstraction and immateriality of the 
knowledge economy. It restores materiality and relationality as central elements to the 
discussion on how digital socialism could be looked at, instead of just being imagined 
as a timid reformist attitude within the domain of communicative capitalism’s 
knowledge economy.  
Apart from it shaping an ethics that is not abstract and universal but contextual and 
intimately connected to labour – care and the work of care, care is the work of care –
there is an aspect of contemporary care that offers another interesting angle to the 
                                            
24 A good overview can be found in Koehn (1998) and Held (2006). 
25 See for example Held (2006, 13-15). 
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debate on digital socialism. Reproductive labour, which has been traditionally under-
stood as women’s work, and which is increasingly occupying a crucial sector in con-
temporary market economies to the extent that we can speak of a “care economy” 
(Hester 2018, 346-347), is threatened by the growing automation that is causing an 
impending “crisis of work” (Hester 2018, 344). This dramatic technological change in 
the job market is investing not just high-income economies, but also developing coun-
tries, further strengthening power inequalities that are already in place.  
The domain of the care economy, which once seemed the exclusive territory of 
feminised (paid, underpaid, or unpaid) work, is now at risk of being colonised in its turn 
by the abstraction and immateriality of automation. The New York Times refers to a 
recent experiment in France where Zora, a robot caregiver, has replaced humans in 
assisting elderly people (Satariano, Peltier, and Kostyukov, 2018). Care.Coach, a 
“game-changing innovation for aging and geriatric care that leverages the best of both 
human and technological capabilities”26, is successfully providing patients with pet av-
atars that assist with psychosocial support 24/7 and from a distance, while “conversa-
tions of a clinical nature are automated through software algorithms that implement 
clinical best practices”27. 
“The care.coach approach is a thoughtful combination of digital technology and 
genuine human connection…a creative solution to the shortage of qualified caregivers 
in the US”28, says Tom Grape, chairman and CEO of the Benckmark Senior Living 
company. Actually, rather than due to a shortage of qualified caregivers, the business 
of automated care is on the rise because of its cost-effectiveness in a healthcare mar-
ket, like the US, which is highly commodified and competitive. “Human contact is now 
a luxury good” (Bowles 2019), the New York Times has titled, hinting at the increasing 
phenomenon of automation and screen-mediation taking over all domains of human 
life for the working class. In stark contrast, elites enjoy the privilege of disconnecting 
when they wish to take a distance from technology, still being able to purchase non-
automated, more costly human labour.  
Automation’s takeover of all aspects of human life, including that of care which once 
was the domain of women’s labour and of relational, interdependent, sociality-centred 
ethics, certainly rings an alarm bell. However, considering the matter more closely, a 
striking similarity emerges between the expanding market of automation and the con-
temporary care economy. Often times, in fact, tech-powered automation requires some 
sort of human labour to function properly. Care.coach’s virtual pets, for example, are 
voiced by staff working in the Philippines (Mannion 2017), a country increasingly be-
coming, as Sara T. Roberts’ (2019) brilliant work highlights, a world hub for operations 
related to commercial content moderation, from “cleaning”29 the web from pornogra-
phy, violence and hate speech, to contributing to tasks of low-level automation, such 
as the ones required by automated healthcare.  
In both cases, such duties are performed by underpaid labour, migrants and 
women, or people located in developing nations – the case of the Philippines is exem-
plary of a country in which an entire sector of the population significantly works accord-
ing to the time zone and the cultural values of another country, the US (Roberts 2019). 
Often times, this exploited, cheap labour is subject to psychological repercussions for 
the kind of sensitive work they have to perform on a daily basis, whether cleaning the 
                                            
26 See the website https://www.care.coach/about.html 
27 https://www.care.coach 
28 https://www.care.coach 
29 As the title of a recent documentary on this topic, “The Cleaners” (2018) by Hans Block and 
Moritz Riesewieck. 
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web from child pornography and terrorism-related content, or assisting elderly people 
with depression and all sorts of syndromes. Almost always, this workforce is invisible. 
Not only because it disappears in the eyes of the end user by virtue of the automation 
process, but also as the workers are obliged to sign non-disclosure agreements with 
the company who hires them and who does not wish them to address these practices 
in public30. 
It is precisely in this invisibility that we should be able to find a connection, following 
Anne Boyer’s insight: “the work of care and the work of data are quiet, daily, persistent, 
and never done” (Boyer 2015). We do not get to see the women, the migrant, the 
unprivileged who perform the care work in the form of unpaid or underpaid labour, often 
in private spaces, far away from public eyes. These figures are erased by the ideolog-
ical glossiness of the knowledge economy presupposing and assuming the existence 
of independent, completely autonomous individuals – a fiction embedded in contem-
porary neoliberal capitalism. As much as we do not get to see the exploited workers 
from the Global South or from unprivileged and poor areas of the Global North, who 
are constantly monitoring and cleaning our social media posts, which we understand 
as textual manifestations of our rights to freedom of expression; or those who assist 
our elderly remotely at any time of the day, disguised as coloured tech avatars as if 
they were lacking material existence, empty stomachs to fill, families to feed, bills to 
pay. The work of care and the work of data go unnoticed until they are missing. “A dirty 
house attracts more attention than a clean one” (Boyer 2015), and the work of “clean-
ing” the web from the obscenities of free speech should never be paused, as otherwise 
the toxic waste of our alleged freedom of expression would immediately emerge to the 
surface.  
In automation, in the quantification process, these postcolonial bodies are erased 
and condemned to disappear, subject to the violence of abstraction that is inherent in 
data and knowledge production. Where does the non-quantifiable go? How does the 
non-quantifiable inhabit the domain of the digital? How do we restore the materiality of 
these bodies, how do we rehabilitate personhood in the digital, through the digital?  
Capital is trying to colonise our bodies and render them into data and abstraction, 
into invisible yet functioning units. It is at the intersection between the work of care and 
the work of data that we should initiate a reflection on digital socialism, in this very 
material overlap of flesh and bones, bits and pixels, melted together into a concrete 
political formation that we have not fully explored yet.  
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Abstract: This paper contextualizes and analyses the policy proposals of new “left populisms” 
(Mouffe 2018) for the regulation and reform of the “platform capitalism” (Srnicek 2017) that 
increasingly organizes digital communication. The era of the 2008 crash and subsequent re-
cession saw the emergence in North America and Europe of new left-wing electoral initiatives, 
either as new parties or fractions within older parties. These include, in the USA, Bernie Sand-
ers and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Democrats; in the UK, Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party; in 
Spain, Podemos; in Germany, Die Linke; in France, La France Insoumise. While many of these 
groupings might be described as socialist, or democratic socialist, they often also distinguish 
themselves from older socialist or social democratic formations; so, for lack of a better term, 
we call them left populisms. Left populisms are connected in contradictory ways to the appear-
ance of platform capitalism, a corporate model exemplified by Google, Facebook, Apple, Am-
azon and Uber, deploying proprietorial software as a launch-point for user activities accessing 
commodified or advertising-driven goods and services. The rise of left populism correlates with 
the ascent of platform capitalists. Left populist parties emerged from the anti-austerity move-
ments (Occupy in the USA, the Indignados in Spain, student campus occupations in the UK) 
organized with the help of social media platforms. However, it is also the failures and scandals 
of platform capitalism have been important to left populism. Edward Snowden’s revelations of 
ubiquitous surveillance and the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica-Russian hacker imbroglio 
around the 2016 US election have fuelled a “techlash” against giant digital corporations that is 
now an important component of left populist sentiment. Drawing on policy documents, mani-
festos, speeches, position paper, this paper analyses the policy platforms in which left populist 
parties confront platform capitalism around issues of content regulation; concentration of own-
ership; the rights of digital workers; alternative ownership models; and proposals for a high-
tech driven transition to “postcapitalism” (Mason 2016). It considers the similarities and differ-
ence between and within left populist parties on these issues; the extent of their departure from 
neoliberal policies; and their differences, and occasional erratic similarities, with right-wing 
populisms, such as that of Trump. It then reviews critiques of left populism made from Marxist 
and ecological anti-capitalist positions, with particular reference to technological issues. The 
paper concludes with a summary of the opportunities and problems for a left wing “data popu-
lism” (Morozov 2016) in the current political conjuncture. 
Keywords: left populism, platform capitalism, digital networks, capitalism, socialism, populism 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade, amidst economic crisis and recession, a wave of new left electoral 
parties or party fractions has appeared in Europe and North America. These include, 
in Europe, Spain's Podemos; Germany’s Die Linke; France's La France Insoumise, 
and in the UK, Jeremy Corbyn's Labour Party. There are also parties that once might 
have been termed “left”, for whom that designation now seems dubious, such as 
Greece’s Syriza, and Italy’s Five Star movement. In the United States, supporters of 
Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and (by some reckonings) Elizabeth War-
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ren constitute a left resurgence within the Democratic Party. In Canada, Québec Sol-
idaire adds to the roster. Some of these parties and party fractions (henceforward, for 
economy, “parties”) self-describe as “socialist”, or “democratic socialist”. However, 
other of the new formations wish to distinguish themselves from older socialist or social 
democratic parties whose current conservatism they repudiate. Some observers speak 
of “movement parties against austerity “(Della Porta et al. 2017), but this formulation is 
both awkward and too broad, because different, right-wing tendencies have also 
emerged from the era of austerity. A more useful concept is Chantal Mouffe’s (2018) 
“left populism”, designating electoral parties claiming to represent the people against 
alien interests, interests that for right populisms are liberal elites or foreign migrants 
but in left populisms are corporate oligarchies.  
Amongst the corporate oligarchies that left populisms oppose are those of “platform 
capitalism” (Srnicek 2017), the masters of the software and hardware infrastructures 
on which users rely to work, shop, sell, socialize and conduct ever-growing portions of 
everyday life. From such activities, proprietors of these “platforms” draw revenues via 
commodity sales, advertising, and data extraction. This business model, exemplified 
by Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon and Uber, has spread from search energies and 
social media across the economy, driving the ascent of what are today some of global 
capitalism’s most highly valued corporate giants. The idea of platform capitalism has 
been widely adopted by media and communication scholars. It has, however, been 
criticised for inadequately addressing the social conflicts surrounding the emergence 
of the new digital oligopolies (van Dorn 2017). This essay addresses that omission by 
examining left populist responses to platform capitalism, their proposals for its reform 
or supersession, and the problems and possibilities of such programs. 
2. From Street to State via Social Media 
Left populisms and platform capitalism are closely connected. Both emerged over the 
same period, from about 2004 to 20161. The major connector is the Wall Street crash 
of 2007/2008, and the decade-long recession in the Global North that followed. The 
economic meltdown propelled capital’s search for a new growth sector, which it found 
in already nascent “platforms” (Srnicek 2017; Mosco 2017). Left populisms emerged 
as response to austerity, recession, debt, unemployment, precarity, and inequality, so-
cial problems that these platforms accentuated. But left populist parties were born from 
social movements that used capitalist platforms to protest these injustices. Many of 
such parties had origins in “occupy” or take the “square movements” ignited by the 
crash; Podemos in the Indignados’ occupation of the Puerto del Sol in Madrid (Delclós 
2015); Sanders’ 2016 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in Occupy 
Wall Street (Gabbatt 2015; Stewart 2019); Momentum, the ginger group for Corbyn’s 
ascent, from UK campus occupations of 2010-2011 (Earle 2018); Québec Solidaire 
                                            
1 On a purely impressionist basis, compare these chronologies. On the left populist side: Syriza 
was founded in 2004; Die Linke in 2007; M5S in 2009; Occupy movements were active from 
2011 to 2014; Podemos was founded in 2014; Corbyn won Labour leadership, and Sanders 
ran his presidential nomination bid, in 2015; La France Insoumise was founded in 2018, and 
in that year Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez was elected to the US Congress; Sanders and Warren 
both bid for Democratic presidential nomination in 2019. On the platform capital side, Google 
launched its Initial Public Offering (IPO) in 2004, and Facebook did so in 2006 Apple sold its 
first iPhone in 2008; Twitter made its IPO in 2013; in 2017 Apple, Facebook, Amazon, 
Google, Microsoft occupied five spots amongst the top global corporations by market valua-
tion; 2019 saw the IPOs of Uber, Lyft, and Pinterest. 
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from French-Canada’s “Maple Spring”. Such movements famously organised via so-
cial media platforms. “Facebook revolutions” is undoubtedly a hyperbolic phrase, but 
one containing a grain of truth. 
 As the tide of occupations ebbed, some activists turned “from the streets to the 
state” (Gray 2018), and from “changing the world without taking power” (Holloway 
2002) to taking parliamentary power. In doing so, they applied their familiarity with dig-
ital media to electoral politics. This dynamic is analysed by Paolo Gerbuado (2019) in 
his The Digital Party, which examines both the strengths and weaknesses of such or-
ganising. Gerbaudo acknowledges the speed, scope and precision of digital cam-
paigns, and its obvious appeal to youth completely familiarised with networked envi-
ronments. But he also charts unexpected consequences, such as a tendency to polar-
ise party structures between what he terms “hyper-leaders”, whose charismatic image 
is built around carefully cultivated online presence, and “super-bases” of followers 
prone to rapid networked endorsements of their initiatives.  
This paper does not, however, deal further with these tactical campaigning and 
organisational uses of digital media by left populist parties. Rather, it focuses on the 
strategic issue of the programs left populists have proposed for the reform or super-
session of platform capitalism. For although left populisms organise via digital plat-
forms, their rise coincides with great scandals about such platforms: Edward Snow-
den’s surveillance revelations; the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica-“Russiagate” im-
broglio; multiplying issues of hate speech, network toxicity and privacy abuse. Further, 
for millennial youth, the employment practices of Uber, Mechanical Turk, Task Rabbit, 
Deliveroo and CloudFlower typify the worst of a precarious gig-economy. All this has 
informed a mounting “techlash” (Foroohar 2018) underway since 2017. In this context, 
what Evgeny Morozov (2016) terms “data populism” – a critique of the oligopolistic 
powers of digital giants – became an important part of left populism.  
These proposals for reforming or even dismantling platform capitalism have many 
strands. Some issues are specific to particular nations. For example, in the United 
States, Sanders and his supporters were active in protests against the Trump admin-
istration’s 2017 revocation of “net neutrality” – the principle that Internet service pro-
viders (ISPs) treat all data equally and not speed or slow it for profit (Coldewey 2018). 
The fight for net neutrality was in the US a major cause, and a bellwether for other 
struggles over digital policy. But while left populists in Europe and Canada are con-
cerned about the US precedent (Orsini 2017), no similar attack on net neutrality has 
yet been mounted in these regions, so the issue does not have the same salience.  
Yet despite such differences, left populists have common proposals about platform 
capitalism. These commonalities can be tracked through party programs; policy state-
ments; position papers; and speeches and books by party leaders, members, advisors 
and sympathisers. Drawing on such sources, I outline five themes:  
a) calls for the regulation of Internet speech and privacy (Section 3);  
b) “trust-busting” legislation to break up concentrations of ownership (Section 4);  
c) regulation of gig economy working conditions (Section 5);  
d) forms of alternative ownership of digital resources, including nationalisation, mu-
nicipal digitalism, open-source institutions, and platform cooperatives (Section 6)  
e) plans for a digitally-driven transition to “postcapitalism” (Mason 2015; Section 7). 
3. Internet Speech and Digital Surveillance 
Issues of Internet speech regulation and privacy protection are the least distinctive 
area of left populist policy proposals, but only because these concerns have suddenly 
become widespread. Since 2016 there has been a surge of concern across the political 
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spectrum over hate speech and also at least ostensible expressions of outrage at the 
scope of commercial privacy invasion. In Europe, such concerns are now widely 
adopted by the political centre. In the US, Mark Zuckerberg himself called for govern-
ment rules for social media content as the price of preserving his private empire (BBC 
2019). Here left populism has contributed to “mainstreaming” of policy ideas unthinka-
ble only a few years ago, but now conventional wisdom.  
Left populist perspectives on speech regulation do however have inflections that 
separate them from centrist and conservative positions, largely to do with concerns 
about the national security state. While generally supporting regulation of hate speech 
and other toxic Internet content, left populist parties have criticised reliance on corpo-
rate-run semi-automated screening systems, and the danger of blacklisting all forms 
of dissent. Thus in 2009, Die Linke opposed Germany’s “access” legislation for block-
ing content such as child pornography on the grounds that “a largely uncontrolled tech-
nical censorship infrastructure is in principle incompatible with fundamental rights” 
(Feilner 2009). In Spain, Podemos’ leader Pablo Iglesias denounced prosecutions of 
artistic works, including online content and retweeted jokes, for alleged “glorification of 
terrorism” under the conservative governments notorious “gag law” (López-Terra 2017; 
Jones 2018) 
 Left populists have also highlighted platform capital’s collaboration with the uncon-
strained surveillance projects of state intelligence agencies and police forces. In the 
US, Sanders opposed the Patriot Act, warrantless wiretapping and overly broad gov-
ernment surveillance as blatant overreaches of government power, and has recently 
has denounced the police use of facial recognition technologies (Lutz 2019). When 
Jeremy Corbyn (2016) launched a “people's charter of digital liberties”, it pledged to 
protect British citizens from "unwarranted snooping on their online activities by the se-
curity services”. Such concerns are particularly acute for left populist parties because 
some, of them, such as Podemos and the Labour Party, have themselves been subject 
to state surveillance (Nikandrov 2015; Evans 2017). However, these parties have also 
sometimes themselves been criticised by surveillance activists for compliance with 
state authorities around digital monitoring of terrorist or separatist threats (Ball 2016; 
López 2019). 
4. Concentration of Ownership 
Digital trust-busting – breaking up Google, Facebook and other digital giants – is a 
natural issue for left wing parties. Leaders such as Sanders and Corbyn regularly de-
nounce monopolistic capital, including that in the media and communication sector. It 
is, however, another sign of recent “techlash” that left populist parties are today far 
from alone on this question. Anti-trust activities have returned to the policy repertoire 
of even centrist institutions. Since 2016, the European Union has fined giant US plat-
form capitalists for anti-competitive practices, such as Google’s abuses in the mobile 
phone, shopping-comparison and online-advertising sectors, Facebook’s melding of 
personal data gathered from its various subsidiaries, and Apple’s tax evasions (Stevis-
Gridneff 2019) – even if these multibillion penalties are minor relative to the wealth of 
their targets, and payment indefinitely delayed by litigation. 
However, the issue takes on a more serious complexion in the USA, where 
legislation could, hypothetically, actually divest Alphabet/Google or Facebook of 
corporate holdings. The argument for such action has historical precedent. If “data is 
the new oil”, why not apply the same logic that made Rockefeller’s empire the target 
of early twentieth century trust-busting? Despite Sanders’ long anti-monopoly record, 
it is Elizabeth Warren (2019) who has made digital anti-trust a central policy plank of 
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her campaigns and indeed one of her central claims to being counted as a “left 
populist”. Her proposal to structurally separate the corporate operation of a digital 
platform from sale of its own products (for companies with over $25 billion in annual 
global revenue) updates the classic regulatory principle of division between “carriage” 
and “content” (Dayen 2019). It explicitly has Amazon Marketplace, Google’s ad 
exchange, and Google Search in its sights. Warren’s proposal is reinforced by 
promises to investigate and reverse anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions in the 
digital domain, naming Amazon, Google, and Facebook as probable targets (Warren 
2019; Dayen2019). Sanders has endorsed the idea of breaking up Facebook.  
The anti-trust attack on the “bigness” of Big Tech has become a new horizon for 
progressive activism in the US. One should not, however, overstate its radicalism. As 
Warren herself makes clear, anti-trust is not inherently anti-capitalist; rather, it protects 
the so-called free-market against its self-destructive tendencies. The breakup of the 
regulated telecommunication monopoly of AT&T can be regarded as a founding act of 
neoliberalism (Lüthje 1993). Indeed, on anti-trust, left populism overlaps with right pop-
ulism. Trump has made forays into this area, posing as a tribune of the people in his 
highly personalized feud with Jeff Bezos’ Amazon. His administration is now taking a 
more systematic approach to the issue, with Department of Justice investigations into 
anti-competitive platform practices recently announced (The Economist 2019a). Ironi-
cally, “legacy” media moguls such as Rupert Murdoch support the breakup of their 
digital competitors (Scola and McGill 2019). Despite left populism’s embrace of “anti-
trust”, there can be no assumption its outcomes would be democratising. All depends 
on what alternatives might be available to fill the space created by diminishing the 
oligopolies of platform capitalism. I turn to this question in a moment, but first we should 
look at the related issues of digital labour conditions. 
5. Gig Worker Rights 
Left populist parties are virtually unanimous in their critique of the low wages, precarity 
and lack of benefits suffered those who work for platform capitalists. Amazon fulfilment 
centres, with their reliance on temporary workers and zero-hour contracts, relentless 
digital monitoring, mental and physical stressing of employees, and poor health and 
safety conditions epitomise the problem. Left populists also target so-called “lean plat-
forms” (Srnicek 2017) such as those of Uber, Lyft, and Deliveroo that rely on algorith-
mic management to coordinate workers using their personal equipment (cars or bikes), 
and classifying them as “self-employed” agents to avoid responsibility for training, 
safety provisions, health insurance, holidays and other benefits. 
In this regard, La France Insoumise (LFI), a party whose appearance was directly 
related to protests against the liberalising of France’s labour laws under Sarkozy and 
Macron, is exemplary. LFI uses the term “Uberisation” to identify “a breakdown of work 
structures” that is “due to the emergence of a model organized around digital plat-
forms”. It declares Uberisation a “social regression” characterised by “wild deregulation 
of professions and sectors” and “fraudulent and widespread circumvention of fiscal and 
social rules”. Uberisation “causes workers' rights to disappear [...] through massive 
recourse to self-entrepreneurship” producing “an unprecedented deterioration in work-
ing conditions” and accumulating profits” while “squeezing wages and social rights” 
(LFI 2017). LFI’s leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon has also argued that “Uberisation” is 
gender-coded and especially injurious to women because “Uber's world is that a self-
employed worker without rights, who thinks he's smart as long as he's healthy and has 
no children” (Durand and Goldberger 2018).  
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LFI therefore explicitly situates itself on the side of recent labour protests in France- – 
taxi drivers protesting Uber, bicycle courier collectives formed after the sudden closure 
of the Tok TokTokTake and Eat Easy – and also of worker movements in the US and 
UK fighting to “reclaim their pseudo-independence and combat over-exploitation”. It 
proposes that precarious and so-called self-employed workers be given full access to 
the” general social security scheme”; “every worker performing his or her work in a 
situation of economic dependence [...] must be presumed to be an employee, and thus 
enjoy the rights attached to it”. LFI also proposes that platform capitalists be subject to 
“approval procedure that will make it possible to verify that they meet the social, fiscal 
and regulatory obligations in force” (LFI 2017). 
Similar statements and policies can be found from almost all left populist parties. 
Die Linke’s 2011 platform declares the party against “replacement of the regular work-
force by temporary agency work or bogus self-employment”; a later “digital agenda” 
advocates redistributing the benefits of advanced digitalisation, including a 30-hour 
working week, a basic income, and at least two sabbaticals during every working life-
time (Offerman 2017). UK Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn accuses "unscrupulous 
bosses" of using technology to undermine workers' rights; declares that the gig econ-
omy, depicted as "modern and dynamic", actually denies "both employees and cus-
tomers basic protections" and harms workers' mental health; and urges young people 
to join a trade union to protect their rights. A Labour government would, he says, make 
it easier for unions to go on strike and extend full employee rights to all workers in the 
gig economy – such as sick pay, parental leave and protection against unfair dismissal. 
(BBC 2017). In the US, Bernie Sanders in 2018 drafted a Stop Bad Employers by 
Zeroing Out Subsidies (Stop BEZOS) Act, a proposal for a tax on large corporations 
equal to the federal benefits their low-wage employees would have to claim to make 
ends meet (Heater 2018). His recent Workplace Democracy plan has promised the 
abolition of the “independent contractor” status of workers in companies such as Uber 
and Lyft. Both Sanders and Warren have supported the struggle for California’s historic 
Bill AB 5, an important step in this direction (Corbett 2019).  
6. Alternative Ownership 
Left populist parties have many ideas about diversifying control of digital platforms, 
part of their wider reconsiderations of what social ownership of the means of production 
might mean today (Beckett 2019). An important statement of this approach is the 2017 
study of “Alternative Ownership” commissioned by the UK Labour Party. This envis-
ages reviving and revising traditional models of industry nationalisation, adding higher 
levels of transparency and accountability to public-sector ownership; fostering eco-
nomic activity by municipalities and locally-led social enterprises; encouraging worker’s 
co-operatives and other employee ownership plans. This is a general plan, not one 
specific to digital platforms. But all of these alternative ownership approaches – and 
some more beside – have application to platform capitalism, and have been taken up, 
with varying inflections and intensities, by other left populist parties.  
 
(i) Public Sector Platforms:  
 
The Alternative Ownership paper per se actually has little to say about digital indus-
tries, though it cites the UK postal services, alongside railways and the energy sector, 
as privatised services to be re-nationalised under its new model. But Labour leadership 
speeches, policy statements and think tank pieces fill out the picture. A “British Digital 
Corporation” (BDC), a sister to the BBC, would host non-profit services rivalling those 
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of digital corporations, including a Facebook alternative (Jones 2018; Lunden 2018; 
Watson 2019). Other public service applications promised in the Labour Party’s (2016) 
Digital Democracy Manifesto include a guarantee to “deliver high speed broadband 
and mobile connectivity for every household, company and organisation in Britain from 
the inner city neighbourhoods to the remotest rural community”; a free-to-use on-line 
hub of learning resources for the National Education Service; an “open-knowledge” 
portal where “the findings of all state-funded research to be made available without 
charge” and enabling online voting, and even public meetings, in elections. In a similar 
vein, La France Insoumise pledges to oppose corporate platforms with “public plat-
forms of general Interest” dealing with both “physical services (public transport, local 
product distribution networks, etc.) and immaterial services (access to law, transpar-
ency of data, etc.),” and ensuring that “the value created by an ecosystem is paid back 
to society, not captured in financial form” (LFI 2017). 
The most dramatic initiative on public sector initiatives from a left populist party to 
date is, however, the announcement by the Labour Party in its 2019 election Manifesto 
that it would provide full fibre broadband service to everyone in Britain by 2030 (Labour 
Party 2019, 51). This “British Broadband” service would be created by nationalising the 
digital network arm of the private company BT (British Telecom), compensating share-
holders to the tune of about $15 billion (Fildes and Pickard 2019); the costs for oper-
ating the new network would be paid for by “taxation of multinationals, including tech 
giants” (Labour Party 2019, 51). The pledge elicited an alarmed counterattack by the 
Conservative Party, the tabloid press and BT spokespeople, all claiming it underesti-
mated costs of the project. At the time this article was finalised, the UK election cam-
paign was still underway. 
 
(ii) Digital Municipalism:  
 
Progressive digital municipalisms has been pursued especially vigorously in Spain by 
Podemos and its city-level political allies, such as Barcelona en Comu and Más Madrid 
(Baird and Junque 2019; Romanos and Sádaba 2016). In Barcelona, during the mayor-
alty of Ada Colau, the city’s chief technology officer, Francesca Bria (2018) and her 
colleagues developed “a new social contract for the digital age”. Data gathered from 
services such as transportation would be a publicly owned and protected asset, used 
for urban planning purposes; a TOR-encrypted whistle-blower tool shielded public 
workers denouncing corruption; urban 3D-printing maker labs were set up; and a spe-
cial online platform enabled citizens to participate in civic policy making (Bria 2018; 
Barcelona Ciutat Digital 2019).  
In Madrid, under the mayor Manuela Carmena and her Ahora Madrid party, Spain’s 
capital experimented with similar initiatives, including the use of the Decide open 
source platform for participatory budgeting, citizen policy proposals and consultation 
processes (DeJohn 2017). These metropolitan projects supported a network of smaller 
municipal initiatives in Spain, and internationally. Not all these efforts have been suc-
cessful, and recent municipal elections saw setbacks for left parties in Barcelona and 
Madrid. Recent assessments of prospects for a left digital urbanism strike a soberer 
tone than earlier utopian visions (Morozov and Bria 2018). Nonetheless, these experi-
ments have provided practical laboratories for the digital policies of left populism, and 
are critically important in suggesting alternatives to corporate led “smart city” plans, 
such as Google/Alphabet’s infamous “Quayside” appropriation of Toronto’s waterfront. 
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(iii) Open Source Institutions: 
 
Many left populist manifestos mention the progressive potential of “open source” soft-
ware and hardware. For example, soon after its formation Die Linke took a pro-open 
source stance (Feilner 2009), and just before the 2017 German federal elections pub-
lished a document titled “10 Points For a Digital Agenda” (Kipping et al. 2017). Its au-
thors, three of whom previously worked for the Pirate Party, rearticulated the aspira-
tions of the Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) movement for “digital coopera-
tion, collaboration, sharing and re-use” within the framework of a socialist electoral 
project (Offerman 2017). The realisation of FOSS ideals, they said, depends on an 
institutional framework that not only provide the necessary legal protections but also 
encourage widespread adoption of open source and open standards software. Without 
such an institutional context, big data and machine learning and other computing inno-
vations threaten the emergence of a digital feudalism. However, a left government 
could legislate the conditions in which cultural products and scientific knowledge would 
become free and available to all as open data. In contrast with Germany’s “Industry 
4.0” policy of intense automation, they posit the creation of "Social State 4.0”. All public 
networks would be based on open-source infrastructures; internet access should be 
free; all software used in political processes would be open source. “We want,” the 
manifesto says “to uninstall the neoliberal version of platform capitalism and create a 
new drive system” (Kipping et al. 2017). 
 
(iv) Platform Cooperatives & Inclusive Ownership:  
 
An important strand in left populist ownership plans is the digital extension of left tradi-
tions of Co-operativism. Platform co-operatives are businesses based on computing 
platforms, but owned and governed workers and users. Many such projects currently 
exist, though generally on a small scale (Scholz and Schneider 2017). The concept is 
widely supported by left populist parties as an alternative to the exploitative path of the 
gig economy. It has been embraced La France Insoumise, supported in the progres-
sive municipalism of Podemos allies, and celebrated by Corbyn (2017): “imagine an 
Uber run co-operatively by the drivers, collectively controlling their futures, agreeing 
their own pay and conditions, with profits shared or re-invested”.  
The Co-operative Party, an affiliate of the Labour Party, proposes large scale digital 
systems to assist workers and consumer cooperatives, including platform cooperatives 
(Lawrence et al. 2017). Platform Co-operativism has been criticised for underestimat-
ing the difficulties small enterprises confront in face of the massive network-effect ad-
vantages enjoyed by established platform capitalists (Srnicek 2017), condemning 
worker- and user- owned alternatives to the “dwarfish forms” Marx saw as the fate of 
all co-operatives within capitalism.  
However, left populist plans include state support for cooperatives, including plat-
form cooperatives, by, for example, financing through special investment banks. How 
far this would be sufficient to give platform co-operatives a fighting chance to compete 
with the Ubers and Googles is, to say the least, uncertain. However, it is also important 
to note that left populist programmes also include methods of advancing worker own-
ership that do not depend on the co-operative form but aim at similar goals. These 
include the idea of “Inclusive Ownership Funds” (IOF) by which a small percentage of 
companies’ shares would be regularly transferred to workers up to a set cap (say 10%), 
and idea with roots in postwar Sweden’s labour-led “Meidner Plan” (Gowan and 
Viktorsson 2017). The funds would, in many firms, soon make the workers the largest 
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single shareholder, able to elect their own trustees and directly influence company de-
cisions. This idea has been most developed by the UK Labour Party, but was also 
recently adopted by Sanders (Blackburn 2018; Gowan 2018; Bruenig 2019b). Such 
plans – a variant of an earlier tradition of “fund socialism” (Bruenig 2019a) – are not 
specific to platform enterprises, and lack some of the DIY appeal of platform coopera-
tives, but do offer a gradual route to somewhat collectivizing ownership of behemoths 
of platform capitalism. 
7. Postcapitalism 
While anti-trust legislation, gig worker protections and alternative ownership plans 
would be important reforms, they are not the most audacious left populist ideas for 
dealing with platform capitalism. For these, we have look to a group of left intellectuals 
broadly in the orbit of Corbyn’s Labour Part.; Nick Srnicek, not only an originator of the 
term “platform capitalism” but also co-author with Alex Williams Inventing the Future 
(Srnicek and Williams 2015); journalist Paul Mason, advocate for Postcapitalism (Ma-
son 2015); and Aaron Bastani (2019), proponent of Fully Automated Luxury Com-
munism. These thinkers are united by the idea of a left populist politics with a pro-
gramme based on the rapid development of a high-tech economy which, they believe, 
opens a path to a society of abundance in many respects beyond capitalism.  
The major process enabling this transition would be the erosion of the need for 
wage labour by artificial intelligence (AI), robotics and other advanced forms of auto-
mation. Paid work would be progressively replaced by either Universal Basic Income 
(UBI) (Srnicek and Williams 2015; Mason 2015), or a comprehensive range of Univer-
sal Basic Services such as health care, transportation, housing, education (Bastani 
2019). To this Mason and Bastani adds the idea that a digital economy will inevitably 
generate more and more free goods, as point and click reproduction reduces marginal 
costs to zero. As the freely available goods include will include tools for communal 
planning, the possibility for a society that is both freed of wage labour and increasingly 
capable of democratized decisions, and hence substantially “beyond capitalism” will, it 
is claimed, emerge.  
This “left accelerationist” (Williams and Srnicek 2013) vision of a postcapitalism 
attained by speeding up high-technology has classic Marxist roots in the idea that cap-
italism will be destroyed by the tension between the force and relations of production, 
and also in the famous “Fragment on Machines” in Marx’s Grundrisse, which appears 
to predict dissolution of the wage form by automation. It is also in a way the digital-era 
successor to Lenin’s enthusiasm for the assembly line and definition of communism as 
‘the soviets plus electricity” – with one important difference: it dispenses with the messy 
business of revolution, substituting an evolutionary, tech-driven path to postcapitalism. 
“AI plus UBI (or UBS)” [Artifical Intelligence; Universal Basic Income; Universal 
Basic Services] has become a mantra for some strands of left populisms. It has a com-
plex relation to left populism’s other major societal vision, that of a “Green New Deal” 
responding to climate emergency, an idea most energetically advocated in the US by 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, but echoed in the UK Labour Party, La France Insoumise 
and other left populist formations. Fully Automated Luxury Communism (FALC) and a 
Green New Deal (GND) can be seen as compatible, if the latter is interpreted solely as 
an eco-modernising project, dependent entirely on developing large scale solar, wind 
and other renewable energy systems. However, there is an obvious tension between 
the “automation now”, “post-work version” of FALC and the New Green Deal emphasis 
on “green jobs”. And the potential contradictions between the two increase sharply if a 
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GND is understood as including any de-growth component that would curb aggregate 
production and consumption, undercutting the promise of abundance integral to FALC. 
It thus cannot be taken for granted that an effective NGD is fully compatible with 
either the “automation” or the “luxury” of Fully Automated Luxury Communism. In re-
gard to digital networks, many eco-modernist proposals for high-technology solutions 
to global explicitly rely on big data monitoring of energy consumption and use (Bratton 
2019), and could be expected to entail state-led surveillance, social media nudging 
and admonition aimed at shaping such behaviour. It is, again, uncertain how far such 
an element of a GND would be compatible with the commons, privacy protection and 
freedom from surveillance made in the “new data deal” (Bria 2018) that left populist 
parties also advance. 
8. Conclusion: Problems and Possibilities 
Left populism presents an amalgam of policies to change platform capitalism. Some 
are modest neo-social democratic steps (Watkins 2016), others more ambitious. This 
mix is, as we will discuss, problematic. But it nevertheless marks a significant incursion 
on neoliberal “common sense”, opening a window to ideas of public ownership of tech-
nologies and network governance in ways not seen since 1970s. This shift in the wind 
has been registered by opponents of the left. The Economist (2019b) reports on the 
rise of “millennial socialism” with alarmed condescension; in the USA, Republican at-
tacks on figures such as Alessandria Octavia Cortes manifest both confidence “social-
ism” can’t win – so should be talked up – and fears it might – so must be run down. 
Left populism is however also controversial on the left. Mouffe is a declared “post-
Marxist” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The turn to a parliamentary strategy and a disa-
vowal of a specifically class politics characteristic of left populist parties has led some 
Marxists to declare it “pseudo-socialist” (López 2019). Many see populism as almost 
inherently right-wing (Dean 2017; Revelli 2019). Others, while critical of post-Marxism, 
nonetheless believe a left populism drawing on the concept of “the people” – as in “the 
popular front”, or “the people united shall never be defeated” – has communist and 
socialist potential (Rancière 2013; Sotiris 2019). This debate is joined and cross-cut by 
autonomists, communisers, anarchists and horizontalists of all stripes, often opposed 
to any party form or parliamentary strategy. Bearing these entangled discussions in 
mind, I conclude with a brief review of three criticisms of left populist strategies towards 
platform capitalism.  
First, and most pragmatically, left populist ideas are still a long way from the corri-
dors of state power. So far, no left populist party has achieved a national electoral 
victory, other than Syriza, which in 2014 marked its success by abdicating its anti-
austerity mandate, and Italy’s Five Star party, which promptly entered a disastrous 
coalition with the far right. Since then the torch passed to first to Podemos, now in 
decline, then to the British Labour Party, currently mired in Brexit problems, and to the 
US, where at the time of writing, Sanders and Warren, though important contenders in 
the Democrat’s nomination race for the presidential election of 2020 are still widely 
considered unlikely to win. Parties formed in the period of acute crisis following the 
Wall Street crash have faced a more difficult terrain during the subsequent slow and 
ambivalent economic recovery – and will face another changed situation in any future 
recession.  
The issues of the digital industry and network policy discussed here are probably 
by no means the most significant in determining left populist electoral success or fail-
ure, which may hinge far more on health care, education, debt, trade and immigration. 
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In particular, it is unclear how much traction long-view promises of a high-tech post-
capitalism have with households immediately concerned about low pay-cheques, sky-
rocketing child-care and education costs and diminishing welfare rates.2 
Second, were a Corbyn or a Sanders to win electoral victory, as David Broder 
(2019) observes, “their difficulties would only begin”. The left turn “from the street to 
the state” since Occupy has reignited a series of debates about the problems of any 
electoral transition to socialism that for Marxists go back to the arguments of Lenin, 
Bernstein, Kautsky and Luxemberg at the start of the 20th century to those of Poult-
antzas and Miliband at is mid points. As Broder remarks, there is a “dismal record” of 
supposedly socialist governments which, rather than reforming or abolishing capital-
ism, were instead themselves “reformed” to become “mere administrators of the exist-
ing system”. This is often explained in terms of the class backgrounds of politicians 
and civil servants, but ultimately the problem is structural. In capitalism, state revenues 
depend on national capital and ensuring that capital’s continued profitability is a com-
pulsion; without it “the state itself would collapse” (Bolton and Pitts 2018, 143). For a 
left populist government to quietly erode capitalism from within, without bringing the 
house down on its own head in a crisis that would require a far more revolutionary 
response, would be extremely difficult. It is not hard to imagine, for example the re-
sources that a Google or Facebook could throw against policies aimed at their expro-
priation. This is point about which the most lucid supporters of left populists (such as 
Broder) are very well aware, but to which they do not necessarily have a good answer 
(see also Sunkara 2019; Blanc 2019).  
The third critique, however, is that despite its apparent radicalism, left populism has 
already, prior to election, conceptually made deep pre-emptive compromises with cap-
italism. Left populist parties generally assume and advocates a social path of high 
technology, high productivity modernity. And even though these policies are termed 
“postcapitalist”, they are sometimes, virtually in the same breath, advocated both as 
leading “beyond the market” and as a way capitalism might “escape” from its current 
economic stagnation (Mason 2015, loc. 144). Left “accelerationist” ideas of a post-work 
society based on state-supported “fourth industrial revolution” development, with a UBI 
to pacify surplus populations, could well be enabler of, rather than alternative to, large 
scale capitalist AI development (Dyer Witheford, Steinhoff and Kjosen 2019). Ecoso-
cialists might also suggest that the idea that human emancipation is identical with the 
advance of a high-production, high-technological networked society is precisely what 
is thrown into question by global heating and other environmental-crises, and by the 
critique from the South of extractivism and low-cost microwork. There is a real question 
as to how far political platforms for “socialism with an iPad” (to use a phrase of Corbyn’s 
shadow chancellor, John McDonnell) are adequate to the scale of today’s planetary 
crisis (Davey 2016).  
In raising these points, I by no means propose a blanket rejection of left populism. 
On the contrary, I think it is an important, substantive project. I do want, however, to 
suggest it be understood as a moment in a long arc of post-crash politics. Left populist 
parties were born out of struggles, as a response to the defeat of occupy movements. 
Their development will depend on further struggles, both within the broad left, and 
against its opponents. Any electoral left populist success would probably unleash pan-
                                            
2 Adam Greenfield (2017, 109-110) reports a cautionary episode in which a well-intended at-
tempt to establish as 3-D printing lab in an impoverished area of Barcelona on the site of a 
former community food bank was angrily resisted by residents! 
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icked reactions, violent in both overt and subtle ways, from the most conservative sec-
tions of capital and the neo-fascist right3. It would also catalyse conflicts within the left, 
between those who wish to contain electoral victory within a first world social demo-
cratic frame, and those seeking yet more equalitarian and ecologically viable out-
comes. In this sequence, the electoral bot and party blog are followed by the return of 
the red hack and the mobile phone coordinated riot. Seeing left populisms not as an 
endpoint of struggles, but as a relay or node in an ongoing cycle of conflicts that has 
flowed from the street to the state and will likely flow back again, is perhaps the most 
productive and realistic way to understand these parties and their relation to platform 
capitalism.  
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Abstract: The use of digital technology has become a key part of contemporary debates on 
how work is changing, the future of work/ers, resistance, and organising. Workerism took up 
many of these questions in the context of the factory – particularly through the Italian 
Operaismo – connecting the experience of the workplace with a broader struggle against cap-
italism. However, there are many differences between those factories and the new digital work-
places in which many workers find themselves today. The methods of workers’ inquiry and the 
theories of class composition are a useful legacy from Operaismo, providing tools and a frame-
work to make sense of and intervene within workers’ struggles today. However, these require 
sharpening and updating in a digital context. In this article, we discuss the challenges and 
opportunities for a “digital workerism”, understood as both a research and organising method. 
We use the case study of Uber to discuss how technology can be used against workers, as 
well as repurposed by them in various ways. By developing an analysis of the technical, social, 
and political re-composition taking place on the platform, we move beyond determinist read-
ings of technology, to place different technologies within the social relations that are emerging. 
In particular, we draw attention to the new forms through which workers’ struggles can be 
circulated. Through this, we argue for a “digital workerism” that develops a critical understand-
ing of how the workplace can become a key site for the struggles of digital/communicative 
socialism. 
Keywords: Workerism, operaismo, socialism from below, Deliveroo, digital economy, digital 
socialism 
1. Introduction 
Digital technologies – whether platforms, automation, artificial intelligence, or other 
novelties – are increasingly dominating the debate on work and how it is changing. In 
particular, the topic is increasingly referred to as “the future of work” something that 
either explicitly or implicitly sees little role for workers agency in this supposed future. 
In this article, we prefer thinking about the future of workers and the central role they 
play in struggling over and reshaping work. Instead of predicting how many workers’ 
jobs may be “lost” to automation (Frey and Osborne 2013), considering whether their 
work is “decent” (Berg et al. 2018) and classifying workers according to whether they 
are “low” or “high” skilled, we want to draw attention to the new skills, tactics, and 
strategies that workers devise in their struggles against digital capitalism.  
This article focuses on what we term “digital workerism”, an approach that seeks to 
return to the premise of workerism that workers and their experiences matter to the 
critique of capitalism, while updating its methods into a digital context. This is ex-plicitly 
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an attempt to force workers agency back into the future of work, specifically while ex-
perimenting with what digital socialism could mean in practice.  
In order to achieve this, we first return to workerism to consider what tools and 
frameworks can be salvaged for this project. Second, we consider how these could 
contribute to a “digital workerism” and would it would entail. Third, we apply this to the 
case study of Uber, both specifically in the UK and more widely in a global con-text. 
This involves thinking critically about class composition in light of new technolo-gy, 
platforms, and the circulation of workers' struggles. Then, finally, the article con-cludes 
by using this approach to discuss what a “digital socialism” could entail – par-ticularly 
when drawing on these struggles as a guide. 
2.  Learning from Workerism  
The use of digital technology has become a key part of contemporary debates on how 
work is changing, the future of work/ers, resistance, and organising. Workerism took 
up many of these questions in the context of the factory – particularly through the Italian 
Operaismo – connecting the experience of the workplace with a broader struggle 
against capitalism. The Italian workerists began from a fundamental perception that a 
gulf was emerging between the struggle of workers in the rapidly developing high tech 
production sectors of Italian capitalism (particularly automotive, technological and 
chemical manufacture) and the politics of working-class parties, such as the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI).  
The first evidence of the developing gulf was a wave of near-insurrectionary strug-
gle against the conference of the neo-fascist MSI party that broke out in Genoa in 1960. 
It was led by young factory workers who became known as the “striped T shirts” 
[magliette a righe]. Their militancy was not restricted to the streets, but also increas-
ingly bled over into the workplace. It was in this context that the workerists began to 
publish their first cohesive journal, Quaderni Rossi [Red Notebooks], in which they at-
tempted to theorise how this gulf had emerged, and what it meant for socialists (Wright 
2017). It was in this context that operaismo developed its theory of empirical research 
into the workplace through the idea of workers’ inquiry. 
Workers’ inquiry did not begin with operaismo. Its history can be traced back directly 
to Marx and then, depending on the genealogy employed, via Lenin, Mao, the John-
son-Forrest Tendency, and Socialisme ou Barbarie before it arrives in 1950/60s Italy. 
However, it is in its Italian context that workers’ inquiry had perhaps its most influential 
20th-century iteration. Turin-based dissident Marxist Danilo Montaldi was the first to 
connect the Italian movement to the work being carried out by other currents abroad 
through the translation of The American Worker (Romano and Stone 1946), one of the 
first inquiries to be produced by the American Johnson Forrest Tendency. In his intro-
duction of the Italian translation, he stressed that the text “expresses with great force 
and profundity this idea, practically forgotten by the Marxist movement after the publi-
cation of the first volume of Capital, that the worker is first of all someone who lives at 
the point of production of the capitalist factory before being the member of a party […] 
and that it is the productive process that shapes his rejection of exploitation and his 
capacity to build a superior type of society […]” (Montaldi 2013)  
In its operaist form, workers’ inquiry became a mode of scientific investigation into 
the balance of class forces in the rapidly-developing sphere of production (rather than 
the narrative exploration of working-class life, as most earlier forms of labour studies 
had been). In a period of transformation, it would allow Marxists a way to connect with 
the reality of working-class struggle and develop their ideas accordingly.  
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The results of workers’ inquiry were primarily comprehended through the framework of 
a theory that has (largely postfacto) been expressed as “class composition”. This 
framework is built around a close attention to what Marx identified as the three “simple 
elements” that make up any labour process: the “(1) purposeful activity, that is work 
itself, (2) the object on which that work is performed, and (3) the instruments of that 
work” (Marx 1990, 284). These factors are understood as the technical composition of 
the working class: that is to say, the way that labour power is organised with capital to 
produce a productive process. This technical composition, which includes patterns of 
cooperation is then understood as creating the basis for a leap into resistance. This 
resistance, organized on a collective basis and utilising forms and tactics that emerge 
from the technical composition, is then understood as the political composition of the 
working class. Recent work has also extended this approach by considering factors 
beyond the labour process under the heading of “social composition” (Notes from Be-
low 2018).  
In the last ten years, there has been a renewed interest in workerism, particularly 
through the approach of workers' inquiry. The financial crisis of 2007-8 led to a wave 
of political contention that catalysed the development of a generation of Marxist intel-
lectuals who acted as the avant garde of what Milburn (2019) has called “generation 
left” In the search for new theoretical and methodological tools with which to under-
stand the re-emergence of overt class struggle, many of these intellectuals happened 
across Italian workerism – often through the lens of Steve Wright’s history of the 
workerists, Storming Heaven (2017) and the work of German Workerists associated 
with the journal Wildkat and the Hotlines call centre inquiry project undertaken by 
Kolinko (2002).  
This move was perhaps one of the first indications of a wider tendency towards a 
revitalised 21st-century workerism that has been expressed through an increase of 
workers' inquiry publishing. For example, the special issues of Ephemera (see Wood-
cock 2014), the launch of Viewpoint and Notes from Below. For the Notes from Below 
project this re-articulation of workerism in the contemporary context means using a 
practice of workers’ inquiry to understand workplaces from the working class’ point of 
view and then interpreting the results of that inquiry through a theory of class compo-
sition, understood as:  
a material relation with three parts: the first is the organisation of labour-power 
into a working class (technical composition); the second is the organisation of 
the working class into a class society (social composition); the third is the self-
organisation of the working class into a force for class struggle (political compo-
sition) (Notes from Below 2018). 
3. What is “Digital Workerism”? 
The main aspects, as discussed above, that can be inherited from workerism provide 
a starting point for thinking about class composition and work today. However, class 
composition has shifted in profound and differing ways, meaning that many of the ques-
tions need to be taken up very differently today. If the tools and the frameworks of 
workerism provide the starting point, we also need to start charting a new path forward 
in the context of digitalisation. 
This paper is not the first to propose thinking about what a “digital workerism” could 
involve. For example, Brown and Quan-Haase’s (2012) call for a “Workers’ Inquiry 2.0” 
examined digital labour, drawing on Bruns’s (2008) portmanteau of “produsage” – pro-
tripleC 18(1): 132-145, 2020 135 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
duction and usage. They studied Flickr, a website that hosts a picture gallery with as-
pects of social media. The core of their argument is about how these are not “users”, 
and this is a “complete misnomer”, as they are “produsers […] willing to produce con-
tent at no cost to the owners of these domains at the same time as these sites generate 
massive profits” (Brown and Quan-Haase 2012, 488).  
While this is an interesting endeavour, we seek instead to return the focus to the 
workplace specifically in our formulation of digital workerism. For example, their study 
does not interrogate the conditions or struggles of the workers paid to ensure the op-
eration of the platform, upon which the produsage takes place. Brown and Quan-
Haase (2012, 494) conclude that “the mode of produsage should be considered hyper-
exploitative because it does not even offer its legions of workers a wage in exchange 
for their labour power and time.” While they are right to identify new methods of exploi-
tation, there is a risk that this loses focus on exploitation through the wage relation. For 
example, as Dyer-Witheford’s (2015, 93) notes, it is right to: 
reject a direct equivalence between the experience of, say, the dagongmei and 
Facebook users. But vampire bites come in many ways. Facebook posting is a 
form of exploitation, which, without explicit violence, is nonetheless parasitic. It 
does not replace the “normal” structures of daily class exploitation at work and 
home, but is added to and superimposed upon them, to constitute a regime in 
which the user is habituated, on pain of exclusion from social worlds, to surren-
dering the elements of their personality – identity, creativity, sociality – to en-
hance the circulation of capital. This submission is not the same as the brutal 
bodily discipline inflicted on the dagongmei, but it is a form of subjectification 
that is both infiltrative and extroversive in the abject submission to the commod-
ity form it elicits. 
While some of those involved in Italian Operaismo went on to look for new social sub-
jects everywhere, including within a boundless “multitude” (Hardt and Negri 2000), 
there is a risk here in forgetting about the continuing importance of exploitation at work. 
we risk falling into the post-workerist trap of looking for the new social subject every-
where but the workplace. While making sense of digital capitalism from this lens does 
offer some insights, it says nothing about the work, infrastructure, and capital required 
for the activity to take place. Our focus is not on the “free labour” (Terranova 2000) of 
Internet users, despite the the “nascent evidence that this hyper-exploitative relation-
ship is causing produsers to organise struggles against it” (Brown and Quan-Haase 
2012, 458). These have been focused around what they describe as the “frequent up-
roars occurring on social networking sites regarding the violation of one’s privacy 
[which] have time and again resulted in controversy”.  
There are similar comparisons that could be made with the conflict in videogames 
over modifications (or mods). Valve and Bethesda decided to try and monetise mods 
on the digital distribution platform Steam. In response, as Daniel Joseph put it, the 
“mod community then collectively lost its shit”, convincing the company to reverse its 
decision. This ties into a longer history of modding, resistance, and forms of “playbor” 
(Kücklich 2005) within the videogames industry – something which later formed the 
backdrop of worker organising in the industry (Woodcock 2019). However, it would not 
make sense to base an understanding of class struggle in the industry only from the 
free labour of modders. We see digital workerism as a return to a focus on workers, 
albeit integrating an understand of how different forms of labour feed into their strug-
gles. 
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For a “digital workerism”, there are a series of studies that have already begun to 
sketch what it could mean in practice – although none of these have yet used the term 
– which move away from either a focus on technology or users, and instead privilege 
the self-activity of workers. Arguably, one of the first in this vein was the Kolinko (2002) 
collective’s inquiry that examined class composition in call centres, taking aim at how 
technology was being used by management to recompose precarious workers. This 
approach was taken up by Woodcock (2017) in his ethnographic inquiry into working 
conditions, technology, management, and resistance in a call centre in London. Call 
centres have proven to be an important testing ground for changing forms of digital 
work, experimenting with new technological methods of surveillance and control, which 
have then been applied more widely in other industries and sectors (Woodcock forth-
coming). This means that the prelude to thinking about a digital workerism involved 
finding ways to understand digital technologies from the perspective of workers expe-
rience of the workplace.  
The rapid growth of the gig economy and platform work has provided a focus for 
new forms of digital workerism. As discussed previously, platform work has become 
symbolic of many of the far reaching – and potential future – changes in work. Too 
often, the focus is not on new forms of class composition this entails, but becomes 
narrowly concerned with technologies and algorithms. However, the workers' inquiry 
method has increasingly been applied, both in Notes from Below and elsewhere, to 
begin understanding the new composition on gig work platforms in London. For exam-
ple, Waters and Woodcock (2017) put forward a co-written inquiry into working for De-
liveroo, drawing on the experience of Waters, as well as digital methods including self-
tracking and multimedia representation. This approach of co-writing has been followed 
up with Aslam and Woodcock (forthcoming), covering the history of driving for Uber, 
the story of organising, and the struggles against both the company, the regulator, and 
in the courts.  
Both Cant and Woodcock (as well as the other editors of Notes from Below) pub-
lished a series of interviews and reports from the front lines of the gig economy, includ-
ing worker bulletins and strike reports. The most recent piece includes a polemic 
against other reports that keep talking about the emergence of resistance in platform 
work, arguing instead that the key is now understanding in which ways it will develop 
(Cant and Woodcock 2019). Cant (2019) has recently published his workers' inquiry 
into Deliveroo, interrogating these changes within a framework of class composition. 
Similarly, albeit in a different industry, Woodcock (2019) has applied this framework to 
the videogames industry.  
Across all of these, there are substantial challenges in thinking about, or even car-
rying out, these kinds of projects from an academic institution. This is particularly due 
to ethics review boards discouraging this kind of research process, as well as an em-
phasis on legal liability that disadvantages critical research (Badger and Woodcock 
2019). This makes intervention from an academic context a challenge, something that 
is not an optional add on for workerism, but core to the practice. However, there is a 
powerful example of how HCI (Human Computer Interaction) can influence thinking 
about intervention. Irani and Silberman's (2013) Turkopticon project established a soft-
ware plug in to support micro-workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk. It provides a way 
for workers to rate those giving out the tasks, reversing the panopticon like process 
that Mechanical Turk uses to organise and regulate this digital work. In addition, 
Turkopticon provides a way to bring workers together to discuss their work, focusing 
on a bottom up organising approach. 
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Across these examples, the possibilities of a digital workerism emerge. However, it is 
important to remember that workers' inquiry has two central concerns: first, the rela-
tionship between technical and political composition; and second, the synthesis of re-
search with organising. For “digital workerism”, this means following Notes from Below 
to introduce the third aspect of social composition, while in the latter part, drawing at-
tention to the politics of technology when considering co-research. It is to the applica-
tion of this framework that we now turn. 
4. The Case Study of Uber 
We use the case study of Uber to discuss how technology can be used against work-
ers, as well as repurposed by them in various ways. By developing an analysis of the 
technical, social, and political re-composition taking place on the platform, we move 
beyond determinist readings of technology, to place different technologies within the 
social relations that are emerging.  
Much of the research on Uber has focused on technology, a narrow aspect of the 
technical composition of Uber. For example, many studies have focused on the use of 
algorithms in general (Pasquale 2015; Lee et al. 2015), and at Uber in particular (Ros-
enblat and Stark 2016; Rosenblat 2018) as well as critiques of this new mode of work 
organisation (Slee 2015; Scholz 2017). In part, this is due to the highly visible example 
of technological change that Uber represents. While there have been other examples 
of significant management-led technological change, Uber is one that many people 
have direct experience of as customers or can access very easily through the 
smartphone app interface. There was a similar starting point for Ravenelle’s (2019) 
study of gig work, having come into contact with these workers as a customer.  
It is clear that aspects of algorithmic surveillance and control are key to understand-
ing the shifting composition in platform work (Woodcock forthcoming), including the 
mediation of work via a platform, the use of data, ratings by customers, and so on. 
However, there is a risk with many accounts of Uber that these are seen as totalising 
methods of control that provide little ability for workers to contest or subvert these. 
Instead, through inquiry with workers it is possible to pick apart these aspects of the 
labour process to understand how they work in practice. In particular, this draws atten-
tion to the material parts of the work, including the kind of car used and the relation-
ships through which it is owned. In London, the majority of cars are leased Toyota 
Prius hybrid cars, locking drivers into high weekly payments for a specific car, prevent-
ing cheaper options. In addition, Uber drivers have to hold a private hire license, issued 
by TfL (Transport for London). This means a large proportion of drivers work full time 
to cover their costs and attempt to make a living. This is different to parts of the US, 
where drivers are not licensed and can use a much wider variety of vehicles, meaning 
part time work is more common. This means that while there might not seem to be a 
workplace (at least analogous to those found by the original workerists), drivers share 
the roads and the city, often with common meeting points.  
In London, the social composition of Uber drivers is shaped by the pre-existing 
relationships within the taxi industry – particularly the two-tiered distinction between 
Black Cabs and minicabs. While Black cab drivers have to pass “the knowledge” test 
of geography and routes, and drive the differentiated Black cab, minicab drivers have 
a much lower bar to entry. They do not need to pass additional tests, but are required 
to have a private hire license. Many of these minicab companies are based out of 
offices with radio controllers, recruiting from migrant groups. There is also a clear split 
in racial composition between the white British Black Cab drivers and (often migrant) 
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BME minicab drivers. When Uber was established, it targeted minicab drivers, recruit-
ing these drivers and their licenses. This meant that there were many pre-existing re-
lationships and networks that were imported into Uber, including friendship groups and 
migrant organisations. These form the basis of the “invisible organisation” (Alquati 
2013) that preceded more formal organisation of Uber drivers.  
As detailed by Aslam and Woodcock (forthcoming), there is already an on-going 
history of struggle in Uber in London. This first began in 2013 with WhatsApp groups 
of drivers that started to discuss problems with working for Uber and having initial 
meetings with the platform. By 2014, the drivers began having organising meetings 
and launched LPHADA (London Private Hire App Based Drivers Association), after 
which Uber stopped communicating with them. The following year, LPHADA was 
folded as the drivers joined the GMB union, which then supported the employment 
tribunal case against Uber in 2016. However, the drivers were dissatisfied with the 
approach of GMB, launching a network of drivers called UPHD (United Private Hire 
Drivers). After an election within GMB was cancelled, the drivers then left and affiliated 
to the IWGB. At each stage, there has been a moment of political recomposition as 
drivers have experimented with different forms of organisation - and different organi-
sations - as well as moving targets from only Uber, to the courts, and most recently 
targeting the regulator (TfL) as well as the mayor of London. Throughout this process 
there have been different points of contestation, as well as moving from networks to 
strikes and protests. As Yaseen Aslam has explained: ‘When we first started organis-
ing people said we would never succeed – included trade unionists, academics, and 
journalists that we thought would be on our side’ (Aslam and Woodcock forthcoming). 
Instead, the drivers have had to learn their own approach to becoming organisers - 
leading to a complicated route as they begin to find ways to successfully resist. Most 
recently, drivers began coordinating internationally to strike and protest Uber’s IPO. 
This latest moment of political recomposition is spreading across national borders. 
What this analysis of Uber highlights is that the shifting technical composition of 
platform work is not only led by capital. Uber engages with previous forms of work, 
relationships, and organisations. As such, it is not just a “disruptive” business model 
and technological innovation, but instead is mediated through existing pressures within 
capitalism. This also returns a focus to the agency of workers – who after all the plat-
form needs to actually driver the cars, despite the use of bogus self-employed status. 
5. Forming a “Digital Socialism”? 
In particular, we draw attention to the new forms through which workers’ struggles can 
be circulated. Through this, we argue for a “digital workerism” that develops a critical 
understanding of how the workplace can become a key site for the struggles of digi-
tal/communicative socialism. 
The focus of Italian workerists on the self-activity of workers and their political 
agency emerges out of a longer-term commitment at the heart of Marxism. Indeed, 
Engels (1888, 517) famously wrote in his introduction to the communist manifesto that 
“the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself”. In 
doing so, he was rephrasing interventions by Marx (1875) in his Critique of the Gotha 
Program and their joint drafting of the International Workingmen’s Association’s Gen-
eral Rules (Marx 1871; see Hal Draper 1971 for an overview of the concept of self-
emancipation in the Marxist tradition). This foundational idea served as the cornerstone 
of the work of both men and their vision for a transformation of the capitalist world-
order through struggle from below and worker self-organisation.  
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Equally important was the fact that Marx and Engels theorised this approach in oppo-
sition to different strands of socialism that were developing in their lifetime. On the one 
hand, they polemicised against utopian socialists who believed that the unleashing of 
the productive and creative potential of capitalism, this time under workers’ control, 
would liberate humanity from the material limitations of its natural environment. On the 
other hand, both men took on the growing influence of reformist ideas and their heavy 
reliance on a teleological reading of history that would inevitably lead from within the 
existing infrastructures of capitalism to workers’ power (see the above-mentioned Cri-
tique of the Gotha Program, Marx 1875). 
What both traditions had in common, despite their deep-seated opposition to each 
other, was a reliance on the development of technology, a lack of engagement with the 
realities of workers’ struggles, and a confidence in an inevitable socialist future that 
would emerge from the entrails of capitalist society. Against this, Marx and Engels 
would argue for the need to rupture with the old order and identify the working classes’ 
strategic position in production as the key to make this rupture possible. There was 
nothing pre-determined about socialism – it could only be achieved through a ruthless 
struggle against capital and its erstwhile representatives.  
Unfortunately, while this tradition of self-emancipation remained important within 
Marxism, from Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg to C.L.R. James and Angela Davis (to name 
but a few, alongside the Workerists discussed above), the history of 20th-century so-
cialist movements was marked by the twin dominance of Stalinism and social democ-
racy. Both approaches succumbed to the siren call of technological determinism and 
historical teleology and abandoned the agency of working people as the driver of social 
transformation and the only potential route towards a classless socialist society. It is 
these traditions that Draper defined as “socialism from above”, because of their belief 
that socialism could be imposed by “socialist governments” once they had captured 
the state, in opposition to “socialism from below”, which were those traditions that con-
tinued to foreground workers’ struggles and self-organisation contra capital and the 
state (Draper 1966).  
Similar questions continue to confront social movements today. From the hopes 
surrounding the emergence of new self-proclaimed socialist electoral projects in Eu-
rope (see for example Watkins 2016) to the emergence of new utopian techno-centrist 
accounts of a socialist future (Bastani 2019), contemporary activists and theoreticians 
continue to propose routes out of capitalism that bypass workers’ self-organisation, 
struggle, and ultimate collective democratic control over production. The debates sur-
rounding digital platforms and their future, discussed above, run into comparable is-
sues: stuck between technological determinism and the illusion of disappearing work-
ers they imagine and theorise change while writing worker agency out of the picture.  
So, what about digital socialism? What we have outlined in the first sections of this 
essay is the approach of “digital workerism” and its application to Uber. However, one 
of the challenges of workerism has always been the leap from the technical to the 
political. In this section, we want to consider how “the refusal” (see Tronti 2019) and 
other tendencies of struggle can connect to a political horizon. In the case of Uber, 
where the technological aspects of technical composition are particularly sharp, we 
consider how such composition can be considered on the political terrain. Before turn-
ing to discuss how struggles of Uber drivers can be connected to a digital socialism, it 
is first worth considering what other approaches are already underway when thinking 
of platform work specifically and how they inscribe themselves within the traditions of 
the workers’ movement that fail to foreground worker agency.  
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The first example is one that attempts a synthesis between theory and practice: the 
Fairwork Foundation. Both Sai and Jamie have been involved in the early phase of this 
project – and the experiences inform our thinking about practice in various ways. The 
basic aim of the project is to improve working conditions of platform workers through a 
certification process (Graham and Woodcock 2018; Woodcock and Graham 2019). 
This is an attempt at impact-orientated research – albeit one more attuned to the idea 
of measurable impact that has become popular in British universities, which is a very 
different fusion of theory and practice to workerism. The core of the Fairwork project 
involves scoring platforms against five principles of fair work – pay, conditions, con-
tracts, governance, and representation – out of a total of ten points (with two points 
available for each of the five principles). The project had some initial success in refus-
ing to follow the platform operator logic that workers were self-employed – as well as 
encouraging one platform in South Africa to agree to recognise a union should one be 
established. The first is part of winning a wider argument about the platform economy 
being underpinned by bogus self-employment, while the latter is an example of how 
research can help to encourage worker self-organisation.  
As neither of us continue to work for the project, we have now had the space to 
reflect on the tensions and contradictions of a certification project. These kinds of pro-
jects rely – at least to some extent – on the voluntary engagement of the company to 
be certified. This has reached limits with certification in other industries. For example, 
the Fairtrade certification – targeted at commodities like coffee and chocolate – con-
tinues to disintegrate (Subramanian 2019) – as well as never having rigorously en-
gaged with workers’ rights as a core concern anyway – as companies decide to opt 
out. Fairwork, like other certification approaches requires funding in order to continue, 
as well as maintaining relationships with the certified organisation for access to data 
and so on. This means that checks and balances are key to ensuring that workers’ 
concerns are heard above the other pressures. For example, with Fairwork, each 
stakeholder is given a say over changes to awarding a score each year (for example 
raising the level of pay to receive a point), which means that while workers have a say, 
but so do platforms, academics, policy makers and so on. This means a necessary 
watering down of the thresholds to make the scoring palatable for a range of stake-
holders, rather than giving primacy to workers. 
The second approach is that of platform co-operatives or co-ops (Scholz 2016). At 
first glance, platform co-ops seem like an exciting shortcut to the challenges of con-
temporary class struggle. After all, socialism could be conceived of as a “free associa-
tion of producers” in which the means of production are no longer privately held, but 
held communally and co-operatively. Many traditionally industries present substantial 
barriers to workers simply setting up their own co-operative alternatives, for example, 
factories require high levels of capital outlay. Platform co-ops, or so the argument goes, 
are an easy alternative. Instead of needing capital intensive infrastructure, a taxi co-op 
would just need a co-operative app as the drivers already own the capital (in the form 
of the car and smartphone and so on). This argument is presented as a technological 
solution and shortcut to fairer work – there is not even any need to have conflict with 
the existing capitalist enterprise.  
Platform co-ops are clearly influenced by the FLOSS (Free, Libre and Open Source 
Software) movement, and inflected by the technological determinism and libertarian 
optimism that can be found amongst some of their proponents. Like open source, if 
workers can make something just as good (or even better) as those projects funded 
by capitalists, why would users not choose to switch over to the more ethical alterna-
tive? The problem with a platform co-op version of Uber is that the real cost of taxi 
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transportation in London is often much higher than the advertised price to users – and 
more often even higher than that paid to drivers. Given the strategic importance of 
London to Uber there has been heavy spending of venture capital as subsidies.  
A platform co-op would have to compete with – and indeed out-compete – a capi-
talist platform like Uber. While an ethical platform might seem to be an easy sell versus 
a company like Uber, the latter has a vast marketing budget and already has the user 
base. The ability for venture capital platforms to run at a loss to ensure monopoly (or 
near monopoly) status, means that they have the resourcing to be vicious competitors. 
The only successful alternatives have been able to operate when regulators or legal 
changes have banned capitalist alternatives. However, a broader question about what 
a co-op involves can also be found here. For some proponents of platform co-ops, it is 
simple as having the digital platform infrastructure as no longer privately owned – or at 
least no longer profit seeking. This means it does not have to involve worker democ-
racy or other aspects of more radical co-ops that we might associate with a “free as-
sociation of producers”. 
Workers have neither called for platforms to be rated as fair, nor have Uber drivers 
in London campaigned for a platform co-op alternative. There was only one abortive 
attempt to set up a co-op between the GMB (a union that organises Black Cab drivers 
and at one point had Uber driver members, although they later left to join IWGB) and 
NEF (the New Economics Foundation – a progressive think tank).  
What marks out both of these approaches is that they are, to adapt Draper's termi-
nology, both approaches for fairer work that are devised and implemented “from 
above”. They draw on expertise from academics, rather than from workers. Rather than 
wishing to engage in lengthy polemics, we use these as warning points that can help 
us make sense of what a digital socialism “from below” could look like. As Draper 
(2019, 10) explains, “socialism from above” is “handed down to the grateful masses in 
one form or another, by a ruling elite which is not subject to their control”. Whereas, 
“socialism from below” starts from the “view that socialism can be realized only through 
the self-emancipation of activised masses in motion, reaching out for freedom with their 
own hands, mobilized ‘from below’ in a struggle to take charge of their own destiny, as 
actors (not merely subjects) on the stage of history” (Draper 2019, 10). 
The risk with thinking about digital socialism is that it can tend towards “from above” 
given the technological solutionism that often accompanies discourse in this area, of-
ten imbued with the “Californian ideology” of neoliberal technological determinism (Bar-
brook and Cameron 1996; Sandoval 2019). However, rather than falling into the some-
what obvious trap of thinking that digital socialism could be built with an “Uber for X” - 
the now common refrain that the platform model can, and should, be applied to every-
thing (Srnicek 2017) – we should instead identify where, how, and under what condi-
tions digital socialism can be built from below.  
Callum has argued that the strategy through which we could achieve a digital so-
cialism from below is “platform expropriation”. The hypothesis of this strategy is that a 
transferal of capital ownership from bosses to workers in the platform sector, achieved 
through an escalating cycle of political struggle (a cycle that has already been the sub-
ject of significant inquiry), would be the optimal way to prevent market competition from 
undermining different forms of worker-run platforms. 
This transformation of ownership, however, is not enough in and of itself. Manage-
ment of the platform has to be placed in the hands of both tech and delivery workers, 
in conditions of workers’ control. But rather than commodity production under workers’ 
control, which would remain just a strange form of distributed ownership capitalism, 
the real socialist possibility in such a reorganisation lies in the decommodification of 
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the platform through its integration into a programme of universal basic services. Ra-
ther than maintaining the current market niche of food delivery to relatively well-off 
urban white-collar workers, this people’s Deliveroo would be actively re-designed to 
produce the greatest possible social use value. By taking control over their daily activ-
ity, exploited platform workers could increasingly become the co-producers of a de-
commodified urban food system – one premised on the socialist transformation – and 
collectivisation – of the relations of social reproduction.  
These far-reaching changes are only possible to win through a digital socialism 
from below. As the instances of workers struggle in platform work continue to rise – as 
well as increasingly connecting on a transnational level – the task ahead is to connect 
these struggles against platforms to the fight against digital capitalism much more 
broadly. The fight of Uber drivers in London, Bangalore, Sao Paolo, Cape Town, San 
Francisco are beginning to converge. The struggles of these workers, both locally and 
internationally, are key to understanding capitalism today. Like the struggles of factory 
workers for the Italian Operaimso, we can begin to see the germ of an alternative that 
emerges from the refusal of platform workers. However, if we propose forms of digital 
socialism from above, we risk not only missing these radical germs, but also encour-
aging the viral spread across the digital economy and beyond.  
Digital workerism, therefore, goes beyond just theorising digital capitalism to en-
gage in the theory and practice of workers’ struggle. While we may start with a tradi-
tional method, like Marx’s (1880) famous postal questionnaire, the intention is not just 
to collect data. Marx’s survey was also intended to make contact with workers, seeking 
to use the research process as the starting point to organising. Digital workerism too 
can start with research, but it must involve the meetings, picket lines, WhatsApp 
groups, and Facebook pages. It requires supporting actual workers struggles, experi-
menting with new forms of co-research that give primacy of the workers viewpoint and 
action. It is from this base that digital socialism can be won. 
6. Conclusion 
Throughout this article, we have sought to chart out an approach of digital workerism. 
This is not to be able to say what a digital socialism would look like, but rather to begin 
plotting how resistance in digital capitalism can become central to its overcoming and 
shaping an alternative future. Our final thought here is about the limits of talking about 
socialism. Too often today, socialism is taken to mean “socialism from above”, some-
thing to be achieved by voting for someone else to enact it. No doubt, a digital socialism 
from above would be markedly better than the current economic and social conditions. 
However, if we are to win a future in which the fruits of technological development are 
freed from the imperatives of capital and shared across society, the vibrant and chaotic 
forces of digital socialism from below will either be needed to help deliver on electoral 
policies, or force its own agenda onto the horizon. The starting point is still one taken 
from workerism, that understanding and supporting workers struggles is key to building 
an alternative – whether the work is digitally mediated or not. 
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Abstract: This paper asks: What can we learn from literary communist utopias for the creation 
and organisation of communicative and digital socialist society and a utopian Internet? To pro-
vide an answer to this question, the article discusses aspects of technology and communica-
tion in utopian-communist writings and reads these literary works in the light of questions con-
cerning digital technologies and 21st-century communication. The selected authors have writ-
ten some of the most influential literary communist utopias. The utopias presented by these 
authors are the focus of the reading presented in this paper: William Morris’s (1890/1993) 
News from Nowhere, Peter Kropotkin’s (1892/1995) The Conquest of Bread, Ursula K. Le 
Guin’s (1974/2002) The Dispossessed, and P.M.’s (1983/2011; 2009; 2012) bolo’bolo and 
Kartoffeln und Computer (Potatoes and Computers). These works are the focus of the reading 
presented in this paper and are read in respect to three themes: general communism, technol-
ogy and production, communication and culture. The paper recommends features of concrete 
utopian-communist stories that can inspire contemporary political imagination and socialist 
consciousness. The themes explored include the role of post-scarcity, decentralised comput-
erised planning, wealth and luxury for all, beauty, creativity, education, democracy, the public 
sphere, everyday life, transportation, dirt, robots, automation, and communist means of com-
munication (such as the “ansible”) in digital communism. The paper develops a communist 
allocation algorithm needed in a communist economy for the allocation of goods based on the 
decentralised satisfaction of needs. Such needs-satisfaction does not require any market. It is 
argued that socialism/communism is not just a post-scarcity society but also a post-market and 
post-exchange society. 
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1. Introduction 
This article discusses the following question: What can we learn from literary com-
munist utopias for the creation and organisation of communicative and digital socialist 
society and a utopian Internet?  
To provide an answer, the article discusses aspects of technology and communi-
cation in utopian-communist writings and reads these literary works in light of questions 
concerning digital technologies and 21st-century communication. The selected writ-
ings include utopian outlines of a future communist society and communist novels. Due 
to limited space, a selection of important communist literary utopias had to be made. 
The selected authors have written some of the most influential literary communist uto-
pias. The utopias presented by these authors are the focus of the reading presented 
in this paper: William Morris’s (1890/1993) News from Nowhere, Peter Kropotkin’s 
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(1892/1995) The Conquest of Bread, Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, and 
P.M.’s (1983/2011; 2009; 2012) bolo’bolo and Kartoffeln und Computer (Potatoes and 
Computers). 
There are many other relevant books that could be included, but we have to leave 
it to other occasions to engage with further utopian-communist works. The present 
author also hopes to inspire other scholars to conduct comparable studies. 
William Morris (1834-1896) was a British artist, activist and communist. He inspired 
the arts and crafts movement, founded the Socialist League, and played a major role 
in the League’s newspaper The Commonweal. Morris’s News from Nowhere is a uto-
pian-communist novel that is set in a future communist society in the year 2102. Peter 
Kropotkin (1842-1921) was a Russian anarchist, scientist, writer, and activist. He is 
widely seen as the most influential theorist of anarcho-communism. Kropotkin’s The 
Conquest of Bread outlines what a future anarcho-communist society could look like. 
Ursula K. Le Guin (1929-2018) was an American science fiction author. Her novels 
and short stories are often set in future anarcho-communist societies on distant plan-
ets. The Dispossessed is one of Le Guin’s most widely read books. It describes life on 
the two planets Anarres and Urras. On the first planet, there is an anarcho-communist 
society. On the second planet, there are capitalist societies. P.M. is the pseudonym of 
the Swiss author Hans Widmer (born in 1947). Besides writing utopian novels, other 
literature, theatre performances, and radio plays, P.M. has also been an activist in 
autonomous and eco-socialist projects and movements. bolo’bolo is P.M.’s most well-
known book. Reminiscent of Kroptokin, bolo’bolo outlines how a future grassroots com-
munist society without capital and the state could look. Kartoffeln und Computer (Po-
tatoes and Computers) is an update of bolo’bolo’s vision written almost thirty years 
later. 
Raymond Williams (1978/2005) argues that utopian fiction often features the world 
altered by natural events, or by willed human transformations or technological trans-
formations of society that result in or make visible aspects of paradise. Dystopian fic-
tion has the same features, but they make visible aspects of hell. The article at hand 
focuses on utopian communist writings. 
What is a utopia? What is utopian socialism? In the Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, Marx and Engels speak of critical-utopian socialism and communism as a kind 
of literature and a type of political movement in the late 17th and the early 18th centu-
ries associated with Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Fourier (1772-1837), and Owen (1771-
1851). Marx and Engels write that these authors’ visions of communism and their social 
experiments took place in a period when “feudal society was being overthrown” and 
the “first direct attempts of the proletariat to attain its own ends” necessarily failed be-
cause of the “then undeveloped state of the proletariat” and “the absence of the eco-
nomic conditions for its emancipation, conditions that had yet to be produced, and 
could be produced by the impending bourgeois epoch alone” (1848, 514). For Marx 
and Engels, these visions of a communist society came too early and could not be 
realised at the time they were conceived: “Such fantastic pictures of future society, 
painted at a time when the proletariat is still in a very undeveloped state and has but a 
fantastic conception of its own position, correspond with the first instinctive yearnings 
of that class for a general reconstruction of society” (1848, 515-516). Marx and Engels 
understand utopias as fantastic visions of future society that cannot be realised in a 
realistic manner under the current societal framework or in the near future. They criti-
cise the abstract character of utopias; but they also state that “these Socialist and 
Communist publications contain also a critical element. They attack every principle of 
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existing society. Hence, they are full of the most valuable materials for the enlighten-
ment of the working class” (1848, 516).  
In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels (1880, 290) writes that utopian social-
ists are “drifting off into pure phantasies”. He argues that utopian socialism is moralistic 
and lacks a scientific analysis of capitalism and its contradictions: “The Socialism of 
earlier days certainly criticized the existing capitalistic mode of production and its con-
sequences. But it could not explain them, and, therefore, could not get the mastery of 
them. It could only simply reject them as bad” (1880, 305). Engels thinks that Marx’s 
works, Marx’s approach of historical materialism, and the notion of surplus-value 
helped to turn socialism into a science: 
These two great discoveries, the materialistic conception of history and the rev-
elation of the secret of capitalistic production through surplus-value, we owe to 
Marx. With these discoveries Socialism became a science. […] To accomplish 
this act of universal emancipation is the historical mission of the modern prole-
tariat. To thoroughly comprehend the historical conditions and this the very na-
ture of this act, to impart to the now oppressed proletarian class a full knowledge 
of the conditions and of the meaning of the momentous act it is called upon to 
accomplish, this is the task of the theoretical expression of the proletarian move-
ment, scientific Socialism (Engels 1880, 305, 325). 
Georg Lukács argues that although classical utopian-communist literature 
[in its] step beyond Capitalism follows fantastic paths, its critical-historical basis 
is nonetheless linked – especially in the case of Fourier – with a devastating 
critique of the contradictions of bourgeois society. In Fourier, despite the fantas-
tic nature of his ideas about Socialism and of the ways to Socialism, the picture 
of Capitalism is shown with such overwhelming clarity in all its contradiction that 
the idea of the transitory nature of this society appears tangibly and plastically 
before us (1962, 28). 
The 20th century showed that science and technology and their class character have 
played a role in the advancement of exploitation, inequality, unemployment, precarity, 
environmental degradation, genocide, extermination, manipulation, etc. In addition, 
both social-democratic reformists, such as Bernstein, and Stalinists used the notion of 
scientific socialism for arguing that capitalism automatically collapses due to its internal 
contradictions, which behave like natural laws. They tried to transfer insights from the 
natural sciences to the social sciences, disregarding the differences between nature 
and society, and used naturalistic, deterministic and reductionist models of society for 
justifying pure reformism and state capitalist terror respectively. The natural science 
fetishism of revisionist social democracy and Stalinism has discounted and degraded 
the importance of class struggles. To speak of socialism as a science has become 
problematic, but the political perspective of socialism has remained highly important to 
this day.  
Critical Marxist theories of technology make use of dialectical analysis in order to 
avoid the determinism inherent in revisionist and Stalinist theories. In light of the rise 
of authoritarian capitalism (Fuchs 2018; 2019), socialism needs not only brilliant anal-
yses of what is wrong in society, but also visions of 21st-century socialism that show 
how society can be transformed and what it can look like in the future in order to inspire 
contemporary class struggles. Perhaps contemporary socialist thought is sometimes 
too analytic. We need new inspirations from concrete-utopian socialism, from stories, 
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visions, literature and popular culture, that tell us how socialism could work today and 
in the near future as communicative and digital socialism. Such stories can influence 
and inspire contemporary socialist strategies and class struggles. 
Utopia is a word that has its origin in the combination of the two Greek words ou 
(‘not’) and topos (‘place’). A utopia is a non-place, the place of nowhere. On the one 
hand, nowhere is a place that only exists in fantasy as dreams that will never be pos-
sible and therefore never come true. But on the other hand, utopias are also visions of 
society as a better place. Such socialist visions can become reality and inspire not just 
our dreams, but also our collective struggles for a better world.  
Socialist science fiction writer Kim Stanley Robinson (2018a) argues that the differ-
ence between utopias and dystopias is that “utopias express our social hopes, dysto-
pias our social fears”. He argues that both utopias and dystopias often have an ideo-
logical character. Ideological dystopias tend to communicate that nothing can be 
changed and therefore to advance defeatism. Robinson therefore argues for the dia-
lectical mediation of dystopias with socialist utopias: 
These days I tend to think of dystopias as being fashionable, perhaps lazy, 
maybe even complacent, because one pleasure of reading them is cozying into 
the feeling that however bad our present moment is, it’s nowhere near as bad 
as the ones these poor characters are suffering through. […] utopia is the idea 
that the political order could be run better. Dystopia is the not, being the idea 
that the political order could get worse. Anti-utopias are the anti, saying that the 
idea of utopia itself is wrong and bad, and that any attempt to try to make things 
better is sure to wind up making things worse, creating an intended or unin-
tended totalitarian state, or some other such political disaster. 1984 and Brave 
New World are frequently cited examples of these positions. […] One way of 
being anti-anti-utopian is to be utopian. […] An adequate life provided for all 
living beings is something the planet can still do; If dystopia helps to scare us 
into working harder on that project, which maybe it does, then fine: dystopia. 
But always in service to the main project, which is utopia” (2018a). 
Robinson argues that utopias and science fiction tell us something about the time they 
were written in. They are manifestations of potentials, potential futures, hopes, and 
structures of feeling about society’s reality at a certain time: “When you talk about the 
future you’re always talking about history. A novel always does this, but science fiction 
does so explicitly, through thought experiments: ‘If we do this we’ll get here. If we do 
that we’ll get there.’ […] science fiction is the realism of our time” (Robinson 2018b, 
88). Science fiction is “describing the feel of our time. […] It’s not a factual analysis of 
the situation. It is not trying to predict the future. It is trying to say how this moment 
feels and what human history means right now” (Robinson 2017). 
Ernst Bloch (1995) distinguishes in his book The Principle of Hope between ab-
stract and concrete utopias. Abstract utopias outline impossible being. They remain 
stuck in “dreaminess” (1995, 146) and are “world-blind hope” (1995, 1039). Concrete 
utopias outline the not-yet of society, being that is possible but does not yet exist. They 
deal with “the Real-Possible” (146) and the “Not-Yet-Become-Good” (146). Concrete 
Utopias give grounds for “militant optimism” (146) and the “active hope” (241; 1197) of 
class struggle. The “concretely utopian is an objective-real degree of reality on the 
Front of the occurring world, – as Not-Yet-Being” (205): “Concrete utopia stands on the 
horizon of every reality; real possibility surrounds the open dialectical tendencies and 
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latencies to the very last” (223). In concrete communist utopias, the good life in com-
munist society shines forth (Vorschein). The concrete communist utopia “is concerned 
to deliver the forms and contents which have already developed in the womb of present 
society. Utopia in this no longer abstract sense is thus the same as realistic anticipation 
of what is good; which must have become clear” (623). Concrete utopias aim at, as 
Marx writes, “making the world aware of its own consciousness, […] awakening it out 
of its dream about itself”, the “reform of consciousness not through dogmas”, and mak-
ing “evident that the world has long dreamed of possessing something of which it has 
only to be conscious in order to possess it in reality” (1843, 144).  
The work at hand reads and interprets concrete utopian elements in the analysed 
communist writings in the light of the concrete potentials that the means of communi-
cation and digital technologies pose in the 21st century. Through an engagement with 
communist fiction it identifies elements of communicative and digital socialism that hu-
mans can collectively possess tomorrow if they manage to realise a socialist society 
through class struggles. My readings of Morris, Kropotkin, Le Guin, and P.M. uncover 
as-yet unrealised potentials of the contemporary means of communication that are real 
possibilities and give grounds for militant optimism and active hope for class struggles 
in and against digital capitalism that aim at the creation of communicative and digital 
socialism. 
Section 2 focuses on Morris’s News from Nowhere, Section 3 on Kropotkin’s Con-
quest of Bread, Section 4 on Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, and Section 5 on P.M.’s 
works bolo’bolo and Kartoffeln und Computer (Potatoes and Computers). Each of 
these sections contains three sub-sections discussing a) communism in general; b) 
technology and production in communism; and c) communication and culture in com-
munism. Section 6 briefly introduces some other novels about post-scarcity com-
munism. Section 7 draws some conclusions.  
In the age of authoritarian capitalism, it is important that we dream about, imagine, 
talk about, envision, communicate, discuss, and struggle for concrete socialist utopias. 
In the 21st century, such socialist consciousness needs to pose the question of the 
digital in order to envision and realise concrete utopias. The proponents of neoliberal 
ideology and authoritarian capitalist ideology want to make us believe that there are 
no alternatives to capitalism and digital capitalism. It is precisely in this situation that it 
is of crucial importance, as Frederic Jameson (2005, xii) reminds us, that concrete 
utopian-communist thought recovers “its vitality as a political slogan and a politically 
energizing perspective” that advances “the dialectic of Identity and Difference” and in-
spire a politics that “aims at imagining, and sometimes even at realizing, a system 
radically different from this one”. 
2. William Morris’s News from Nowhere 
2.1. Communism in General 
In Edward Bellamy’s (1888/2007) novel Looking Backward: 2000–1887, Julian West 
falls asleep in the year 1887 and wakes up in a socialist United States in the year 2000. 
In this society, all industries are nationalised, humans retire at the age of 45, citizens 
receive an equal share of goods and a credit of equal size provided on a debit card 
that is used for shopping, those performing unpleasant or dangerous labour work fewer 
hours than others, there is an industrial army performing compulsory labour in an effi-
cient manner, education up to the age of 21 and the level of college is free, all types of 
labour are seen as being of equal importance, poverty and starvation do not exist, 
there is a low level of crime and disease, and there is free entertainment.  
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Bellamy’s novel was first published in 1888, which means that he could not envision 
computer technology, robots and a digitally automated economy, so that the economy 
he depicts is labour-intensive. Individuals retire early, but perform hard, highly disci-
plined labour as part of a compulsory labour service. The character Julian West com-
ments: “[Y]ou have simply applied the principle of universal military service, as it was 
understood in our day, to the labor question” (1888/2007, 36). Dr Leete, who explains 
to West how American society works in 2000, comments that labour is organised as “a 
disciplined army under one general” like “a fighting machine” (143). In this society, 
labour is toil and therefore alienated. High productivity is not achieved by the human-
istic design and use of machines, but by the disciplining and military organisation of 
the workforce, which is an expression of inhumanity.  In a foreword published in 1960, 
Erich Fromm commented on Looking Backward: 
It is a society which not so much because of technical inventions, but rather 
through the rationality of its organization can produce enough to satisfy every-
one’s economic needs. […] There is no effective democracy; only those over 
forty-five and not connected with the industrial army have the right to vote. The 
administration is organized according to the principles of an army. […] it is nev-
ertheless a society in which the majority of the citizens are subject to the com-
mands of industrial officers, and have little chance to develop on their own initi-
ative. […] The aim of socialism was individuality, not uniformity; liberation from 
economic bonds, not the making of material aims into the main concern of life. 
Its principle was that each man is an end in himself, and must never be the 
means of another man (Fromm 1960).  
Bellamy’s fetishism of toil reminds us of Stalin, who wrote into the 1936 Constitution of 
the USSR: “In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied 
citizen, in accordance with the principle: ‘He who does not work, neither shall he eat’” 
(USSR 1936, Article 12).  
The British socialist writer, artist and activist William Morris reviewed Looking Back-
ward. He wrote that 
the impression which he [Bellamy] produces is that of a huge standing army, 
tightly drilled, compelled by some mysterious fate to unceasing anxiety for the 
production of wares to satisfy every caprice, however wasteful and absurd, that 
may cast up amongst them. […] In short, a machine-life is the best which Mr 
Bellamy can imagine for us on all sides; it is not to be wondered at then that his 
only idea of making labour tolerable is to decrease the amount of it by means of 
fresh and ever fresh developments of machinery. […] Now surely this ideal of 
the great reduction of the hours of labour by the mere means of machinery is a 
futility. The human race has always put forth about as much energy as it could 
in given conditions of climate and the like, though that energy has had to strug-
gle against the natural laziness of mankind: and the development of man’s re-
sources, which has given him greater power over nature, has driven him also 
into fresh desires and fresh demands on nature, and thus made his expenditure 
of energy much what it was before. […] I believe that the ideal of the future does 
not point to the lessening of men’s energy by the reduction of labour to a mini-
mum, but rather to the reduction of pain in labour to a minimum, so small that it 
will cease to be a pain; a gain to humanity which can only be dreamed of till men 
are even more completely equal than Mr Bellamy’s utopia would allow them to 
be, but which will most assuredly come about when men are really equal in 
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condition.[…] That variety of life is as much an aim of true communism as equal-
ity of condition, and that nothing but an union of these two will bring about real 
freedom (Morris 1889). 
Based on his critique of Bellamy’s novel, one year later Morris (1890/1993) published 
his own utopian communist novel News from Nowhere. Looking Backward started “the 
train of thought” that “led to his writing News from Nowhere” (Thompson 2011, 542). 
Frederic Jameson (2005, 144) argues that “Bellamy’s industrial state (modeled on the 
army) is refuted by the anarchistic ‘withering away’ of the state in Morris, while the 
account of labor in Looking Backward (something like Marx’s ‘realm of necessity’ op-
posed to the ‘realm of freedom’ of non-work and leisure time) is challenged by Morris’s 
notion of a non-alienated labor which has become a form of aesthetic production”. 
News from Nowhere is “not merely a contrasting utopia to Bellamy, it is a campaign 
against the whole mechanization of existence” (Bloch 1995, 613).  
In News from Nowhere, the Victorian socialist William Guest wakes up and finds 
himself in a socialist society in the year 2102. He wanders through this society and 
learns about it from Dick Hammond, Dick’s great-grandfather, and others. In the end, 
it turns out that the visit to communism was a dream, but one that is a vision of a better 
society that can inspire humans in their struggles for a better world. 
In the future socialist society William visits, there is no capital, no private property 
of the means of production, no exchange, no wage-labour, and no money. It is a class-
less society. There is no dull compulsion of the market forcing humans into wage-la-
bour and class relations. They work voluntarily with the “freedom for every man to do 
what he can do best” (Morris 1890/1993, 123). Use-value shapes the economy, and 
humans produce for society’s real needs, not for the accumulation of profit. The social 
environment and goods are beautifully designed so that beauty is a general principle 
of society. There is no poverty and all individuals are generally happy and beautifully 
dressed. There is gender equality. The overcoming of alienation and exploitation has 
enabled longevity and has drastically reduced crime, which has allowed the abolish-
ment of prisons. A participatory democracy (“the whole people is our parliament” [107]) 
has replaced government, parliament, and the state. In News from Nowhere, there are 
separate houses for individuals and families, indicating that Morris considers privacy 
and individuality in a communist society to be important. 
2.2. Technology and Production in Communism 
In News from Nowhere, there is no compulsory labour. Everyone is very industrious, 
conducts self-chosen work that results in beautiful results, and is happy doing so. One 
of the depicted society’s principles is “Thou shalt work in order to live happily” 
(1890/1993, 112). The novel features the work of weavers, housekeepers, “genuinely 
amusing work, like house-building and street-paving and gardening” (68), pot-making, 
glass-blowing, road-mending, hay-harvesting, or carving that workers experience as 
very pleasurable. For example, a road-mender working with a pick, says: “[it] is good 
work for hardening the muscles, and I like it; though I admit it is pleasanter the second 
week than the first” (83). And haymaking is presented as “easy-hard work” that “tries 
the muscles and hardens them” and “is always pleasant if you don’t overdo it” (195). 
One of the novel’s basic assumptions is that making and creating something beau-
tiful automatically makes workers happy. There is undoubtedly a certain truth to the 
claim that work that enables a high level of creativity can be self-fulfilling for humans. 
But not all work involves a high level of creativity, is pleasant, and creates beauty. 
Think for example of the cleaning of public toilets, the collection of garbage, and the 
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inspection and cleaning of sewage ducts and sewage plants. Morris leaves open the 
question of how dirty work is conducted. In News from Nowhere, there is a certain 
idealisation of hard and mundane physical labour such as road-mending, street-pav-
ing, house-building, haymaking, or housework.  
Morris (1884, 98) himself questioned that “all work is useful”. He writes in the essay 
Useful Work Versus Useless Toil that it is an ideology to think “all labour is good in 
itself” (1884, 98). There is useless toil that is a curse and that humans should refuse 
(98). In this essay, Morris stresses the feasibility of the communist design and use of 
science and machines for automating and reducing toil: 
Science duly applied would enable them [humans] to get rid of refuse, to mini-
mize, if not wholly to destroy, all the inconveniences which at present attend the 
use of elaborate machinery, such as smoke, stench, and noise. […] In a true 
society these miracles of ingenuity [labour-saving machines] would be for the 
first time used for minimizing the amount of time spent in unattractive labour, 
which by their means might be so reduced as to be but a very light burden on 
each individual. All the more as these machines would most certainly be very 
much improved when it was no longer a question as to whether their improve-
ment would ‘pay’ the individual, but rather whether it would benefit the commu-
nity (Morris 1884, 115, 117). 
But in the same essay, there is also a passage that claims that certain forms of toil 
could be made pleasurable so that machinery could be replaced by human work: “So 
much for the ordinary use of machinery, which would probably, after a time, be some-
what restricted when men found out that there was no need for anxiety as to mere 
subsistence, and learned to take an interest and pleasure in handiwork which, done 
deliberately and thoughtfully, could be made more attractive than machine work” (Mor-
ris 1884, 117-118). Raymond Williams stresses that “Morris wanted the end of the 
capitalist system, and the institution of socialism, so that men could decide for them-
selves how their work should be arranged, and where machinery was appropriate” 
(Williams 1960, 167). 
On the one hand, we find indications in News from Nowhere that science and tech-
nology are used in the way Morris pointed out in his essay Useful Work Versus Useless 
Toil. In the conversation between William Guest and old Hammond, the latter describes 
how the economy works in the communist society in the year 2102: “All work which 
would be irksome to do by hand is done by immensely improved machinery; and in all 
work which it is a pleasure to do by hand machinery is done without” (Morris 
1890/1993, 127). As a result, “all work is now pleasurable” because it results in “honour 
and wealth” even if the “actual work is not pleasant”, or work “has grown into a pleas-
urable habit”, or “there is the conscious sensuous pleasure in the work itself; it is done, 
that is, by artists” (122-123). 
Given that Morris wrote in the late 19th century, one cannot expect him to envision 
computing and robotics. His insight that communist science should develop and ad-
vance communist machinery that allows automating irksome and unattractive labour is 
an important principle of communism. Morris would agree that it is important that in a 
communist society there are robots that are capable of cleaning sewage and toilets.  
In News from Nowhere, there is, however, also hard physical labour such as mun-
dane housework, the mending of roads, the laying of bricks, and the harvesting of hay 
that he thinks can be made pleasurable in a communist society. In a communist soci-
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ety, there should not just be toilet- and sewage drain-cleaning robots, but highly effi-
cient, ultra-fast washing machines available in every house or block of houses, dish-
washers, robot vacuum cleaners, robot lawn mowers, robotic builders creating and 
mending roads and houses, agricultural robots, etc. Labour that is not itself pleasant 
should in a communist society be automated as far as possible. If someone enjoys 
hoovering floors, cleaning toilets, and washing dishes by hand, they will be able to do 
so and to volunteer to conduct such work not just for themselves but also for others. 
But a decisive aspect of a communist economy is that there are machines available 
that can conduct labour that is unattractive, irksome, annoying, or dangerous for hu-
mans.  
In News from Nowhere, work is scarce (Morris 1890/1993, 81), but Morris does not 
give much attention towards describing the use of science and technology, although 
he makes clear that both are important in a communist society. There are factories 
without energy supply, where humans conduct hand-work (81). Roads are mended 
with picks (82-83). There was “the great change in the use of mechanical force” that 
led to the abolishment of manufacturing centres (102). In the story Morris tells, the 
revolutionaries have consciously decided to replace lots of activities carried out by ma-
chines by handicraft. Therefore, they speak of the end “of the machine period” that 
brought about “the transition from the makeshift work of machines […] into the new 
handicraft period” (199-200). “[M]achine after machine was quietly dropped under the 
excuse that the machines could not produce works of art, and that works of art were 
more and more called for” (201). The communist society that William visits is “not an 
age of inventions” (192). Although it is not ruled out that machines are used for replac-
ing unpleasant human labour, overall the society that Morris describes in News from 
Nowhere is a pre-industrial, agricultural socialism, where humans enjoy hard physical 
labour and beauty is the abundant result of handicraft.  
It is reasonable to doubt that in a communist society many people find hard labour 
such as brick-laying, haymaking, road-mending, or street-paving pleasurable. Morris 
underestimates the humanistic potentials of modern technologies in communist soci-
ety. It is a romantic idealisation to think that once private property and class relation-
ships have disappeared, humans suddenly find joy in hard, exhaustive, monotonous 
physical labour.  
What we can learn from Morris’s utopian communist society is the importance of 
the principle of abundant beauty and the advancement of possibilities for creative work 
and work as art and play. Morris underestimates the potentials of modern technologies 
and could not envision a post-industrial socialism, where computing technologies and 
knowledge work play an important role and may enable the end of toil, unpleasant and 
dangerous labour and the maximisation of free, self-determined time used for leisure, 
creativity, social engagement, political debate, art, and human togetherness.  
If it turns out in Morris’s utopia that large groups of humans find physical labour 
cumbersome and unpleasant and stop doing it, and machines are not available for 
replacing them, then the economy could easily enter crisis, which could be a foundation 
of the return of a class society. A highly productive post-industrial socialism where 
robots and computing are used for providing possibilities to automate dangerous, un-
pleasant, stupefying, monotonous, and physical labour is less likely to return to a class 
society and more likely to provide happiness for all. Morris overestimated the interest 
and capacity of humans to find pleasure in mundane, hard physical labour. In a highly 
productive digital-communist society, humans can volunteer to conduct hard labour if 
they indeed find it pleasurable, but a decisive feature of such a society is that there are 
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machines available that can to a significant degree conduct such work or make it less 
alienating.  
2.3. Communication and Culture in Communism 
In News from Nowhere, humans communicate with each other in a very polite manner. 
They are very friendly, open-minded, caring, and solidary. They call each other “neigh-
bours”. Here is an example from the book, where William in a shop receives a beautiful 
pipe and Latakia tobacco as gifts:  
‘I advise you to cram your bag, because you may be going where you can’t get 
Latakia. Where is your bag?’ I fumbled about, and at last pulled out my piece of 
cotton print which does duty with me for a tobacco pouch. But the girl looked at 
it with some disdain, and said: ‘Dear neighbour, I can give you something much 
better than that cotton rag’. And she tripped up the shop and came back pres-
ently, and as she passed the boy whispered something in his ear, and he nod-
ded and got up and went out. The girl held up in her finger and thumb a red 
morocco bag, gaily embroidered, and said, ‘There, I have chosen one for you, 
and you are to have it: it is pretty, and will hold a lot’ […] ‘Thank you so very 
much’, I said at last, effusively, as I put the pipe in my pocket, not without a 
qualm of doubt as to whether I shouldn’t find myself before a magistrate pres-
ently. ‘Oh, you are so very welcome’, said the little lass, with an affectation of 
grown-up manners at their best which was very quaint. ‘It is such a pleasure to 
serve dear old gentlemen like you; specially when one can see at once that you 
have come from far over sea’ (Morris 1890/1993, 73-74). 
The political system that Morris depicts in News from Nowhere is a communicative 
participatory democracy (in Chapter IV): Citizens meet in neighbourhood assemblies, 
where they discuss matters of concern for the community. Suggestions for certain 
changes, such as building a new bridge or town hall, are made. If such proposals are 
supported by others, then pro- and counter-arguments are collected and published. In 
a later meeting, a “vote by show of hands” (119) is taken. If the minority is of significant 
size, then discussions and further votes continue until consensus is reached or the 
minority is happy to accept the decision.  
Morris stresses that true democracy requires discussion and face-to-face assem-
blies. In the 21st century, Internet communication can support participatory democracy: 
The collection of arguments and counter-arguments can be started face-to-face, but 
can then be continued online. It can make use of user-generated content, wikis that 
allow the creation of collaboratively edited texts, videos that express the opinions of 
groups and individuals, links to and summaries of academic studies, online discussion, 
etc. Face-to-face communication can more easily create social cohesion than online 
communication, which is why in a participatory democracy digital communication 
should support, but not replace personal meetings and assemblies. Computer net-
works also enable electronic voting, which on the one hand allows increased partici-
pation, but on the other hand is susceptible to plebiscitary demagoguery, where the 
questions that are being asked and voted on are manipulative and defined by a minor-
ity. 
In News from Nowhere, there are no telegraphs, telephones, or other two-way 
forms of mediated communication over distance. A call is made by blowing a bugle-
horn that attracts the attention of a particular person nearby (Morris 1890/1993, 51). 
People ride in horse-drawn carriages at a slow pace (59-61; 62; 64; 164). William, Dick 
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and Clara move from London to the countryside in a boat that sails on the Thames. 
The boats are rowboats powered by human sculling (202). In the society discussed by 
Morris, railways were abolished (206; 215-216) and transport is based on human and 
animal power. There are no direct, two-way long-distance forms of communication. 
The organisation of transport and communication is toil. There are mysterious “force 
vehicles” that have “taken the place of our old steam-power carrying” (186), but it is 
not clear how they work, how important they are, and what exact role they play. 
In capitalism, lots of long-distance transportation and communication has to do with 
the transport and marketing of commodities and the organisation of exploitation over 
distances. Transnational corporations can only exist based on global means of com-
munication and transportation. Certainly, there would be less need for global transport 
in a communist society because commodities will have disappeared. But a communism 
that abolishes long-distance communication and transport deprives humans of the pos-
sibility to travel, learn about foreign cultures, and make friends all over the world. In 
such a society, culture is likely to be local and mundane. There would still be a need 
for transporting goods from one location to others where the conditions for the produc-
tion of these use-values do not exist, in order to enable wealth for all. And there would 
still be the human need and desire to undertake travels to learn about the world, enjoy 
themselves, and meet others. There would no longer be travels for the organisation 
and management of exploitation. Fossil-fuel driven, individually owned cars would be 
unlikely to exist, but there would be effective networks of public transport. Fewer long-
distance flights and journeys than today would be needed. Rockets, aeroplanes, 
buses, railways, trams, ships, cars, lorries, mopeds, cable cars, etc. will be solar-driven 
or powered by other forms of green energy. Those who enjoy driving buses or practic-
ing the work of a captain of a ship or aeroplane would be able to do so. But there will 
also be the possibility to use highly developed, secure self-driving vehicles that utilise 
Artificial Intelligence.  
In News from Nowhere, there is no formal school system; children learn practically 
and through curiosity (Chapter V). They are highly educated and speak several lan-
guages. There is a certain hostility against books, reading, and writing, and children 
are not much encouraged to read (68; 166; 175). There is a danger that in a society 
without books or with a lack of engagement with books individuals would lack imagi-
nation and society would become static, too pragmatic, and lack critical reflection ca-
pacities. Schools and formal education should continue to exist in a communist society, 
but there should be no performance principle and no grading system, and humans 
should be enabled to learn in a participatory manner.  
2.4. Conclusion 
We can learn from News from Nowhere that communism is likely to transform human 
culture, manners and behaviour so that humans are less aggressive and engage with 
each other in a much more friendly, open-minded, caring, and solidary manner than 
today. Beauty will not just be a feature of the natural and physical world, but also a 
characteristic of the human character and interpersonal relations. 
The political system of a communist society requires the participation of humans in 
making decisions that concern their lives. Participatory democracy is the political sys-
tem of a communist society. In such a society, there is enough motivation, interest and 
time available for humans to engage in political debates and decision-making. Com-
puter networks will support democratic information and communication; not replacing, 
but rather enhancing face-to-face assemblies and debates. 
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In a communist society transport and communication should not entail toil and localism 
as in News from Nowhere, but, based on green computing and green transport tech-
nologies, should enable humans to communicate and travel globally so that they learn 
from each other, enjoy discovering the world and meeting other people in distant cul-
tures, and create a global community of friends. In a communist society, schools would 
continue to exist but be organised as participatory organisations. Learning, reading, 
writing, art, critical thinking, critical arguing, critical reading, critical writing and critical 
debating would be encouraged and practiced in cultural communities of life-long learn-
ers and cultural creators. Digital technologies would be used for supporting these crit-
ical and cultural skills. 
3. Peter Kropotkin’s The Conquest of Bread 
3.1. Communism in General  
Peter Kropotkin was a leading anarcho-communist thinker and activist. In his book The 
Conquest of Bread, Kropotkin (1892/1995) outlines the utopia of an anarcho-com-
munist society and explains how the economic, political and cultural foundations of 
such a society can be organised.  
Kropotkin’s communism is based on the collective ownership of the means of pro-
duction enabling wealth for all and luxury for all. The economy is built on the principle 
of mutual aid. Companies are worker-controlled and houses owned by those who live 
in them: “The common possession of the instruments of labour must necessarily bring 
with it the enjoyment in common of the fruits of common labour” (1892/1995, 32). Com-
munist anarchism is based on the principle “to every man according to his needs” (33). 
There is no wage-labour, no money, and no exchange, but distribution of goods ac-
cording to needs in the form of gifts. Humans themselves know best what they need. 
Communism uses the principle “[t]ake what you need” (34). Kropotkin is influenced by 
Marx (1875, 87), who formulated the principle “[f]rom each according to his abilities, to 
each according to his needs” as one of the cornerstones of a communist society. Kro-
potkin argues that in communism the state and governments should be replaced by 
free agreements between communes; that there is no need for authority in order to 
make organisation work.  
Murray Bookchin further developed Kropotkin’s approach into libertarian municipal-
ism. The municipality is an important organisational unit. There are also confederations 
of municipalities, i.e. communes of communes:  
the ‘apex’ of all authority would lie with the municipal assemblies, guided by 
majority rule both in the assembly and among the assemblies of a confederal 
region; the ‘base’ would lie with the broadest confederal councils whose work is 
simply administrative and adjudicatory, and whose deputies, drawn from smaller 
confederal bodies, would be easily recallable and subject to careful popular 
oversight (Bookchin 1992, xix-xx).  
Confederalism takes on the form of a “commune of communes” (1992, xxi), to which 
municipalities send delegates that debate matters concerning citizens at levels of or-
ganisation above the municipality. Participatory democracy requires “personal interac-
tion” and “face-to-face education” fostering “the development of a face-to-face democ-
racy” (xxiv). We can add to Bookchin’s view that in the age of the Internet, certain 
preparatory contributions and information can also be provided online so that online 
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information, online communication, and user-generated online content support face-
to-face deliberation and decision-making.  
3.2. Technology and Production in Communism 
For Kropotkin, communism is a highly productive, post-scarcity society that makes use 
of and further develops the means of production: 
It now remains for society, first, to extend this greater productivity, which is lim-
ited to certain industries, and to apply it to the general good. But it is evident 
that to utilize this high productivity of labour, so as to guarantee well-being to 
all, Society must itself take possession of all means of production. […] It is a 
case of producing the greatest amount of goods necessary to the well-being of 
all, with the least possible waste of human energy (1892/1995, 88, 89).  
In the 21st century, communism can make use of digital technologies in order to in-
crease productivity and create wealth and luxury for all beyond scarcity and necessity. 
Kropotkin reminds us that communism requires technological foundations and that 
communism today requires digital foundations.  
Further developing Kropotkin’s communist anarchism, Murray Bookchin (1986) ar-
gues for the use of computing technologies as liberatory technologies that form one of 
the foundations of a post-scarcity society. A post-scarcity society realises what Kropot-
kin terms wealth for all and luxury for all: 
Post-scarcity society, in short, is the fulfillment of the social and cultural poten-
tialities latent in a technology of abundance. […] a new technology has devel-
oped that could largely replace the realm of necessity by the realm of freedom. 
[…] It is arguable whether computer ‘intelligence’ is, or ever will be, creative or 
innovative (although every few years bring sweeping changes in computer tech-
nology), but there is no doubt that the digital computer is capable of taking over 
all the onerous and distinctly uncreative mental tasks of man in industry, sci-
ence, engineering, information retrieval and transportation. Modern man, in ef-
fect, has produced an electronic ‘mind’ for coordinating, building and evaluating 
most of his routine industrial operations (Bookchin 1986, 13, 115, 123). 
Comparable to Bookchin, Herbert Marcuse also developed a concept of liberatory 
technology. For Marcuse, a true society “presupposes freedom from toil” (1964, 133) 
and therefore requires highly productive technologies designed and applied in humane 
and sustainable ways. He defines the “good life” as “a life which is as much as possible 
free from toil, dependence, and ugliness” (1964, 130). A communist society needs “the 
planned utilization of resources for the satisfaction of vital needs with a minimum of 
toil, the transformation of leisure into free time, the pacification of the struggle of exist-
ence” (257). 
In communism, modern technologies are not abolished, but radically reconstructed: 
If the completion of the technological project involves a break with the prevailing 
technological rationality, the break in turn depends on the continued existence 
of the technical base itself. For it is this base which has rendered possible the 
satisfaction of needs and the reduction of toil – it remains the very base of all 
forms of human freedom” (Marcuse 1964, 236). 
Capitalist technology has to be sublated and a technology of liberation to be created: 
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For freedom indeed depends largely on technical progress, on the advancement 
of science. But this fact easily obscures the essential precondition: in order to 
become vehicles of freedom, science and technology would have to change 
their present direction and goals; they would have to be reconstructed in accord 
with a new sensibility – the demands of the life instincts. Then one could speak 
of a technology of liberation, product of a scientific imagination free to project 
and design the forms of a human universe without exploitation and toil” (Mar-
cuse 1969, 19). 
In 19th-century socialism, communists such as Marx and Engels argued that the abo-
lition of the state, exchange, and wage-labour was not immediately possible and that 
therefore an intermediate stage between capitalism and communism was needed, 
where the state continues to exist and co-ordinates production. Anarchists such as 
Bakunin and Kropotkin argued, in contrast, that the state needed to be immediately 
abolished together with capital and that the immediate creation of a society without 
domination was possible and necessary. Whereas Marxists favoured a combination of 
revolutionary and parliamentary politics in order to seize state power, anarchists ar-
gued against party politics. The conflict between the communists around Marx and the 
anarchists around Bakunin led to the split of the First International in 1872. 
Marx’s criticism of anarchism was certainly correct in the 19th century: even in the 
most developed countries, productive forces were not developed to a degree that 
would have allowed the immediate transition to a fully communist society. In the 19th 
century, anarchists had a naïve, idealist, abstract-utopian image of post-capitalism. In 
the age of digital capitalism, the levels of productivity are so high that the first stage of 
communism is no longer needed and a widely advanced communism that enables 
post-scarcity and wealth for all could be immediately introduced. In the age of digital 
technology, the traditional conflict between Marxist communists and communist anar-
chists about the question of whether an interim stage is needed between capitalism 
and full communism has become superfluous.    
Kropotkin argues that the principle of “Bread for All” and assuring the provision of 
“Shelter, food, and clothes to all” (1892/1995, 55, emphasis in original) is the most 
immediate need in the course of and after a revolutionary transition to a new society. 
But he also points out that beyond the satisfaction of these very basic needs a com-
munist society needs to be able to guarantee not only the physical survival of its in-
habitants, but also the need of luxury for all: “After bread has been secured, leisure is 
the supreme aim” (95). Kropotkin follows Marx’s insight that communism and the com-
munist application of technology enable the “wealth for all” and that free time “will grow 
for all”. In a communist society, the “measure of wealth is then not any longer, in any 
way, labour time, but rather disposable time” (Marx 1857/1858, 708). In 21st-century 
society, wealth for all also includes the access of all to the world’s knowledge as 
knowledge and digital commons and the gratis access of all to creative and digital skills 
and the cultural resources needed for universal artistic and creative production so that 
everyone can become artistically and an intellectually accomplished.  
Kropotkin argues that as a result of technological developments in communism, 
humans will engage in diverse free activities “to satisfy […] artistic or scientific needs” 
and have ample time available for their hobbies (1892/1995, 97). The social revolution 
opens up universities, laboratories, research institutes and science to all and thereby 
promotes “the spirit of invention” and the “impulse to thought, this boldness, this 
knowledge, this conviction of working for all” (1892/1995, 102), which in turn helps to 
advance society’s productive forces and the development of knowledge, science, and 
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technology. A revolution “implies the awakening of human intelligence, the increasing 
of the inventive spirit tenfold, a hundredfold, it is the dawn of a new science” (177). 
Based on William Morris, Kropotkin argues that in a communist society that maximises 
free time, work becomes art (105) and everyone can become an artist.  
Kropotkin stresses that a communist society must use and develop the means of 
production and employ certain forms of collective reproductive labour (e.g. the provi-
sion of services such as public kitchens providing free food or the collective washing 
services of clothes and dishes) in order to rid itself of hard, dangerous and unpleasant 
labour: 
Cleaning, rubbing the skin off your hands when washing and wringing linen; 
sweeping floors and brushing carpets, thereby raising clouds of dust which af-
terwards occasion much trouble to dislodge from the places where they have 
settled down, all this work is still done because woman remains a slave, but it 
tends to disappear as it can be infinitely better done by machinery. Machines of 
all kinds will be introduced into households, and the distribution of motor-power 
in private houses will enable people to work them without muscular effort. […] 
But emancipation from domestic toil will not be brought about by small machines 
only. Households are emerging from their present state of isolation; they begin 
to associate with other households to do in common what they did separately” 
(Kropotkin 1892/1995, 112). 
Future communism requires digital machines such as toilet-cleaning robots, robotic 
waste collection and recycling, robot vacuum cleaners, robot lawn mowers, robot build-
ers, agricultural robots, etc. in order to automate as widely as possible dangerous, 
exhausting, monotonous, mundane, boring, and unpleasant necessary labour. This 
excludes certain work such as human care because robotic psycho-therapists and car-
ers are inhumane and would make people more ill and unhappier instead of supporting 
them. Robots can be used in meaningful ways in medicine, for example in robot-as-
sisted surgery, where the robot supports but does not replace the human surgeon. In 
care, labour such as moving hospital beds, changing sheets, cleaning instruments, 
washing the laundry, etc. can certainly be automated and robotised without fostering 
inhumanity.  
In the book Four Futures: Life After Capitalism. Peter Frase (2016, 47) argues that 
in a communist society, robots should conduct “the more emotionally complex aspects 
of care” and writes that “a robot nurse could be more comforting than an overworked 
and exasperated human one” (2016, 47). In a communist society, those who need care 
will not automatically be put into special institutions, but will to a larger degree than 
today live with their family and friends. On the one hand, more time would be available 
for friends and family to undertake care work. And on the other hand, there will still be 
professional carers who practice care out of communist solidarity. In a communist so-
ciety, where humans are solidary, more humans will be interested in engaging for a 
certain number of hours per year in professional care work. Robotic emotional care 
does not work and is inhumane because machines do not have and cannot properly 
simulate feelings, ethics, and emotions. Robotic psychotherapists, doctors, nurses, 
midwives, etc. are not an expression of communist care, but of inhumane, alienated 
care. 
Kropotkin argues for the creation of agro-industrial communes, which can be 
achieved by creating urban fields and agricultural parks so that land, food and industry 
are organised close by one another:  
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If fields are to be properly cultivated, if they are to yield the abundant harvests 
that man has the right to expect, it is essential that workshops, foundries, and 
factories develop within the reach of the fields. A variety of occupations, and a 
variety of skill arising therefrom, both working together for a common aim – 
these are the true forces of progress (Kropotkin 1892/1995, 175). 
Today, we need communist agro-industrial-digital communes, where tangible and in-
tangible production are organised in the same locales and the division between mental 
and manual work can more easily be overcome than in an international division of 
labour. In a digital communist society, digital technologies will advance the digital sup-
port of agriculture, manufacturing and services so that the division of labour can be 
abolished, necessary labour can be minimised, and free work beyond necessity and 
compulsion can be maximised.  
Given that the computer is a universal machine, in a communist society it can be 
used as a tool that supports the sublation of the division of labour; the divisions be-
tween agriculture, industry and services, producers and consumers, mental and man-
ual labour, town and countryside, developed and developing countries, productive and 
reproductive labour, paid and unpaid labour, the international division of labour, the 
gender division of labour, and so on. For example, the digitisation of agriculture, man-
ufacturing and services makes it easier to organise these forms of production in all 
localities so that the distinction between the rural countryside, the post-industrial global 
metropolis, and de-industralised cities becomes superfluous.  
In a communist society, a diversity of realms of production could flourish independ-
ent of location and the division of labour could, along with class society, be abolished. 
But not everything can be produced everywhere. You cannot grow bananas in Scan-
dinavian gardens. There will always remain a certain need for international mutual aid 
and international gifting co-ordinated via networked computer systems that record the 
global demand for goods as well as the production capacities in self-managed compa-
nies, communes, communes of communes, regions, etc.  
3.3. Communication and Culture in Communism 
Communist society will possess the material foundation and productivity that allows 
the sublation of the division of labour between mental and manual labour:  
It is precisely to put an end to this separation between manual and brain work 
that we want to abolish wagedom, that we want the Social Revolution. Then 
work will no longer appear a curse of fate: it will become what it should be – the 
free exercise of all the faculties of man (Kropotkin 1892/1995, 133). 
Kropotkin follows Marx’s concept of the well-rounded individual that emerges based 
on communism’s abolition of the division of labour. Marx speaks of a  
communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each 
can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the gen-
eral production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and 
another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming 
hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic” (Marx and Engels 1845/1846, 47). 
In digital communism, it is possible that the well-rounded individual creates digital vid-
eos in the morning, cooks a meal whose recipe they have obtained from a friend over 
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the Internet in a collective kitchen at noon, spends time with family and friends in the 
afternoon, prepares themselves via the Internet for the next day’s local assembly 
where an important collective decision will be taken in the early evening, then together 
with others cooks a meal, and in the evening continues the work on a novel that will be 
distributed online and as a free paperback using a Creative Commons licence. 
Kroptokin argues for creating a different kind of school system that works without 
authority, the performance principle, and grading:  
the child reputed lazy at school is often the one which simply does not under-
stand, because he is being badly taught. […] Do not you see that by your meth-
ods of teaching, framed by a Ministry for eight million scholars, who represent 
eight million different capacities, you only impose a system good for mediocri-
ties, conceived by an average of mediocrities? Your school becomes a Univer-
sity of laziness, as your prison is a University of crime. Make the school free, 
abolish your University grades, appeal to the volunteers of teaching; begin that 
way, instead of making laws against laziness which only serve to increase it 
(1892/1995, 141, 142-143). 
3.4. Conclusion 
In the digital age, Kroptokin’s vision of a communist society remains highly relevant. 
Although in the 19th century computing could not be envisioned, Kropotkin was, like 
Marx, an anticipatory thinker, who saw communism as a highly productive society, 
where technologies are designed in humanistic ways and support the creation of 
wealth and luxury for all.  
In the 21st century, communism can make use of digital technologies in order to 
increase productivity and create wealth and luxury for all beyond scarcity and neces-
sity. Kropotkin reminds us that communism requires technological foundations. 
4. Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed  
4.1. Communism in General 
Ursula K. Le Guin’s (1974/2002) The Dispossessed is a science fiction novel that deals 
with life in future societies located on two different planets: the communist planet An-
arres and the capitalist society A-Io on the planet Urras. In the 1960s and 1970s, there 
was “a whole explosive renewal of Utopian thinking and imagination, and for a rebirth 
of the older narrative form. Ursula K. LeGuin’s The Dispossessed […] was the richest 
literary reinvention of the genre” (Jameson 1991, 160). 
On Urras, societies are shaped by private property, classes, capital accumulation, 
money, and commodity exchange on markets. The reader learns that on this planet 
and in its various national societies, one finds commodity fetishism, a gender division 
of labour, competition, tabloid journalism, exams in universities and schools, and wars. 
It is a generally rich, but unequal, exploitative and war-waging planet. Visiting Urras 
from Anarress, the book’s main protagonist Shevek comments: “And you the posses-
sors are possessed. You are all in jail. Each alone, solitary, with a heap of what he 
owns” (1974/2002, 190). 
On Anarres, we find collective worker ownership of companies and their means of 
production (syndicates), federations of organisations, participatory democracy, gender 
equality, and an administration (Production and Distribution Coordination, PDC) that 
does not rule over citizens but merely coordinates production. PDC consists of volun-
teers who are selected by lot and serve for a period of five years (1974/2002, 14). 
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There are no contagious diseases on Anarres. Anarres is built on mutual aid and soli-
darity, its principles are “to give, not to sell” (15) and “[h]aving’s wrong, sharing’s right” 
(44). We learn that people typically work five to seven hours a day and four to five and 
a half days a week (156), which means between twenty and thirty-eight hours and a 
half per week.  
The settlers who built society on Anarres deliberately left Urras because they 
wanted to escape from capitalism. On Anarres, they built an alternative society, the 
Odonian society. But Anarres is a planet with low vegetation, rough climate and no 
animals: “Anarres is all dust and dry hills” (189). It is much more difficult to sustain an 
economy there than on Urras. The advantage of these conditions is that it is unlikely 
that imperialists from Urras try to conquer Anarres because there is no wealth to be 
exploited. They will stick to organising exploitation on their own planet. But the disad-
vantage is that building a communist society under such difficult environmental condi-
tions is hard; almost impossible. The result is that Anarres is a rather poor socialist 
society with low productivity that experiences phases of collective hardship, poverty, 
famine, and drought. Scarcity is also a potential source of the emergence of class di-
visions: Anarres faces the danger of turning into a class society. 
Anarres is not free of antagonisms and asymmetric power. The book discusses the 
case of the scientist Sabul who uses his reputation and influence to make others work 
for him and take the credit for their labour, a process that can be termed academic 
exploitation.   
4.2. Technology and Production in Communism 
Heavy physical, unpleasant, or dangerous labour exists on Anarres and is organised 
as labour performed on rotational duty. Labour such as toilet cleaning and waste col-
lection is collectivised. Shevek explains: “Well, we all do them. But nobody has to do 
them for very long, unless he likes the work. One day in each decad [= ten days] the 
community management committee or the block committee or whoever needs him can 
ask him to join in such work. […] People take the dangerous, hard jobs because they 
take pride in doing them, they can – egoise, we call it – show off” (1974/2002, 124-
125).  
In The Dispossessed, adverse economic and environmental conditions result in a 
four-year long period of famine. Individuals take on jobs wherever they are needed, 
which rips apart families and friendships and makes people unhappy. There is no 
forced labour. Individuals could refuse accepting jobs in regions away from their friends 
and family. But their sense of duty and a culture where the collective interest is seen 
as much more important than the individual interest makes them reject this option, as 
they do not want to be seen as individualists: “To survive, to make a go of life, an 
Anarresti knew he had to be ready to go where he was needed and do the work that 
needed doing” (204).  
The book shows that a socialism of scarcity is built on the principle of equality, but 
does not automatically make individuals and society happy and renders it difficult to 
realise a dialectic of collective and individual interests. Whereas capitalism fetishizes 
individualism without nourishing the collective and common good, the socialism of 
scarcity fetishizes collectivism without individuality and does not give enough space to 
individual interests and needs. High productivity is a necessary, but not sufficient con-
dition for a socialism that enables wealth and happiness for all. The Dispossessed 
presents, as the subtitle of some editions of the book indicates, an “ambiguous utopia”. 
Carl Freedman (2000, 122) argues that The Dispossessed is “a self-critique of anar-
chism” because it shows that “material privation not only sets quantitative limits to the 
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achievements of socialism; it may qualitatively deform socialist values at their very 
core”.  
In contrast to the situation on Anarres, labour on Urras is highly productive and 
creates an overall richer society. Visiting Urras, the book’s main protagonist Shevek is 
impressed by “the greatness of the enterprise” of building space ships on Urras, 
whereas the ships of Anarres’ space fleet are two hundred years old. To “build just a 
ship to carry grain across the sea […] it takes a year’s planning, a big effort of our 
economy” (1974/2002, 73). Le Guin’s book risks the danger of cementing the myth that 
a communist society is necessarily less productive and poorer than a capitalist society. 
Frederic Jameson (2005, 159) argues that Le Guin’s novels are  
the prototype of a Utopian commitment to the countryside and the village, to 
agriculture and small face-to-face groups, as opposed to the urban celebrations 
of a Delany: the commitment of a pastoral Morris, as opposed to the industrial 
Bellamy. Indeed, the opposition probably becomes meaningful only after indus-
trialization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”.  
On the one hand, there is validity in the criticism that Le Guin omitted description of 
high-tech communism. Reynolds (2005, 87-88) argues that “Le Guin’s suggestion is 
that, so long as […] suffering is freely shared like everything else, then even the most 
extreme hardship may be chosen and made part of one’s freedom”. On the other hand, 
in response to the criticism that her novels avoid high-tech Le Guin writes that technol-
ogies such as making a fire without matches are very complex and that “all science 
fiction is, in one way or another, technological.” She says that in her novels, the “hard 
stuff’s inside, hidden” (2004). There are computers on Anarres and in an anarcho-
primitivist society without science and technology, a tech-communist such as Shevek 
simply would not exist.  
Le Guin does not provide the answers to how high-tech communism is possible, 
but she inspires us to ask the right questions, such as: What would have happened if 
the settlers had stayed on Urras and had successfully organised a revolution? What 
would a communist society look like on Urras? Such questions are the “hard stuff” that 
is hidden inside her novels. In this context, Hamner (2005, 228) argues that The Dis-
possessed is “an incomplete utopia, but we see the beginnings of revolution in Thu 
and A-Io and the hope of renewed progress in the revolution on Anarres”. 
When Shevek visits Urras, his hosts try to keep him from meeting the poor because 
they are afraid he could lead or inspire such a revolution. The dominant class on Urras 
is interested in Shevek’s theory of simultaneity and tries to hide him from the property-
less class. The real concrete utopian-communist potential that the book outlines occurs 
when Shevek joins revolutionaries in Benbili, an undeveloped part of Urras, where the 
propertyless rebel against their exploitation. This part of the story focuses on class 
struggle as the potential for the creation of a highly developed communist society. The 
settlers have fled not just from capitalism, but also from class struggle. They were ab-
stract utopians trying to create an autonomous communist society under improper ma-
terial conditions.  
On Anarres, there are computers that co-ordinate “the administration of things” (Le 
Guin 1974/2002, 82). The Division of Labour Office (DivLab) hosts a huge database 
that contains information about every job that needs to be done, the priorities of all 
workers, and their assignments (1974/2002, 222). Le Guin hints at the importance of 
co-ordinating the demand and supply of labour in a communist society via networked 
computing. 
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4.3. Communication and Culture in Communism 
There are no national languages on Anarres. People speak Pravic, which like Espe-
ranto is a constructed language. On Anarres, there is not so much need for long-dis-
tance communication via radio, telephone, and postal mail because there is no sales 
communication (Le Guin 1974/2002, 208). There is little sense of privacy on Anarres, 
which is why personal letters are not sealed (1974/2002, 209). Life is very local, and 
personal telephone calls are rare and have to be arranged in advance (209). The PDC 
controls which letters are sent to Urras or rejected, because the latter’s inhabitants are 
seen as enemies (133): there is censorship of such communication.  
Shevek is a real communist. He creates his theory of time because it can underpin 
the creation of an instantaneous, interstellar communication system, an Internet of the 
Universe that is called the “ansible”, which is short for “the answerable”. The ansible is 
“a device which will permit communication without any time interval between two points 
in space. […] So we will be able to use it to talk between worlds, without the long 
waiting for the message to go and the reply to return. […] Like a kind of telephone” 
(283). Like Tim Berners-Lee, who made the World Wide Web a commons, Shevek 
does not want to earn money from his theory and the resulting communication system, 
but wants to give his ideas to the world as a gift. Shevek explains his motivation: “I’d 
like to share it out. […] It ought to be given out, handed around. It won’t run out!” (311). 
The Dispossessed is the story of how Shevek invents the ansible, which exists as in-
terstellar Internet in the ten books that make up Le Guin’s “Hainish Cycle”.  
Le Guin (1966) had already introduced the ansible in her first novel Rocannon’s 
World, where it is spoken of as “the big machine […] which can speak instantly to other 
worlds, with no loss of years”. In The Left Hand of Darkness, Le Guin (1969/2017) 
describes the “ansible communicator” as working on the “constant of simultaneity”, re-
quiring no radio waves and producing “a message at any two points simultaneously”. 
“A NAFAL ship takes 67 years to go between Gethen and Hain, but if I write a message 
on that keyboard it will be received on Hain at the same moment as I write it” 
(1969/2017). The Dispossessed reveals the origin of the ansible in Shevek’s develop-
ment of a General Temporal Theory.  
Raymond Williams (1978/2005) argues that in science fiction, utopian transfor-
mations are all too often not “social and moral but natural”. Le Guin’s The Dispos-
sessed deprives “utopia of its classical end of struggle” (1978/2005, 212) by an “open 
utopia” (211) where “the good land is in the grip of the Urrasti dominance” (211). 
Shevek is the social character typifying the struggle for the open communist utopia.  
Comparable to Jürgen Habermas, Shevek believes in the good potentials of com-
munication. He says that “[s]peech is sharing – a co-operative art” (Le Guin 1974/2002, 
28) and sees communication as a means “to unbuild walls” (1974/2002, 65). For 
Shevek, communication is an important foundation of universal peace, peace in the 
Universe. Shevek describes the potentials of the ansible as “making a league of worlds 
possible. A federation” (284). He imagines the creation of an interstellar public sphere 
that fosters peace and understanding.  
But the example of the Internet commons shows that in a world that has not rid 
itself of class divisions, dominant classes can turn the commons into commons of cap-
ital and commons of authoritarianism. Created as a commons, the World Wide Web is 
today dominated by the likes of Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Alibaba. In 
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2019, these four companies together made profits of over US$70 billion from the com-
modification of the Internet1. And there is also the political colonisation of the Internet 
by authoritarians. Using Twitter, Donald Trump communicates in order to build physical 
and political walls (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Tweet by Donald Trump, source: http://www.twitter.com, accessed July 15, 
2019 
Communication is neither good or evil by nature; it is a tool mediating good and evil 
social relations. Habermas (1991) points out that there are economic and political 
forms of the colonisation and feudalisation of the public sphere. Commodification and 
authoritarianism have colonised the Internet.  
We can learn from Le Guin’s works that universal and global communication sys-
tems need to rid themselves of commodification and authoritarianism and be designed 
and used in a participatory-democratic manner in order to foster the public sphere, 
peace, and global understanding. A communist society needs a communist system of 
communication that is based on the principles of common access, common use, and 
the creation of possibilities for common encounters of humans that strengthen solidar-
ity and friendship.  
4.4. Conclusion 
Ursula Le Guin’s The Dispossessed does not convince as a utopian story of what a 
communist society could look like. Anarres is a failed experiment where power inequal-
ities cannot be overcome and humans suffer and are unhappy under the conditions of 
a socialism of scarcity. The book’s strength is the portrayal of Shevek as a communist 
social character who is both opposed to capitalism on Urras and the unhappy life on 
Anarres. He is a tech-communist who makes his invention, an interstellar Internet of 
the Universe, available as a common good and sees the communist potentials of tech-
nologies for the creation of a truly humanist and communist world. Socialist transfor-
mation requires many Sheveks.   
 
                                            
1 Data source: Forbes 2000 List of the World’s Largest 2,000 Companies for the year 2019, 
https://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/, accessed on 18 July 2019. 
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5. P.M.’s bolo’bolo 
5.1. Communism in General 
P.M. (1983/2011) outlines in his utopian work bolo’bolo the foundations of a society 
that is free from domination, capitalism, and the state.  
“bolo’bolo” is a society of autonomous communities. A bolo is a “large communistic” 
household (1983/2011, 20) consisting of 300 to 1,000 individuals. Bolos are spaces of 
communication, production, and reproduction. A bolo is a “direct, personal context for 
living, producing, dying” (72-73). P.M. thinks that a community of 500 individuals con-
stitutes the ideal size of a bolo (22-23). As far as possible, a bolo tries to organise food 
production locally so that it is “largely self-sufficient so far as the daily supply of basic 
food is concerned” (75). The introduction of urban farming is common in a bolo. The 
basic necessities of life are provided for free to the members of a bolo.  
P.M. argues that necessary work guaranteeing survival (such as agricultural work) 
must be compulsory and divided among all members. Typically, it would constitute 10 
percent of the available active time (88; 119). P.M. suggests that 10 percent of the 
working time in a bolo could be passed over to the township so that production for 
trans-local needs could be organised (119). The township could pass over 10 percent 
of the total working time it contains to the region, which again could pass over 10 per-
cent to the planetary community (119). “Organising more complex forms of production 
– “water, energy, raw materials, transportation, high tech, medicine, etc.” (97) – re-
quires “exchange and co-operation” across bolos “on higher social levels: towns, val-
leys, cities, regions, continents – for raw materials, even world-wide” (97).  
P.M. suggests that ten to twenty bolos together form townships (120) organising 
common institutions (such as hospitals), and that counties consist of ten to twenty 
townships (124-125). Autonomous regions are made up of twenty to thirty counties 
(126). Based on P.M.’s assumption that an ideal bolo has 500 members, a county 
bears a maximum of 200,000 inhabitants and a region a maximum population of 6 
million. According to P.M., the Earth could consist of “about 700 regions in all” (130), 
which means a maximum of 4.2 billion inhabitants. In 2020, the world population was 
7.8 billion; in 1983, the year bolo’bolo was first published, it amounted to 4.7 billion2. 
Forcibly reducing the world population is not compatible with a free society. It is in 
this context a bit disturbing that P.M. suggests that every individual should be equipped 
with a suicide/death pill (79; 111-112), that medieval duels should be revived (79; 147-
149), and that “longevity won’t be a general value” (110). But in his work Kartoffeln und 
Computer (Potatoes and Computers), it becomes evident that P.M. (2012, 20; 43; 
2009, 17; 19) in no way supports repressive population policies and revises his vision 
so that there are enough organisational units that are the homes of 9 billion individuals. 
In Kartoffeln und Computer, P.M. identifies more organisational units than in bolo’bolo: 
neighbourhoods, boroughs/towns, cities, territories, (sub-)continents, the planet (2009, 
19).  
The idea of population reduction has been part of the reactionary and racist politics 
of Social Darwinism. An anarchist version of such politics needs to be avoided. A long, 
healthy and happy life for everyone is desirable and only becomes possible in a com-
munist society that does not deny but supports medical progress for all. At the global 
level, the average life expectancy of those born in 2020 is 73.2 years and, of those that 
will be born in 2100, 81.7 years3. Such progress should be celebrated, not denied in a 
                                            
2 Data source: UN Population Statistics, https://population.un.org 
3 Data source: UN Population Statistics, https://population.un.org 
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necrophilic manner akin to fascination with death. If possible and enabled by scientific 
progress, then all individuals in the world should enjoy a good, long life.  
P.M. suggests that large cities should be “thinned out” (1983/2011, 125) so that 
they are not larger than 500,000 individuals. It is unlikely that many families who have 
lived for a long time in communities within large cities would volunteer to move away. 
In the 1970s, the compulsory depopulation of cities based on the idealisation of rural 
life in villages and the ideology of the creation of an agrarian socialism resulted in 
genocide under Pol-Pot’s Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. This should teach us a historical 
lesson about attempts to ruralise society. 
In bolo’bolo, decisions on all of the organisational levels of a communist society are 
made based on a system of “delegation from below” (122), where two delegates are 
chosen by lots to represent a unit in an assembly for a limited period of time, where a 
small number of external delegates and delegates from neighbouring units are also 
represented. There are bolo assemblies, township assemblies, county assemblies, re-
gional assemblies, and one planetary assembly.  
The assembly meetings are transparent and broadcast on television (123). P.M. 
seems to see such assemblies as a kind of government that takes decisions. This is 
certainly one possibility. Another possibility is that there is deliberation within local com-
munities before decisions are made and local constituencies vote on certain options 
that are suggested in a grassroots manner. In the age of the Internet, individual online 
debate can support face-to-face meetings and electronic forms of citizen participation 
in debates are possible.  
5.2. Technology and Production in Communism 
The “real motivation” for individuals to “live together” in a bolo “is a common cultural 
background” (1983/2011, 84). More complicated forms of production such as construc-
tion, water and electricity supply, sewage, the production of machines, tools, clothes, 
furniture, electronics, etc. depend “on the cultural identity of a given bolo” (96). One 
problem of the organisational form of the bolo is that it is predominantly a cultural unit 
of togetherness, where humans come together relatively arbitrarily and spontaneously 
and not around a shared interest in a particular type of skill or production.  
A bolo is predominantly a unit of culture and not of economic production. As a con-
sequence, in such a society there could easily be a large number of bolos that do not 
have the necessary number of individuals with the skills needed for producing the 
goods and services necessary for survival. The fact that P.M. suggests that there is no 
education system in bolo’bolo may easily make skills shortages and educational defi-
cits a severe problem that hampers the survival capacity of bolos and the bolo’bolo-
society. If in contrast the basic organisational unit is not a local neighbourhood, but the 
self-managed company (the co-operative) in a decentralised planned economy, then 
the anarchy of production can more easily be avoided. P.M.’s vision of bolo’bolo lacks 
decentralised planning of the economy and could easily end up being a society of gen-
eral poverty and shortage.  
bolo’bolo’s anarchy of production should, according to P.M., be overcome by gifts, 
township-depots of surpluses, exchange, barter agreements, and markets. There are 
markets as “agreements on importation/exportation of energy” (100). In bolo’bolo, gift-
ing is spontaneous (132), there are common pools of reserves that are given to those 
communities that require them (133), barter agreements between bolos and at other 
organisational levels (134-137), and also money-based markets (137-139). In the 
bolo’bolo-society, there is exchange-value such as “100 bottles local wine” = “20 
pounds feta cheese” (136).  
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P.M. argues that the need for “economic – i.e., value-calculating – exchange” (137) 
would be drastically reduced. The problem is that every exchange needs to be based 
on some standard of exchange and that labour-time is a likely candidate for such a 
standard. Because of different local production conditions, some organisational units 
are inevitably more productive than others. In an exchange-economy, the more pro-
ductive units can attain advantages in barter agreements and as a result accumulate 
surpluses of certain goods that others cannot obtain. Exchange is always unequal ex-
change that results in class divisions between richer and poorer individuals, groups, 
classes, and regions. Marx stresses that when there are different societal and natural 
conditions of production, “the same quantity of labour satisfies a different mass of re-
quirements in different countries, and consequently under otherwise analogous cir-
cumstances, the quantity of necessary labour-time is different” (1867, 650). In an ex-
change-oriented system, units, communities, countries and regions that have a lower 
productivity face disadvantages and get less in exchange for their products than oth-
ers. Uneven geographical and social development is a consequence of exchange. A 
communist society needs to abolish exchange and organise the economy as a high-
tech, post-scarcity gift economy.  
Theodor W. Adorno stresses the dominative and destructive character of all ex-
change. He argues that barter and exchange mean “an exchange of things that are 
equal and yet unequal” (1973/2004, 147). In “the institution of exchange there is cre-
ated and reproduced that antagonism which could at any time bring organized society 
to ultimate catastrophe and destroy it” (Adorno 1969/1970, 149). Emancipation re-
quires the ability to “transcend barter” (1973/2004, 147). In “post-capitalist societies”, 
“there can be no question that exchange will have ceased to take place” (2000, 31). 
P.M. writes that computer networks could be used in bolo’bolo for storing offers for 
barter agreements that “could be consulted by others who’re looking for a certain prod-
uct” (1983/2011, 135). In high-tech, post-scarcity, digital communism, exchange be-
comes superfluous and production and distribution can, with the help of global com-
puter networks, be organised as a needs-based economy. Households and local com-
munities can enter their local demand for certain products and services for particular 
periods of time (such as one month) into a global economic database that is accessible 
to everyone and therefore also to the producers of these goods who can orient their 
production activities towards actual needs.  
Self-managed companies specialising in certain forms of production know what 
their average productivity is and can thereby calculate how many products they are 
able and willing to produce per month. They also enter their average output per unit of 
time into a global database. If such computer-based needs assessment and computer-
based production planning is organised globally, then an Internet-based process of 
decentralised economic planning is realised. An algorithm calculates what share of the 
products created in a particular self-managed company is allocated to what local com-
munity. In order to avoid high levels of transportation, the principle is used that goods 
that satisfy the needs of individuals in certain local communities are produced in the 
geographically closest companies that have a corresponding production capacity. In-
evitably, there will be shortages of certain important products in particular regions, such 
that physical transportation of goods will not cease to exist, but become part of a global 
solidary gift economy without exchange. A computerised, networked post-scarcity so-
cialist society does not need any form of exchange. The computerised decentralised 
planning process identifies global shortages, which allows the planning of mitigation 
strategies. 
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Although P.M. says that in a future society there should be no limits on “pleasure and 
adventure” (55) he argues for the organisation of bolos, towns and regions as a “rela-
tively lame, harmless, low-productivity affair” (119), which implies low productivity and 
the existence of toil. It is therefore no surprise that bolo’bolo does not discuss automa-
tion and robots. A communist society is a society where there is wealth for all, which 
requires high technology, high productivity and the abolition or at least massive reduc-
tion of toil. The communist shaping and use of computing and robots can automate 
alienated labour. Full automation is neither possible nor desirable because there are 
many creative activities that humans want to conduct, complex activities where robotic 
decisions are dangerous or impossible, and social activities where robotic activities are 
inhumane (e.g. the education of children or the emotional and social care of the sick 
and elderly).   
But there are also activities that are objectively alienated, such as waste collection 
or the cleaning of toilets, sewage systems and sewage plants. Socialising the labour 
of cleaners of public toilets and sewage divers so that everyone has to do such dirty 
work for some hours per week does not make it less alienated. A communist society 
cannot exist without the cleaning of public toilets, the collection and recycling of gar-
bage, and the maintenance of sewage drains and sewage plants. The solution is, how-
ever, not that we learn to love dirt and shit and stop the work of cleaning, as P.M. 
suggests (“Dirt and the right to be dirty can even be a form of luxury”, 103), but that 
such labour is automated and in a communist society conducted by toilet- and sewage-
drain-cleaning robots and waste-collecting and waste-recycling robots. A communist 
society without toilet- and sewage drain-cleaning robots is unimaginable. Technical 
progress has been made in the development of toilet-cleaning robots. Giddel is the 
world’s first portable toilet-cleaning robot. Such robots should be widely used for clean-
ing public toilets in a communist society and should also be available for households, 
where individuals, families, or collectives of individuals live who want to use cleaning 
robots. 
5.3. Communication and Culture in Communism 
In bolo’bolo, there are no specialised institutions, including educational institutions 
such as schools and universities (1983/2011, 112). There is also no compulsory liter-
acy (113). Knowledge is “acquired on the job” (113). There are cultural centres, and 
increased amounts of free time are used for cultural activities (114). The university “will 
become universal”, there will be “more possibilities for information and research”; “sci-
ence will be in the reach of everyone” (114).  
It is difficult to see how skills and knowledge could diversify and become universal 
without schools and universities. Reading, writing, mathematics, abstract and critical 
thinking are not simply acquired as part of training on the job, but require in-depth 
engagement with knowledge in social learning communities. There is a danger that 
bolo’bolo is a highly pragmatic society that is oriented on instrumental skills and does 
not nurture mass intellectuality, critical and creative thinking, and the complex skills 
and technologies emanating from such thought. As a consequence, bolo’bolo could 
mean a return to the agricultural age, featuring toil, poverty, scarcity, hard labour, and 
low living standards. A communist society must be a technologically highly productive 
information society or it will not exist.  
That schools and universities continue to exist in a communist society does not 
mean that these institutions will take the same form as today. They will have a more 
democratic and participatory character and be oriented on the principle that we can all 
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best learn from others and in communities of learners without learning pressure and a 
grading system.   
“Communication in itself will have a different character under the conditions of 
bolo’bolo” (114). According to P.M., in bolo’bolo there is a much higher level of inter-
personal communication for spreading news, so that there is no mass press: “Paper 
information will be limited to bulletins of all kinds, to proceedings of neighbourhood or 
city assemblies […] and to reviews” (115). P.M. seems to assume that most global and 
trans-local communication organised by the media system stems from the antago-
nisms of capitalism and the state. There is a danger that the elimination of regional, 
international and global media and communication systems would support localised 
forms of bigotry and nationalism. A truly communist society consists of individuals who 
are curious about individuals, communities and life in other parts of the world. News-
papers, television, radio and Internet communication would lose their capitalist char-
acter as means of advertising, sale, ideology, and become global means of infor-
mation, communication, news, entertainment, debate, participation, and collaboration. 
Truly participatory media can only exist in a communist society, in which the common 
ownership of the means of production exists and these means are used for common 
production (citizen journalism), common debate, and the common participation of eve-
ryday individuals. Communism does not have to abolish, but to radically transform the 
contemporary means of communication. 
bolo’bolo was written at a time when computer networks such as the ARPANET 
and Minitel existed, but had not yet reached the status and reach that e-mail, the In-
ternet, and the World Wide Web have today as international and global means of com-
munication. P.M.’s suggestions for how to use the means of communication focus on 
local applications with low-usage capacities:  
Local cable-TV networks, radio stations, video libraries, etc., can be installed by 
local organisms (see tega, vudo) and remain under the control of the collective 
users” (116).  
Already at this moment there’s a computer terminal for every bolo on the planet 
– no more production is necessary. The telephone network could also be com-
pleted in such a way that every bolo could have at least one station. This means 
that it could be connected with regional or planetary processors or data-banks. 
Of course, every bolo would have to decide on the basis of its cultural back-
ground whether it needs such means of communication or not” (117). 
In the early 1980s P.M. probably did not have the utopian vision of imagining the ex-
istence of the global communication system of the Internet and how it could be re-
purposed in a communist society as means for global cultural production and global 
economic and administrative co-ordination, but there is also a certain degree of fetish-
ism of localism and local communities in his approach. Communist societies have to 
be ‘glocal’, i.e. based on a dialectic of the global and the local that combines global 
localities and local globality as unity within diversity, in order to avoid both localist big-
otry (diversity without unity) and globalist cultural domination (unity without diversity).  
P.M.’s claim that “bolo’bolo will not be an electronic civilization – computers are 
typical for centralized, depersonalized systems” (116) blames the computer as such 
for the ills of bureaucracy and class society. Communism will be, among many things, 
a form of digital, post-industrial socialism or it will not exist. 
In his later work Kartoffeln und Computer (Potatoes and Computers), P.M. stresses 
that commons are resources that are necessary for all humans and are maintained by 
172     Christian Fuchs 
   CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
a community. As a consequence, commons should not be private property or a com-
modity, but be accessible to all and collectively controlled. Land (food, resources, en-
ergy, etc.) and knowledge (“the capacity to use and improve all means of production”) 
are two key types of the commons (P.M. 2009, 17). The commons are ”all about pota-
toes and computers” (2009, 17). In his later works, P.M. gives much more attention 
than in earlier works to the role of computing in communism. He argues that ‘co-oper-
atories’ are spaces where knowledge is shared and becomes a common. The Internet 
“can function as a global on-line cooperatory”, but computer-supported co-operation 
would have to be a combination of “internet and face-to-face gatherings” (2009, 19). 
The Internet could also play a key role in the organisation of the economy: 
A postcapitalist household system is in principle demand-oriented. Instead of 
dumping commodities onto a market, goods that are needed are ordered by the 
consumers (who in turn are organised democratically on various levels). The 
producers (the same people wearing different hats) try to match these orders 
with the available resources (including their capacity or willingness to produce 
them) and give feedback to the ordering persons/institutions, who in turn modify 
their orders. This system of iterative planning seems clumsy, but computer pro-
grammes that can support it already exist. According to Paul Cockshott and Allin 
Cottrell’s Towards a New Socialism, there is no amount of complexity that such 
planning algorithms couldn’t handle” (2009, 22). 
Cockshott and Cottrell (1993, 118) propose the creation of “a socialist market in con-
sumer goods” that uses computerised planning so that prices are regulated according 
to labour-values. In their suggested system, labour-values of goods are calculated by 
recording labour-times as well as the inputs and outputs for the production in each 
company and for each commodity.  
In our hypothetical socialist economy, each unit of production would use such a 
package to build a model of their production process. The spreadsheet model 
would have fed into it how much labour had been used over the last week, how 
much of each other input, and what the gross output had been. Given up-to-
date figures for the labour values of the various inputs, the spreadsheet would 
rapidly compute the labour values of the outputs. […] The whole system would 
be acting as a huge distributed supercomputer continuously evaluating labour 
values by the method of successive approximation (Cockshott and Cottrell 
1993, 59).  
Based on an algorithm, the commodity prices and target outputs of companies are set 
accordingly.  
In Cockshott and Cottrell’s version of socialism, commodities, prices, markets, ex-
change-value, and wage-labour (although not remunerated in money, but in labour 
credits, which is another general medium of exchange) continue to exist. The two au-
thors underestimate how high levels of productivity and networked communication en-
able the elimination of exchange-value and the creation of a gift economy. Nick Dyer-
Witheford (2013, 14) argues that automation as well as the copying of digital content 
and hardware (3D printing) and peer-to-peer production, enabling decommodification 
and the creation of digital commons, point in the direction of a communist system, 
where  
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scarcity is replaced with plentitude, ending the need for either prices or planning. 
For Marxists, ‘plenty’ yields the transition from the ‘lower’ phase of communism, 
which still must grapple with problems of scarcity, to the higher phase of ‘from 
each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs’” (2013, 14). 
Evgeny Morozov (2019, 54) suggests the use of the feedback infrastructure enabled 
by digital technologies and big data for “non-market forms of social coordination”, such 
as bringing together “problem-finders” and “problem-solvers” in collaborative digital 
problem-solving (2019, 56), the design of non-markets (57), or decentralised planning 
of the economy (62-65): “On the consumption side, the predictive capacity of Big Data 
can anticipate our preferences better than we can; […] Likewise on the production side, 
3D printers enable cheap and flexible manufacturing, without the need for massive 
fixed-capital investment” (62, 63). 
Morozov refers to Daniel Saros’ (2014) approach for suggesting the creation of a 
digital socialist market economy:  
At the centre of his system stands a General Catalogue, something of a mix 
between Amazon and Google, where producers, who are organized in guild-like 
‘worker councils’ – worker-run startups if you will – list their products and ser-
vices in a way that would be familiar to users of Apple’s App Store or Google’s 
Play Store. Consumers, equipped with a unique digital id card, turn to the cata-
logue to register their needs during the so-called ‘needs registration period’ at 
the beginning of each production cycle; they rank the products they want, spec-
ifying their quantities for the next cycle. Consumers can still purchase products 
they didn’t request after the need-registration period ends, but they receive 
higher bonuses if their purchases do not deviate from their initial predictions” 
(Morozov 2019, 64). 
In the economic system both Saros and Morozov suggest, companies do not make 
profit, but commodities, exchange-value, money, and markets still exist; this also im-
plies the existence of wage-labour. Production is more needs-oriented because con-
sumers indicate their needs in a decentralised manner over a networked database 
system.  
But given that exchange is always unequal exchange, there will be unequal distri-
bution of money and goods and unequal purchasing power in such a system. In addi-
tion, some co-operatives will sell more and be more productive than others, which may 
result in bankruptcy, overproduction, crises, precarious working conditions, wage cuts, 
lay-offs of certain groups of workers, unemployment, etc. Exchange-value, commodi-
ties, wages, and markets are unnecessary mediators of the economy which create 
inequalities. 21st-century socialism requires a decentralised system of planning that 
uses a networked information system that is organised over the Internet.  
In such a decentralised communist information system, humans register their 
needs and wants, co-operatives’ production capacities are recorded, and both sets of 
data are co-ordinated so that co-operatives produce use-values that correspond to ac-
tual needs and wants. Data-based recommendation systems that use a publicly trans-
parent open access algorithm for assessing the defined needs of consumers and sug-
gesting what other goods the consumer might be interested in can be organised via 
the networked planning system. For such a system, no money, no commodities, no 
exchange, no markets, and no wage-labour are needed. Socialism must aim at elimi-
nating these forms of economic mediation right from the start and in their place imple-
ment a socialist gift economy. As far as possible, a socialist economy should also make 
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use of the automatic and robot-supported production, distribution, repair, disposal, and 
recycling of goods.   
In Kartoffeln und Computer, P.M. puts more stress on gifts and commons and less 
on markets and exchange than in bolo’bolo. He argues that markets are “terribly waste-
ful” (2009, 22) but nonetheless suggests that creative enterprises “may operate with 
market systems, with money, bartering, gifts or just when there is occasional demand” 
(19), which contradicts his argument in the same book that knowledge should be 
treated as a common good available to everyone. Once a market and exchange are 
introduced, there are mechanisms that exclude humans from wealth.  
5.4. The Communist Allocation Algorithm 
The allocation of the amounts of products that consumers need from the producers is 
the key economic issue in a communist economy. Networked computing can be used 
for supporting the organisation of economic allocation. For the allocation process itself, 
the consumers and producers need to deal with the following questions: 
 
x Q1: How many goods of the types g1, g2, … gi does consumer cj want and need in 
a certain period of time? 
x Q2: What producing unit (co-operative) pi produces how many units of a certain 
good during a particular period of time (e.g. one month)?  
x Q3: How many hours during a certain period of time does individual ii make available 
in order to produce a certain good gj according to their abilities and in what co-oper-
ative pk do they work? 
x Q4: What is co-operative pi’s productivity, i.e. how many goods of a certain type gj 
does it produce during a particular period of time?  
x Q5: In co-operative pi, what amount of goods-type gj are produced by robots and 
what amount by humans during a certain period of time? 
x Q6: Allocation function: What amounts of goods g1, g2, … gi do co-ops p1, p2, …. pj 
produce and what amounts of these goods are delivered to consumers/communities 
c1, c2, … ck? 
x Q7: Given certain needs and productivity levels, can a sufficient amount of the 
goods g1, g2, … gi be produced during a certain period of time? If there are goods 
where the need is going to be larger than the expected production capacity, what 
mitigating measures can be taken? 
x Q8: What amount of reserves of the goods g1, g2, … gi  should be produced by what 
co-operatives in order to mitigate against economic crises? 
 
A key aspect of the communist gift economy is the allocation of co-operatives’ produc-
tion capacity to the quantities of goods needed and requested by consumers and com-
munities so that production is organised in such a way that transport distances are kept 
at a minimum. Physical proximity is important in order to reduce transport time, 
transport labour, and possible negative effects of transport on the environment. 
Using software and networked computing, an allocation algorithm is used for defin-
ing what producer produces what amount of a certain good for whom. This algorithm 
is run in order to create an allocation matrix at the start of a production period (e.g. at 
the start of each month). Networked computing as infrastructure that runs the allocation 
algorithm is used for communicating to producers what amounts they produce and for 
whom. Here is the syntax of such an algorithm: 
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Goods types: G[1,2, … M], there are M types of goods that are needed, G[1] is the ID 
of goods type number 1 
Consumers: C[1,2, … N], there are N consumers, consumers can be individuals, 
households or organisations or communities, C[1] is the ID of consumer number 1 
Producers: P[1,2, … O], there are O producers; producers are individuals, co-opera-
tives or other organisations, P[1] is the ID of producer number 1 
 
Variable matrixes that are defined per period of time (e.g. one month) by producers 
and consumers respectively: 
Consumers: Needs matrix NEED[x, y]: the amount that consumer C[x] requires of good 
G[y] during the production period (e.g. during one month) 
Producers: Production capacity matrix PCAPC[x, y]: the amount of good G[y] that pro-
ducer P[x] can produce during the production period  
 
Available functions: 
x = CLOSEST(y, z, NEED[y,z]) 
This function provides the ID of the producer P[x] that is in closest physical proximity 
to consumer C[y] and is capable of producing the amount the consumer needs of good 
G[z]. If the producer’s capacity is already fully allocated, then the next closest pro-
ducer’s capacity is checked. The function returns the ID of the producer that is located 
closest to the consumer and can produce the latter’s demand of a certain good. If no 
producer is available, then the function returns the value 0. The function CLOSEST 
uses the production capacity matrix PCAPC [i,z], i=1…O, the needs matrix NEED[y,z], 
and a database and a function that together provide the distances between consumers 
and producers in order to determine the right producer and store its ID in variable x.  
 
Allocation matrix: 
For a particular production period, the allocation algorithm defines a three-dimensional 
allocation matrix A[x, y, z] that specifies the amount of good G[z] that producer P[x] 
producers for consumption by consumer C[y] 
 
FUNCTION ALLOCATE(N, M, O) 
BEGIN 
FOR c = 1 TO N DO 
BEGIN 
 
FOR g = 1 TO M DO 
BEGIN 
 
k := CLOSEST(c, g, NEED[c,g]); 
 
IF k=0 THEN  
FOR i=1 TO O DO A[i, c, g]:=”N”; 
ELSE 
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The ALLOCATE-algorithm defines the allocation matrix A[x, y, z]. If there is no produc-
tion capacity available for fulfilling the need of a certain consumer, then the specific 
cells in the three-dimensional matrix contain the symbol “N” (no capacity). For exam-
ple, if consumer C(123) requires two goods G(999) for which there is no production 
capacity, then the algorithm fills all matrix cells A[i, 123, 999], i=1, 2, … O (all produc-
ers) are filled with the symbol “N”. After the allocation algorithm has been run, one 
knows if and what production shortages exist. 
 If there are significant shortages then there is a need to mitigate. One mitigation 
strategy is that each producer always tries to produce a reserve of e.g. 10 percent of 
each good that are used when shortages occur. A second option is that one tries to 
use additional robots to create more products. A third option is that calls are sent out 
over the producer/consumer-Internet app communicating that a certain amount of 
working hours is needed in order to satisfy society’s need and that volunteers are 
sought who work for a certain amount of hours in a particular co-operative. If there are 
not enough volunteers or not enough robots available, then a maximum amount of 
goods that consumers can receive of the scare good can be introduced for a limited 
period of time.   
5.4. Conclusion 
bolo’bolo is a book that inspires the reader to think about how a communist society 
could look and what organisational features are needed to overcome class, capitalism, 
the state, nations, borders, exploitation, and domination. P.M.’s vision is a commune 
of local communes that is based on grassroots democracy, self-managed production, 
and autonomous life organised without capital, class, and the state. He envisions a 
participatory society that has a grassroots character.  
There are limits of P.M,’s vision in respect to the use of communication technolo-
gies, computers, and robots, where the book is not visionary and not utopian enough 
and is in danger of idealising local, rural life that is based on hard physical labour and 
has low levels of productivity.  
P.M.’s bolo’bolo and Kartoffeln und Computer are important contributions to dis-
cussions about post-capitalism and show that alternatives to capitalism are feasible. 
How such alternatives should best be organised is debatable and is a practical and 
collective question of the realisation of concrete utopias.   
6. Other Novels About Post-Scarcity Communism 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s (1911/2018) novel Moving the Mountain plays in a future 
post-scarcity society, where eugenics is practiced in order to kill the mentally ill, the 
disabled and criminals. Published in 1911, the novel cannot envision a society where 
computing plays an important role.  
In Philip José Farmer’s (1967/1992) Riders of the Purple Wage, there is a post-
scarcity society where everyone receives a basic income and people live in segregated 
communities, there is government surveillance and a sterilisation programme, and cit-
izens engage in anti-social behaviour, including sex between children and parents, 
forced emigration, and riots and violence in the arts scene.   
Samuel Delany’s (1976/1996) Trouble on Triton is a direct response to Le Guin’s 
The Dispossessed. Delany focuses on Bron Helstrom, a troubled and unhappy char-
acter living in the utopian society Triton, which is at war with Earth. Triton is a socialist 
society where computers play a role. But the novel is too preoccupied with subjectivity 
to deal with questions such as how production and distribution work, how garbage is 
collected, or what role computers play in the economy. 
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In Kim Stanley Robinson’s (1992; 1993; 1996) Mars Trilogy, a post-scarcity society is 
established on Mars. The plot focuses on the settlement of Mars, where longevity be-
comes possible, and conflicts over emigration from an Earth ridden by wars, environ-
mental disasters and transnational corporations’ dictatorship. The book predominantly 
focuses on conflicts and wars that shape the build-up of a communist society on Mars 
and is not so much focused on communism itself.  
In James P. Hogan’s (1992) Voyage from Yesteryear, a space expedition escapes 
from global war and authoritarianism on Earth and establishes a communist post-scar-
city society on Chiron, a planet in the Alpha Centauri star system. The economy is 
automated and human labour has been replaced by robot activities. The plot focuses 
on how the rulers of Earth try to conquer Chiron and implement fascist rule on the 
planet.  
In Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom (2003) Cory Doctorow presents stories that 
are set in the Bitchun society, which features immortality, post-scarcity, and the respect 
of fundamental rights. There is a digitally-organised reputation system called Whuffie 
that measures how popular an individual is and provides privileges to the most liked 
individuals. The plot revolves around a turf war between two rival adhocracies about 
the control of Disney World. Doctorow’s (2017) Walkaway describes a dystopian post-
scarcity society where the rich elite rules over citizens in a dictatorial manner, citizens 
are under constant surveillance, and military force is used against rebels who walk 
away from this repressive society. 
Iain M. Banks’ (2011) Culture series consists of nine novels and a volume of short 
stories. The Culture is an anarcho-communist society where the economy is auto-
mated, there is no state, and Artificial Intelligence systems (“the Minds”) conduct all 
administration. The plot focuses on wars and conflicts with less-developed societies 
on other planets, such as the Idiran War between the Culture and the militaristic Idi-
rans, and how the Culture uses espionage, agents, and special operations for defend-
ing its society and expanding its influence. The novels are more focused on interstellar 
conflicts than on how a highly automated communist economy and a communist soci-
ety work.  
Ken MacLeod’s stories, novels, and book series, such as the Fall Revolution Series 
(2008; 2009), the Engines of Light Trilogy (2000; 2001; 2002), and The Corporation 
Wars (2018), are often science fiction space operas that involve life on other planets 
and focus on wars and conflicts between communists and their enemies. 
Most of the mentioned novels are either dystopian, or contain no computing, or do 
not focus much on how the economy works. They are preoccupied with wars, espio-
nage, and conflicts that are all too characteristic of contemporary capitalist society. A 
genre of post-scarcity communist novels, where technologies are used in a humane 
way and society is democratic and participatory and the plot revolves around the or-
ganisation of the economy and society, has yet to be created. 
7. Conclusions 
There are important lessons we can learn for the organisation of a future communist 
society from the readings of communist utopias presented in this paper.  
7.1. William Morris’s News from Nowhere: 
Beauty as a principle of society: 
What we can learn from Morris’s utopian communist society is the importance of the 
principle of abundant beauty and the advancement of possibilities for creative work 
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and work as art and play. Morris underestimates the potentials for modern technologies 
and could not envision a post-industrial socialism where computing technologies and 
knowledge work play an important role and enable the end of toil, unpleasant and dan-
gerous labour and the maximisation of free, self-determined time used for leisure, cre-
ativity, social engagement, political debate, art, and human togetherness. 
Machines for the conduct of dangerous, unpleasant, stupefying, monotonous, 
and physical labour: 
A highly productive post-industrial socialism where robots and computing are used for 
providing possibilities to automate dangerous, unpleasant, stupefying, monotonous, 
and physical labour is less likely to turn back into a class society and more likely to 
provide happiness for all. Morris overestimated the interest and capacity of humans to 
find pleasure in mundane, hard physical labour. In a highly productive digital-com-
munist society, humans can volunteer to conduct hard labour if they indeed find it 
pleasurable, but a decisive feature of such a society is that there are machines availa-
ble that can to a significant degree conduct such work or make it less alienating.  
The beauty of interpersonal relations and communication: 
We can learn from News from Nowhere that communism is likely to transform human 
culture, manners and behaviour so that humans are less aggressive and engage with 
each other in much more friendly, open-minded, caring, and solidary manners than 
today. Beauty will not just be a feature of the natural and physical world, but also be a 
characteristic of the human character and interpersonal relations. 
Participatory democracy as communist politics: 
The political system of a communist society requires the participation of humans in 
making decisions that concern their lives. Participatory democracy is the political sys-
tem of a communist society. In such a society, there is enough motivation, interest and 
time available for humans to engage in political debates and decision-making. Com-
puter networks will support democratic information and communication; not replacing, 
but rather enhancing face-to-face assemblies and debates. 
Communist transport and communication: 
In a communist society, transport and communication should not mean toil and local-
ism, unlike in News from Nowhere, but, based on green computing and green 
transport, technologies should enable humans to communicate and travel globally so 
that they learn from each other, enjoy discovering the world and meeting other people 
in distant cultures, and create a global community of friends. In a communist society, 
schools would continue to exist, but be organised as participatory organisations. Learn-
ing, reading, writing, art, critical thinking, critical arguing, critical reading, critical writing 
and critical debating would be encouraged and practiced in cultural communities of 
life-long learners and cultural creators. Digital technologies would be used for support-
ing these critical and cultural skills. Certainly, there would be less need for global 
transport in a communist society than in capitalism because commodities and exploi-
tation will have disappeared. Fossil-fuel driven, individually-owned cars are unlikely to 
exist, but there would be effective networks of public transport. Fewer long-distance 
flights and travels than today would be needed. Rockets, aeroplanes, buses, railways, 
trams, ships, cars, lorries, mopeds, cable cars, etc. would be solar-driven or powered 
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by other forms of green energy. Those who enjoy driving buses or piloting ships or 
aeroplanes would be able to do so. But there will also be the possibility to use highly 
developed, secure self-driving vehicles that make use of Artificial Intelligence. 
7.2.  Peter Kropotkin’s The Conquest for Bread: 
Wealth and luxury for all in the digital age: 
Kropotkin’s communism is based on the collective ownership of the means of produc-
tion that enables wealth for all and luxury for all. In 21st-century society, wealth for all 
also includes the access of all to the world’s knowledge as knowledge and digital com-
mons and the gratis access of all to creative and digital skills and the cultural resources 
needed for universal artistic and creative production so that everyone can become an 
artistically and an intellectually accomplished.  
Post-scarcity digital communism:  
For Kropotkin, communism is a highly productive, post-scarcity society that makes use 
of and further develops the means of production. In the 21st century, communism can 
make use of digital technologies in order to increase productivity and create wealth 
and luxury for all beyond scarcity and necessity. Kropotkin recalls that communism 
requires technological foundations and that communism today requires digital founda-
tions. Future communism in the 21st and 22nd centuries requires digital machines in 
order to automate as widely as possible dangerous, exhausting, monotonous, mun-
dane, boring, and unpleasant necessary labour. 
Communist agro-industrial-digital communes: 
Kropotkin argues for the creation of agro-industrial communes. In a digital communist 
society, we need communist agro-industrial-digital communes, where digital technolo-
gies advance the digital support of agriculture, manufacturing and services so that the 
division of labour can be abolished, necessary labour can be minimised, and free work 
beyond necessity and compulsion can be maximised. Given that the computer is a 
universal machine, it can in a communist society be used as a tool that supports the 
sublation of the division of labour so that everyone can become an intellectual, an art-
ist, and both a manual and a mental worker. Digital communism will create well-
rounded individuals using digital technologies.  
7.3. Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed: 
The need for post-scarcity communism: 
The Dispossessed’s ambivalent utopia shows that whereas capitalism fetishizes indi-
vidualism without nourishing the collective and common good, the socialism of scarcity 
fetishizes collectivism without individuality and does not give enough space to individ-
ual interests and needs. High productivity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition 
for a socialism with wealth and happiness for all. 
The communist social character: 
The book’s main protagonist Shevek is a communist who wants to support the creation 
of common goods that foster universal friendship, mutual aid, and universal solidarity. 
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Shevek creates his theory of time because it can underpin the creation of an instanta-
neous, interstellar communication system, an Internet of the Universe that is called the 
ansible, which is short for “the answerable”. Like Tim Berners-Lee, who made the 
World Wide Web a commons, Shevek does not want to earn money from his theory 
and the resulting communication system, but wants to give his ideas to the world as a 
gift. For Shevek, communication is an important foundation of peace in the Universe. 
The Internet of the Universe as interstellar public sphere: 
For Shevek, communication is an important foundation of universal peace. He imagi-
nes the creation of an interstellar public sphere that fosters peace and understanding. 
We can learn from Le Guin’s works that universal and global communication systems 
need to rid themselves of commodification and authoritarianism and be designed and 
used in a participatory-democratic manner in order to foster the public sphere, peace 
and global understanding. A communist society needs a communist system of com-
munication that is based on the principle of common access, common use, and the 
creation of possibilities for common encounters of humans that strengthen solidary and 
friendship. 
7.4. P.M.’s bolo’bolo and Kartoffeln und Computer 
The communist gift economy: 
We can learn from P.M.’s works that contemporary societies are productive enough 
and provide powerful means of networked communication so that decentralised eco-
nomic planning of production and distribution allows the abolishment of all exchange 
and the replacement of the commodity economy by the gift economy. Exchange is 
always unequal exchange that results in class divisions between richer and poorer 
individuals, groups, classes, and regions. A communist society needs to abolish ex-
change and organise the economy as a high-tech, post-scarcity gift economy. 
Decentralised, computerised planning in the communist economy: 
In high-tech, post-scarcity, digital communism, exchange becomes superfluous and 
production and distribution can, with the help of global computer networks, be organ-
ised as a needs-based economy. Households and local communities can enter their 
local demand for certain products and services for particular periods of time (such as 
one month) into a global economic database that is accessible for everyone and there-
fore also for producers of these goods. Self-managed companies specialising in certain 
forms of production know what their average productivity is and can thereby calculate 
how many products they are able and willing to produce per month. They enter their 
average output per unit of time into a global database. If such computer-based needs 
assessment and computer-based production planning is organised globally, then an 
Internet-based process of decentralised economic planning is realised. An algorithm 
calculates what share of products of a self-managed company is allocated to what local 
community. In order to avoid high levels of transportation, the principle is used that 
needs should, as a preference, be satisfied by goods produced in the geographically 
closest companies. Inevitably, there will be shortages of certain important products in 
particular regions, so that physical transportation of goods will not cease to exist, but 
become part of a global solidary gift economy without exchange. 
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The automation of unpleasant and dangerous labour in communism: 
Public toilets are highly prone to becoming dirty and dysfunctional. The public toilet is 
a symbol for the question of how the economy is organised in a communist society. If 
such a society manages to organise the most unpleasant labour such as the cleaning 
of public toilets and sewage drains and the collection of garbage, then the communist 
economy will work. If public toilets overflow and are dysfunctional, then it is also likely 
that collective housing projects, self-managed companies and society as a whole will 
be dysfunctional. The question of how public toilets are organised and maintained is a 
key metaphorical question for communist societies. A communist society cannot exist 
without the cleaning of public toilets, the collection and recycling of garbage, and the 
maintenance of sewage drains and sewage plants. The solution is, however, not that 
we learn to love dirt and shit and stop the work of cleaning, but that such labour is 
automated and, in a communist society, conducted by toilet-, and sewage drain-clean-
ing robots and waste-collecting and -recycling robots. A communist society without 
toilet- and sewage drain-cleaning robots is unimaginable.  
7.5. Guidelines for Writing and Struggles for Utopias of Digital and Communicative  
Socialism 
From the readings of the discussed communist utopias, we can formulate some guide-
lines for how storytelling and fiction can best outline concrete utopias of digital and 
communicative socialism: 
Communist digital machines: 
Communism is a highly productive digital society where toil, dangerous, unpleasant 
and necessary labour have been abolished by alternative scientific and technological 
progress. Digital machines are used for creating an economy that fulfils human wants 
and needs. The effects of these machines on society are socially and environmentally 
sustainable and the development of machines, science and technology is a participa-
tory process where all those who are affected by science and technology’s use to-
gether take collective decisions. 
Wealth and luxury for all in digital communism: 
Digital communism is a society that features wealth and luxury for all in a socially and 
environmentally sustainable manner. The means of production are common goods 
owned collectively by those who work with them. Human wealth is a common, which 
means that the riches that satisfy human needs and wants are available to everyone 
as gifts without payment. Common goods include the knowledge commons and the 
digital commons. The means of communication, including digital technologies, are 
common goods managed in a democratic manner. 
Work as art that creates beauty: 
In communism, human toil has disappeared, but human work continues to exist beyond 
necessity as free activity that humans use for artistic, creative, social, self-fulfilling, self-
determined and intellectual work, political debate, human togetherness, etc. Work be-
comes art and humans strive to create a beautiful world that benefits all. Lots of work 
is conducted in co-operatives as social production. 
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The communist social character: 
In concrete-utopian digital communist stories, the reader meets individuals who are 
representatives of the communist social character. There is beauty in their interper-
sonal relations and communication. They are friendly, open-minded, caring, and soli-
dary humans who treat others in a humane manner and strive to foster common wealth 
and common benefits for all.  
In stories where we hear about revolutionary situations that aim at overcoming class 
society or have established a communist society, the communist social character who 
strives for a society that benefits all plays a particularly important role. 
Well-rounded individuality: 
In digital communism, the division of labour and society’s divisions have been abol-
ished. There are agro-industrial-digital communes, where digital technologies advance 
the digital support of agriculture, manufacturing and services. In such a society, it is 
common that humans do not have a single realm of activity, but undertake multiple 
creative and social work activities. Humans are well-rounded individuals. Digital tech-
nologies support their creativity and well-rounded activities. In communist society, hu-
mans are general intellectuals and artists with manifold cultural interests.  
The communist economy and decentralised, computerised planning: 
The economy of digital communism is a gift economy without exchange, markets, com-
modities, money, and wage-labour. It is based on the principle ‘from each according to 
their abilities, to each according to their needs’. Globally networked computing systems 
are used for organising a needs-based gift economy, where needs and wants are rec-
orded in a decentralised manner, which means that humans and households regularly 
enter their basic and special needs into a database. The production process is trans-
parent and needs-oriented. The produced amounts of goods are digitally recorded so 
that the level of productivity of each unit is known. Consumers’ wants and needs and 
production capacities are co-ordinated via decentralised, computerised planning. Pro-
duction is to a significant degree organised at the local level, but there is also trans-
local, regional, trans-regional and global gifting organised via computing and environ-
mentally sustainable transport technologies. 
Participatory democracy: 
Participatory democracy is communism’s political system. Humans have the time, 
skills, motivation and interest to engage in political assemblies where decisions that 
concern them are discussed and taken. There are assemblies at various organisational 
levels of society ranging from the company and local community level to the global 
level. There are communes, communes of communes, communes of communes of 
communes, etc. that host assemblies as decision-making bodies. Large assemblies 
consist of delegates appointed for a limited period of time by their grassroots commu-
nities. Networked computer technologies support but do not replace face-to-face meet-
ings. 
The digital and global public sphere: 
In digital communism, there is a global public sphere, where humans debate matters 
of concern vividly and reach understandings. There are no asymmetric power struc-
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tures that colonise the public sphere. The public sphere involves face-to-face encoun-
ters as well as the support of political information, communication, collaboration, and 
co-operation by the global Internet that is free from harassment and bullying and where 
humans communicate as friends. Digital communism knows no national borders and 
is not a form of local bigotry and isolationism. It is a glocal society that is based on a 
dialectic of the local and the global as well as universal and global cultural unity in 
diversity. Humans encounter each other as friends and fellow human beings. Sustain-
able communication and transport technologies enable humans to explore the world 
and make contacts and friends all over the world. The public sphere is to a significant 
degree a cultural public sphere, where humans encounter each other in order to make 
new friends and enjoy life together.  
Everyday life in digital communism: 
Stories about digital communism provide lots of insights into details of everyday life, 
including education, family life, friendships, love, birth, food supply, eating, consump-
tion, culture, arts, housing, energy supply, utilities, communication, the means of com-
munication, transportation, entertainment, sports, privacy, health, illness, social care, 
death, gender relations, sexuality, etc. The stories also outline what positive roles dig-
ital technologies play in everyday life and where they do not play a role because their 
use is considered harmful.  
Transformation, revolution, the capitalist past: 
Stories about digital communism also compare the organisation of and everyday life in 
digital communism to past stages of history, where capitalism or other class societies 
existed. They also reveal how the revolutionary transition to communism took place. 
There are comparisons between means of production/communication, including the 
digital means of communication and digital machines, in class society and in digital 
communism. The design, use, and impacts of technologies in capitalism and com-
munism are compared. 
Contradictions:  
If communist novels, stories and fiction focus predominantly on problems, conflicts, 
wars, or violence in respect to communism, communist technology, or the relationship 
of communism and class society, then there is the danger that the impression is cre-
ated that communism can never work and should not be created in the first instance. 
A pure focus on such issues should therefore be avoided.   
But digital communism is not a society that is free from contradictions and prob-
lems. There are problems and contradictions of digital communism that we learn about 
in concrete-utopian communist stories. But class relations, exploitation, and domina-
tion do not exist, which makes it easier to solve problems and deal with contradictions. 
Digital communism is a problem-solving society, where humans are in general crea-
tive, intellectual, critical beings who together engage in trying to solve the problems 
society is facing. In some stories, digital communism comes under the threat by hostile 
groups or societies, who threaten to invade and destroy communism and to impose a 
class rule. Such stories show how digital communism deals with existential threats in 
a resilient manner. Occasionally, there are stories in which such threats turn digital 
communism from utopia into dystopia and later back into utopia.  
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Dialectical technology: 
Raymond Williams (1978/2005) argues that it is problematic when technological trans-
formations in fiction are presented based on the logic of “technological determinism”, 
where there is “little or no social agency” and technology has “certain ‘inevitable’ social 
consequences” (1978/2005, 198). In such stories, technological transformation is the 
opposite of humans’ wilful transformation; there is no dialectic of society and technol-
ogy. Utopia and dystopia are “narrowed from agency to instrumentality” (199). Science 
fiction is scientific, then, because science and technology take on an instrumental char-
acter. 
 In the concrete utopian-communist story it is important that science and technology 
are presented as dialectical. In both capitalism and communism, there is a dialectic of 
science/technology and society. The consequences and impacts of science and tech-
nology on society are not inevitable, but depend on human interests and on how hu-
mans shape science, technology, and society. Utopian and dystopian technological 
impacts are not natural consequences of science, technology, or society. Science and 
technology often have multiple, contradictory potentials, realities, impacts, and conse-
quences. In a communist society, science and technology are far from perfect, but also 
contradictory. It is, however, more likely that they have positive consequences and 
impacts than in class society. If something goes wrong, then it is easier in such a social 
formation for humans to intervene, undertake mitigating interventions and undo nega-
tive impacts.  
Dialectical technology depends on dialectics of technology and society, continuity 
and discontinuity, agency and structure. In concrete-utopian communist stories, there 
are struggles for a good society that involve struggles for and about good technology. 
Utopian-communist literature needs struggling, humanist, solidary communist social 
characters such as Le Guin’s Shevek or the revolutionaries in Morris’s chapters on 
“How the Change Came” (Chapter XVII) and “The Beginning of the New Life” (Chapter 
XVIII). Such communist social characters should also be present in respect to the dia-
lectics of technology.
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Abstract: This paper investigates how the global class of organic intellectuals will emerge. It 
thus updates Marx view on class struggle dynamics of the 19th century by taking the quantum 
leap of productive forces during the last 200 years serious. The most striking new element is 
the tremendous increase of the force of information power brought about by ICT. The emer-
gence of Fascism and Stalinism in the first half of the 20th century was just a frightening first 
symptom of the coming age of alienation. Today, basing class membership – including the 
emergence of class consciousness – only on the (physical) local position in industrial produc-
tion units is insufficient, even misleading. Global production is by its inbuilt complexity blurring 
the visibility of a specific worker’s exploitation status. There is necessary alienation, but then 
class struggle managed disinformation and manipulation is added. For the progressive classes 
this implies that they are split along the lines of their respective education status – how far the 
fog can be dissolved. This is where the concept of the global class of organic intellectuals, of 
an avantgarde, enters. The paper shows that already in the emergence of this new socialist 
agent the structures, in particular the information structures, of the next mode of production 
have to be present. It turns out that features, which are evil for capitalist thought are often the 
most important ingredients for the constitution of the forerunners of a socialist global society: 
persistent contradictions and diversity, exploding oscillations, deep and time-consuming dia-
logues, irrational solidarity, aesthetic stubbornness. The new intellectuals can remain rooted 
in local circumstances, can be organic, because they share many of these features with the 
exploited classes within which they act as catalyst, as avantgarde. In the end global socialism, 
organised by a revolving class of organic intellectuals, has to master alienation. This is the 
challenge. 
Keywords: revolutionary class, alienation, global class of organic intellectuals, political 
avantgarde, socialism, capitalist algorithm, socialist algorithm 
1. Introduction 
Contemporary social forces are building up steam. It is not just the global climate, 
which rapidly starts to oscillate with higher and more surprising amplitudes. More and 
more authoritarian state leaders subscribe to a kind of disintegrating capitalism, which 
falls back to the coercive mechanisms which were thought to be overcome after World 
War 2. In this situation a new wave of modernized Fascism knocks at the door and its 
resonance in the population shows that the progressive movements still have so far 
not really understood what Fascism is1. Their analysis mostly just scratches the sur-
face when it investigates singular historical features of 20th century Fascism. Neither 
                                            
1 The two classical approaches to explain 20th century are (1) the so-called “Western” interpre-
tation, which equates Fascism and Stalinism as “Totalitarism”, and (2) the “Eastern” interpre-
tation, which considers it to be just the rule of most radical imperialistic capitalists. For a 
critique of both compare Hanappi (2019b). 
188     Hardy Hanappi 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
 
the personality of Hitler, nor that of Mussolini, nor that of Stalin should be taken as a 
historical force. Single politicians as well as the local and transient historical peculiari-
ties in which they are embedded in, are of secondary importance if the long-run dy-
namics of capitalism are to be investigated.  
Progressive theory in the tradition of Marx’s analysis – what in this special issue is 
called socialism – has to be envisaged as a theory about the dynamic struggle between 
classes. The agents of change, those pushing forward social progress as well as those 
trying to turn back the wheels of history, are large groups with a shared common con-
sciousness, which runs through different stages of emergence. Moreover, even the set 
of classes to be considered does not stay constant. The last 75 years have seen a 
tremendous turmoil of emerging and vanishing class consciousness, pseudo-con-
sciousness, misconceived class relationships, mixtures of class, race, and nationalism, 
and the like.  
In short: this confusion indeed was the fertile ground that the dominant economic 
theory of the ruling class, i.e. neoclassical economic theory, had proposed with its 
methodological individualism. If human individuals are the uniquely possible starting 
point for any social theory, if classes are assumed not to exist, then some surrogate 
Newtonian mechanics framework (neo-classical theory) can be used to show formally 
that we live in the best of all possible worlds; no change needed. Just make sure that 
political institutions never disturb market forces. In such a theory, progressive classes 
do not exist, neither does their enemy, the capitalist class. For the former, the teaching 
of such a theory is a tranquillizer, a distraction directing attention away from the under-
standing of social dynamics and substituting it by acquiring mathematical skills appro-
priate for 19th century physicists. For the ruling classes such a theory is useless as well 
– apart of its manipulative task with respect to their enemies.  
When Fascism did strike after World War 1 the capitalist class could not use its 
theory to understand what is going on. It had to rely on somebody without education in 
economics, but with the ability of marrying political skill with convincing rhetoric and a 
good sense of feasibility: John Maynard Keynes. His doctrine, known as Keynesian 
macroeconomics, could hide the class concept behind a veil of accounting relation-
ships and an assumed average behaviour of individuals, so-called socio-psychological 
constants. An approach good enough to re-introduce the state as an institution that is 
needed to save capitalism from its own aggravating sequence of heavier and heavier 
crisis. Some former leaders of the labour movement could be pacified by transferring 
the class struggle to the couloirs and meeting rooms of state institutions. Integrated 
capitalism was born, and after the little understood intermezzo of Fascism could flour-
ish to its global zenith. Class, as a central concept of political economy, was eliminated 
from the theoretical discourse. 
But as a motor of real economic processes classes were as vital as always, just 
theories had gone astray. Of course, class structures were changing since Marx’s 
death in 1883 – not a big surprise. Changes in the capitalist mode of production, dis-
crete steps of its development leading to different stages of capitalism, are to be un-
derstood in front of what is common to all stages, of what is the essence of capitalism. 
Capitalism is a particular mode of production embedded in the larger category of com-
modity producing societies. Commodity exchange – a consequence of the division of 
labour – implies the emergence of money, which in turn is accompanied by the step-
wise evolution of money forms and their corresponding forms of political organisation. 
Hence, the capitalist mode of production is characterised by a particular money form, 
which best can be understood as an algorithm. 
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In recent discourses the concept of an “algorithm” has taken on a somewhat mystic 
character, so let me clarify its use in this text. With the shift of formalisation techniques 
from classical mathematics towards computer programs several important new twists 
of understanding of processes were implied. A programme running on a computer is 
an algorithm, i.e. it performs a sequence of instructions, which change the set of vari-
ables present in the programme. Though the number of instructions is finite, the pos-
sibility of recursive calls of itself within a program – realised in the machine by con-
structing copies of the calling program – leads to a new understanding of infinity, called 
the “halting problem” in computer science2. From a more profane view, in a finite world 
programmes need a stop condition since the space for storing copies is finite. The stop 
condition thus links the external conditions of the programme’s environment (its limits) 
to the general set of instructions. To do this it must be included in the programme. A 
second important twist stems from an extension of the concept of a variable. A variable 
is a sign referring to another sign, where at the so-called roots of such a sign structure 
usually signs referring to measurable properties of non-signs occur. With modern 
learning techniques sign systems can be derived directly from the interaction between 
the learning program and these (dynamically changing) roots – though, of course, sev-
eral axiomatic restrictions of the learning algorithm (often disguised linearity) have to 
be considered. Unlike the stop condition, which points at the preliminary character of 
all recursive thinking in real life, the wide opening of self-constructing programmes3 
due to machine learning has blurred the common perception that programs still are 
necessarily deterministic. They are written and implemented by human individuals to 
run in a finite world. 
An order given by a firm owner to one of its employees is an algorithm too. It is a 
sequence of actions, which the employee has to perform. In a specific firm each ab-
stract command will refer to a less abstract action, which the worker has to accomplish 
– often in more direct physical contact, important for the production process. The boss 
is the programming authority. The worker is the machine. Note that recursive calls now 
assume a different flavour: Employees higher up in the firm hierarchy become copies 
of the boss (or the next higher level) at the interface to the next lower level. The stop 
condition now simply is the worker who has no other workers subordinated to him/her, 
i.e. the level where there are workers that do not give orders.  
But the real crux that enabled the capitalist mode of production was the evolution 
of money forms taking place in capitalism: A capitalist owner does not just own a spe-
cific firm, he or she rather handles capital, i.e. as a class capitalist owners gain the 
flexibility to jump from one firm to another firm, from one country to another country, 
from one tax regime to another tax regime, etc. This new flexibility substitutes the in-
flexible family bonds, which held the feudal class together, and makes the capitalist 
class a more abstract class. The only common element in all parts of capital in the 
world that has to contrast this overwhelming flexibility is what I call the ”capitalist algo-
rithm”. It is an algorithm again, which can be spelled out very clearly, see below (sec-
tion 2). Just like recursions the capitalist algorithm can spread, can enhance feudal 
societies, and can counteract like a disease in societies at the verge to socialism. Like 
                                            
2 On a very general level the halting problem is one of the logically undecidable problems as 
Alan Turing showed (see Turing 1937). There is no possible algorithm that can free a pro-
grammer from the need to shut down an otherwise infinitely running programme in all cases. 
A somewhat disappointing result, though an infinitely running capitalist algorithm is illusionary 
due to the physical finiteness of the world anyway.  
3 Conceptually self-constructing programmes have already been studied by John von Neu-
mann (1966). For an implementation, see Pesavento (1995). 
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cancer, it can disguise as a promised growth process for individual humans, while it 
actually only addresses capital, and even its individual human agents are forced into 
its spell – they are just character masks. 
This is just the first inhuman aspect of the capitalist algorithm: it enslaves all human 
individuals of all classes. The second inhuman aspect emerges due to the fact that at 
the lowest level of the recursive command chain in a social system there is not just a 
copy of an algorithm for which no additional space in the working memory can be found 
– as it was the case in a computer. The very reason for the running of the overall 
programme in this case is unmistakably specified, it is exploitation: there is no room 
for a human programmer to play around with a toy problem.  
At the roots of society an anti-thesis is forming, as Hegel would have called it. It is 
something that non-living software due to its missing consciousness never will be able 
to achieve. From all parts of the enslaved humanity, but substantially from these ex-
ploited roots, resistance against the capitalist algorithm can constitute itself. It certainly 
will need to present a different algorithm in its fight against the capitalist algorithm. This 
algorithm will be characterised by strong and sophisticated feedback loops from the 
roots of a global society – what today might be called future democracy, socialism, or 
dictatorship of the proletariat. The design of such a socialist algorithm will bring current 
attempts in machine learning studied in academic circles to flourish. And it will imply a 
new money form overcoming capital. An educated guess is that the foundations of this 
money form are labour time and lust.  
The concept of an algorithm thus has emerged as an important concept, and is 
here to stay with us. In capitalism the capitalist algorithm is the most general abstract 
programme that governs capital, currently the highest money form of frozen, appropri-
ated social value. The next mode of production will need a governing programme, an 
algorithm, too. But instead of an illusionary unstoppable accumulation imperative this 
algorithm will aim at what now is at best a side constraint: (1) compatibility with envi-
ronmental limits and (2) abolition of exploitation of “humans by humans”, feedback 
loops and diversity instead of hierarchical authoritarian power structures. 
2. The Capitalist Algorithm 
In societies dominated by agriculture, contradictions between cities, i.e. places of ex-
change, points of concentrated political power, and the open land were aggravating. 
Exploitation, i.e. the appropriation of surplus by a ruling class, was managed either by 
direct coercive force – in the beginning the domain of the feudal class – or later by 
enforcing rent payments in the form of money, i.e. a system of carriers of social value, 
e.g. coins. The necessary acceptance of this carrier system had, of course, to be se-
cured by the feudal state. With further sophistication of the monetary exploitation sys-
tem the ruling class experienced a split: On the one hand the politically governing old 
feudal class and on the other hand the non-feudal merchants which were able to keep 
the difference between bought and sold commodities as private money stock. In the 
sequel the latter were the part of the ruling class that provided credit for the nobility, 
with which then an army of mercenaries could be hired for internal and external exer-
tion of direct power. These soldiers (including administrative military personnel of the 
state) constituted a further split within the ruling class. 
The fruits of the global division of labour which started with the discovery and ex-
ploitation of new continents (e.g. in 1492) made merchants cooperating with the crown 
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rich. Merchant capitalism was the first monetary program following the capitalist algo-
rithm. This algorithm looks as follows4: 
 
For each member of the set of currently possible visions do (“vision loop”) 
Produce a vision of specific (entrepreneurial) activity 
Check expected wage cost 
Check expected interest on credit-money (vulgo “capital cost”) 
Check expected effective demand 
Compute expected growth rate of capital 
Estimate the probability to achieve that growth rate 
End of vision loop 
Choose the vision yielding the highest utility of a mean-variance utility function 
Check if the selected vision’s utility exceeds the expected utility of a supplier of credit-
money  
If the lender’s utility is higher, then perform the chosen project, 
else become a supplier of credit-money. 
 
For merchant capital its entrepreneurial component was still somehow hidden below 
the dominance of the political might of the necessary feudal sovereign. Spanish, Por-
tuguese, Dutch, and British conquerors were “explorers”, though their visions already 
concerned the accumulation of capital stock5. 
The close connection between profit made by merchant companies and the territo-
ries conquered and exploited by the feudal state enabled the ruling classes to keep 
their contradictory goals most of the time latent. A more pressing problem were the 
fetters of limited productive force, which the growth process inscribed in the capitalist 
algorithm soon met. E.g. the capacity to manufacture the amount of cotton transported 
to England by the merchants from the cotton fields of America was soon reaching its 
limit. At this point in time the magic word of “innovation” became the new mantra, be-
came a systematic force in capitalism. Innovation designates activities which transform 
a combination of existing, but seemingly unconnected elements into a new social prac-
tice. In capitalism this new social practice typically concerned the activities of a pro-
duction unit, of a capitalist firm. This narrower concept of innovation nevertheless in-
cluded at least three elements: technical innovation, organizational innovation, and 
product innovation.  
It is evident that the ability to perform innovation was not a very common property 
in the group constituting the politically ruling feudal class. The nobility were the degen-
erated heirs of lucky and brave knights that made their fortunes in the times of direct 
coercive power struggles6. Thus it soon became clear that the ruling classes ap-
proached a further split: The non-feudal bourgeoisie was dividing into entrepreneurial 
                                            
4 A detailed description can be found in Hanappi (2013). The algorithm is formulated with the 
help of an image of capitalist behaviour, which stems from observing firms of fully developed 
capitalism, though the nucleus of it is already visible in merchant capitalism. 
5 The fascination with gold that is so characteristic for that period is telling.  
6 The correspondence between special properties of the members of a ruling class and their 
historical mission was highlighted by Antonio Gramsci (Gramsci 1930/1999). 
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capitalists performing innovation and money owners7 administering the transfer of the 
(monetary) fruits of exploitation to the different components of the capitalist system. 
Since innovation first started to take hold in the factories, in the industries on the island 
of England, the stage of capitalism that followed merchant capitalism has been named 
industrial capitalism. In the words of Marx, this industrial capitalism signals the “histor-
ical mission” of capitalism, its raison d’être in the evolution of mankind. Entrepreneurial 
activity increases labour productivity by process innovation and explores the space of 
human utility dimensions by product innovation. Both are prerequisites for welfare in-
crease of the whole species: work less and derive utility from an expanding universe 
of consumption and service dimensions. Schumpeter later stylised the fraction of en-
trepreneurs as the heroes of capitalism, ignoring Marx’s conclusion that the disequilib-
rium process initiated by industrial capitalism will necessarily lead to a revolutionary 
shake-up: The so-called “productive forces”, i.e. the potential welfare increase, is going 
to run ever faster than the slow changes in class structures, which hinder that such a 
latent general welfare increase materialises.  
The first clash in 1848 was a failure for the bourgeois fraction of the ruling class, 
the next one in 1918 proved to be its final triumph. Marx’s hope that a revolution within 
the ruling classes could open up the possibility for a takeover of power by the exploited 
classes turned out to be unjustified. The capitalist algorithm survived both World Wars 
of the 20th century. 
Since the end of World War 1 capitalism developed into a new stage, which I call 
integrated capitalism8. During this stage several new elements of capitalism were 
emerging:  
(1) In the interwar period, capitalist nation states, the administrative political fraction 
of the ruling class, allowed for some participation of the exploited classes in the policy 
process – thus the label integrated capitalism.  
(2) Integration at the level of nation states was paralleled, sometimes even sup-
ported, by a boost of nationalism, which in the end helped the emergence of Fascism 
and Stalinism. Fortunately, Fascism experienced a heavy blow in WW2, and in 1990 
also Stalinism saw a drawback. More recently, nationalism raises its evil head again. 
(3) Both elements mentioned above owe a lot to the rise of new information tech-
nology. The manipulation of internal model-building activities of human individuals, i.e. 
the provision of interpretation schemes, has reached unforeseen levels. To exert 
power by information policy has become the most effective weapon not just for private 
firms (with omnipresent advertisements) but also for “political entrepreneurs” distorting 
more traditional class relations. In other words, we are living in an age of alienation. 
Compared to the previous two centuries, this concept now experiences a boost: Today 
reigns hyper-alienation. 
The common ground of all stages, i.e. the capitalist algorithm, is itself based on the 
existence of exploitation, the permeating process which it handles in stage-dependent 
ways. 
                                            
7 This group includes what today is called ‘banking’ as well as central banks and national (min-
istries of finance) and international (ECB, IMF, etc.) financial authorities. In the last 170 
years this conglomerate has developed a highly sophisticated internal structure, first inves-
tigated from a socialist perspective by Rudolf Hilferding [Hilferding, 1910]. 
8 Compare Hanappi (2019a). 
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3. Stages of Exploitation and Class Dynamics 
Exploitation in its most general sense is the process of the taking away of lifetime of 
one group of living systems from another. To exploit the growth processes of plants 
and animals by eating them is how mankind exploits nature9. Note that in this case 
exploitation takes place between species, and that the notion of sustainability is implic-
itly characterised by the need of the growth process of inputs to the exploiting species 
has to be at least as high as the demand for them – though the build-up of stocks of 
inputs can act as a buffer10. The notion of the scarcity of inputs thus falls into two 
categories: inputs from renewable sources (other species) and inputs from finite 
amounts of material. Only the former qualify as elements of the exploitation process.  
As Marx observed, the exploitation of “man by man” is an extension of the exploi-
tation of nature by the human species, which immediately implies that there exist clas-
ses within mankind: an exploiting class and an exploited class. The power to exploit 
characterises the ruling class as the exploited class is characterised by its stagnation 
at just sustainable levels of reproduction. The transfer of lifetime can be complete, as 
is the case in the slavery mode of production, or it can be engineered by institutional-
ized transfer of labour time (corvée), commodity transfer (rent), or money transfer 
(taxes). The latter three have been different phases of exploitation mechanisms in feu-
dal medieval Europe, designed to keep the exploited class of farmers at the lowest 
level of sustainability. These steps of exploitation in Feudalism already herald the as-
cent of money forms as general systems of signs of social value.  
In capitalism money forms take over, the capitalist algorithm presented above links 
the behaviour of the exploiting class to the working of a specific money form, i.e. capi-
tal. In all stages of capitalism exploitation therefore can be traced back to the transfer 
of labour time from the exploited class to the exploiting class, measured in terms of the 
general sign system of social value, in money terms. A precise ex post formulation of 
a labour theory of value, which reports this transfer on a global level, is in principle 
possible, though extremely cumbersome. It has to account not only for the intricacies 
of myriads of institutional details that emerged in class struggles all over the world, it 
also has to consider that the oscillations of power struggles between classes, between 
firms, between sectors of the economy, and between nation states certainly have led 
to prices that cannot be considered to be “equilibrium prices” in any useful sense.  
Nevertheless, ignoring the difficulties of an algorithmic representation of what hap-
pened in the world last year, it is theoretically sound to draw a clear border line between 
the (globally) exploited class and the ruling class of exploiters based on a labour theory 
of value11. In so far Karl Marx’s hypothesis on the purification of the class antagonism 
between capital and labour is still valid. But this overarching structure of capitalism as 
a particular mode of production of commodity producing societies does not directly 
translate into a purification of two antagonistic classes. Only during the first half of the 
19th century – the time of Marx socialisation – the impressively fast emancipation of an 
anti-feudal young bourgeoisie parallel to a socialist avantgarde consisting of anarchists 
                                            
9 For a formal model – a simple Lotka-Volterra system – of this process compare Hanappi 
(2006). 
10 Even in advanced texts of Marxist mathematical economists, e.g. Roemer (1981, p. 19), this 
so-called feasibility condition usually is derived as a flow equilibrium, without mentioning the 
importance of stock variables. Note that capital is a stock variable! 
11 From the perspective of the labour theory of value there is no middle class, this is the major 
argument in the paper Hanappi & Hanappi-Egger (2012). 
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and communists gave the impression that a future bipolar constellation of the exploi-
tation structure only waited for a final intervention of communist intellectuals. The 
avantgarde of communist intellectuals acts as an agent of enlightenment and trans-
forms the working class from a class in itself into a class for itself – so went the argu-
ment at that time. 
This plan to catalyse a communist revolution until the end of the 19th century failed. 
But with respect to the transformation of the working class into a class in itself remark-
able successes surfaced as the growth of membership in unions towards the end of 
the 19th century shows. The decisive setback only came with WW1, when the victory 
of national consciousness over class consciousness – in particular in Germany and 
France – became manifest (compare Hobsbawm 1990). 
How deep nationalist propaganda had entered the minds of the population turned 
out in the interwar period. With more advanced information technologies even more 
radical variants of nationalism, racism and fascism, could take hold in the populations 
of the losers of WW1, Germany and Italy. The fascist movement became the first 
“class” without economic rooting, a party held together simply by direct paramilitary 
coercive force and propaganda. A set of simplistic narratives boasted towards a con-
fused audience (with the help of the newly available broadcasting devices) combined 
with a dubious call for party discipline was the prelude. With the Great Depression of 
1929 the fascist movement finally received the necessary economic backing of Ger-
man warfare industries. The economic upswing of the 1930s still was taking place with-
out a noteworthy fascist theory12, it was just the demand induced by fascist war prep-
aration that drove the economy. Of course, the national socialism of fascists was no 
socialism at all. The choice of the name “Nationalsozialismus” already reveals a typical 
trick of fascist movements: Sell your slogans as mixtures of incompatible buzz words. 
A confused slogan will be appreciated by a confused audience. In the end it is just the 
glitter and glamour of the packaging of the void, which stirs the enthusiasm of the fas-
cist mob. “The medium is the message” was McLuhan’s judgement much later. 
In Russia the coalition between many farmers and the weak urban proletariat that 
Lenin had formed to overthrow Czarism had to build a non-feudal state from scratch. 
Forced industrialisation thus should produce more proletarians while an apparatus of 
state administrators being communist party members were acting as substitutes for 
the working class. In 1924, when Stalin after Lenin’s death took over, a particular na-
tionalist policy element – “socialism in one country” – was added to this setting. The 
ruling class in the Soviet Union, de facto the elite of the national communist party, was 
different from the fascist rulers in that they indeed had a more or less realistic master 
plan to develop socialism. What they soon started to miss, after Lenin’s death even 
started to suppress, was innovation and creativity, which they substituted by military 
controlled discipline and correlated hierarchical power structures. The population did 
develop into a class structure following this hierarchy. On top was the elite of adminis-
trators of state power more or less identical with the party leaders. On the levels below 
there was the management personal with executive power according to their position 
in the hierarchy. All of them more or less conscious of executing a faint copy of the 
capitalist algorithm to win what had been called “system competition with the West” by 
the doctrine of “socialism in one country”. Below these classes with graded ruling 
                                            
12 One of the predecessors of Keynes’ ideas, Michail Kalecki, at the time probably had a better 
understanding of the fascist movement than its proponents, see Kalecki (1943). 
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power there was the amorphous mass of workers, which became increasingly tired of 
policed discipline lacking increases in welfare13.  
Then World War 2 stopped the proliferating social cancer called Fascism and in the 
West brought integrated capitalism to its most sophisticated form. In many OECD 
countries a two-party system served as a simulation of the interplay between a working 
class oriented economic policy and the goals of the capitalist class. Compromises be-
tween these two large parties, including alternate state leadership – became the rule. 
In the East the Soviet Union had advanced towards Europe and its satellite states 
became copies of the Russian original. As the latter could build on their pre-war 
knowledge stock their technologically more advanced commodities became the ex-
ports to the USSR which they exchanged for cheap energy. Nationalism in the new 
states remained as latent as religious attitudes. Only when the systems collapsed 
around 1990, their social structures rapidly broke up. Quick adopters in the population, 
often with the help of Western intruders, formed a young capital class that was able to 
apply the capitalist algorithm in the new environment. In Russia, this class now is called 
the group of new oligopolists and constitutes a second pillar of the ruling class. There 
again is a similar, even more pronounced development in China. 
But in the early 1970s, integrated capitalism in the West had passed its zenith. The 
part of the ruling class controlling international finance had concentrated in the USA. 
To cement its economic dominance the regime of fixed exchange rates was given up, 
leading to a burst of US exports, a price hike of oil prices and turmoil in two-party 
systems worldwide. Around 1980, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut 
Kohl took office and a long-run downturn of social democratic parties in Europe (and 
the Democrats in the USA) started. The global capitalist class started again to shape 
the world economy according to its goals. It followed the capitalist algorithm. 
Globalisation now meant that global value chains were booming. Financial centres 
in the rich world’s big cities together with multinational firms looked for countries with 
low wages and sufficient knowledge for production, other countries with high effective 
demand, and still other countries to be used as tax havens. The ruling classes were 
split again into multinational and transnational giant firms on one hand and local na-
tional capitalists on the other. State administrations started to align along continental 
frameworks; the banking sector was already a highly concentrated global network. The 
capitalist class thus today is characterised by a mosaic of partly opposing entities, 
though all parts subscribe to their perception of the capitalist algorithm. They mistak-
enly perceive this algorithm and its growth imperative as an unchangeable “natural” 
property of mankind. 
On the side of exploited classes, the work of the traditional industrial proletariat of 
OECD countries to a considerable extent has been shifted to 3rd world countries, com-
pare Cope (2015). This element of the globalisation process implied a severe split of 
the working class. It not only meant that overall representatives of workers do not exist, 
at best there are some local national leaders. It alenaso implied that the commodities 
had to be sold to consumers in rich countries, buying with money they received from 
credits, increasing the debt levels of banks and governments. While wages and com-
modity prices were – and to some extent still are – the central variables for exploitation 
within a national economy, the new global setting has replaced them by exchange 
                                            
13 The development of China had many similarities to the original Stalinist production system. 
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rates and debt levels14. The fragility of this global financial system popped up in 2001 
as the so-called IT-crisis, and as a real disaster in 2008. 
Despite the fact that the global working-class today is atomised as far as its class 
consciousness is concerned, it nevertheless is more tightly interwoven in the global 
production process itself than in any time in human history. The leap from a class in 
itself to a class for itself therefore has widened enormously. 
4. The Emergence of the Class of Organic Intellectuals 
The local environments, the perceived worlds within which workers expend their labour 
time, remain alien to the quantitative amount of money they receive in return for their 
activity. If they compare their deal with what happens in distant environments they 
often simply cannot understand. If then the global financial coordination system gets a 
blow – the crisis of 2008 probably was just a prelude to the next, really heavy shock – 
it seems to be an unexplainable natural catastrophe, fate, bad luck.  
Remembering that the last comparable financial crisis, the Great Depression of 
1928, in the end was only overcome by the war expenses of Fascist regimes heading 
for WW2 should make us aware that the rise of extreme right-wing parties all over the 
world eventually is a messenger of a new kind of Fascism, a thunderstorm of a 3rd 
World War, which with less luck than with the previous one, mankind will not survive. 
Fascism builds on nationalism paired with a technologically amplified hatred (i.e. a 
blind feeling) on the bugaboo of an enemy. To fight it, the opposing attitudes and ac-
tions have to be launched: global humanism and scientific analysis of social contradic-
tions.  
To support a fascist regime is usually not the first choice of a capitalist class. But 
unfortunately, due to the destructive power of contemporary weapons, even seemingly 
small conflicts at the periphery involving a handful of “madmen in authority who hear 
voices in the air” (Keynes 1936, 241) are sufficient to cause a global disaster15. With 
fascism in state power the growth imperative of the capitalist algorithm assumes its 
ugliest face: military conquest and an internal police state. Compared to the 20th cen-
tury, today’s “surveillance capitalism”16 now possesses means to monitor the individual 
behaviour of citizens in real time. The problem of a centralised police state is not the 
availability of this enormous amount of data, the problem is how to select the relevant 
parts and pieces. To be able to do so, some kind of interpretation of observed mes-
sages is mandatory. This starts with the occurrence of certain words and contacts to 
seemingly suspicious persons. As in the 20th century, it will end with a complete 
streamlining of communicated independent thought and the burning of (electronic) 
books. There is a global community which is the carrier of exactly this: the global com-
munity of scientists. It will be its vital interest to fight Fascism. 
As a matter of fact, contemporary science to a large and increasing extent takes 
place electronically. Ideas are exchanged, laboratory experiments are performed, re-
ported, simulated with the help of electronic devices. There now exists already a global 
                                            
14 Note that national government debt is just firm and household debt disguised by the promise 
of a capitalist nation state to be able to set the record straight by appropriate fiscal policy any 
time the creditors want it. Left wing actors in governments therefore are always a threat for 
these creditors, which explains debt problems of left-leaning governments. 
15 In 1936. Keynes was not aware that his prophetic words applied even better to the fascist 
leaders that are not even “distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years 
back”. Fascism is free from any serious theoretical content below the surface of propa-
ganda.  
16 The term was recently popularised by Shoshana Zuboff (2019). 
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community of scientists held together by the various objects of investigation studied 
and a shared devotion to reveal scientific truth. But note that the same information 
infrastructure that enables the jump in scientific collaboration has led to a jump in fra-
gility and random outcomes of traditional democratic mechanisms. This is the result of 
the success of the first three stages of capitalism (merchant, industrial, and integrated 
capitalism), which have pushed the global division of labour to a level that in the era of 
global alienation now isolates individuals in perception bubbles with little chances to 
understand larger parts of their actual economic and political interdependence.  
The most important big topics for them look like completely unpredictable white 
noise, like fate. They are the blank white sheet in front of which the stupid narratives 
of soap operas and outdated religious ghost stories entertain them. Sure enough, the 
global structure of production, in particular global value chains, has also left its trace in 
the structure of the global working class. Despite its common high level of alienation, 
the part of the proletariat working in third world countries deliver an overload of labour 
time with minimal room for their own education or political emancipation.  
The part of the exploited living in OECD countries acts either as better educated 
worker or in the administration (including marketing and selling) of the global produc-
tion process. This latter part is also needed to complete the circuit of exploitation, i.e. 
to buy the cheaply produced products at prices allowing high enough (always mone-
tary) global profits. This is only possible due to the global system of credits and national 
government debts. Today’s profit of the large and successful firms is made possible by 
allowing less wealthy, even poor citizens in the rich world to pay later17. In many OECD 
countries that have more developed tradition of the labour movement, this borrowed 
increase in consumption also acted as a tranquiliser with respect to more radical so-
cialist aspirations: If capitalism manages to make you better off, why should you fight 
it? And if this experience prevails for decades, then the notion of exploitation vanishes 
in the minds of the population. Alienation then not only concerns alienated products 
and alienated, complicated production relationships, it in particular becomes a strange-
ness with respect to the own status of the now completely alienated individual human 
being. In such a situation mass psychology becomes very volatile18. Political moves of 
larger groups of such societies become as difficult to predict as the moves of an ag-
gressive tiger. 
On the other side of the globe, humans of the Global South live in poverty, in locally 
encapsulated regions where hard labour in low-paid manufacturing enclaves is organ-
ised. In such an environment, there is only little time and communicative space to de-
velop islands of intellectual counterinsurgency. Aggression in such a depressing con-
text sometimes turns to cultural implosion, to a return to outdated religious traditions. 
Again, this type of revolts is erratic, difficult to predict, and in its high aggressive poten-
tial also reminding on the just mentioned tiger. 
The problem for a global class of organic intellectuals is that there is no way to ride 
these tigers with enlightenment arguments – as Marx had hoped to have found the 
most oppressed class, the proletariat, which only needed its class consciousness (pro-
vided by communist intellectuals) to become a class for itself. To some extent, the 
alienation process is irreversible, the enormously grown human society needs it, needs 
the division of labour (including the one between manual and intellectual labour) to 
reproduce itself. What is not needed is the omnipresence of the capitalist algorithm. 
                                            
17 The alternative to produce more commodities for the super-rich is limited by the tremendous 
shrinking of the members of this group. 
18 With reference to Sigmund Freud’s insights, Adorno (1951) discusses how fascism is able 
to use this volatility. 
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Quite to the contrary, this virus of a fading away capitalist mode of production again 
and again jumps on the train of authoritarian, fascist movements supporting their war 
preparations (and wars) for profitable short-run investment. World War 3 is knocking 
at the doors of human history; there is no good reason why this history might not end 
with the capitalist mode of production – though certainly not in the paradise that the 
prophets of capitalism (as nature’s final goal) had promised.  
The global class of organic intellectuals, as a conscious part of the exploited people 
in the world, therefore needs an add-on to the self-imposed “enlightenment”’ – to its 
own knowledge acquisition – that enables it to interact with the poor South as well as 
with the hyper-alienated rich North. Today scientists and intellectuals are dispersed all 
over the world and serve very different class interests rooted in the wide variety of 
human cultures. Large parts of this group already strive for progress of humanity in a 
very general sense, to know induces to be left-leaning. But these are not a proper class 
yet. That they develop into the global class of organic intellectuals is still a desideratum. 
So far the original class background of the future members of this new class is less 
important, due to a worker’s little time left to become an intellectual it is even more 
probable that a considerable part originally does not come from working class families. 
But as they become “organic” they transform themselves into a vital part of this newly 
emerging class, which then forms a tight coalition with the most exploited parts of the 
global working class19.      
To be “organic” means to be closely connected to the poor South and the hyper-
alienated rich North, while nevertheless to have some stand-alone capabilities. Con-
nections as information flows come – actually are in principle already available – via 
the global information infrastructure. Connections in a more physical sense, i.e. con-
nections as commodity and service flows, are still waiting to be designed – on a global 
level, of course. In other words, it is democracy itself that waits to be transformed from 
an antediluvian rule of majority voting to a pragmatic design of global reproduction of 
the species20. This would be the riding of the tiger. 
5. Afterthoughts 
For the just mentioned design political economy needs a substantial remake of what 
mainstream economic theory provides today. Most types of equilibrium assumptions 
make only sense if some extremely fast processes are included in models of extremely 
slow processes. For processes taking place in approximately the same range of speed, 
e.g. in political economy dynamics, there is no place for (general) equilibrium theories. 
They have to be replaced by formalisms that grasp dynamic instability, increasing dis-
equilibria, structural instability and emergence and exit of relevant variables. For theo-
retical physics and biology some formalisations of this kind – often using algorithmic 
formalisms - already exist, the social sciences are lagging behind. Synthesis of the 
different sciences with respect to the formalisms used thus is getting even more im-
portant. 
But not only formal techniques need an upgrade. Looking at the objects of investi-
gation also reveals a necessary turn of attention. The spell of being concerned only 
                                            
19 The global production structure today is organised mainly along global value chains (see 
Suwandi 2019). Therefore, the different strata of exploitation strength are geographically mir-
rored. This is an important source of information for the newly emerging class. 
20 To square the potential of the internet with the need to develop democracy also is in the 
focus of the work of Eugenia Siapera (2017).  
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with the economy within the borders of a nation state obscures most scholarly commu-
nication. This is evident in microeconomic theory that explicitly assumes away influ-
ences of a capitalist political entity called the state. In macroeconomic theory this state 
is added again, while the misspecifications of a representative household and a repre-
sentative firm are dropped to make room for underspecified behavioural aggregates 
that shall substitute classes. But what remains almost completely out of sight is the 
level of the (really finite) world economy21. In times of global value chains and global 
finance, the largest scope, the world economy, has to be political economy’s first focus. 
But since political economy needs at least two focuses to bring in additional dimen-
sions (compare our eyes), there also has to be a complementary second focus. We 
need to give attention to the diversity of perceived dynamics of political economy in 
different locations in the world.  
Producing an abstract global model (first focus), which aspires to grasp the essen-
tials adequately, is not a matter of freewheeling theoretical invention. Its abstract as-
sumptions have to be derived (in Marx’ words produced as “Gedankenkonkretum”, a 
“totality of thoughts” that is “concrete in thought”, Marx 1857/58, 101) by finding shared 
elements in a great diversity of local observations. To perceive these local dynamics 
(second focus) – including the mental models of the local classes involved – is an 
indispensable precondition for useful abstractions of the first focus. Since the two eyes 
of the scientist are interdependent, how local dynamics are observed also is framed by 
the global view. A conscious and close interaction of the two perspectives, global and 
local, bridging generalisation and Schumpeterian diversity22, shall be a permanent as-
piration. 
Diversity is here to stay, though in ever-changing forms. This provides a possible 
answer to the question: What is so socialist about the global class of organic intellec-
tuals, anyway? To start with, the currently observed result of several hundreds of years 
of capitalism is significant enough. The capitalist algorithm has produced an enormous 
split – a diversity – of wealth and income in the world23. At the same time, it has also 
led into a bewildering diversity of perceptions of what is going on. This is the experience 
of an age of alienation. The globally possible information overload in the communica-
tion sphere now mainly consists of advertisements and manipulative messages, which 
indeed mute any communication. In this way the capitalist mode of production has 
undermined the possibility of a democratic global political economy, it currently could 
tilt over to a reprise of autocratic authoritarian regimes fighting each other in a Third 
World War (compare Hanappi 2019a). Capitalism enters its self-destructing last stage. 
The hope is that it can be decoupled from the fate of the human species. If the 
global class of organic intellectuals24 can contribute to this decoupling, this is exactly 
                                            
21 Open economy models of macroeconomics are an insufficient attempt to cope with this ab-
sence. They usually start with a two-country case and then eventually jump to the infinitely-
many countries case – for technical convenience, of course. Needless to say that such mod-
els are rather inadequate for a treatment of the world economy, since they are based on a 
“representative” macroeconomic country model. 
22 Re-occurring diversity is as important as its counterforce of sudden singling out of temporary 
Schumpeterean heroes. This idea already has been the mantra of Darwin’s evolutionary 
view in biology. This type of diversity is what here is called “Schumpeterean diversity”. For 
a model of an “optimal” level of diversity (see Hanappi and Hanappi-Egger 2004).  
23 Note that these distributions are epiphenomena caused by exploitation. 
24 Being “organic” in this context means to be on the side of the human species, on the side of 
“living labour” instead of “dead labour”, i.e. capital (the capitalist algorithm), as Marx once 
remarked: “Indem der Kapitalist Geld in Waren verwandelt, die als Stoffbildner eines 
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what can be called “socialist”. Of course, if the catastrophe can be prevented, then the 
diversity of the global population remains intact, organic intellectuals will be just one 
element of it. They will work on an elimination of the most painful type of diversity today, 
the one in living conditions around the globe, and at the same time they will try to spur 
the diversity of utilities which the locally dispersed communities are able to experience. 
In both respects, several thresholds will have to be respected:  
(1) Mankind is also a system of biological entities. Thus, it needs a minimum of 
reproducible resources to survive, which limits its own reproductive activities. To care 
for sustainability in a world where also self-reproducing inputs (plants and animals) 
have rather finite growth rates, means to be restrained by a complicated network of 
checks and balances.  
(2) As a species, mankind builds up neg-entropy. But it nevertheless is embedded 
in the long-run increase of entropy, i.e. it was born and will die. Birth and death reduce 
human individual experience to a much shorter period than the one of the species. As 
a consequence, the knowledge capacity of any human individual is much smaller than 
the knowledge capacity of the species. It is the diversity of finite knowledge capacity 
appearing in different communities (storing a medium-time experience), human indi-
viduals (storing a short-time experience), and human society’s knowledge (storing the 
long-time experience), which in its interwoven status restricts what each of these enti-
ties can communicate, what it can transmit to other entities. These limits of knowledge 
acquisition25, of learning and teaching, are not only dispersed along the dimension of 
time of experience, they are also dispersed with respect to geographic location.  
(3) A third limit, which usually is ignored, concerns a property that in physics is 
known as inertia. For a social entity this property means that its inscribed procedures 
will be repeated unchanged if no stimulus is forcing a change. Such a stimulus can 
come from suddenly changing environmental conditions, or from internally built expec-
tations, both reasons often being interconnected26. 
For the global class of organic intellectuals, it is most important to learn from the 
just mentioned limitations27. From limitation (1) it becomes clear that the adjective “or-
ganic” also has to cover the fact that animals, plants, and non-living scarce resources 
have to be explicitly included in any design of a new mode of production. This was not 
the case when the outgoing capitalist algorithm emerged, which still reaches for the 
unbound growth of the capital stock. From limitation (2) a more modest, a more realistic 
                                            
neuen Produkts oder als Faktoren des Arbeitsprozesses dienen, indem er ihrer toten 
Gegenständlichkeit lebendige Arbeitskraft einverleibt, verwandelt er Wert, vergangne, 
vergegenständlichte, tote Arbeit in Kapital, sich selbst verwertenden Wert, ein beseeltes 
Ungeheuer, das zu ‚arbeiten‘ beginnt, als hätt' es Lieb' im Leibe”  (Marx 1867b, 209). 
English translation: “By turning his money into commodities which serve as the building 
materials for a new product, and as factors in the labour process, by incorporating living 
labour into their lifeless objectivity, the capitalist simultaneously transforms value, i.e. past 
labour in its objectified and lifeless form, into capital, value which can perform its own 
valorization process, an animated monster which begins to ‘work’, ‘as if its body were by 
love possessed’” (Marx 1867a, 302). 
25 The ability to forget the correct less important parts of knowledge in time never has to be 
forgot as a constitutive part of the learning process. 
26 In the 19th century, the upheaval of the working class was stimulated by the expectation that 
the lives of workers will be condemned to misery forever if they would not start a communist 
revolution. On the other hand, reactions on an approaching climate catastrophe are fuelled 
by direct perceptions of sudden environmental changes as well as by expectations formu-
lated by climate science.   
27 Compare the use of game theory for studying limits, as proposed by Herb Gintis (2014). 
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vision of enlightenment has to be derived. The idea that knowledge only flows top-
down, from an intellectual elite to an unconscious mass of less educated individuals, 
this idea has to be rejected. In the end this idea has been at the core of the religions 
that dominated early stages of human evolution: an omniscient entity (God) is govern-
ing what human knowledge can achieve. Instead, the mentioned structural limitations 
show that knowledge flows in all directions: between communities (often dubbed “cul-
tures”), within the members of communities and classes, between global knowledge 
and all other entities (often using the internet). The distinction between different chan-
nels, as already mentioned in the previous chapter, therefore becomes very important. 
The preliminary character of all knowledge, of course, does not nullify the fact that 
there is a grading from less adequate to most adequate knowledge. The push towards 
upgrading on all levels and for all entities for the next mode of production via commu-
nication is the final step ending religions, substituting them by rules of commensurate 
behaviour. Nevertheless, also in this field some diversity will persist, Schumpeterean 
diversity. The lessons taken from limitation (3) are straightforward extensions from the 
previous points. Why should a social entity – a human individual, a community, a class, 
society as a whole – change its course of behaviour? The first, the most evident reason 
is that the dominant behaviour has changed its environment in a way that makes sur-
vival with the same behaviour impossible. Like an asteroid that is led by its physically 
determined trajectory into a planet: without consciousness a crash is inevitable. Inertia 
in a society does exist too.  
The only remedy to prevent a crash in living systems is by building expectations, 
which in turn are built on memories. Memories can be grouped in two categories, good 
ones and bad ones28. When expectations for the future trespass a certain sensitivity 
border as compared to the current situation, then a social entity will surmount inertia. 
If something very bad pops up or if something particularly nice can be expected, then 
regular behaviour will be overridden by a new type of action. The lesson for the global 
class of organic intellectuals follows straight from this observation: The situation of the 
global working class exploited in third world countries (mainly in manufacturing) keeps 
it in a state of despair that continuously breeds radical hate and energy to change their 
fate. For them, fuelled by bad expectations based on bad memories, organic intellec-
tuals have to provide designs of a future global mode of production that give them 
hope. This is complicated and includes strategies on how to get from here to there, but 
it is possible.  
For the population in the richer part of the world, where the age of alienation has 
arrived at a fragile state of confusion, the immediate danger is a return of nationalism 
leading to fascism and as a consequence to global war. It has to be noted that nation-
alism also works with expectations, with the propagation of a seemingly extremely glo-
rious future. It promises the re-birth and domination of a grand nation (“to make the 
nation great again”). The fight of organic intellectuals against fascism in the area of 
ideology therefore has to demolish this illusion scientifically and has to provide a vision 
of love and peace for all women and men as alternative. The latter is not a scientific 
project. It is an emotional message rooted in the acceptance of the preliminary char-
acter of scientific knowledge, in the acceptance of the sensual, of the aesthetic remains 
of human perception. It might be difficult to learn for intellectuals that influence on oth-
ers, empathy with others, is also based on channels that are not using knowledge, but 
                                            
28 Why and how these two types of memories are emerging goes far beyond the scope of this 
paper. It only has to be noted that the two categories always have to be linked to the con-
sciousness of the respective social entity. 
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somehow accept its limited character. These channels are using beauty and lust – and 
as history teaches any social movement neglecting them is doomed to fail29. To ride 
the tiger of alienation in an age of alienation the class of organic intellectuals will have 
to develop its aesthetic attraction too! 
These paragraphs are not a closing conclusion. They are an open invitation to de-
velop further ideas on how to proceed. With each movement of the tiger below us our 
reactions must be rational and intuitive at the same time, such are the living conditions 
of the class of organic intellectuals. 
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Abstract: In this paper we discuss the rise of BreadTube and what it means for the spread 
and normalization of socialist ideas online. We aim to focus on four major YouTube content 
creators – Contrapoints, Philosophy Tube, Shaun, and Hbomberguy – to outline how they con-
struct their videos to entertain, inform, as well as debunk both alt-right and (economically) lib-
eral talking points, helping to prevent potential radicalization of a mostly young audience who 
stand at a crossroads in their ideological development. Aside from examining the content of 
produces by the creators, we also hope to investigate the unique configuration of their platform 
use, emphasizing such elements as distributions, financing, and audience interaction.  
Keywords: digital, BreadTube, Reddit, digital socialism, affective media, Patreon, YouTube 
1. Introduction: Enter BreadTube 
In January 2019, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez dropped by an event hosted by Harry 
Brewis (‘Hbomberguy’), who raised money for a transgender charity by live-streaming 
the videogame Donkey Kong 64 for around 50 hours. In a show of international soli-
darity, Cortez’s act was the first big intersection of BreadTube with “real-world” political 
figures, the first major instance of it being propelled outside the confines of its digital 
origins. 
BreadTube (or ‘YouTube but good’ as referred to by its adherents) is a loose asso-
ciation of independent online videographers and their surrounding communities that 
makes up a leftist response to alt-right use of digital media. The moniker Loose Asso-
ciation implies a lack of central organisation, of a structure that determines their rela-
tionships. Instead, a shared ideology binds them together. Including such content cre-
ators as Contrapoints, Hbomberguy, and Philosophy Tube, BreadTube stretches be-
yond YouTube, with a presence on various social media platforms (e.g. Reddit, Some-
thing Awful), as well as its own websites (e.g. BreadTube.tv). These digital outposts 
serve as video aggregators, discussion spaces, and even platforms for social mobili-
zation. 
Borrowing its name from Kropotkin’s anarchist classic The Conquest of Bread, 
BreadTubers and their viewers do not shy away from associations with leftist thought. 
BreadTube.tv claims that the goal is “to challenge the far-right content creators who 
have taken advantage of the profit-driven algorithms used by services like YouTube 
for the purpose of spreading hate” (“About · BreadTube” n.d.). They express a “wish 
to educate people on how their world operates, the alternative possible visions for our 
future, and how we organize ourselves to get there.”  
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Our position is that BreadTube is a form of digital praxis promoting new types of digital 
engagement with leftist and socialist thought. While the impact of BreadTube within 
the political arena is yet to be seen, the increasing popularity of its content shows a 
growing public awareness of the lacunas of capitalism, as is evident from reports by 
more traditional media outlets (e.g. Jacobson 2019; The Economist 2019).  
 We start this article with a reflection on the role of communication technologies in 
contemporary class struggles. We argue that assemblages like BreadTube present a 
way of applying affective media that goes beyond creation of antagonists, or pure vio-
lent jouissance associated with libertarian uses of affective media (Jutel 2017). Sec-
ond, we examine how these formations aid the spread of socialist ideas. We propose 
that BreadTube can fulfil the educational and agitprop purposes of media, assisting in 
a Brechtian reconfiguration of the people (Žižek 2018): the transformation of the inert 
mass of the working class into a politically engaged united force.  
We then discuss the applicability of socialist literature to the BreadTube phenome-
non. We draw on studies of earlier leftist online communities as well as contemporary 
leftist theoretical scholarship, positioning BreadTube at the intersection of these two 
themes. In section three we engage with BreadTube itself: both the content and the 
virtual community (Song 2009) surrounding it. Is it possible to conceptualize 
BreadTube as socialist? Or is it part of the nexus of communicative capitalism, offering 
the feeling of change without bringing about real transformation? If – as we argue – it 
is the former, what makes it informative and mobilising? What does this phenomenon 
mean for discussions of (digital) praxis? In the final section, we reflect on the future of 
BreadTube, by bringing up Marcuse’s work on the Tea Party (Marcuse 2010), while 
considering some of BreadTube’s present limitations. 
2. Helping Others Remember to Dream 
BreadTube does not have a central hierarchy. It is made up of loose linkages that 
congregate on different social media websites, with videos serving as focal nodes that 
anchor discussions of ideology and praxis. Our preliminary conceptualisation of 
BreadTube is to see it as a catalyst, an agent preparing and hastening up conditions 
for change, rather than the site in which said change occurs. Discussing the prospect 
of radical change today, Žižek (2018, 481) argues that revolutions come to those with 
patience. To quote:  
Revolutionaries have to wait patiently for the (usually very brief) period of time 
when the system openly malfunctions or collapses, seize the window of oppor-
tunity, grab the power […] so that, once the moment of confusion is over, the 
majority gets sober and is disappointed by the new regime, it is too late to get 
rid of it, and the revolutionaries have become firmly entrenched. 
BreadTube serves to create the conditions necessary for socialism to become an ac-
ceptable reality. It helps disentangle the meaning of socialism from the capitalist smear 
campaign, re-articulates it in a positive light, resulting in a push towards a vision of a 
shared, achievable reality. It represents some of the “hard theoretical work” needed to 
break free from the ideological mask fixed upon the working class that makes its mem-
bers turn again one another (blaming the immigrant, the feminist, etc.) (Žižek 2018).  
BreadTube gently pushes its viewers to perceive the injustices thrust upon them by 
the capitalist system. BreadTube’s common tactic revolves around taking a right-wing 
talking point or “alternative fact” and subverting it. Critical analysis of such talking points 
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as climate change denial or the Great Replacement of Europe (i.e. the Muslim/refu-
gee/migrant ‘invasion’) introduces the viewer to a gentler politics. It should be noted 
that unlike the cyberlibertarian formations investigated by Jutel (2017), where antago-
nization of political opponents takes centre stage, BreadTube content tends to focus 
on understanding, analysis, and suggestion of alternatives to the talking points pre-
sented. The discussion – be it about the men’s rights movements (Contrapoints 
2019b), Flat Earthers (Hbomberguy 2018), or Unite The Right’s actions in Char-
lottesville (Shaun 2018) – stays clear of the trolling and vulgar jouissance that is char-
acteristic of the alt-right (Jutel 2017). While also aiming to entertain, this more pensive, 
critical approach, while most certainly not inciting a swift socialist uprising, may lay the 
necessary groundwork. 
It is hard to classify BreadTube videos as socialist per se, and a broader view of 
leftist thought is more appropriate. In his discussion of the continuing relevance of 
Marxism, Wright (2018) raises four “central propositions” that remain relevant today 
and constitute the basis of our discussion: 
x Capitalism obstructs the realisation of conditions of human flourishing. 
x Another world is possible. 
x Capitalism’s dynamics are inherently contradictory. 
x Emancipatory transformation requires popular mobilisation and struggle. 
BreadTube – through both videos and discussions  – directly engages with and con-
tributes to this broad conceptualisation of the Marxist and socialist traditions. The first 
and third propositions show the need for BreadTube, as it helps pull back the veil of 
capitalism by defamiliarizing and deconstructing the status quo. As for the second and 
fourth proposition, BreadTube can advance a popular cultural style of the socialist 
movement without explicitly naming it as such. Wright (2018) reminds us that emanci-
patory transformation requires building institutions to embody relevant ideals, that 
transcending capitalism is not a manner of rupture, but of consciously building up a 
foundation of socialism inside of capitalism. Distorting the normalcy of our capitalist 
world order is one of the core tasks that BreadTube undertakes.   
BreadTube, despite its anarchist-inspired name, is a comprehensive host of leftist 
worldviews and analyses. Some state that they are spreading leftist thoughts (e.g. 
BadMouse self-describes as creating “leftist propaganda” (BadMouse n.d.)). Others 
seek to obtain a wider audience, rarely directly mentioning socialism. As if in a con-
scious effort to avoid the negative association socialism has amongst those she wishes 
to engage, Contrapoints (Natalie Wynn) describes her videos as follows: “My political 
aim is to counterbalance the hatred toward progressive movements that is so common 
online. Stylistically, I try to appeal to a wide audience and avoid merely preaching to 
the choir.” Orientating the uncertain viewer towards a type of leftist, socialist thought 
without confronting them with affective signifiers that these terms accumulated in pop-
ular press is one of the great strengths of this community. 
Invoking the Zapatista movement’s famous notion of “One No, many Yeses” 
(Wolfson 2014) BreadTube appears to embrace heterogeneity as long as all the noses 
are pointed in the direction of opposing the capitalist status quo. This, however, leads 
to a problem of the will of the people, the theorisation of which has been a contentious 
issue. In this instance, we borrow Dean’s (2012, 114) formulation of the will of the 
people as “as a divisive political subject that produces itself through its practices 
[whose] will precedes not only its knowledge of what is willed, but the people itself.” As 
Žižek (2018, 479) argues, today there is no “global cognitive mapping”, no collective 
will. BreadTube has the potential to structure the previously this will by shining light 
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upon the frustrations viewers might have with the capitalist system, inciting a yearning 
for the communist horizon.  
Continuing this train of thought, Dyer-Witheford (2015, 10) notes that knowledge is 
the “main site for contesting capitalism”. For socialism to be successful, critique of ide-
ology must become part of mainstream discourse (Fuchs and Monticelli 2018). It needs 
spokespersons and leaders, someone to decode academic debates and terminology, 
to sieve out the core message, to convey it to their audience in a clear and engaging 
manner. BreadTube fills an ideological void for people who may lack the means and 
methods to educate themselves. It is bite-sized and features well-produced video spec-
tacles.  
Fuchs (2018) notes that a Marxist theory of communication should analyse the 
structure of ideology through various channels. One must overcome “capitalism, class 
society, exploitation, and domination” (Fuchs 2018, 531). BreadTube can have an 
emancipative function of exposing the viewer to the previously unseen flaws of capi-
talism. This leads to a question of how BreadTube differs from earlier forms of leftist 
digital media.  
Wolfson’s (2014) study of Indymedia can help us identify why earlier attempts at 
(digital) socialism failed. He argues that Indymedia organisers did not set clear goals, 
only asking themselves “What do we want to achieve?”. Without a strong aspiration it 
was difficult to organise and invoke societal change. This, in combination with a lack 
of clear leadership or organisational forms, led to the diminishing effectiveness of this 
media project. While BreadTube exhibits similar issues, the crucial differentiating factor 
is that this community is centred around individual content creators. While said creators 
have not yet exhibited interest in changing their platform from one of words into one of 
actions, they are engaged in a style of informational warfare with the modern right.  
Dean (2012), discussing Occupy Wall Street, states that for communism to flourish 
we must not simply be together, but rather “stick together”, turning our collective desire 
into actual change. A desire that must be channelled into action by leaders (Žižek 
2018) who can formulate strategies and educate. This desire can be misguided – as 
we in the past few years have seen this desire being harnessed by extremists to cast 
the blame upon the refugee, the immigrant, the other. Crucially, we must remember 
that “strategies don’t just happen” (Wright 2018, 499). 
On social media, activism-related discussions are a frequent sight, urging people 
to go beyond the videos: “Watching YouTube videos never led me to praxis – reading 
theory did” (BobartTheCreator2 2019). BreadTube can thus be seen as a gateway to 
socialist thinking. It utilises the information infrastructure of capitalism to present the 
masses with visions and dreams of a better, fairer world: something that left has failed 
to accomplish up to this point (Dear 2012). Dean argues that we have unlearned how 
to dream of a better future, and it is up to communists to show why socialism is “the 
best alternative” to capitalism” (83). Some BreadTubers directly state that their reason  
for making videos is to counteract the growing influence of the alt-right on the internet 
(Contrapoints 2019a; Hawking 2019). 
Having looked at a range of discussions and interpretations of Marxist thinking, it 
appears that BreadTube can perform a variety of essential functions, including promot-
ing socialist ideals, educating the population, and sparking the dream of socialist tran-
scendence. Moreover, it can serve to connect the work of theoreticians with practical 
mobilisation, preparing the discontented population by promoting the central proposi-
tions outlined by Wright (2018).  
All this sounds good, but one wonders whether BreadTube has the capacity to for-
mulate a collective will capable of affecting change. Its decentralised nature, the style 
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of content produced, the channels of its distribution and the format of its discussions 
can be seen as strengths or as weaknesses. We must more thoroughly investigate 
these constitutive elements.  
3. Analysing BreadTube 
YouTube is the root, the platform where videos get posted and disseminated by con-
tent creators. These videos are discussed in the comment section of the platform, but 
most of the discussion takes place on social media platforms such as Reddit or Internet 
forums like Something Awful. Reddit is a website that hosts a multitude of subreddits, 
each a community that regulates its content through voluntary moderation, with the 
admins proper only interfering in extreme cases (e.g. child pornography).  
A viewer might become curious and follow the links provided in the video descrip-
tion or the comments. This would lead them towards the major BreadTube discussion 
spaces where, in an ideal case, they could be guided towards a gentler politics. Simply 
put, this is a two-layered “hijacking.” The first layer involves use of search algorithms 
by BreadTubers to disseminate their videos. The second layer – a kind of affective 
hijacking – revolves around using a variety of theatrical and didactical styles to convey 
leftist thought. The system is well summarised by Roose:  
The core of BreadTube’s strategy is a kind of algorithmic hijacking. By talking 
about many of the same topics that far-right creators do – and, in some cases, 
by responding directly to their videos – left-wing YouTubers are able to get their 
videos recommended to the same audience (Roose 2019) 
3.1. BreadTube’s Logistics and Funding 
The platform dependent nature of BreadTube requires us to consider its position at the 
intersection of communicative capitalism and affective media. Does it have emancipa-
tive potential or is it a form of affective media labour, with capital “contradicting the 
productivity of biopolitical labour and obstructing the creation of value” (Hardt and 
Negri, 2009, 144)? Through affective media we are made to think of ourselves as parts 
of a bigger narrative,  apparently fighting capitalism online, while in fact contributing to 
its continued existence. 
Most major BreadTubers use YouTube to spread their ideas. Some of them 
acknowledge Google’s role in the propagation of hate but are in the end reliant on it. 
As a small sign of resistance, some BreadTubers use Patreon (a crowdfunding plat-
form) to make a living, with some opting out of monetising their videos (i.e. turning off 
advertising). Patreon serves to democratise socialist knowledge. BreadTubers’ videos 
are free to watch and discuss online. Those able and willing to fund the production are 
invited to make direct contributions.  
Democratisation of knowledge is explicitly mentioned by Philosophy Tube, who af-
ter austerity in the UK education system “decided to give away [his] MA in Philosophy 
free to people who don't have the opportunities for learning [he has] had” (Philosophy 
Tube n.d.). He wants to “get people in a position where they can take cutting edge 
academia and apply it to the real world” (n.d.). The image of leaving the ivory tower to 
is a common theme within the BreadTube community.  
To sum up, the work of BreadTubers is a reconfiguration of socialist promoted via 
capitalist information structures with the goal undermining them. These videos serve 
as discussion nexuses, forming communities of practice. Ideally, the more well-versed 
can guide those who, after having seen a video, are looking for more answers. An 
example of this is shown below:  
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Figure 1: Revolution UK subreddit announcement 
These videos appear to have a ripple effect. The Revolution UK community features 
many links to protests, mixed with questions from people frustrated with the status quo. 
For example, one commenter says they are “[t]ired of the left being purely reactionary 
but feel powerless to actually help in any capacity” (Azulmono55 2019). 
Earlier we presented BreadTube as a catalyst or gateway towards socialist thought. 
As shown, the various pathways that lead from BreadTube videos can put a viewer on 
the road towards discussions, consideration, and acceptance of leftist thought. 
3.2. The Content 
One of the difficulties in defining BreadTube is its inclusiveness. There is no arbiter, 
nor any clear notion of what a ‘BreadTube video’ is. Rather, it is through consensus 
that work gets incorporated into the canon. This happens through discussions on fo-
rums, voting on Reddit or simple agreement between users. In this article we focus on 
the four largest YouTube channels whose videos are frequently discussed in the 
BreadTube communities. These are Shaun, Hbomberguy, Contrapoints, and Philoso-
phy Tube. Their content can be generalised into two categories: the response video 
and the explanatory video.  
In the first type, a (right-wing) talking point is explained, analysed, and debunked. 
For example, Hbomberguy in the ‘A Measured Response’ series tackles climate 
change denial propagated by popular right wing YouTube channels. Similarly, Shaun 
in ‘A Response To...’ directly engages with other YouTube channels, discussing topics 
such as why ‘European History Is Not White History’, ‘Feminism, Why You Need It’, or 
‘What Is White Supremacy’. Shaun also has a video series on how ‘PragerU Lies to 
You’. PragerU is a right-wing propaganda outlet, “one of the most effective conversion 
tools for young conservatives” (Nguyen, 2018). These response videos use popular 
(right-wing) talking points to anchor discussions surrounding issues such as feminism, 
right-wing outrage, socialist alternatives, the manufacturing of ‘cultural Marxism’, and 
so on.  
The second category – the explanatory video – has a more general aim: rather than 
focusing on a particular point, these videos introduce and analyse a  larger theme. The 
work of Contrapoints and Philosophy Tube exemplify this approach. The former covers 
topics such as ‘Incels’, ‘The West’, ‘What’s Wrong With Capitalism’, ‘The Apocalypse’, 
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and ‘Beauty’, and the latter delves into the subjects of ‘Reform or Revolution’, ‘Witch-
craft, Gender, & Marxism’, and ‘Elon Musk’.  
We have selected three recent videos about the climate disaster to serve as exam-
ples (Table 1). As Shaun does not have a video on this topic, we did not include him.  
 
Channel: Contrapoints Hbomberguy Philosophy Tube 
Video title The Apocalypse Climate Denial: A measured Response Climate Grief 
Date December 2nd 
2018 May 31
st 2019 August 22nd 2019 
Length  24:43 41:19 29:30 
Views (on 3 
October 
2019)  
867,463 1,295,413 438,922 
Table 1: Basic YouTube video information 
While this is but a small sample of the BreadTube universe, we believe these videos 
are good demonstrations of how leftist (socialist, progressive) thought is embedded in 
video content, how it is relayed to the viewer. 
3.2.1. Philosophy Tube: Climate Grief 
In Climate Grief, Philosophy Tube discusses the climate disaster in its totality. In his 
productions, he speaks directly to the viewer in the guise of different personas. In this 
case, the central character is a kind of futuristic priest delivering a eulogy at the “funeral 
for planet earth.” Another recurring character is the “travelling salesman,” a caricature 
of a (neo)liberal who proclaims himself to be moral, preaching ‘responsibility’ and ‘ra-
tional debate’ while seeking faults in others. Central to the video is the argument that 
climate change is not one problem, but a composite of many problems. Borrowing a 
term from philosopher Timothy Murton, he refers to the climate disaster a hyper object.  
Philosophy Tube makes frequent use of a variety of literature to support his argu-
ments. Another example is the use of Terry Eagleton’s Why Marx Was Right  (Eagleton 
2011) to argue that the acknowledgement of the world as tragic fuels fascism, “persua-
sive to so many liberals because it acknowledges that many things just suck.” 
Philosophy Tube criticises both right wing climate change denial and left-wing 
techno fetishists that believe in technological solutions (citing Bastani’s book Fully Au-
tomated Luxury Communism (2019)), arguing that there is more than one way to deny 
climate change. He asserts that the tragedy of the current situation is our sense of 
powerless, the belief that those at fault might never reap what they sow. He does offer 
hope, however, arguing that smaller and within-reach acts of unionisation, empathic 
politics, listening to indigenous people and their philosophies are all part of understand-
ing and dealing with the climate disaster. He concludes by stating that: 
[R]ather than not thinking about it, or hoping for a perfect technological solution 
seriously considering the world might end with climate change might be a 
chance to ask: what were the good bits? Apocalypse doesn’t actually mean the 
end of the world, it’s a Greek word that means the revealing of knowledge. 
Philosophy Tube poses questions and dilemmas while supplying answers and worka-
ble solutions: listen to indigenous philosophies, recognise that you have more allies 
than you think, that we are not alone in the our individual struggles but are part of a 
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greater whole (a covert case of class analysis if there ever was one). Climate change 
is a host of issues rather than one isolated struggle. We need to think about how we 
want the world to look after the apocalypse.  
3.2.2. Contrapoints: The Apocalypse 
Contrapoints’ The Apocalypse – like many of her other works – employs a discursive-
dialectical technique. The video features a scientist that tries to convince a decadent 
denier (lying in a bath) of two things: that climate change is real, and that the world 
needs to be saved. The video involves the scientist explaining things to the denier (or 
the audience) after which they shortly discuss the content, with the denier occasionally 
interrupting the video. The explanatory parts are factual, discussing the consequences 
of climate change, as well as the lobbying efforts to deny, delegitimise and supress 
climate change policies. The strength and impact of Contrapoints’ content lies in the 
discussion elements. 
The conservative climate change denier begins on the premise that the scientist 
seeks only to “shove the liberal agenda down [their] throat”. But the latter retorts 
through engagement with the denier’s own rhetoric, asking if she wants more refugees 
(“no!”), then arguing that climate change policies need to be implemented to avoid that 
(“no!”), or otherwise more refuges will come (“no!”). Contrapoints does her best to pre-
empt arguments from those on the opposite end of the political spectrum, and this 
allows her productions to go beyond antagonism by showing an understanding of the 
other side.  
Contrapoints provides guidance, emphasising practical individual and group in-
volvement: we need to push for rapid political change, go on strikes, vote, demand 
action. She states that capitalism cannot provide a solution to climate change due to 
its propensity for short term thinking, which is incompatible with the long-term orienta-
tion of climate change. The video ends humorously with the acknowledgment that the 
conservative needs an antagonist, which echoes earlier findings on cyber-libertarians 
and affective media (Jutel 2017): “how am I supposed to care about rising sea levels? 
There are Muslims and Mexicans – there could be Muslim Mexicans for all I know”. 
Ending on a joke, the scientist conjures up an opposition figure for the denier. The Dark 
Mother – the Sea – who threatens to consume the planet.  
3.2.3. Hbomberguy: Climate Denial 
In contrast to the other two channels, Hbomberguy plays himself talking straight to the 
camera, occasionally cutting to relevant footage or comedic sketches. He admits he is 
not an expert – he was originally a videogame YouTuber – and relies less on academic 
writing, speaking more from his own experiences. Unlike the previous examples, he 
directly attacks some talking points explicitly highlighting their wrongness rather than 
leaving the moment of realisation with the viewer. The video employs a personable 
approach with Hbomberguy wondering how climate change deniers are able to persist 
despite the obvious flaw in their arguments, debunked with a few seconds googling. 
The video first discusses why the “science” of climate change denial is based on lies. 
It then outlines how denialism works by pointing out stakeholders (e.g. oil companies) 
with vested interests. 
Discussing popular right-wing figures such as Stephen Crowder and Patrick Moore, 
Hbomberguy explains to the viewer how they manipulate those on the fence (the con-
servative audience), how they make the audience feel good about themselves by as-
serting their viewpoint as the right one. Hbomberguy notes: “The product [Stephen 
Crowder] is selling is ideology.” The main point of the video is not about climate change 
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but the mechanisms of this ideology, how its rhetoric is sold to the people, how a veil 
of ignorance and denial gets woven and placed over their minds. Hbomberguy reveals 
the inherent contradictions of right-wing discourse that claims to stand for reason and 
facts, to be pro-science.  Joking that “climate change isn’t your fault, it’s the Koch’s 
brothers’ fault,” he argues that the most effective strategy is to agitate for political 
change. The video ends in a hopeful manner, stating that if even someone like him can 
realise that these people are just being paid to make him feel good, then perhaps all 
of us can pierce the veil.  
3.2.4. Synthesis 
The videos discussed lay bare the inherent contradictions of the right-wing stereotype: 
logical, science-adhering sceptics who prefer reason to feelings. What sets these 
channels apart from the more radical BreadTube adherents is their neutral appear-
ance, which allows them to attract a wider viewership and to attain relevance beyond 
a leftist or socialist echo chamber. 
Often there are no winners in these videos. Rather, they assert that deciding on the 
truth of the matter is left to the viewers. Philosophy Tube, Contrapoints, and Hbom-
berguy tell their audiences to look at the sources themselves, to witness the debate at 
hand, to establish their own viewpoint. This stands in contrast to the contentious poli-
tics of the likes of Ben Shapiro or Jordan Peterson, who popularised themselves on 
the wave of the ongoing populist right-wing resurgence. They rely on the creation of 
antagonists as acknowledged in Contrapoints’ video, positioning their ideological op-
ponents as sources of all that is wrong with the world.  
On BreadTube, antagonization does not take centre stage. There is a level of hon-
est engagement with opposing arguments. Unlike cyberlibertarian forms of affective 
media that prioritise jouissance (Jutel 2014) over other themes, there are no real 
gotcha moments, no one-liners. The intent is not to create enemies (a constructed 
other) but to examine, deconstruct and critique the points brought up. This might be 
due to the independence of these creators and the democratisation of their videos 
through voluntary donations. Unlike many of their counterparts, BreadTube content 
creators by and large do not have a product or point of view to sell. They are therefore 
freer to discuss any topic in any way they wish1. 
Channels such as Philosophy Tube or Hbomberguy take a more liberal approach 
with their format, structuring their work like mini-documentaries or television series. But 
what is consistent across these content creators’ videos is production value. Their vid-
eos have been professionalised as the popularity (and income) of the channels in-
creases. We view this as a positive evolution. Videos like these serve to introduce a 
new generation to ideas and viewpoints which they otherwise may not have encoun-
tered. 
3.3. The Community  
The largest discussion site for BreadTube is Reddit, a social media platform that is 
infamous for being extremely laisse faire in its content moderation. Reddit hosts a num-
ber of fascist, extreme right, nationalist forums that spread hate and discontent on the 
Internet. Analysing the website, Massanari (2017) argues that its design implicitly pro-
motes a techno-culture that encourages toxic behaviour.  
                                            
1 For example, the earlier mentioned right-wing users Ben Shapiro and Stephen Crowder both 
push a range of products in their videos ranging from “brain power enhancing pills” to general 
merchandising.  
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There is friction between acknowledgement of these platforms (e.g. YouTube, Reddit) 
as tools of (capitalist) oppression, and relying on them for the means and methods to 
spread and discuss leftist ideas. This leads to some interesting parallels with the real 
world. The subreddit for the popular leftist/anarchist podcast ChapoTrapHouse re-
cently got “quarantined” due to repeated calls for violence. This means that it does not 
receive any advertising and is delisted from the main site. This development was re-
ceived as good news by many, considered to be a form of “digital squatting” (larrikin99 
2019).  
A socialist worldview ties together networks such as ChapoTrapHouse and 
BreadTube. Due to their sparseness, there are difficulties in making decisions across 
networks, or even within one. Organisational power is something that we should not 
expect from BreadTube. Rather, BreadTube is more a gateway to further activism, a 
tool for the untangling of our ideological shackles. It is a catalyst that speeds up the 
development of favourable conditions under which things can progress and change. 
Figure 2 is a network graph that show in which other communities users from the 
BreadTube subreddit are active. We used data from August until September 2018.  
We can see a leftist Reddit network with sub-communities such as Anarchism, 
Communism, and Anti-Capitalism. There are links to communities dedicated to edu-
cating the people (Socialism101, debatesocialism, LateStageCapitalism) but also sub-
reddits focused on organising action.  
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Figure 2: Networks of commenters who post in BreadTube and other Subreddit Com-
munities 




Figure 3: Climate change activism on the LateStageCapitalism subreddit 
 
Figure 4: Introduction text on every comment thread on the LateStageCapitalism sub-
reddit  
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Several of these communities have a strong didactive element where people ask ques-
tions and get answers from those more versed in leftist thought. A common sight on 
many leftist subreddits are recommended book lists, some even hosting recurring book 
clubs. There is a grassroots element with users educating themselves, often drawing 
directly from the classical works of socialism.  
BreadTube is a general catch-all leftist subreddit meaning that its content is not that 
radical. It has an pedagogical function, guiding users to ways to educate themselves 
through readings, videos, and other types of media.  
Figure 4 shows that BreadTube is not an isolated instance but a central node of the 
left-leaning Reddit sphere. It belongs to a constellation of leftist communities, consti-
tuting a starting point of a journey towards leftist thought, towards deconstruction of 
the (ideological) bias against socialism that has accumulated due to decades of prop-
aganda, with Trump and Johnson being the most recent and vocal examples (Cam-
maerts et al. 2016) of socialism’s vilification. On 24 September 2019, Donald Trump 
vowed in his United Nations speech to “never let America become a socialist or com-
munist country” (Schwartz 2019). On 2 October 2019, UK  Prime Minister Johnson 
called for “raising the productivity of the whole of the UK, not with socialism [...] but by 
creating the economic platform for dynamic free-market capitalism” (Mason 2019). An 
important question remains: How can socialism best be understood today?  
4. Discussion: Everyday Critical Theory 
Grassroots localised socialist revival is growing on certain Internet spaces. While many 
caveats exist, there is hope for social change and public mobilisation. BreadTube sig-
nifies a return to a classic, democratised socialist mass education programme. How-
ever, there is a risk of BreadTube becoming subsumed under neoliberalism and indi-
vidualism if socialism is seen and practiced as fashion rather than a political and social 
need. 
There is also the threat of techno-fetishism, that BreadTube might fuel the assump-
tion that open source software and knowledge constitutes socialist praxis or is social-
ism. Jutel (2017) points out the dangers of such techno-fetishism, that it can lead us to 
believe we are acting politically by clicking, making us feel good and righteous while 
playing into the hands of a capitalist society. The collective potential of this community 
is yet to be revealed, as it has mainly operated within the boundaries of the platform(s). 
A further question is whether there is any potential for transcending the common forms 
of political participation and change, as the democratic exercise of voting is a ques-
tionable method of pushing for real change. However, faith in the democratic process 
remains, exemplified by calls for people to vote Trump out of the office (Contrapoints 
2018).  
Use of social media for political education and mobilisation occurs not only in leftist 
movements, but also among the alt-right who rely on affective media and video pro-
duction to radicalise youths. This behaviour has had a substantial yet sombre impact 
on the real world, exemplified by the Christchurch shooting and the Charlottesville 
massacre. These and other examples show the negative potential that is inherent to 
social platforms and media content-based mobilisation. 
Another concern is whether and how BreadTube can engage those on the opposite 
side of political debates. Recent media coverage (see Fleishman 2019) has highlighted 
that BreadTube  can de-radicalise the radical right (Fleishman 2019). Commenting on 
her videos covering alt-right talking points, Contrapoints said: “Deradicalizing is part of 
my work, maybe even the most important thing I've done” (Contrapoints 2019a). 
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BreadTube does not exist in isolation. It is part of a larger movement against right wing 
and populist thought that have dominated the media landscape over the past few 
years. In 2010 Peter Marcuse wrote an article analysing the Tea Part movement. Why 
did it suddenly explode in popularity and what can we do to counteract it? Written be-
fore the rise of the alt-right, Marcuse conceptualises the Tea Party as “repression from 
below, not from above” (2010, 356). He argues that there is a need for critical theory 
in everyday life – a critical theory from below – to steer individuals’ frustrations with the 
system towards proper causes and solutions. His categorisation of resistance as indi-
vidual or collective, comprehensive or partial, serves to emphasise the need for 
BreadTube, as it allows for bottom up critical engagement to be embedded in everyday 
life. The “extreme displacement,” as Marcuse calls it, felt by many due to the havocs 
of capitalism can be channelled towards a progressive form of resistance rather than 
being co-opted by the alt-right.  
It remains to be seen in what ways the BreadTube content creators are able (or 
willing) to transform themselves into more overt political actors. It is unclear if this is 
something we should ask of them, as their role might be to act as guides, starting points 
for education and mobilisation.  
However, what remains certain is that like Lenin standing on the train and speaking 
to workers more than a hundred years ago, BreadTube is a socialist movement. Tech-
nological progress has given us tools that allow for the advancement of socialism. 
BreadTube subverts techno-capitalism and hijacks YouTube’s algorithms in order to 
spread leftist thought.  Rather than being stuck on rails, Lenin’s train now takes the 
form of smartphones and online videos, allowing emancipatory politics to integrate 
seamlessly into everyday life.  
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Abstract: This article explores the Brazilian Blogosfera Progressista (Progressive Blog-
osphere, hereafter BP), a leftist political communication initiative aiming to conciliate an insti-
tutionalized model of organization with a networked model of action. Despite the disparity of 
resources existing between them, BP proved able to counter effectively the mainstream me-
dia’s political framings, thanks to wise networking strategies, which explored the communica-
tive opportunities offered by social media. The Centro de Estudos de Mídia Alternativa Barão 
de Itararé – Barão de Itararé Alternative Media Studies Center – is an essential piece in this 
schema, as it works as a coordinating agency for BP members and trains new participants. 
Our article intends to discuss this and other characteristics of BP as a group, and the chal-
lenges it faces at the present, after the rise of Jair Bolsonaro to Brazil’s presidency. 
Keywords: Blogosfera Progressista, counter-hegemonic media, activism, Brazil, Vanguard, 
networked organization 
1. Introduction 
In June 2013, massive demonstrations – known as the Jornadas de Junho (June 
Journeys) – took place in several cities in Brazil. The immediate factor triggering pro-
tests in the city of São Paulo was the rise of the bus fares, from 3,00 to 3,20 reais. 
Other demonstrations followed and, soon, they “were not only about the 20 centa-
vos”; they also demanded better social services (as health and education), com-
plained against the realization of the FIFA World Cup in 2014, and the Rio de Janeiro 
Olympic Games, in 2016, and denounced government corruption, among numerous 
other topics. They were hailed as a vibrant example of a new model of politics, one 
allowing the crowds to demonstrate (and even impose) their will to the political elites. 
Scholars soon identified parallels between these demonstrations and others occur-
ring around the world, as the Occupy movement in the United States and Europe, the 
Indignados movement in Spain, the Arab Spring, among many others (Castells 
2012). These movements were presented as a radically new type of political mobili-
zation, capable of uniting different political agendas, a model that Bennett and 
Segerberg (2013) named “connective action”, which was made possible by the 
emergence of social media. 
In retrospect, it seems clear that the Jornadas de Junho backfired. When the demon-
strations began, the Brazilian presidency was already in the hands of PT (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores, or Workers’ Party) for ten years. During this period, consistent social 
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policies led millions of people to ascent from poverty to a middle-class status, numer-
ous public universities were created, and affirmative policies allowed for the first time 
a massive number of non-white people to have access to them. Additionally, the 
economy looked solid, and Brazil enjoyed a considerable prestige in the international 
arena. President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva ended his two-terms period (2003-2006 
and 2007-2010) with a record high popularity, and just before Jornadas de Junho, his 
successor Dilma Rousseff was very popular too (Ballestrin 2019; Singer 2019). Ironi-
cally, most leaders of the first demonstration were members of PT, aiming to push 
the party more to the left. However, as they disdained the very idea of a political van-
guard, they were incapable to coordinate actions in order to obtain practical results 
from the protests. Even worse, right-wing militants infiltrated the manifestations and, 
little by little, proved able to hijack their agenda, by changing the focus to corruption, 
and then to PT’s corruption.      
Additional manifestations occurred in 2014 – this time against the FIFA World Cup 
– and contributed to weaken PT and president Rousseff, who, despite this, managed 
to be re-elected. Protests asking Rousseff to be impeached began just after she was 
sworn in, in January 2015 – this time carried out by right wing groups and supported 
by the mainstream media, with basis on the allegation that PT was a “criminal organi-
zation”. Under a strong attack both from the Judiciary – the Lava Jato Operation, led 
by Judge Sergio Moro, turned from a general anti-corruption crusade into an anti-PT 
movement – and the mainstream press, Rousseff was impeached in 2016, in a par-
liamentary coup. In 2018, Lula was arrested after a Kafkaesque judicial process, and 
prevented in disputing the presidential elections. Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right politician, 
won the elections and invited Moro to be his Minister of Justice (Feres Junior and 
Gagliardi 2019). In a short term, neoliberal policies reverted the previous social con-
quests, political repression peaked, the universities went under attack. Interestingly, 
the bus fare in São Paulo is now 4,30 reais. 
The disdain regarding the importance of the political vanguards proved to be a 
core fragility for the Jornadas de Junho movement. Yet, despite the massive atten-
tion it received, this is not the only existing model that explores the potentialities of 
digital media for political mobilization. This article explores one of these alternatives: 
The Brazilian Blogosfera Progressista (Progressive Blogosphere, hereafter BP) a 
leftist political communication initiative aiming to conciliate an institutionalised model 
of organisation with a networked model of action. Despite the disparity of resources 
existing between them, BP proved able to counter effectively the mainstream media’s 
political framings, thanks to wise networking strategies, which explored the communi-
cative opportunities offered by social media. The Centro de Estudos de Mídia Alter-
nativa Barão de Itararé – Barão de Itararé Alternative Media Studies Center – is an 
essential piece in this schema, as it works as a coordinating agency for BP members 
and trains new participants. Contrary to that suggested by Bennett, Segerberg and 
Castells, we contend that there is still room for collective models of activism and old 
principles characteristic from socialist activism – as the vanguard model of organiza-
tion – remain valid nowadays, in a growingly digital environment.  
The article is organized as follows. It starts with the origins of BP in light of two 
historical antecedents: 1) the influential role that communist professionals exerted in 
the process of modernization of the Brazilian journalism, in the 1950-70s; 2) the tradi-
tion of independent journalism, which developed in Brazil during the military dictator-
ship era, in the 1960-70s. The third section discusses the organisational characteris-
tics of BP. It proposes a typology of its members, describes its networking structure 
and the vanguard role that Barão de Itararé Center performs on it. The fourth section 
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focuses on BP modus operandi and its impact as a counter-hegemonic media. The 
fifth and sixth sections discuss, respectively, the challenges faced by BP after the 
2016 coup, and the surprising opportunities that the chaotic Bolsonaro government 
present to the rebuilding of the Brazilian left. The final section looks for general les-
sons from the BP. It is argued that the logic of collective action remains as necessary 
as ever for social movements, and that models of organization originated from social-
ism – as the organizing role of political vanguards – are still necessary in order to 
allow them to establish and pursue coherent strategies and courses of action. 
2. Historical Context 
The origins of BP in Brazil can be traced to 2006, when political activists and journal-
ists joined efforts in search of a counter-hegemonic alternative to the conservative 
mainstream media, one of the most concentrated in the world (Moreira 2016). After 
the return of democracy, in 1985, Brazilian mainstream media claimed to exert a 
quasi-official branch of the government, whose attributions included to act as a mod-
erating power with respect to the three official branches of government, intervening in 
political issues “for the sake of democracy” (Albuquerque 2005; Guimarães and Am-
aral 1988). Concretely, this implied in systematically taking sides against the political 
left in general and PT in particular (Azevedo 2017; Feres Junior and Gagliardi 2019)), 
as well as, championing neoliberal policies as corresponding to the “national inter-
est”. 
After Lula was sworn in as Brazil’s president, in 2003, the mainstream media lost 
much of their ability to influence the government’s political agenda, but still remained 
very powerful. In the following years, they used this power as a means to destabilize 
Lula and PT, by associating them to negative values as populism, corruption, and 
authoritarianism (Albuquerque 2019), but this was not enough to avoid Lula’s reelec-
tion in 2006, and from making Dilma Rousseff his successor in 2010 – she was also 
reelected in 2014. As this happened, they engaged in a campaign aiming to defeat 
PT by any means (Damgaard 2018; Feres Junior and Sassara 2018). This finally 
worked, as President Rousseff was deposed in 2016, and Lula was put in jail in 2018 
– in both cases after very controversial political and judicial processes.  
It was against this backdrop that BP emerged as a counter-hegemonic medium. 
Still, other factors must be taken in account to understand BP’s development in Bra-
zil. A first aspect that influenced the progressive blogosphere in Brazil refers to par-
ticular characteristics of the development of Brazilian journalism and how it impacted 
on the journalists’ professional culture. Two elements may be emphasized here: 1) 
the considerable influence that communists exerted in the Brazilian journalistic cul-
ture, in the decades following the end of World War II; 2) the rise of an independent 
journalism movement in the 1960-70s. 
In the 1950-70s, there were many communists in Brazilian newspapers – even in 
conservative ones – some of them in editorial positions. The owners of these news-
papers were aware of the presence of communists, but they did not matter – O Glo-
bo’s owner, Roberto Marinho used to refer to them as “my communists” (Albuquer-
que and Roxo da Silva 2009). This happened for different reasons. First, most Brazil-
ian communists had a middle-class background, rather than a working-class one, 
and communism had a considerable appeal for a large part of Brazilian intelligentsia. 
This made them particularly attractive in a time when journalism experienced a mod-
ernisation process and needed a skilled workforce. Additionally, the Leninist views 
about the importance of the newspapers as an instrument for political organization 
contributed to make journalism more attractive for Brazilian communists (Serra 
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2007). Yet, the presence of communists in the newsrooms has come with a price: 
They were expected to not engage in subversive activities and be acquiescent to the 
newspapers’ editorial lines. In fact, the newspapers’ owners considered them as be-
ing a particularly disciplined group of journalists. In exchange, they enjoyed some 
autonomy in everyday routines in the newsroom, which allowed them to hire fellow 
communists. Paradoxically, the Communist Party’s structure worked as a factor rein-
forcing the discipline in the newsrooms. This non-orthodox pact made sense because 
Brazilian communists had a reformist, rather than revolutionary approach to politics, 
and were disposed to make alliances with sectors of the bourgeoisie (Albuquerque 
and Roxo da Silva 2009).  
This arrangement endured until the end of the 1970s. At that time, in a context of 
growing competition, newspapers looked for a more professional management sys-
tem, in which the communists were not necessary anymore (Albuquerque and Roxo 
da Silva 2009). Added to this, the Communist Party was not as influential as before, 
as the Workers’ Party (PT) emerged as a political force disputing its hegemony in the 
Brazilian left. Different from the communists, petista journalists viewed the newspa-
pers’ owners as adversaries, as they imposed an “economic censorship” that pre-
vented them to make “real journalism” (Smith 1997). The journalists’ unions became 
particularly active in voicing an anti-capitalistic view of journalism, by demanding so-
cial control of the news (Roxo 2013). 
A parallel development refers to the rise of a model of independent journalism in 
Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s (Kucinski 1991). At that time, Brazil experienced a bru-
tal military dictatorship, which systematically repressed the freedom of expression 
and brutalised journalists (Kushnir 2004; Smith 1997). However, this did not prevent 
the mainstream media outlets to unambiguously support and being generously re-
warded for this (Guimarães and Amaral 1988; Kushnir 2004). In such circumstances, 
many journalists came to believe that the only possible manner to exert their profes-
sion was outside the mainstream media, as independent journalists. Numerous inde-
pendent outlets were created, but most of them were short-lived, as they fell victim to 
political repression and economic difficulties (Kucinski 1991). However, the inde-
pendent journalism ideal remained influential in Brazilian journalism’s culture, and 
together with the anti-capitalism agenda, it served as an inspiring source to the BP. 
A second factor that influenced the progressive blogosphere in Brazil has to do 
with political changes associated with the rise of the political left to the presidency, 
not only in Brazil but also in other South American countries, such as Argentina, Bo-
livia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Despite being very 
different in their political styles – some more populists, others more institutionalised; 
some closer to socialism and others to social democracy (Cameron 2009; Castañeda 
2006; Lupien 2013) – those countries proved able to forge a regional alliance and a 
common Latin American identity. The Latin American elites reacted to it, by present-
ing leftist governments as putting democracy in jeopardy, sometimes picturing them 
as a part of a broader “Bolivariana” or “Chavista” conspiracy. Accordingly, they 
claimed for themselves the performance of the role of the political opposition that po-
litical parties were not able to exert (Farah 2010). As the political engagement of Bra-
zilian media became more and more explicit, professional journalists felt compelled 
to take side against them and, in order to do this, they joined political activists to form 
BP.  
The third and last prerequisite of BP is technological in nature: The new wave of 
independent journalism and political activism would not be possible in the absence of 
a media infrastructure allowing low-cost communication between activists, journalists 
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and their public. The rise of blogs, in the early-2000s, and social media networks 
such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram provided them with the means to present 
an alternative to the mainstream media – although, as Bailey and Marques (2012) 
observe, in many cases, originally independent journalistic blogs were absorbed by 
the mainstream media. Furthermore, the networking character of these media al-
lowed activists and journalists to forge strategies permitting them to reach a much 
larger public that would be possible if they acted in an isolated manner.  
3. Structure  
BP is a complex organisation with porous borders. It includes agents with different 
(although essentially compatible) agendas, institutional profiles, and models of ac-
tion. This section explores BP as a particular type of media ecosystem (Magalhães 
and Albuquerque 2017; Rovai 2018), describes the characteristics of the actors tak-
ing part in it, the types of relationship they have established with each other, and the 
role performed by Barão de Itararé as a vanguard agent, which provided BP with a 
considerable degree of organicity. 
3.1. Typology of BP Members 
The members of BP differ in their nature, status and social capital type (De 
Magalhães Carvalho 2018). As its origin coincides with the rise of the personal blogs 
(Aldé, Escobar and Chagas 2007; Quadros, Rosa and Vieira 2005), BP was initially a 
confederation of individuals but, since then, it has evolved and included other, more 
institutional types of agents. Individuals form the most important aspect of the BP 
ecosystem. Notable cases include Rodrigo Vianna’s O Escrevinhador and Conceição 
Oliveira’ Maria Frô. In some cases, individual blogs evolved to become small journal-
istic outlets, as Paulo Henrique Amorim’s Conversa Afiada, which is run by four jour-
nalists. There are also more consolidated journalistic groups, such as Brasil 247, 
Opera Mundi, Revista Forum, all originally online, and the online version of the mag-
azine Carta Capital, and other media related to political parties, such as the web por-
tal Vermelho that is associated with the Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Co-
munista do Brasil, hereafter PCdoB), and PT na Câmara that is associated with PT 
(De Magalhães Carvalho 2018; Magalhães and Albuquerque 2017).  
A BP membership is associated with different types of sources of authority. The 
three most relevant types are journalists, activists and politicians. Journalists have 
the more prestigious position in the BP ecosystem. Many of them had distinguished 
careers in the mainstream media before joining BP, and some were able to conciliate 
both activities (Guazina 2013). Conversa Afiada’s Paulo Henrique Amorim worked for 
a long time as the anchor of Globo Network’s newscast Jornal Nacional and Jornal 
da Globo and remained as the anchor of the Record Network until 2019, when he 
was fired. He eventually passed away a few weeks thereafter. Viomundo’s Luis Car-
los Azenha worked as a television reporter on the SBT, Manchete and Globo net-
works.  Luis Nassif, from GGN Jornal, was a member of the Editorial Council of the 
newspaper Folha de S. Paulo. Paulo Nogueira, the editor of Diário do Centro do 
Mundo held editorial and foreign correspondent positions in Veja, Exame and Época. 
Socialista Morena’s Cynara Menezes formerly worked for Folha de S. Paulo and the 
Veja magazine. The founding members of BP began their blogs as personal projects, 
parallel to their professional careers, according to the spirit of “personal blogs” of the 
mid-2000s, and posteriorly professionalised them (Guazina 2013). They sustain an 
ambiguous relationship with the mainstream media as, on the one hand, they con-
tend they don’t do real journalism, as they are compromised with economic and polit-
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ical interests but, on the other hand, their past work in these very media paradoxically 
provides them with journalistic authority (Zelizer 1992) which lends credibility to BP 
as a whole. 
Different from journalists, whose foremost interest in BP lies on exerting journal-
ism far from the imposed constrains by the mainstream media, activists perceive it as 
a means for promoting a political cause. Activists are much more diversified in their 
authorizing sources and styles than journalists. Conceição Oliveira, the head of the 
blog Maria Frô describes herself as a historian and educator who fights for racial and 
gender equality. Created as a strictly personal blog, Maria Frô subsequently acquired 
a more political tone. It later was hosted in the web portal Forum. Oliveira also co-
operates with other BP media. Another prominent member of BP is Eduardo 
Guimarães, a lawyer who had no previous political experience before founding his 
Blog da Cidadania.  
The boundaries between the identities of journalists and activists are considerably 
porous, however, as BP descends from the independent journalism movement. The 
case of Altamiro Borges – responsible for Blog do Miro, and one of the most im-
portant articulators of Barão de Itararé – is a case in point in this respect. He gradu-
ated in journalism studies in 1979, the same year he became affiliated to PCdoB. 
Since since then he has engaged in the midialivrismo (free media) movement and 
has been allied with other social movements such as the MST (Movimento dos Tra-
balhadores Rurais Sem Terra, Movement of Landless Rural Workers). The blending 
between the journalist and activist identities is particularly notable in some of the 
more institutionalised actors of B such as Revista Forum, Carta Maior and Brasil de 
Fato, as their origins are related to the World Social Forum, an anti-neoliberal global-
isation event whose first edition occurred in the city of Porto Alegre in 2001 (De 
Magalhães Carvalho 2018). 
The third category, politicians, refers to individuals who had a political career be-
fore joining BP, political parties and other political organisations. Two parties – 
PCdoB and PT – have been particularly active in BP. PCdoB was a junior partner 
during the PT-led governments, but in BP their asymmetrical relationship was some-
what inverted. PCdoB benefited from its large experience in communication in ac-
cordance with Leninist principles. When it split from PCB (Partido Comunista Brasilei-
ro/Brazilian Communist Party) in 1962, PCdoB inherited the newspaper Causa 
Operária (Worker’s Cause), which was deemed illegal during the military dictatorship 
(1964-1985). In 2002, PCdoB was a pioneer in using digital media as a resource for 
party communication, as it created the web portal Vermelho (Red). Causa Operária 
and Vermelho adopted totally different communicative logics: While Causa Operária 
targeted hardcore activists, in a time when they faced intense political repression, 
and used a very politicised language, Vermelho looked to reach a broader public 
through a more informative approach, which is expressed by the slogan “the well-
informed left” (Mourão 2009).  
3.2. BP’s Networking Structure 
More than a group of individuals, BP is also defined by the concrete relations the in-
dividuals involved in it establish with each other. Working as a pack, BP is a force to 
be respected. It works through a verticalised network structure, which is built through 
reciprocal quoting, sharing of posts, linking to other members’ pages and “official” 
policies of partnership, which are indicated in the blogs’ blogrolls. This allows the 
messages originally posted by particular members to reach a much larger audience 
tripleC 18(1): 219-235, 2020 225 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
than it would be possible otherwise. A network schema of the relations between BP 




Figure 1: BP Network in Facebook 
This logic results in a hierarchical model of organisation. The central position in the 
system is occupied by prestigious journalists and activists, in most cases belonging 
to BP’s first generation (Magalhães and Albuquerque 2017). Their prestige allows 
their posts to be shared with a wider range of people than others. The second level 
refers to other actors identifying themselves as members of BP. Many of them joined 
BP later and do not use blogs but have social media accounts on Twitter, Facebook, 
Instagram and other platorms that they use to echo BP’s content. 
The third level refers to agents that do not belong formally to the BP universe, but 
establish some tactical alliances with it, motivated by common interests or sensibili-
ties. A particularly relevant case refers to other leftist activist media organisations that 
differ from BP in their political and organisational approaches. Two particularly rele-
vant cases refer to Mídia Ninja and Intercept Brasil. Mídia Ninja – Ninja is an acro-
nym for Narrativas Independentes, Jornalismo e Ação (Independent Narratives Jour-
nalism and Action) – is a collaborative journalism project providing live coverage of 
protests through the use of cell phones, which gained momentum during the Jorna-
das de Junho in 201 when activists in their coverage provided live testimonies of po-
lice brutality (Cammaerts and Jiménez-Martinez 2014; Penteado and Souza 2016). 
Initially, BP actors were mostly suspicious both of Mídia Ninja’s unmediated journal-
istic methods and its political agenda, as they were sceptical or even critical of the 
Jornadas de Junho’s political intentions and impact. However, BP and Mídia Ninja 
established closer ties after 2016, when they allied in defence of President 
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Rousseff’s government, which faced a process of impeachment. In the same line, 
The Intercept Brasil, the Brazilian branch of The Intercept – which played a central 
role in the Wikileaks case – gained a lot of prestige among BP members in conse-
quence of the Vaza Jato initiative, which presented disturbing evidences about the 
political motivations behind Lava Jato and pointed to the operation as an effort for 
toppling President Rousseff and putting former President Lula in jail. 
3.3. The Role of Barão de Itararé as BP’s Political Vanguard 
Online networking practices have a great importance in forging BP as a coherent po-
litical media group, but offline models of organisation are also essential. Barão de 
Itararé has a crucial role in institutionalising BP. The origins of Barão de Itararé can 
be traced to the Confecom (Conferência Nacional de Comunicação or National Con-
ference of Communication), in 2009 (Rovai 2018). At that time, the Brazilian govern-
ment called representatives of diverse civil-society organisations to discuss the mod-
el of media communication existing in Brazil, and proposing modifications to it (Inter-
vozes 2010). A similar approach was adopted later with respect to the Marco Civil da 
Internet in 2014. Many proposals resulted from the meeting, as for instance: the 
acknowledgement of communication as a social right; the creation of a National 
Communications Council, which would be responsible for establishing and monitoring 
public policies on the sector; public funding policies for the media and measures in-
tending to avoid property concentration. These proposals alarmed the mainstream 
media organisations, which accused Confecom of trying to establish a potentially au-
thoritarian model of control of communications. Contrary to what was happening with 
the Marco Civil, the measures proposed by Confecom were not approved by the Bra-
zilian National Congress. Nevertheless, Confecom was the seed of BP, thanks to the 
Barão de Itararé’s efforts.  
The Barão of Itararé Center was created in May 2010 with the purpose of “creat-
ing something capable of reuniting social movement activists with journalists and 
bloggers who took part in Confecom” (Borges 2016). In August, it promoted the First 
National BlogProg Meeting in São Paulo. Other meetings followed in 2011 (Brasília), 
2012 (Salvador), 2014 (São Paulo), 2016 (Belo Horizonte). Additionally, Barão de 
Itararé promoted other events, such as an international meeting in 2011. In 2013, it 
sponsored the first edition of the National Course of Communications for Media Activ-
ists, targeting activists from community, unions and alternative media. 
According to its president Altamiro Borges, Barão de Itararé has four core objec-
tives: 1) to take part in the fight for the democratisation of the Brazilian media; 2) the 
support of alternative media in Brazil; 3) the study of the transformations happening 
in the media landscape at the present; 4) the education of new communication activ-
ists. In order to do this, Barão de Itararé conciliates a rigid hierarchical structure, 
which include a President, a General Secretary, different Directors, a Fiscal Council 
and an Advisory Council with a considerable diversity in its membership, including 
intellectuals from different leftist groups. As Penteado and Souza put it, it “presents a 
transitional model between the traditional one and those exclusively based online, as 
it sustains a verticalized structure and actors associated to it preserve their autonomy 
to act and produce content” (2016, 47-48). These characteristics constitute Barão de 
Itararé’s role of a political vanguard role in BP. Although activists associated with 
PCdoB have a particularly prominent role in Barão de Itararé, their influence on the 
BP agenda is quite limited. PCdoB is not a significant player in national politics, and 
therefore its political ambitions are modest. This allows other agents to feel comfort-
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able with Barão de Itararé’s role. Paulo Henrique Amorim, whose core source of au-
thority is associated with journalism, provides an example: 
I am sympathetic to the Instituto de Mídia Alternativa Barão de Itararé, which 
tries to gather giant egos around punctual missions. But his president Miro 
Borges often succeeds. The movement’s results are stronger than the sum of 
progressive bloggers. They have a role that I think is formidable: to dissemi-
nate the poison that, in the end, contaminates the dominant system (Amorim 
2017). 
4. Modus Operandi and Impact  
Putting it simple, BP provides the basis for a critical counter-public – that is a coun-
terhegemonic public sphere (Fuchs 2010; Negt and Kluge 1993) – aiming to chal-
lenge the views disseminated by the mainstream media. As BP is not only a vehicle, 
but a media ecosystem (Magalhães and Albuquerque 2017; Rovai 2018), the activi-
ties of its members include not only producing and divulgating media content, but 
also sharing material produced by fellow members, or other critical content. In most 
cases, the material vehiculated by BP consist of pieces critical to the mainstream 
media news coverage, as well as interviews and analytical pieces, and more rarely, 
in-depth reporting. 
A concrete example, referring to the Bolinhagate incident, illustrates the dynamics 
of BP collaboration in opposing mainstream news media framings. In the morning of 
October 20, 2010, just a few days before the presidential elections – in which PT’s 
Dilma Rousseff appeared as a clear favourite – José Serra, the main candidate op-
posing PT’s government was hit by an object on his head, during a campaign walking 
tour in Rio de Janeiro. The walking tour was then cancelled, and Serra was taken to 
a hospital. The scene was registered by a Folha de S. Paulo reporter with a cell 
phone camera, and at night, it was exhibited by Jornal Nacional, Rede Globo’s main 
newscast, in a two and half minutes news piece that described the object as being 
solid, and therefore the situation as an attempt against Serra, made by PT activists. 
In the following day, Jornal Nacional dedicated seven minutes to the incident, pre-
senting a non-official report made by the forensic expert Ricardo Molina. Other main-
stream news media, such as the newspapers Folha de S. Paulo, O Estado de São 
Paulo and Veja magazine, echoed the idea that Serra had been hit by a solid object. 
Then, Daniel Florêncio, a film maker, posted on Twitter a video entitled “Bolin-
hagate – the Jornal Nacional edition”, which denounced the mainstream media’s 
coverage as a fabrication. According to him, Serra was hit by a paper ball (bolinha de 
papel in Portuguese), and not a solid object (in fact, posterior images did not show 
any bruises on Serra’s head, and this is significant, as he is bald). The video was re-
tweeted by Cynara Menezes and other influent bloggers and then went viral. 
Viomundo published a letter, written by the Federal Forensic Experts Association, 
raising doubts about the mainstream version of the incident. Other important BP ve-
hicles shared the letter. Rodrigo Vianna published on his blog O Escrevinhador that 
some journalists from the Globo Network became so ashamed of the Jornal Nacion-
al’s seven-minutes news segment that they booed when it aired.  
Humour was another resource employed to spread the message. Serra was por-
trayed as the Matrix’s character Neo, dodging a paper ball. A picture showed a paper 
ball with the X-Files title “I want to believe” behind it. Activists even created a flash 
game, which invited players to throw paper balls at Serra, as he tried to hide behind 
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the Jornal Nacional’s bench. BP’s version reverberated in the international media and 
hashtags related to the case became trend topics on Twitter. 
The Bolinhagate case presents a vivid example of how a collective effort made by 
BP members allowed them to successfully counter mainstream media framings. BP 
members made intensive use of social networking sites to propagate their narratives. 
Comparative analysis shows that Brasil 247, one of the most prominent progressive 
bloggers, managed to gather more visibility than some traditional media organisa-
tions.  
Time-series of the total shares of publications on Facebook reveals that the Brasil 
247 fan page reached 16 million shares on 2016, the year of Dilma Rousseff’s oust-
ing by the Brazilian Parliament. In comparison, O Globo, one of the largest newspa-
pers in the country, shows an opposite trend of decay after 2014. Results shed light 
on BP’s struggle for online visibility, as Progressive bloggers were able to amass 
more shares than resourceful media organizations. 
5. The Challenges ahead of BP  
Having been created during the PT-governments era, BP has been facing unprece-
dented challenges in recent years. During the second term of Dilma Rousseff’s pres-
idency, PT politicians and its allies became subject to a continuous harassment by 
the judiciary, public prosecutors, the press, and far-right activists. Things became 
worse when vice-president Michel Temer took Rousseff’s place after her impeach-
ment. In order to avoid PT’s return to power, former president Lula – who was the 
favourite in all electoral polls to win the presidential race – was arrested. The Brazili-
an Supreme Court prohibited that Lula gave interviews to the press under the allega-
tion that this could “disturb” the electoral process. Additionally, during the entire cam-
paign the mainstream media presented Fernando Haddad, who replaced Lula as 
PT’s candidate, as being a political extremist who is just as dangerous to democracy 
as Jair Bolsonaro (Feres Junior and Gagliardi 2019).  
The Brazilian mainstream media has traditionally refused to recognise BP mem-
bers as legitimate media agents, as they claim for themselves the monopoly of the 
right of doing genuine journalism. To be sure, their monopolist demands are so ex-
tensive that, in October 2016, the Associação Nacional de Jornais (National News-
papers Association or ANJ) required that the Brazilian Supreme Court limits the activ-
ities of the Brazilian branches of foreign online journalism outlets – as, for instance, 
BBC Brasil and El País Brasil – under the allegation that they violate a Constitutional 
limit that establishes a 30-percent limit of foreign participation in Brazilian media or-
ganizations (Folha de S. Paulo 2016). Mainstream media play an even rougher role 
in the fight against their BP competitors, which they call “dirty blogs” and to whom 
they deny a journalistic status, despite the fact that in many cases bloggers previous-
ly had a solid career in the mainstream media.  
The consequences of this can be very serious, as illustrated by the case of Blog 
da Cidadania’s Eduardo Guimarães. In March 2017, he was detained by the Federal 
Police under the orders of Judge Moro, who accused his blog of being a “vehicle of 
political propaganda” and releasing confidential information that put at risk the Lava 
Jato’s investigations. According to Moro, as Guimarães was not a journalist, he had 
no right to the legal protection offered to journalists. More recently, in 2019, Glenn 
Greenwald, the Pulitzer Prize winner ahead of the Intercept Brasil was portrayed by 
part of the mainstream media as being a hacker, rather than a journalist, in an at-
tempt to demoralize the Vaza Jato series, presenting it in a criminal framing. 
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A second challenge is the emergence of a highly popular alt-right media ecosystem. 
In the events leading to the parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff, strong ma-
chines of far-right propaganda disputed the narratives and discourse both from the 
traditional journalism vehicles and from progressive bloggers. The far-right ecosys-
tem is a loosely connected network of diverse actors, ranging from journalists fired 
from the national press, authoritarian politicians, neo-Pentecostal preachers, digital 
savvy youngsters, and a myriad of parody/fake accounts (Santos Junior 2019). The 
far-right groups’ model of operation differs from BP particularly considering the anti-
systemic hostility against parties, as well as the political, journalistic and intellectual 
establishment (Sponholz and Christofoletti 2019). The communication practices re-
semble astroturfing and informational warfare techniques such as the public harass-
ment of opposition leaders, physical threats; all sorts of innuendo and smear cam-
paigns (Santos Junior 2019). 
Finally, a more recent development refers to the moral panic that has been gen-
erated, in a worldwide scale, around fake news (Carlson 2018), which gained ground 
in 2016, after the referendum that decided for the United Kingdom’s exit from the Eu-
ropean Union (Brexit) and the election of Donald Trump as the President of the Unit-
ed States. In both cases, “Russian meddling” was blamed as one of the key factors 
explaining these electoral results (Boyd-Barrett 2019). The fake news problem 
gained a lot of attention in March 2018, when it was revealed that Cambridge Analyt-
ica, a political strategy company that worked for Trump, irregularly obtained data from 
more than 50 million Facebook users, and Facebook did nothing to prevent this sur-
veillance.  
This scandal contributed to aggravate already existing accusations against social 
media platforms as being co-responsible for the fake news wave. Reacting to these 
critiques, social media platforms engaged in a series of practices that, arguably, 
aimed to contain fake news diffusion. In Brazil, Facebook Journalism Project and 
Google News Initiative provided financial backing for Projeto Comprova (Comprova 
Project), an initiative joining three fact-checking agencies (Lupa, Truco and Aos Fa-
tos) and news media outlets – some of them belonging to the mainstream media, as 
Veja, Folha de S. Paulo and O Estado de São Paulo (Strano 2018). Added to this, 
Facebook endowed Lupa and Aos Fatos with the responsibility of checking the distri-
bution of fake news in its platform (Facebook 2018). Perpetrators would be eventual-
ly punished with a temporary or even permanent ban. Although fake news has been 
often associated with the far-right alt-media, the new censorship dynamics estab-
lished by Facebook and the fact-checking agencies allowed them also to target BP 
members. For instance, on June 12, 2018, Revista Forum published the information 
that Pope Francis sent a chaplet and a letter to Lula, in order to express his solidarity 
to him. Although there were controversies with respect to details of the incident, Lupa 
promptly classified this news as fake news and as a consequence Revista Forum 
was subject to retaliatory measures, which included a temporary Facebook ban. 
6. Bolsonaro’s Government and the Unexpected Opportunities for BP 
At a first sight, the rise of Jair Bolsonaro – an unabashed defender of the previous 
Brazilian military regime, who once said he intended to shoot leftist activists – to the 
Brazilian presidency seems to put BP in great peril. Surprisingly, this appears to not 
be the case. Bolsonaro’s far-right activists do not identify BP as their prime adver-
sary. Instead, they have focused their attention on the mainstream media, which they 
accuse to be “leftist” and “petista”. Although some leftists have been targeted by Bol-
sonaro activists’ harassment – The Intercept Brasil, in particular – this happened in a 
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much less systematic manner than it would be expected. Indeed, it is possible to ar-
gue that Bolsonaro’s disastrous and divisive style of government provides BP with 
promising political opportunities.  
In order to understand that, it is necessary to highlight the very special circum-
stances allowing the 2016 coup against President Rousseff to happen. This was only 
possible because different fractions of the Brazilian political right joined forces with 
the mainstream media, leading sectors of the judiciary and the Prosecutor’s Office, 
the Federal Police and military leaders to topple PT by any means (Albuquerque 
2019; Tatagiba 2018). By blaming PT as the source of all corruption existing in Brazil, 
they succeeded in presenting the Brazilian left in a criminal framing and contended 
that the solution for the Brazil’s political problems was to be achieved by judicial 
means. Judge Sergio Moro emerged, in their discourse, as the leader of a moral cru-
sade, and the main antagonist of Lula, who was pictured as the mastermind of the 
enormous corruption schema that, allegedly, was led by PT (Damgaard 2018; Feres 
Junior and Gagliardi 2019). The far-right activists associated with Bolsonaro had a 
subsidiary role in this arrangement, as they were responsible for assembling people 
for the anti-PT manifestations and physically intimidating the leftists (Santos Junior 
2019; Tatagiba 2018), who the press, conveniently, ignored.  
Contrary to Rousseff, vice-president Temer, who took her place, had several ac-
cusations of corruption pending against him. In his government, several social poli-
cies established by the PT-led governments were reverted, the economy stalled, and 
the confidence in the institutions of representative government collapsed (Goldstein 
2019). In 2018, Lula emerged as the clear favorite to win the elections, but he was 
put in jail on the orders of Judge Sergio Moro. Contrary to the mainstream elites’ ex-
pectancies, however, this did not benefit the institutional right. Rather, the crisis of 
legitimacy of the representative institutions, which resulted from the Lava Jato Opera-
tion, opened the way for the antisystem candidate Jair Bolsonaro. He disputed the 
second round of the election with Fernando Haddad, a candidate with a political 
moderate profile, who was the former mayor of the city of São Paulo and succeeded 
Lula as the PT candidate. Although the mainstream media were not sympathetic to 
Bolsonaro, they actually preferred him to Haddad, who was presented as being as 
dangerous to democracy as Bolsonaro – but worse than him, because he supposedly 
was a radical leftist (O Estado de São Paulo 2018).  
The rise of Bolsonaro to the presidency proved to be disastrous for the unity of 
the Brazilian right. Even though the mainstream media and rightist forces support 
Bolsonaro’s neoliberal reforms, his outrageous style of government, poor economic 
indexes and pathetic performance in international forums (as in his inaugural dis-
course in the UN General Assembly), blatant nepotism (illustrated by his attempt to 
nominate his son Eduardo Bolsonaro as Brazilian Ambassador to the United States), 
and, last but not least, reports about his family connections with criminal organisa-
tions (UO 2019) have raised a severe criticism among the mainstream press – alt-
hough nothing comparable to the treatment they gave to Lula or PT. In his turn, in 
many occasions Bolsonaro complained about the mainstream media coverage of his 
government – for instance, he threatened to stop giving interviews unless they “tell 
the truth” about his discourse at the UN – and even suggested he could take 
measures to economically constrain some media. Bolsonaro also has maintained 
conflictual relations with the Brazilian Congress, Supreme Court, and even his own 
political party. The popularity of the president plummeted. He has been rated as the 
worst first term president so far, and even some of his far-right supporters now abro-
gate him.  
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The institutional crisis is not limited to Bolsonaro’s government, however. When, Ser-
gio Moro accepted his invitation to be the Minister of Justice, the credibility of the La-
va Jato Operation suffered a major blow, as his impartiality became highly question-
able. Although part of the mainstream media initially presented him as the “rational”, 
“institutional” face of the government, his prestige was damaged by Bolsonaro’s nu-
merous scandals and public acts to demote him. Even worse, the Vaza Jato series – 
a major investigative report led by the renowned journalist Glenn Greenwald on 
leaked Telegram chats among task force members – indicated that the process that 
led to Lula’s imprisonment was a judicial farce, as the Judge and the prosecutors ar-
ticulated their actions not only with each other, but also with the mainstream media, 
in an effort to de-moralise Lula and PT. Indeed, Folha de S. Paulo’s newspaper pre-
sent self-criticism regarding its coverage of Lava Jato (Lima 2019). At the present, 
the Brazilian judiciary is deeply divided at all levels. In sum, Brazil currently experi-
ences an extraordinarily serious institutional crisis in all branches of government.  
As serious as the Brazilian current situation may be, from the perspective of the 
Left and BP in particular, it represents a political opportunity. Once formidable, the 
forces that overthrew Dilma Rousseff from the presidency and put Lula in jail are now 
divided and have spent a lot of energy fighting each other. At the same time, mount-
ing public evidences indicate that Lula’s image as the mastermind of corruption in 
Brazil was a fabrication with political purposes. This, together with the dignity shown 
by Lula in jail – he refused to make any deal with the Justice Department – and the 
huge contrast between the achievements of his government and the disasters that 
followed the 2016 coup provide a fertile ground for the re-organisation of the left in 
Brazil. At a time when the adversaries are divided, the ability of BP to work as a polit-
ical communication vanguard makes it a very relevant instrument to unify the dis-
course of the left around a common rhetoric and cause. 
7. BP in Perspective: The Role of Vanguard in Networked Media Activism  
In the 2010s, a new orthodoxy emerged regarding mediated social activism, having 
in the works of Castells (2012) and Bennett and Segerberg (2013) their main expo-
nents. Based on protests occurring in different parts of the world – Tunisia, Iceland, 
Spain, United States, Iran, among many other examples – they suggested that the 
Internet offered brand new opportunities for political mobilisation, as it allowed people 
to connect to each other beyond the limits of physical space. According to Castells, 
the digital media allow individuals to recognise common problems and, then, by join-
ing forces and occupying public spaces, to challenge the established powers. As 
these movements originate in the emotions of individuals, shared through networked 
cognitive empathy, they “are the less hierarchical in their organization and the more 
participatory in the movement” (Castells 2012, 15).  
In a similar vein, Bennett and Segerberg identify these movements as organised 
on the basis of a digitally networked connective action model, which differs from the 
traditional collective action model, as it is neither structured in reference to an organ-
ising centre nor does it have a hierarchical structure. Rather, such movements are 
based on the phenomenon of personalised politic that features “citizens seeking 
more flexible association with causes, ideas, and political organizations” (Bennett 
and Segerberg 2013, 5). In both cases, the idea that vanguards are an indispensable 
part of political movements seem to be an anathema. 
Yet, as impressive as these movements seemed to be at a first glance, their ca-
pacity to produce concrete results in the mid-term proved to be questionable at best, 
as they were not able to secure sustainable changes and, worse, in many countries 
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governments actually turned to the right or even, as in Brazil, to the far-right. As 
Gerbaudo (2013a; 2013b) observed, in reference to Egypt, the organisational fragility 
of the prodemocracy movement, closely associated to the informal character of mobi-
lisation and the model of leaderless resistance, not only prevented them to reach 
their goals but, indeed, resulted in a military coup that launched the country again 
into a full dictatorial state. This suggests that, contrary to the hopes of Castells and 
Bennett/Seberberg, vanguards may still be necessary to convert revolutionary situa-
tions into revolutionary outcomes (Tilly 1978). 
Contrary to the dominant view, this article argues, with basis on the example of 
BP, that there is still room for the collective action in networked movements, and old 
models of organisation, associated to the socialist movements – as the role of the 
political vanguards – remain relevant in the digital era. As tempting as the ideals of 
“personalisation” and “participation” may be, they don’t provide a solid basis for co-
herent collective movements (Fenton and Barassi 2011; Fuchs 2010). However, the 
concrete manners to instrumentalise political vanguards are not obvious, as the pre-
sent social and technological circumstances differ sharply from those existing when 
the notion of political vanguard was coined (Pimlott 2015). For this reason, it can be 
instructive to analyse concrete initiatives based on the political vanguard principle as, 
for instance, BP. More than simply an alternative, BP is a critical media initiative 
(Fuchs 2010), which combines a networked model of action (through hyperlinks and 
content sharing) with centralised principles of organisation (Barão de Itararé Center 
is a central piece in this arrangement). BP also preserves some personalised traits – 
not a surprise given its origins lie in personal blogs – which help to provide it with a 
considerable capillarity, but, at the same time, it is a considerably institutionalised 
environment, in which traditional institutions as political parties, social movements 
and journalism exert a core organising role. Until today, this model of organisation 
allows BP to work as an effective critical media environment. However, BP’s depend-
ence on social media may be a factor of risk to its survival, as they, allied to the 
mainstream media and fact-checking agencies, have employed the rhetoric of com-
bating fake news as a tool for curbing political dissidence. 
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Abstract: This paper presents and articulates for the first time the concept of mediation as 
theorised by three key scholars of the Ibero-American space, namely Manuel Martín-
Serrano, Luis Martín-Santos, and Jesús Martín-Barbero. This article shows that their under-
standings of mediation are valuable for the study of digital communication, particularly for 
identifying criteria that facilitate the sublation of communicative capitalism into communica-
tive socialism. The three scholars have placed the concept of mediation at the centre of their 
intellectual production with the aim of breaking with mechanical Marxism, but provide differ-
ing conceptualisations and have scarcely engaged in a dialogue of knowledges. This article 
will articulate the complementarity of Martín-Serrano’s Marxist socio-historical analysis of 
communication, Martín-Barbero’s Latin American cultural studies, and Martín-Santos’s phe-
nomenological theorisation of mediation as the key concept of Marxist epistemology. 
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1. Introduction 
The end of Franco’s dictatorship and the transition to representative democracy wit-
nessed an explosion of cultural activity and working-class struggle in Spain. In the 
intellectual sphere, the late 1970s and 1980s were a fecund time for Spanish critical 
scholarship. Some factors contributing to this intellectual production were the experi-
ences of social struggle, the need to develop new ideas for the new socio-political 
system, the new contact with international scholarship, and the ideological opening of 
society. Of course, Spain and Latin America have strong historical, cultural and lin-
guistic ties, but the reception of numerous Spanish exiles had contributed to further 
intellectual exchange and interculturality. This paper intends to contribute to this ex-
change by putting in dialogue the work of three scholars from the Ibero-American 
space who have played a key part in the international flows of knowledge. 
The three authors discussed in this article have shaped scholarship in the Ibero-
American space, although to differing degrees. Martín-Barbero’s concept of media-
tion has become the dominant paradigm in Latin America and is also influential in 
Spain. Martín-Serrano’s theory of mediation counts with a small school of thought 
with scholars from Spain, Mexico, Cuba and other Latin American countries. Martín-
Santos’s work is not so influential, but is highly appreciated by Marxist thinkers in 
Spain. The three authors began their work in the late 1970s and 1980s, and Martín-
Serrano and Martín-Barbero have continued to investigate mediations until today. 
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Their understanding of mediation and application to digital communication can pro-
vide valuable tools to analyse and extend digital socialism. 
The paper begins with a brief profile of the authors and then discusses their work. 
The article synthesises the understanding of mediation of each of the authors and 
explains the key role this activity can play in the reproduction of (digital) capitalism as 
well as in the development of (digital) socialism. The three perspectives are com-
pared and the possibilities of complementarity are identified. Because the authors 
address mediation from different angles, an articulation of the three approaches can 
reinforce one another and provide a comprehensive conceptualisation of mediation 
and digital socialism. Moreover, the article contextualises how the three understand-
ings of mediation relate to Marx and Engels’s works. 
The work of Martín-Serrano will serve as a starting point of the articulation of per-
spectives because it provides a broad model for the analysis of the relations –
including contradictions– between the communication and social systems, and an 
understanding of mediation focused on media products. Martín-Barbero’s work can-
not be considered to follow a Marxist approach (even though it draws on Walter Ben-
jamin), but brings to the forefront the necessary transformative agency put into prac-
tice in processes of cultural re-signification and appropriation of representations and 
technologies in the social system which multiply and diversify meaning. Finally, Mar-
tín-Santos provides a method to create mediations between theory and praxis by 
transforming knowledge into emancipatory communication and social action. In this 
view, mediation has a bifurcating/transformative capacity when it results from di-
airesis and eidos, especially when the exchange-value of commodities is sublated by 
the use-value.  
The possibilities of complementarity can be readily observed, since Martín-
Serrano focuses on media mediations, while Martín-Barbero stresses the cultural 
mediations of receivers who also become producers, and Martín-Santos provides a 
theory of mediation for revolutionary praxis. The articulation of the three perspectives 
will allow approaching digital communication by focusing on key contradictions be-
tween the capitalist system and digital praxis based on the development of trans-
formative narratives and the cultural and material appropriation of communicative 
and non-communicative means of production. 
2. Profile of the Authors 
The first author who will be discussed, Manuel Martín-Serrano (Spain, 1940-), has 
dedicated his academic career to the development of an encompassing theory of 
communication able to explain the role of communication both in the evolution of na-
ture and in the conformation and transformation of societies. To this end, Martín-
Serrano has drawn on evolutionary theory, sociology, semiotics, anthropology, sys-
tems theory, epistemology, and media and communication studies.   
The first sources of academic influence in Martín-Serrano’s work were Marx, the 
Frankfurt School, Abraham Moles (cybernetics) and May 1968. Drawing on these 
influences, Martín-Serrano has focused on the need to develop a communication 
theory based on the concept of mediation which can help to identify the criteria that 
explain the reproduction and change of societies and of communication systems. He 
has always underscored the importance of theorising communication and founded 
the first Communication Theory department in Spain at Complutense University of 
Madrid.  
On the other side of the Atlantic, Jesús Martín-Barbero’s (Spain, 1937-) concep-
tualisation of mediation has become the dominant paradigm in cultural and commu-
238                   Joan Pedro-Carañana  
 
   CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
nication studies in Latin America. He was born in Spain in 1937, just one year after 
the Spanish Civil War started, and has lived in Colombia since 1963, where he 
founded the School of Social Communication of the Universidad del Valle (1975). His 
work is inspired by Walter Benjamin, Raymond Williams, semiotics, Bourdieu’s soci-
ology of culture, Michel de Certeau’s productive consumption, Cultural Studies, Latin 
American scholarship, and Spanish anarchism.  
Martín-Barbero is known for advocating for a change in scholarly attention from 
the media to mediations. This involves the de-mystification of the power of the media 
in the context of processes of multiple mediations. Martín-Barbero emphasises the 
power of the cultural mediations of popular subjects to re-signify discourses and cre-
ate meaning.    
The third author to be discussed, Luis Martín-Santos (Spain, 1921-1988), was a 
high-school teacher of philosophy and later on a professor of sociology of knowledge 
at Complutense University of Madrid. He should not be mistaken for his namesake 
novelist and psychiatrist who wrote Tiempo de Silencio in 1962. Martín-Santos was a 
Marxist militant who stirred discussions on democracy and authors like Marcuse with 
his high-school students during Franco’s dictatorship. He was also candidate for the 
Spanish Communist Party in the first elections in Burgos.  
Martín-Santos abhorred the functionalist theory of communication for its apocry-
phal consensus fetishism. He was also a cultural dynamiser and organised confer-
ences with Henri Lefebvre, Kart Popper, and other international intellectuals. His re-
search and teaching stays in Germany, France, and the USA put him in touch with 
international thought. His work on mediation aims to reach a combination of Marxism 
and phenomenology which could explain the complex processes involved in social 
revolution.  
3. Manuel Martín-Serrano: Mediations and Contradictions 
In one article in which Martín-Barbero (2007) discusses Martín-Serrano’s work, the 
Colombian author explains the historical importance of Martín-Serrano’s paradigm of 
mediation. In the early 1980s, researchers from Leicester (Graham Murdock and Pe-
ter Golding) where denying the pertinence of a communication theory on the grounds 
that communication is explained by the social formation. According to Martín-
Barbero, this denial actually leads to the adoption of a simplistic and deterministic 
understanding of the relations between communication and society in which commu-
nication is reduced to being instrumental to the social system (social control para-
digm). On the other hand, Martín-Barbero notes that Martín-Serrano advocated for a 
communication theory which acknowledges that communication is socially produced 
and contributes to social reproduction, but that it also has varying degrees of auton-
omy and, thus, that there is possibility of change (the paradigm of dialectics). 
Martín-Serrano first published on mediation in his French PhD thesis (1974). Due 
to difficulties with censorship, the book La Mediación Social (1977) was published in 
Spanish three years later. The book defines mediation as a system of rules and op-
erations applied to any set of elements belonging to heterogeneous parts of reality to 
introduce an order or a design. From this point of view (see also Martín-Serrano 
2004), the representations contained in media products provide a worldview, among 
many other possible worldviews, which influences cognitive systems and social ac-
tion. In turn, the social formation influences the media system, usually to foster the 
reproduction of the same formation. However, media products also include models of 
order which negate the social order and can contribute to social change.  
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Martín-Serrano (2019ab) argues that the ongoing technological revolution includes 
both humanising and dehumanising mediations. The humanisms propose mediations 
which attempt to realise the utopia of a universal access to information (the Enlight-
enment) and the utopia of collectively shared knowledge (communism). On the other 
hand, Martín-Serrano argues that dehumanising communication fosters the techno-
cratic counter-utopia of monopoly capitalism based on positivism, social Darwinism, 
neoliberalism, and post-humanism. 
3.1. Historical Perspectives on the Relations between Communication and Society 
Martín-Serrano (2004) identifies three key approaches of how the relations between 
communication and society have been conceptualised: 
 
x Idealism, the philosophical approach of the Enlightenment, holds that cultur-
al/communicative changes produce change in the social totality. Transforming 
what is said about something, changes that something. By modifying the 
worldview of actors through the spreading of the Lights, society will become freer, 
peaceful, and equal.   
x Mechanical materialism, which is the foundation of vulgar Marxism, holds the op-
posite view. As it is not consciousness that determines reality, but reality that de-
termines consciousness, it is through the change of actions, and not conceptions, 
that reality is transformed. 
x Dialectical Marxism holds that there are mutual, dynamic influences between rep-
resentation and action, communication and society, structure and superstructure. 
Social change requires transformations in both the sphere of ideas and the mate-
rial sphere. 
3.2. Dialectical Relations between Communication and Social Systems 
Martín-Serrano (2004) adopts a dialectical perspective. He argues that Marx’s first 
works (The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, The Holy Family, The German 
Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy) already question the validity of the pro-
gramme of the Enlightenment (voluntarist idealism): in conditions of inequality, it is 
not possible to change society by acting only upon consciousness. The message 
was misunderstood by Blanqui and his followers who relegated communication and 
advocated for revolutionary action to transform society and, thus, consciousness 
(voluntarist materialism). According to Martín-Serrano, in the polemics with Blanquist 
communists since 1848, Marx insisted that historically false consciousness is rooted 
in affective needs which cannot be extirpated simply by eliminating the ideological 
apparatuses or by revolutionary action. Instead, consciousness and social organisa-
tion are interdependent and mutually affect each other. According to Martín-Serrano, 
Marx proposed a socio-historical (material and cultural; systemic) change based on 
solidarity and the shared use of knowledge, which allows the interrelation of theory 
and practice. 
Martín-Serrano (2004; 2007) combines dialectics with systems analysis to con-
ceive the communication system and the social system as two differentiated systems 
which are open to one another, meaning that there are mutual influences. Each sys-
tem has a partial autonomy because it has its own components, organisation and 
functions allowing internal changes. But each system also affects and is affected by 
the other system. 
From this point of view, communication is socially produced. According to the law 
of historical necessity, communication systems are organised in each historical peri-
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od to contribute to the reproduction of the social system, i.e., they tend to adjust to 
the requirements of the social system for its continuity and expansion, which include 
reforms in the system. 
However, the interrelations that take place historically may also generate disad-
justments. This occurs when transformations in the systems make dominant media 
representations not respond to the determinations of the social system to bring about 
its reproduction (technological innovation, economic demands, political control, etc.). 
Disadjustments sometimes refer to a contradiction, when communicative media-
tion exerts intense and prolonged pressure in an opposite and incompatible direction 
regarding the constrictions arising from society. Contradictions can be resolved in 
two distinct ways:  
1. Most contradictions are solved with functional changes in one of the two sys-
tems, or both. Readjustments in the systems occur, but there is no change of system. 
It can take place when the communication system incorporates innovations that allow 
meeting the intellectual and/or economic needs of the social system. It may also 
happen that oppositional mediations contribute to society incorporating some chang-
es, as with the civilising effect of 1968 in capitalism.  
2. Less frequently, a dialectical transformation takes place, when a given system is 
overcome or sublated by a different system, i.e., when changing from one system to 
another system. Martín-Serrano identifies the following dialectical transformations of 
communication systems in relation to socio-historical changes: a) assembly b) by 
emissaries, c) by distribution networks of message, d) by mass production and distri-
bution techniques of communication products e) by virtual networks. It should be not-
ed that when a dialectical change takes place, the new system incorporates elements 
from the previous system, even though it is qualitatively a different system (see 
Fuchs 2015 for further discussion). 
For Martín-Serrano, consensus/conflict (Conflict Studies) is not a dialectical op-
position in regards to capitalism, but reproduction/revolution (Marxism) is.  
3.3. Contradictions of the Digital Era 
According to Martín-Serrano (2019ab), referential, multidirectional digital media have 
been replacing the mass media as the dominant model of the media. This dialectical 
transformation can lead either to a contradiction with regards to the social system or 
to the adjustment of the communication system to the functional change from indus-
trial capitalism to global monopoly capitalism. So far, functional changes in the com-
munication system led by corporations and states have favoured a reproductive digi-
talisation of face-to-face activities. 
However, Martín-Serrano sees possibilities in the use of digital technologies for 
the transformation of the world. The utopia of universal access to information can be 
realised through the referential appropriation of the world which fosters the Enlight-
enment of all people. And the utopia of knowledge sharing can be realised through 
multidirectional virtualisation which socialises and diversifies communication. Use-
value can prevail over exchange-value.  
3.4. The Dialectics of Referential Appropriation 
Since many more people are involved in communicative production than in the mass 
media model, the data of reference (the topics and perspectives) is expanded. Many 
more people can provide many more representations of many more objects of refer-
ence. Martín-Serrano identifies a series of elements of the communication system 
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that stand in contradiction with the requirements of capitalism to reproduce on par 
with the mediations that contribute to its reproduction: 
 
x Universal access to information / Obscurantism.  
x More participants can mean more plurality / Redundancy and stereotype are dom-
inant.  
x There is no need for a narrator / Algorithmic gatekeeping. 
x There is the blurring of the technical division between producers and consumers of 
information / A technocratic class of cognitive managers. 
x Reflecting events / Inventing events. 
 
For Martín-Serrano, the utopia of universal access to diverse information intends to 
elevate the culture of societies in order to assure their democratic, free and peaceful 
functioning. It aims to contribute to human autonomy, the ability to think for oneself 
based on sufficient information, together with the development of the power of altruis-
tic values, of solidarity and can be fostered with public policies and democratic con-
trol of the Internet. The global dissemination of information and knowledge can also 
help people to imagine how a social utopia can look like so that this image serves as 
a compass.  
Martín-Serrano conceives mediation as a kind of Enlightenment, understood as 
the spreading of information, knowledge and education (the “Lights”) that might even-
tually lead to a further utopia based on the collective production and sharing of 
knowledge. The latter can also be pursued through virtualisation. 
3.5. The Dialectics of Virtualisation 
Virtualisation has introduced multi-directionality, facilitating the complete communica-
tion process to take place among a multiplicity of actors. In the context of virutalisa-
tion, Martín-Serrano identifies the following dialectics: 
 
x Multi-directionality can promote socialist relations of solidarity / It is a necessary 
resource for the expansion of capitalism in its purpose of materially appropriating 
the world. 
x Multi-directionality can entail diversity / The transmission of information among 
many actors tends to lead to banalisation (prejudices and stereotypes) and cultural 
industries introduce homogeneity. 
x More participants and frequency / Most of those interactions only take place in the 
virtual space. 
x Communicative interactions are no longer constrained by spatial and temporal 
separations / Nationalism, chauvinism.  
x Intellectual co-production / privatisation of intellectual production. 
 
According to Martín-Serrano, the communist utopia holds that the collective owner-
ship of communicative means of production can foster the production and exchange 
of knowledge based on use-value. Collectively controlled communication can also 
introduce diversity and mediated communication can be used to engage in physical 
action. He contends that there is the possibility now of globalising humanising media-
tions through collective creativity and shared knowledge and memory. 
This utopia seeks to share knowledge of what unites, so that eventually it is possi-
ble to share the world.  
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Martín-Serrano notes the successes of humanising mediations:  
 
• The Internet was born with the purpose of making free knowledge available to eve-
ryone. 
• The expansion of information open to all is unstoppable. 
• The production and use of free software is increasing. 
• There are growing numbers of non-profit online platforms. 
• Social networks are already a real alternative for the organisation of civil society 
and its political mobilisations. 
 
Martín-Serrano notes that both referential and virtual communication require greater 
user autonomy. As a consequence, the effectiveness of dominant mediation to main-
tain social control may decrease. As receivers they will exercise criticism. As produc-
ers, they will diversify social representations, calling into question consensus. 
As developed below, digital mediations can play a key role in the reproduction of 
the capitalist system, but also in change to a communist system. The social uses of 
digital communication will decide if humanising mediations become dominant. 
3.6. Humanising Mediations 
Martín-Serrano argues that humanism proposes to develop our natural capacities 
through the use of technologies aimed at globalising Enlightenment and collective 
solidarity (the foundation of communism). Humanising communication brings aware-
ness of the dignity of human beings and promotes solidarity with all human beings 
and groups. Communication also humanises when it serves creativity, when it is in-
novative and imaginative. 
He considers that humanist communication (and a humanist society) is possible 
due to the genetic inclinations of human nature towards solidarity. Human communi-
cation evolved as another way of securing life based on altruistic values. Altruism 
opposes the humanising power of human nature to the impotence produced by de-
humanising powers. 
This leads to the conclusion that humanising mediations foster intellectual, crea-
tive and moral skills that are limited by the state of societies. Technologies are used 
to eliminate these limitations by transforming societies; humanising mediatons refer 
to socio-genetic changes. 
3.7. Dehumanising Mediations 
Martín-Serrano states that dehumanising communication links individual and collec-
tive security to ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and the imposition of force. Communica-
tion dehumanises when it limits imagination, and reproduces conformism and resig-
nation in the face of obscurantism, which is a vision of human relations that renounc-
es altruistic feelings and values. 
Martín-Serrano argues that a key role of today’s mediating institutions is to ensure 
that conflicts that could confront subjects with institutions and structures are trans-
ferred to interpersonal relationships. To cope with the continuing crises of socioeco-
nomic origin, each individual is expected to “change” himself/herself as many times 
as necessary and as much as necessary. These mediations encourage people to 
adapt to living in a state of permanent crisis, without questioning the global system. 
These mediations are applying the technocratic counter-utopia. 
According to Martín-Serrano, posthumanism promotes, willingly or not, the tech-
nocratic counter-utopia by proposing to equip humans with artificial abilities. Posthu-
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manism claims that technological and genetic interventions will eventually replace the 
current “homo faber” with a post-human being adapted to social control; these media-
tions refer to anthropogenic changes.  
Martín-Serrano identifies communicative mediations that stand in contradiction to 
the social system and other mediations that are oriented on contributing to the repro-
duction of capitalism. The next section shows the complementarity of this approach 
with that of Jesús Martín-Barbero, whose work focuses on humanising practices of 
cultural mediation that introduce re-signification and diversity. 
4. Jesús Martín-Barbero: Cultural Mediations 
While Martín-Serrano focuses on what the communication system does to the people 
in the social system, Martín-Barbero and the Latin American school of communica-
tion give priority to what people in the social-cultural system do with the communica-
tion system.  
Martín-Barbero’s (1987; 1993) concept of mediation is widely understood as the 
cultural appropriation and re-signification of communication. This is done through 
agency (interpretation and production of meaning) by the receivers, who also be-
come co-creators in the communication process. New meanings emerge from collec-
tive knowledge and interrelate with new practices. The key actors in this process are 
popular subjects and culture, which facilitate diversity, resistance and social change. 
According to Martín-Barbero the mediations of popular culture are the most important 
influence in defining the social meanings of communication processes and, thus, are 
the main counterhegemonic force. With digital convergence the possibilities have 
expanded for introducing diversity, interculturality, translation and sustainability.  
4.1. From Media to Mediations  
Martín-Barbero’s academic efforts have focused on moving from media-centrism to 
the mediations that shape the communication process. In the author’s own words, 
the analysis of mediations focuses on 
processes, practices and means of communication, and in that order of im-
portance, that is, starting from the social processes in which communication is 
embodied, followed by the practices in which different cultures insert commu-
nication, and thirdly the media that, from the Egyptian palimpsest and the 
Greek choir were transformed into book – newspaper – cinema – radio – TV – 
Netflix (Martín-Barbero 2015, 14 [translated from Spanish to English]).  
Changing the focus from the object to the process allowed research to be opened to 
the everyday practices of popular agents who play and an active role in the produc-
tion of meaning. Martín-Barbero (2014) opposes what Raymond Williams criticised 
as the nefarious combination of technological determinism and cultural pessimism in 
critical scholarship. 
For Martín-Barbero the most important mediations take place in cultural process-
es, and particularly popular culture, albeit this is not the only locus. He views popular 
culture as the main provider of mediations between society and mass culture:  
Instead of starting the investigation with the analysis of the logics of production 
and reception, to then look for their relations of overlapping or confrontation, 
we propose to start from the mediations, that is, from the places from which 
the constraints that delimit and shape the social materiality and cultural ex-
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pressiveness of television (Martín-Barbero 1987, 23 [translated from Spanish 
to English]). 
Even though Martín-Barbero focuses mainly on cultural mediations, he has also iden-
tified other forms of mediation which give sense to communication. As noted by 
Gámez-Torres (2007), in the first edition of From the Media to Mediations, Martín-
Barbero (1987) identifies key cultural mediations such as the habitus, families’ daily 
life, social temporality, and cultural competencies. In the prologue to the 1998 edition, 
the author proposes new mediations to explain the new complexities in the constitu-
tive relations between communication, culture, and politics. Martín-Barbero (1998, 
xvi) relates cultural matrices (CM) and industrial formats (IF) on the one hand and on 
the other hand the productive logics (PL) and the reception or consumption compe-
tencies (RC). The relations between CM and PL are mediated by different institution-
al regimes, while the relations between CM and RC are mediated by various forms of 
sociality. Technicities mediate between PL and IF, and rituals mediate between IF 
and RC. 
Martín-Barbero defines technicity as the narrative aspect of the media that works 
as an organiser of perceptions and institutionality as  the influence of economic, polit-
ical and cultural interests on the media. Sociality is comprised by the everyday rela-
tions that involve non-mediatised socio-cultural mediations while rituality encom-
passes the different interpretations, readings, and uses of media.  
4.2. The Mediation of Popular Culture: Counterhegemonic Agency  
Martín-Barbero (1987; 1993) argues that there are great difficulties in applying Marx-
ist theory, and especially Adorno’s work, to Latin American reality. Martín-Barbero 
criticises Horkheimer’s and especially Adorno’s work for cultural pessimism and elit-
ism and argues that sensitivity towards mass and popular culture and cultural diversi-
ty are key to understanding Latin American reality. A variety of historical conflicts and 
hybridisations among people and between mass and popular culture have created a 
heterogeneous cultural landscape.  
Martín-Barbero also criticises Marxism for negating the value of the category of 
“the people”. The Enlightenment placed the people at the centre of politics and Ro-
manticism of culture. Marxism negated both through the sublation of “the popular” 
into the proletariat. On the other hand, anarchism combined politics and culture to 
affirm the validity of the popular and showed the rich possibilities of viewing the peo-
ple as a historical agent of resistance and change. For anarchism, the people was an 
apt concept in relation to its opposition to all forms of oppression, while Marxism re-
duced the struggle to the relations of production. In the context of Latin America, 
Martín-Barbero argues, mestizo and hybrid cultures provide the key counterhege-
monic mediations. In this view, identities play a key role in cultural mediation. 
Against orthodox Marxism and the core of the Frankfurt School, Martín-Barbero 
finds inspiration in Frankfurt School associate Walter Benjamin. Martín-Barbero 
writes that Benjamin pioneered the understanding of popular culture not as its denial, 
but as experience and production. In his view, Benjamin allows us to think historically 
about the relationship between transformations in production conditions and changes 
in the space of culture, understood as the sensorium of modes of perception; the so-
cial experience. 
According to Martín-Barbero, Benjamin showed that the media do not provide to-
talitarian alienation, but hegemony subjected to contradictions. Benjamin didn’t ac-
cept that meaning had been absorbed by exchange-value. Meaning is transformed 
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and leads to social realities that include both obscurantism and creativity. Benjamin, 
Martín-Barbero argues, opened the path to the study of the experiences of op-
pressed people who configure modes of resistance, grant meaning to the struggles, 
and are fundamental counterhegemonic actors.  
4.3. Digital Convergence and Cultural Diversity 
By looking at digitalisation from the mediations of popular culture, Martín-Barbero 
(2008; 2014) understands digital convergence as diversity, intercultural communica-
tion, translation, and sustainability. 
4.3.1. Diversity 
Martín-Barbero argues that the digital revolution has enhanced the possibilities of 
diversifying popular mediation. Communication ceases to be a process between pro-
ducers and consumers. Digital convergence allows dissolving this social and symbol-
ic barrier because it de-centres and de-territorialises the possibilities of cultural pro-
duction. This leads to heterogeneity of symbolic production. As communicative pro-
duction democratises on the Internet, the meanings of the mediations lived by re-
ceivers also become more diverse, which affects social action and media practices.  
Martín-Barbero holds that digital convergence also favours the possibility of sus-
tained intercultural translation. He argues that the revitalisation of identities provides 
a key entry point to understanding online diversity. Identities can introduce counter-
hegemony because of the demand for recognition, the search for meaning, and the 
way of belonging to and sharing the world. All identity is generated through narratives 
that tell stories to others. And interculturality and translation are key to facilitating di-
versity. 
4.3.2. Intercultural Communication 
Martín-Barbero (2008, 12) writes that “the Internet is the site of the total communica-
tion meeting point, a place where cultures can communicate endlessly. Internet has 
been a dream for mankind since quite a long”. In this view, digitalisation has provided 
unprecedented spaces for intercultural communication on a global level. This can be 
observed in the ongoing process of reconfiguration of indigenous, local, and national 
cultures due to the intensification of communication and interaction with other nation-
al and world cultures. For example, digitalisation provides spaces which connect im-
migration territories with the country of origin. 
According to Martín-Barbero, interculturality has nothing to do with what the me-
dia do with cultures. To exist as cultures is to exchange. Cultural diversity cannot be 
created from above. It can only be practiced by the diverse cultures.  
Martín-Barbero notes that intercultural experiences entail a sense of danger and 
insecurity. They tend to be more conflictive than dialogic. However, communication 
can play a constitutive role when the actors acknowledge that the vitality of culture 
depends on its ability to communicate with others. Living cultures confront each oth-
er. They translate and are translated by other cultures. 
4.3.3. Translation 
Martín-Barbero underscores that the paradigm of translation shows the possibility of 
a constitutive mediation between plurality of cultures and unity of humanity. This par-
adigm acknowledges that there are translatable as well as indecipherable aspects of 
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cultures, and that the role of each culture is to know the other cultures and re-know 
itself as such in the possibilities and limits of the exchange.  
To affirm diversity, notes Martín-Barbero, is to affirm translatability, i.e., that there 
is something in common. For example, human rights, while knowing that they are 
perceived and ranked differently by different cultures. Even though there are some 
aspects which cannot be deciphered, every culture is translatable to others because 
it is possible to share aspects of life. 
Translation brings people together because it is based on non-exteriority, non-
foreignness, non-otherness. So, translation allows populations to appropriate – from 
the standpoint of their own culture – new knowledges and languages. The result is 
increased cultural hybridisation. 
4.3.4. Cultural Sustainability 
Martín-Barbero (2008; 2014) claims that cultural sustainability is a concept in con-
struction taken from ecological thought. When applied to culture, it is being used to 
study the relations between cultural difference and social inequality, and, therefore, 
between culture and development. This perspective holds two key ideas. First, the 
long temporality of cultures is in contradiction with the increasingly short temporality 
of objects produced and sold in the capitalist market. Second, cultural creativity in 
community and independent media as well as in cultural industries can play a key 
role in social development. The articulation of cultural value with an alternative form 
of development can make cultural diversity last in time. 
The first idea has to be addressed, according to Martín-Barbero, outside of the 
Habermasian framework of dialogical consensus, in which communicative reason is 
deprived of the political contradictions introduced by technological and market media-
tions. What social change requires is to decipher the hegemony of the market and 
identify and facilitate the counter-hegemonies that can make cultural diversity sus-
tainable. 
The second idea requires three conditions. 1. Autonomy of the communities and 
social movements. 2. Political participation of citizens which is reflected in cultural 
policies. 3. The ability to open one’s own culture to exchange and interaction with the 
other cultures of the country and the world. 
According to the author, digital convergence can contribute to cultural sustainabil-
ity because it breaks with the artificial separations characteristic of Western episte-
mology. Against the excluding power of the written word, oralities and visualities ac-
quire cultural visibility and “intertwine their memories to the imaginary of virtuality to 
give new meaning and new form to cultural traditions” (Martín-Barbero 2014, 26). 
Dualism can no longer be held in this new communication environment. The appro-
priation of the hypertext means putting together texts, sounds, images, and videos in 
an interactive way that expands the possibilities of combining different temporalities, 
reading and writing, the book and the audio-visual, knowing and doing, arts and sci-
ences, culture and technique, reason and imagination, aesthetic passion and political 
action. 
The Internet can also facilitate cultural sustainability by providing new spaces that 
are configured by social movements, cultural communities, and community media. 
Subaltern sectors are increasingly appropriating new technologies to build counter-
hegemony all throughout the world. The political context for interculturality can be 
renewed by networks which connect cultural workers and artists with territorial institu-
tions and social organisations. A new public sphere can emerge with new modalities 
of cultural, artistic, scientific and political communities which benefit from digitalisa-
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tion. These communities are engaged in the decisive political struggle for cultural vis-
ibility. 
Martín-Barbero advocates for implementing public policies for cultural conver-
gence that set the grounds for a new cognitive economy focused on human rights. 
The regulatory frameworks should have both a local and a global scope at the same 
time. In his opinion, the priority is to explore the strategic potential of digital conver-
gence for the socio-cultural integration of the Ibero-American space that is in con-
struction. The survival of diversity depends, according to the author, on a new global 
cultural institutionality capable of interpellating global organisations. This new institu-
tionality will only arise from a new type of relationship of culture with the nation-state. 
This transformation does not involve replacing the state, but citizens reinstating or re-
institutionalising the state so that it focuses on interacting with the local communities 
and the new world actors.   
Martín-Barbero notes the contradictory nature of the digital revolution: it is a 
source of inequalities, but also a source of citizen empowerment. The connective and 
interactive model of net communication facilitates cultural mediations which introduce 
diversity and help people get associated, participate in society and engage in crea-
tive expression. 
If Martín-Serrano writes about the features of humanising and dehumanising me-
diations, Martín-Barbero argues that the possibilities of humanisation depend on the 
mediations arising from popular culture. And, as developed in the next section, Mar-
tín-Santos provides a specific guide, a method for the development of humanising or 
communist mediations both in the communication and the social systems. 
5. Luis Martín-Santos: Mediations between Theory and Praxis 
Luis Martín-Santos’s work adds to the other two perspectives a method to produce 
mediations to articulate revolutionary theory and praxis. Martín-Santos was a special-
ist in Husserlian phenomenology and aimed to combine it with Marxism, particularly 
through the concept of mediation. According to Martín-Santos, Marxism provides a 
framework based on historical materialism and dialectics that can be strengthened by 
phenomenologically detailing the way in which the world becomes present in subjec-
tivity. Thus, phenomenology allowed him to think revolution at the level of meaning. 
Martín-Santos’s (1976; 1977; 1988) work can be interpreted in today’s context to 
define communicative communism as mediations based on diairesis (rupture) and 
totalisation (eidos). These mediations are conducted by the digital proletariat for the 
abolition of the private property of the means of communicative and non-
communicative production (classless society). This model of communication would 
be characterised by confrontation of ideas and dialogue, as well as by the primacy of 
use-value and diversity. 
According to Martín-Santos, the ideas of mediation, diairesis, and totalisation can 
be found throughout Marx and Engels’s works. However, he notes that mediation is 
more prominent in The German Ideology (Marx and Engels 1846/2010), diairesis in 
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (Marx 1844/1975a), and totalisation in 
Capital (Marx 1867/1990). 
5.1. Mediation 
Martín-Santos (1976) claims that Marx and Engels used the idea of mediation much 
more than they named it. He notes that often they did not differentiate it from the 
crude concept of cause, but that the idea of mediation can be observed in their use of 
terms such as connection, root, or result. According to Martín-Santos, a Marxist un-
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derstanding of mediation points to a complex, multi-faceted process that produces 
social change. He was particularly interested in the mediations that can articulate 
theory and praxis to bring about social sublation, i.e., for the emergence of a com-
munist society.  
This understanding of mediation is opposed to both idealistic subjectivism and 
Lenin’s objectivist theory of reflection, since both theories are based on the mechani-
cal and deterministic coincidence of the subject with the real world. Only the pro-
cesses of mediation can facilitate an articulation of revolutionary theory and praxis. 
The author argues that Marx and Engels viewed consciousness and social relations 
as interdependent. 
Martín-Santos (1977) refers to the criticism of Hegel in The German Ideology 
(Marx and Engels 1846/2010): the superstructure is not autonomous; consciousness 
cannot be understood as the result of the autonomous force of the spirit, but as a 
social fact. If for Hegel the Idea creates life, for Marx consciousness and theory have 
their roots in praxis while serving to correct it. 
Martín-Santos notes that historical materialism underscores the importance of 
material mediations in consciousness. Moreover, unlike vulgar materialism, he holds 
that Marx’s dialectical conception of history views ideas as a mediating power. He 
further clarifies that, in spite of some expressive excesses, the works of Marx and 
Engels (for example, The Holy Family, Marx and Engels 1845/1975) identify interrela-
tions between thought and reality and conclude that theory can only be realised as a 
realisation of necessities. 
From a dialectical point of view, mediations between ideas and praxis are found in 
revolutionary processes: praxis is incorporated into theory and ideas become materi-
al power when they are appropriated by the working class (Marx 1844/1975b).   
Martín-Santos (1976, 30) posits three laws to understand the mediations between 
theory and praxis: 
1. The law of non-interruption indicates that all elements are interrelated parts of a 
social formation. No element exists by itself in isolation but as part of a chain of me-
diations that limit and enable each other. 
2. The law of alternative mediation opposes a priori and mechanical approaches 
that reduce social reality to crude relations of cause and effect in which some ele-
ments are mere reflection of others. Even though historical materialism demonstrates 
the determining effect of matter in the last instance, according to this law, in any giv-
en social process there is no a priori hierarchy between economy and culture, no ex-
clusive foundational principle. Instead of strict determinism, there is polivalence. 
There is intellectual democratisation.  
3. The law of revolution as the generalisation and intensification of mediations 
suggests that the programme of historical materialism aims to find and promote the 
mediations that allow unifying theory and praxis. 
Martín-Santos (1977) aims to provide analytical tools to understand and foster 
mediations for revolutionary subjectivisation and material transformation. He under-
stands mediation as the result of a double dialectical movement that operates at both 
cognitive and metaphysical levels as a creator of continuity in the discontinuity of be-
ing and thought. The phase of negativity which renounces to the immediate is under-
stood as a diairesis, a rupture with revolutionary potential. And the movement of sub-
lation is understood as a totalisation which involves recuperation and sublimation.  
Martín-Santos clarifies that diairesis and totalisation are different to an antithesis 
and synthesis. Antithesis and synthesis are based on a logical determination while 
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diaresis and totalisation are based on an anthropological determination in which the 
subject gets involved in social transformation and is transformed. 
5.2. Diairesis  
Martín-Santos understands diairesis as a rupture that produces discontinuity in a fact 
and a concept (or theory) based on its contradictions or internal incompatibilities. If 
bourgeois thought presents both social processes and concepts as a unity with con-
tinuity, Marxism discovers the internal fissures and acts to produce a profound tear. 
Thus, in diaresis, Marxism aims to identify and unveil hidden alienations. By demon-
strating the contradiction in a concept or fact, the diairesis sheds light on a rupture 
that cannot be reabsorbed in the original intended unity. When the fictitious unity is 
revealed, the process of bifurcation is irreversible and consciousness becomes revo-
lutionary. A concept no longer means the same as before. Dialectics has made it crit-
ical. Therefore, diairesis is a method of awareness regarding the material world and a 
guide for praxis. 
Martín-Santos provides several examples which can serve as a guide for theory 
and praxis:  
x Social totality is divided by class struggle (Communist Manifesto). Likewise, the 
Hegelian concept of “man” as a theoretical unit cannot be sustained when Marxist 
diairesis is applied, which shows the alterity of the proletarian and the bourgeoisie. 
The human being is also divided into being and history, discontinuity and continui-
ty, and the proletarian is made up of both physical and spiritual needs. 
x Misery is not only misery, Marx argued in his letter to Schweitzer about Proudhon. 
The concept hides a contradiction, for misery is lack but also strength, repression 
and subversion.  
x The notion of order from the point of view of a formal analysis has a positive 
meaning. However, diairesis discovers the repressive dimension of order as well 
as an empowering dimension that tries to create the conditions for channelling the 
revolutionary protest. 
x Use-value and exchange-value of commodities: Martín-Santos contends that this 
is possibly the most important example of diairesis provided by Marx. In capital-
ism, the quantitative predominates over the qualitative. The fetishism of commodi-
ties is imposed, which hides the social relations of production between people (ex-
ploitation) for the benefit of economic relations between objects. The worker expe-
riences alienation in exchange. There is a humanisation of the product and an ob-
jectification and dehumanisation of the producer.  
x Other diairesis can be observed in society, which is broken in theory and praxis, 
and structure and superstructure.  
5.3. Totalisation 
After diairesis, the next movement in the mediation process is totalisation or conver-
gence. The author argues that the objective is to reach a real unity of the opposites 
(reconciliation) in a classless society by abolishing the private ownership of the 
means of production. Totalisation acts upon heterogeneous elements. It involves the 
convergence of theory and praxis, i.e., the realisation of Marxist philosophy and the 
abolition of the proletariat and class contradictions (Marx 1844/1975b). Revolution as 
a totalisation keeps the continuity of working class struggle in a discontinuity regard-
ing the social formation. As Marx (1867/1990) explains in Capital, collective owner-
ship fosters use-value and brings an end to commodity fetishism. 
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Martín-Santos provides a method to develop totalisations by giving meaning to and 
articulating the diairesis elements. This method is based on variations that allow for 
constructing eidos or polemical ensembles. Specifically, eidos are mediations be-
tween theory and praxis that allow their reunion.    
This method looks at a topic from different points of view and explores all possible 
paths. A variety of aspects of the topic that initially appear to be independent merge 
in a figure (eidos). This eidos, with its internal interrelations and tensions, provides 
the concrete meaning of the topic. While concepts are static and peaceful, eidos are 
dynamic, complex, dialectical and with great cognitive strength, which makes them 
effective mediators to understand and transform reality. Eidos provide the mediation 
needed for scientific thought. 
Martín-Santos notes that Marx (1844/1975b) used this method continually but es-
pecially to describe the proletariat in the introduction to Critique of Hegel’s’ Philoso-
phy of Right. The proletariat was defined here as universality of suffering, sufferer of 
total injustice, artificially impoverished, product of social dissolution, negativity, pos-
sessor of a title of human being, and universal emancipator.  
Martín-Santos applies the method of eidos to explain the sense of revolution from 
different, albeit complementary points of view:  
 
x Social: unequal development of the revolutionary forces; processes to achieve 
harmony and share a programme for a life in common. 
x Economic: functionalisation of wealth; revolutionary energy can improve the econ-
omy by fostering use-value and distributing property. 
x Cultural: counterculture aims to refute existing ways of life and implement prob-
lematic cultural principles which have not been used yet. 
x Political: dispersion (not transfer) of power. 
x Anthropological: new behaviours; recovery of vitality. 
x Historical: a change in the goals and course (not a mere acceleration). 
x Ideological/philosophical: the loss of magic of dominant ideas (de-naturalisation).  
 
Developing communism would require mediations in all dimensions of reality as a 
tensor unity (eidos). However, Martín-Santos notes that this eidos is still too abstract 
and proposes a concrete phenomenology of the dialectics of confrontation and dia-
logue. 
5.4. Communication 
Martín-Santos understands the role of communication as follows: 
The technique of confrontation allows the socialisation of knowledge through ad-
justment, guesswork, regression and other movements of ideas. Discrepancy with 
others allows the discovery of one’s own thought. Together with dialogue, confronta-
tion allows the emergence of the epistemic subject, which keeps thought alive, so-
cialist, and shareable. 
Dialogue means receiving and responding to ideas from others who have had di-
rect experience. “I think” turns into “we think” and “my truth” becomes “our truth”. It 
allows the proletariat to objectivise reality collectively. This real dialogue is continued 
and bifurcated by transcendental dialogue with the classics. Moreover, there is dia-
logue about the revolution but also revolution as dialogue (mediating model and me-
diated model). Dialogue should focus on the concrete, which is contradictory and at-
tached to praxis. Concrete reality is the logos of language and revolution.  
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Martín-Santos contends that in The German Ideology Marx (1846/2010) explains that 
language plays a key mediating role in society because it is real, practical conscious-
ness and always appears as a relation with other people and with other words. It is 
individual and social. The production of ideas is a language and production is the 
language of reality. 
Even though new technologies are mainly used as means for diversion, they can 
also be used to raise class consciousness. Communication can give meaning to the 
revolution and guide action through a renewed eloquence. Instead of adopting a con-
templative way of knowing, a Marxist use of digital media involves adopting a theoret-
ical-practical global attitude to confront capitalism. The point is not to de-codify, but to 
produce communication.  
Transformative communication and action should be grounded in internal democ-
racy and camaraderie as mediations that facilitate the reproduction of the socialist 
project. A Marxist party plays a key role, just as the youth and collective intellectuals, 
but the working class is in charge of leading the process. Since the new proletariat is 
formed by the decomposition of other classes, the origin of today’s proletariat is di-
verse and heterogeneous, and includes all the lucid people who are resisting capital-
istic power.   
In synthesis, Martín-Santos describes a complex process of mediation between 
theory and praxis, superstructures and structures, to produce in an active and in-
ventive way new ideas and material changes. Mediations involve a variety of actors 
and factors, which foster rupture and transformed reunion in the development of a 
communist society and communication system. 
6. Conclusion 
Mediations play a key role in the reproduction of monopoly capitalism, but they are 
also being used to move towards what could be called communicative communism.  
Martín-Serrano notes the contradiction between a multidirectional digital system 
capable of turning most people into producers of communication and expanding the 
data of reference with the need of capitalism to concentrate and control communica-
tion for reproductive ends. In this context, de-humanising (technocratic) mediations 
try to obscure links of solidarity, while humanising mediations count with the technical 
possibility of the world-wide dissemination of information and sharing of knowledge.      
Martín-Barbero complements this perspective by looking at the cultural media-
tions of popular subjects in the counter-hegemonic appropriation and re-signification 
of communication messages and technologies. Martín-Barbero argues that digital 
convergence provides for the first time in history technological means to achieve the 
utopia of diversity through interculturality, translation, and sustainability. 
Finally, Martín-Santos adds a normative guide to action. He conceives mediation 
as the theory-praxis (both material and communicative) that produces diairesis (rup-
tures) and totalisations leading to the abolition of the private means of productions. 
Communication plays a key role in the development of socialist narratives and the 
exchange of theory and praxis, the confrontation of ideas, international dialogue, and 
the expansion of use-value. 
The work of the three authors allows addressing the study of mediations as a 
complex totality with interconnected parts. Communicative communism can thus be 
characterised as being based on critical-transformative mediations that operate both 
in the communication system and the social system to produce ruptures and trans-
form the cultural superstructure that contributes to the emancipation of conscious-
ness in interdependence with the re-appropriation of the means of production by the 
252                   Joan Pedro-Carañana  
 
   CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
heterogeneous working class and other popular actors. They can operate on a global 
level to disseminate information, facilitate the counterhegemonic enjoyment of popu-
lar culture, and contribute to the collective production and sharing of creative work in 
multidirectional flows of communication. This international dialogue can only be 
achieved by introducing diversity, which has to be guided by interculturality, which, in 
turn, is facilitated by the paradigm of translation. These mediations should contribute 
to reducing and eventually eliminating technical and social division of labour. They 
aim to connect theory and praxis in order to create sustainable conditions of autono-
my (freedom) and equality that allow the unfolding of altruistic values and the expan-
sion of use-value.  
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1. Introduction 
As Judy Wajcman (2015, 1) has noted, “there is a widespread perception that life these 
days is faster than it used to be”. Although there is not unilateral agreement on why, 
how or to what extent, one would be hard-pressed to find an argument to the contrary. 
She notes that “talk about life accelerating only makes sense against an implied back-
drop of a slower past” (Wajcman 2015, 6), so any account of the acceleration of the 
pace of life must also provide an account of how we came to be so caught up in such 
perceived rapidity. 
The most comprehensive account of social acceleration, and thus the focus of this 
paper, is given by Hartmut Rosa, a sociologist writing in the critical theory tradition. He 
argues that “we cannot adequately understand the nature and character of modernity 
and the logic of its structural and cultural development unless we add the temporal 
perspective to our analysis” (Rosa 2003, 4). In his 2013 work Social Acceleration: A 
New Theory of Modernity, Rosa denotes three systems of social acceleration (tech-
nical acceleration, the acceleration of social change, and the acceleration of the pace 
of life) which have emerged as fundamental to the human experience of late modernity. 
Using Rosa’s theory of social acceleration, I shall argue that in the context of social 
media, social acceleration produces conditions which support a capitalist status quo. I 
shall conclude by constructing an account of ‘digital deceleration’ as a framework for 
thinking about socialist policies through the distinctive considerations of both social 
acceleration and digital politics. 
2. The Features of Social Acceleration 
For Rosa, “acceleration is an irreducible and constitutive trait of modernization” (Rosa 
2003, 27). For modern societies, capitalist economics dictates that productivity and 
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growth must be continuously rising just in order to preserve what we already have, and 
it is this “frenetic standstill” as he refers to it, that leads to a state of individual and 
institutional inertia, insofar as these rapid changes undermine the belief that our lives 
and our actions are heading in some meaningful direction. Consider “frenetic standstill” 
as structurally analogous to the human body undergoing G-force, for example, in a 
Formula One car or during astronaut training: the acceleration imposed on the body 
makes movement incredibly difficult, such is the burden of the external gravitational 
weight, an invisible but dangerously potent relation of force causing both compressive 
and tensile stress. Rosa wants to explain that the lack of democratic transformation in 
our state of affairs is partially explained by such a phenomenon, that our institutions 
feel unable to initiate change because change is continuously enforced from outside, 
and as such, the uncertainty that is built into the stability of the economic systems of 
modernity create a sense of retrenchment; taking stock; a conservation of energies. 
To return to Rosa’s three systems of social acceleration that characterise moder-
nity, technical acceleration refers to the rapid developments in transportation and com-
munication technologies: from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles with engines 
measured in horsepower, from handwritten letters to direct messaging on social media, 
from the wireless to the radio to the television to smart television streaming services 
(Rosa 2013, 97). Technological acceleration is the acceleration that is goal-directed, 
whether that be in communications, production, or transport. The project of making the 
Internet faster, of increasing the capacity of mobile batteries, of more powerful engines, 
of more immediate communications through telephony; all are contributors to the 
changing perception of time and space in social life. What was once an eight-month 
trip by sea is now a half-day trip by air: technological progress alongside globalization 
has compressed space in social life. 
The second system of acceleration is the acceleration of social change, related to 
this first system of technological change, and can be explained anecdotally. When I 
was in primary school, I was one of the few children who had the privilege of accessing 
a home computer, where I would sit with my father and he’d watch over my shoulder 
as I wrote stories in a Word document or played a puzzle game. By being able to turn 
on the computer and the monitor, click “start”, load “Microsoft Word 1995” and type 
some words onto the screen, I was held up as a computer “whiz” by the teacher and 
would even be asked to help out with some of the younger children during their ICT 
lessons. Even if we remove the technological acceleration from this scenario, and the 
fact that computational power was such that it took half the lesson for the computer to 
even boot up (!), let us contrast this scenario with my experience working as a teaching 
assistant in a primary school in 2016: children as young as seven were capable of 
comfortably navigating protocols for saving their work on a cloud computing system. 
As for the older children who were at most eleven, never mind playing games. These 
kids were accessing a coding application that would help them build their own! 
These examples give credence to the notion that the rate of technological change 
has a knock-on effect for social change: certain skill levels or practices are rendered 
obsolete by the changing relationship between technologies and their users. Looking 
back with hindsight, my computer skills were woefully overestimated, and if I had pur-
sued a career in computer science rather than political theory because of my supposed 
mastery of word processing, I’d be sure to have had a rude awakening at some point. 
Nevertheless, as social change accelerates, the time in which our prior knowledge and 
experience can be considered to hold value or be applied to under-stand where we 
might be going is reduced (Rosa 2009, 83). By the time my ex-students grow up to be 
adults, it may be the case that their coding skills are deemed comparatively primitive, 
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as we lean more towards artificial intelligence to support computational processes. It 
is hard to guess where economic requirements, shifts in our cultural landscape, or 
technological developments, will require technical prowess. Prior to modernity, the way 
you boiled water, cooked food, performed daily tasks, would remain the same: you 
may learn a trade, a skill or a fact about the world in your childhood that would remain 
true and useful to be taught to your grandchildren. To be modern is to live through 
technological developments that fundamentally alter the ways in which people interact 
with their world, to shorten the lifespan of human relationships with particular technol-
ogies, and thus give life a sense of fast-paced movement, towards the direction of 
progress, or otherwise. Progress has its casualties; we are reticent to change, until we 
have little choice but to change to preserve what we have.  
To quote Rosa directly, “social acceleration is defined by an increase in the decay-
rates of the reliability of experiences and expectations and by a contraction of the time-
spans definable as the ‘present’” (Rosa 2010, 16). Modernity has produced a social 
rapidity, where social beliefs and actions are considered sensible, mainstream, or ac-
ceptable, for shorter and shorter periods of time. Rosa refers to these rapid changes 
in “attitudes and values as well as fashions and lifestyles, social relations and obliga-
tions as well as groups, classes, or milieus, social languages as well as forms of prac-
tice and habits” (Rosa 2009, 83). Culture moves at a faster pace, where fashion trends, 
predominant music genres, all the way to political ideologies, are becoming harder and 
harder to catch up with: keeping “in the loop” is almost laborious, and this analysis is 
especially prescient in the age of social media, where internet memes and in-jokes can 
escalate within hours, disappear from relevance within a day and briefly resurface in 
an ironic, tired or even nostalgic reformulation by the end of a given week1. 
For Rosa, the third system of social acceleration, the acceleration of the pace of 
life, can be understood as a form of subjectivity, an effect of feeling as if they are always 
running out of time, that there are never enough hours in the day; a subjectivity that 
views time as a commodity to be spent, and to be spent efficiently, a resource be-
coming scarce. Rosa defines it as “an increase in the number of episodes of action or 
experience per unit of time, i.e., it is a consequence of trying to do more things in less 
time” (Rosa 2010, 21). To explain this idea further, Rosa invites the reader to imagine 
a scenario where you spent two hours a week responding thoughtfully to a stack of a 
half-dozen letters. With the invention of e-mail, it would only take you an hour to do the 
same job. But that’s not what happens, of course: because you can now transmit your 
thoughts instantaneously across the world with the click of a mouse, you will sit for 
those two hours once used for letter-writing and instead try to get through forty or fifty 
e-mails under your belt, stopping after two hours as even more come flooding in. In 
other words, we try to compress actions into the time we have, but then this does not 
                                            
1 We may also wish to incorporate Mark Fisher’s (2009) observation, specifically the notion 
that one of the problems of contemporary culture is the repackaging, collaging and reproduc-
tion of older styles for commodification, with little interest in breaking artistic and cultural 
boundaries and exploring the potential of art in a mainstream context. Fisher, a blogger and 
music critic as well as a cultural theorist, was particularly damning about the state of the 
British music scene, commenting in a lecture series that if you turned on any mainstream 
radio station and listen to the charts, you could be mistaken for thinking that the song could’ve 
been written anytime in the last 30/40 years. In other words, the acceleration of cultural 
change has led to stale imitation and stylistic reproduction, nostalgic homage as a more sure-
fire commercial entity over the risk of authentic expression and experimentation.  
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give us more free time, rather the feeling of being constantly able to do more, coupled 
perhaps even with a tinge of guilt about the fact that we have not. 
Bart Zantvoort’s analysis of Rosa’s overarching conceptual paradigm of social accel-
eration and inertia concludes with the thought that “the frenetic standstill diagnosed by 
Rosa […] understood as global cultural-historical or institutional-structural phenomena, 
cannot be understood separately from the resistances – the vested interests, the ide-
ological investments or the individual compulsions – which cause individuals to main-
tain the status quo” (2017, 720). I echo this sentiment: social acceleration can only be 
understood, and a political response only articulated, once we can understand the 
ways in which frenetic standstill is ideologically reproduced. Next, I shall explore Chris-
tian Fuchs’ Marxist critique of social media; its endemic relationship to capitalism, its 
logic of profit, and the presentation of the user experience. Then, I shall focus (primar-
ily) on the acceleration of the pace of life as I believe it coherently dovetails with Dom-
inic Pettman’s concept of “hypermodulation”, from which I shall later argue that demo-
cratic socialism ought to concern itself with digital deceleration. 
3. Social Media and Capitalism 
It is argued that one of the key contemporary roles of the digital sociology literature is 
to acknowledge and address “the entangled nature of the material and the digital, peo-
ple and machines” (Selwyn 2019, 25). More specifically, it is argued that we live in a 
“platform” society, where all areas of public and private life are permeated by platforms 
(van Dijck et al. 2018). Thus, for the theory of social acceleration to plausibly describe 
our contemporary situation, one would expect some tangible consequence to be found 
in the digital realm.  
Christian Fuchs approaches modern theories of communication, specifically the In-
ternet and social media, from the perspective of critical theory. He argues that social 
media operates to obscure the pre-existent class conditions of subordination and dom-
ination necessarily entailed by the capitalist mode of production (Fuchs 2016, 121). 
Fuchs discusses what he terms the dialectic of the subject and the object with regards 
to Internet communications. He argues that human beings, as subjects interacting with 
the object of social media, use its technologies for creating, sharing and communi-
cating, for collaborative enterprises, and for the fostering of online communities. 
Through these communicative practices, the world of their social media becomes a 
“real” world, not only in the physical sense of being stored on computer servers, and 
accessible through devices, but also in the sense of becoming more concrete and ob-
jective on a psychological level.  
This online world allows for communities to come to new understandings (and mis-
understandings) of the pre-existent social world and produce discourses exclusive to 
these micro-communities, leading to meaningful interaction possibilities previously un-
articulated. As Internet cultures grow, they bleed into the “real” world, as the shorthand 
and the discursive markers used online become more ubiquitous offline as our expec-
tations change about how often the rest of society uses the internet (Fuchs 2016, 122). 
For example, the jarring experience one encounters when they overhear a teenager 
saying “lol” rather than laughing at a joke, blurring the lines between online and offline 
discourses.  
Fuchs argues that the relationship of the individual and the social is “highly antag-
onistic”. Social media can only exist in a context in which people are capable and willing 
to share, communicate, collaborate and identify with various communities, but that 
these actions, whilst encouraged on the online sphere by corporate social media, are 
precisely what the objective social reality has diminished with the individualist culture 
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that has emerged in western democracies. Individuals use corporate social media as 
a means of adhering to the “neoliberal performance principles” as Fuchs calls them, 
curating a picture of oneself for their social networks, and engaging with others on 
these platforms through the addition of carefully selected information available for oth-
ers to view. Social media, in real terms, is a highly isolated and individualistic user 
experience dressed up as a community experience, and behind the curtain of the self-
presenting “performance”, is what Fuchs refers to as the “private property character of 
social media” (Fuchs 2016, 122). Fuchs develops this idea further: 
the fact that user data is sold as a commodity to advertisers- is hidden behind 
social media”s social appearance: you do not pay for accessing Twitter, Face-
book, Google or YouTube. The obtained use-value seems to be the immediate 
social experience these platforms enable. The commodity character of personal 
data does not become immediately apparent because there is no exchange of 
money for use-values that the user experiences (Fuchs 2016, 122). 
To posit the idea differently, outside of the language of Marxist economics, social me-
dia presents itself as a free-to-use tool for sharing things with your friends. Rather, it is 
a platform in which you turn yourself into a commodity by feeding advertisers infor-
mation about your life, values and preferences through acts of curated self-presenta-
tion. There exists an ideological injunction to enjoy the social world, to participate not 
only as a free subject in the rules of the game, but also as an entertained subject, 
experiencing consumption as a form of ritualistic pleasure; we are all hedonists now. 
Fuchs argues: 
Play labour is the new ideology of capitalism: objectively alienated labour is pre-
sented as creativity, freedom and autonomy that is fun for workers. The ideas 
that workers should have fun and love their objective alienation has become a 
new ideological strategy of capital and management theory. ‘Facebook labour’ is 
an expression of play labour ideology as element of the new spirit of capitalism 
(Fuchs 2016, 127). 
As a consumer, the subject is conventionally presented as free and autonomous, ex-
ercising this right to choose by accessing the market economy to purchase commodi-
ties at will, within the constraints of one’s discretionary income. To reproduce capitalist 
relations of production, the system must present itself as the best possible system, and 
corporate media is complicit in maintaining this implicit message to keep the consumer-
subject represented, and therefore, hegemonic. Social media presents its online plat-
forms are purely for our use and entertainment, even down to their corporate pro-
nouncements of benevolence; Facebook harnesses “the power to share and to make 
the world more open and connected”; YouTube wants to  “connect, inform and inspire 
others across the globe”; Twitter wants you “to connect with people, express yourself 
and discover what’s happening” (Fuchs 2016, 133).  
All major corporate social media present themselves as here to help, as benevolent 
as the visions of the peer-to-peer Internet of the 1990’s, or open-source software made 
freely available by socially conscious digital incubators: except unlike the utopian 
dreams of e-democrats, or the tools made available for others such as Wikipedia or 
Linux, these social media companies are worth billions on the stock exchange, despite 
their sloganeering implying a higher calling untethered from the demands of the market 
altogether. 
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Fuchs’ primary claim is that there is a marked difference between how social media 
acts and how it wishes to appear to the end user. The purpose of social media is group 
formation and information exchange, to bring us together. Yet, capitalism subverts 
these newfound communication possibilities, and “fosters new forms of exploitation, 
commodification, individualism, and private property” (Fuchs 2016, 138). Whilst social 
media users upload pictures, message friends and express themselves online, they 
are funnelling data into a machine that primarily functions to transfer that data footprint 
into a product for a company to buy, to advertise to you in a way that turns your own 
sense of self back in on itself, into presenting you with a range of prospective com-
modity purchases.  
Despite these misgivings about the relationship between social media and capitalist 
exploitation, Fuchs argues that there remains emancipatory potential within the tech-
nology: “[it] points towards, and forms together with other technologies, a material foun-
dation of a democratic socialist society, in which the means of physical and informa-
tional production are collectively controlled” (Fuchs 2016, 146). The problem is that 
corporate social media undermines its own political possibilities by serving the capital-
ist status quo and serves to render new forms of “exploitation and ideology” (Fuchs 
2016, 146). Social media turns consumers into prosumers, individuals compelled to 
labour for corporate profit under the guise of play; he argues that it is “mistaken to see 
Facebook as a communications company: it does not sell communication or access to 
communication, but user data and targeted advert space. Facebook is one of the 
world’s largest advertising agencies” (Fuchs 2016, 170). Although social media plat-
forms provide the capacity for users to communicate, they operate more like an online 
dating agency, pairing corporate partners with prospective consumers, under the aus-
pice of connecting human beings with each other: except, as the users do not experi-
ence this manipulation of their own data, perhaps the analogy is closer to a blind date 
where you do not know you are being set up. 
Fuchs’ analysis of social media, specifically the dominant corporate platforms that 
shape the landscape, calls to mind the assemblage referred to as “The Twittering Ma-
chine” by Richard Seymour (2019), a reference to the Paul Klee painting of mechanical 
birds luring those enchanted by their song into a hidden ravine below. The following 
section will consider Dominic Pettman’s account of social media subjectivity, embold-
ened with greater plausibility by Fuchs’ prior account of social media’s economic logic. 
4. Hypermodulation and the Digital Acceleration of the Pace of Life 
Returning to the subject of social acceleration, Judy Wajcman (2015, 5-6) notes that 
“there are both different senses of feeling pressed for time and a range of mechanisms 
that trigger those feelings”. It could be plausibly stated in a digital context that social 
media, specifically the universal platforms2, are predominantly responsible for such 
                                            
2 The IPPR 2018 Commission for Economic Justice report refers specifically to Facebook, 
Alphabet, Amazon and Apple as the ‘universal platforms’ on the grounds “that they have 
accumulated the most data, developed the most advanced analytical capabilities and gained 
greatest ownership of the foundational infrastructure, from mapping to cloud computing, that 
underpins all digital technology” (Lawrence and Laybourn-Langton 2018, 1). In the context of 
social media, we may refer to Facebook, Twitter and Instagram as the universal social media 
platforms, given their substantial market share, with the knowledge that Instagram is owned 
by Facebook and as such, their network effects are pooled, and with the caveat that China 
has its own internal social media market, which itself has created its own internally dominant 
platforms. 
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affects in contemporary subjectivity. In many ways, the largest platforms arguably re-
semble states in terms of their internal complexity and their systems of self-govern-
ance. 
Following on from Christian Fuchs’ analysis of the user experience, Dominic Pettman 
argues that social media represents itself to us as a tailored and unique experience in 
which the individuality of our identity is paramount, and its form is limitless in the sense 
that “no two people will navigate the same branching pathways” (Pettman 2016, xi-xii). 
His approach, which also draws from critical theory, negotiates the modern world of 
the consumer-citizen, claiming that “we hover between the older conceptions of what 
it is to be a person- a citizen, with rights, responsibilities, character, agency, identity, 
and so on- and new, emerging types of being- a consumer, with cravings, likes, pro-
files, and opinions, leaving a trail of cookie crumbs in our wake” (Pettman 2016, 6). 
Pettman appeals to the conceptual frameworks of thinkers like Gilles Deleuze and 
Jean Baudrillard to argue that subjectivity has lost its “scene” and has been replaced 
by the “ob-scene”, by which is meant that traditional distinctions between “public vs. 
private, self vs. other, subject vs. other” have been eroded and in their place, a subject 
whose identity is contingent on its consumption, circulation and production of images 
for a broader technological apparatus. Specifically 
 
the “ecstasy” afforded by social media is decidedly not an overwhelming thrill or 
sense of bliss, but rather the homeopathic parcelling of tiny and banal moments 
of recognition, reassurance, ego reinforcement, humblebragging, notoriety, curi-
osity, shame, and a galaxy of other modest- but collectively significant- affects 
(Pettman 2016, 10). 
 
Linking this account of social media to Pettman’s prior conversation surrounding sub-
jectivity, he makes the compelling claim that social media is not primarily used for en-
joyment, so much as to reinforce our identities, and ensure our visibility to our peers. 
Pettman explores the motivations behind the willingness of users to surrender personal 
information, photos, videos, conversation logs and other data over to a corporate plat-
form for the validation that network visibility incurs. In this sense, digital natives are 
“becoming ‘exo-subjects’, sending selfies out into the void, in the search for validation 
of a self that is now distributed across the wires” (Pettman 2016, 10). When users are 
curating their social media presence, they are quite literally ensuring that they are pre-
sent, that they have the validation of existence in cyberspace, an increasingly im-
portant space where the identity is stored permanently, in a way that requires manage-
ment by the real-world subject; otherwise, one’s identity can become shaped by exter-
nal forces, such as individuals tagging you in unflattering pictures, uploading embar-
rassing videos, or being criticised on these public platforms without exercising one’s 
right to reply: Fuchs’ “play labour” account is almost too optimistic; curating a social 
media account with the level of detail required to flourish in cyberspace is joyless, un-
compensated work, yet it is all but expected of all digital natives. 
We can link this scenario to the consequences of social acceleration: because we 
can express ourselves online, and social media provides a platform to advertise our 
businesses, support our hobbies, pursue our personal interests, we are slowly incul-
cated by these heavily addictive technologies to do so with more frequency and inten-
sity than we otherwise would. The fact that we can get instant updates immediately on 
our phones rather than having to hear about it all on the six o’clock news means that 
are constantly checking our phones: “it is as though, one day, it’s going to bring us the 
message we have been waiting for” (Seymour 2019, 69). 
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Pettman argues that the contemporary subject is being guided by “hypermodula-
tion: the attempt to distract us from the fact that we are indeed being synchronized to 
an unprecedented degree” (Pettman 2016, 130). The contention is that social media’s 
apparatus distracts its users with small bursts of content that elicit various affective 
states, often at different times as other users, and at an ever-faster rate. Our emotional 
states are, therefore, compartmentalized, reduced to quick, sharp reactions to images, 
reports or actions on an algorithmically determined feed of news unique to the user. 
He argues that this flattens the user’s experience of social reality, which is perceived 
as a series of unrelated, chaotic micro-events, without a basis to form a coherent over-
arching social narrative. Social media leaves the subject fragmented and attempting 
to form a cohesive sense of identification by curating their feed to serve as an echo 
chamber, or by jumping to unsubstantiated conclusions. 
Instead of the conventional understanding of critical theory that we are “always-
already” to become a subject, as we operate with an understanding of the signs, sym-
bols and language used for the interpellative process, the fragmentation caused by 
media representations causes the user to remain “always-nearly” a subject, uncertain 
of our place in the world: meaning is deferred by the infinite series of distractions. Ra-
ther than distraction being used to take our attention away from events that we would 
otherwise see, Pettman believes that the distraction is the decoy itself: social media is 
addictive because it distracts us with numerous interpretations, commentaries and re-
actions to the event that would be conventionally occluded: the political event is dis-
torted through extensive coverage, rather than remaining unknown (Pettman 2016, 
11). 
The Internet provides users with access to more information, of varying degrees of 
authenticity and credibility, than ever before in human history, and social media is the 
most sophisticated attempt (so far) to compartmentalise that information in such a 
manner as to provide an ongoing report of social experiences, and in doing so, posi-
tions the user’s auto-curated profile as the location from where to orient this infor-
mation. Pettman’s provocation is that social media protects the status quo by showing 
you what is happening, but as a series of seemingly unrelated experiential nodes, and 
at different times as your fellow users, so that you may vent your anger at injustice in 
isolation, rather than finding a means of protest or resistance in collective outrage. By 
showing all information and presenting it with the same level of urgency and immedi-
acy, it induces a “flattening” affect for the user: “matters of potentially historic import, 
like a civil rights issue […] are now flattened into the same homogeneous, empty digital 
space as a cute critter or an obnoxious celebrity” (Pettman 2016, 35). By receiving 
these various interpretations and media representations of numerous events alongside 
one another from different perspectives, the important political events, and indeed the 
larger social world, appear chaotic and unintelligible, which discourages active political 
participation. 
However, Pettman’s analysis veers towards the conspiratorial in his claim that “it is 
quite deliberate that while one person is fuming about economic injustice or climate 
change denial, another is giggling at a cute cat video […] that nebulous indignation 
which constitutes the very fuel of true social change can then be redirected safely 
around the network” (Pettman 2016,29-30, my emphasis). That this controversial claim 
is made without evidence leaves it dubious but taken as literary license rather than a 
po-faced accusation, it can be plausibly argued that social media produces this circu-
lation of emotional responses around the network as a coincidental consequence of 
the platform’s structure, in a way that may feel intentional.  
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Later, Pettman gives the example of Facebook admitting to “experimenting with 
users” feeds to ascertain the extent to which they can transfer via “emotional conta-
gion”: leading unrelated individuals to experience the same emotional state because 
of the platform’s active intervention and manipulation” (Pettman 2016, 82-84). How-
ever, there remains a marked difference between arguing that social media platforms 
are engaging in a systematic strategy of intentional interpellation and arguing that so-
cial media platforms have demonstrated that they are nonetheless capable of doing 
so. Just because they can, does not mean they are. But given the continuous revela-
tions and scandals breaking about the tech giants, so many that by the time you read 
this, the one that comes to your mind may be different to the one that I would otherwise 
propose, would it be particularly surprising if Pettman was right all along? 
Returning to the psychological implications for the subject, he argues that the dis-
orientation caused by social media produces “emotional dissonance”, because as the 
user is pulled in different directions that elicit completely incongruous emotional states, 
“the moral hierarchies of human culture crumble into a caricature of democracy, in 
which all elements are equal”, in which being “charmed by videos of interspecies friend-
ship” and “(almost) simultaneously disgusted by the latest crime footage” (Pettman 
2016, 37) leads to a blurring of events into individual moments that prompt virtual re-
actions; a like, a love-heart, a share, a retweet.  
Social media produces a vision of a world too chaotic to be challenged, where the 
subject is enticed into fitting into the social machine without friction to “get on” in life, 
and to move from distraction to distraction. Whilst Pettman envisions a world where 
social media designers build distraction into the model for nefarious political ends, I 
here argue there is a more plausible explanation: hypermodulation is not a political 
conspiracy, but an unintentional consequence of the incentive structure of platform 
capitalism informed by the social acceleration of the pace of life. In other words, hy-
permodulation is caused by what may be termed the digital acceleration of the pace of 
life, and thus digital deceleration, the replacement of the universal platforms with alter-
natives sensitive to these affective conditions, may provide a corrective. 
5. Thinking Deceleration 
When Rosa talks about deceleration, he considers it as something that occurs in five 
different ways: firstly, the natural and anthropological speed-limits of biological life; 
secondly, the oases of deceleration that exist either because they eschew modernity 
in the case of the Amish population of the United States, avoided modernity in the case 
of excluded, isolated tribal populations, or deceleration/productive patience is required 
for their process, such as the production of whiskey; thirdly, deceleration can occur as 
a dysfunctional by-product of acceleration, as is the case for traffic jams; fourthly, func-
tional (acceleratory) deceleration, for example, when time-pressed corporate manag-
ers take time to “decompress” on yoga retreats so that they may return to achieve 
success in their accelerated careers without burnout, or ideological (oppositional) de-
celeration, with examples such as the (historical) luddites or (contemporary) “deep-
ecology” anarchist movements; fifth and finally, the structural and cultural inertia that 
occurs as a consequence of frenetic standstill, supported by the (once-popular) claim 
in sociology and theory that “there are no new visions and energies available to modern 
society (hence the most notable absence of “utopian energies”)” (Rosa 2010, 38-39). 
Digital socialist deceleration, I argue, ought to be considered an ideological (oppo-
sitional) deceleration, by way of an acknowledgement of structural and cultural inertia, 
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which involves rejecting the supporting sociological claims3. Digital socialist decelera-
tion rejects the view that we have rejected the end of history and sees this lack of 
utopian energies because of a collective poverty, or lack of acknowledgement of, rad-
ical political thought (with varying theories as to why). We have learned through Rosa’s 
analysis that there are circumstances where deceleration can be a dysfunctional con-
sequence, such as instances where everyone using a new technology causes that 
technology to malfunction or slow down (think servers crashing on the release date of 
a highly-anticipated computer game), and there are even instances where deceleration 
is intentionally inscribed into a system for the purpose of further acceleration (my cyn-
ical example would be firms giving workers the weekend so that they are refreshed to 
be productive on weekdays). What does a socialist project look like under these sup-
posed conditions of modernity? And what role does “modernity” seem to be playing in 
Rosa’s work when many would suggest that “capitalism” would be a more adequate 
descriptor? 
What is modernity if it is not roughly the point at which capitalism began in the 
western world? What do we have to gain from ignoring the obvious fact that we feel 
the need to send off fifty e-mails in one sitting because there are external financial 
pressures beyond technological progress allowing for excess sociability? We are going 
faster because we must go faster, because we can go faster, because our bosses say 
that if we can, we should, and if we do not, we will be fired. Rosa argues that the merits 
of his theory of social acceleration includes its ability to explain “the transformation of 
the productive and consumptive regimes of modernity- from early modernity to “classi-
cal”, Fordist modernity and so on to “late modernity“ (Rosa 2010, 54). Rosa says that 
he does not claim that acceleration is the basis for society, rather a “dynamis, its driving 
force and its logic or law or change” (Rosa 2010, 54). Although I would argue that the 
profit motive serves as the primary engine of change, these competing explanations 
do not necessarily come into conflict during this paper’s analysis of social media. Nev-
ertheless, it seems plausible that social media’s relationship to its platform capitalist 
modus operandi is the driving force behind the hypermodulation of the subject, and 
thus deceleration of social media will either be instantiated through an anti-capitalist 
ideological opposition, or interestingly, a functional acceleratory project; in other words, 
the growing marketplace for products and services that encourage “digital detox”. Cap-
italism attempts to solve the problem it creates itself: a cynical phenomenon exploited 
by the “happiness industry” (Davies 2015). 
Rosa wonderfully articulates the contradiction at the heart of liberal democratic mo-
dernity, an individualist subjectivity that privileges autonomy of action and decision-
making as paramount to what makes us human, and yet paradoxically diminishes our 
capacity for such prospective actions and decision-making, obscured by the systems 
of control that permeate and dominate our social structures. The socialist project ar-
gues that the capitalist mode of production obstructs the autonomy promised by liberal 
                                            
3 Socialism is here defined as commitment to the following principles: equality, insofar as all 
should have broadly equal access to the necessary material and social means to live flour-
ishing lives of autonomy and self-directed meaning; a commitment to democracy as the po-
litical basis for ensuring all have the capacity to make meaningful contributions to the deci-
sion-making processes that will shape the social conditions of their lives (and recourse to 
correct instances of individual or collective injustices); a positive account of freedom shaped 
by a belief in self-determination and self-actualisation (which is linked to the notion of equality 
as means of ensuring autonomy); and solidarity, as G.A. Cohen put it, that people should 
“care about, and, where necessary and possible, care for, one another, and, too, care that 
they care about one another” (Cohen 2009, 34–35). 
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democracy, and as such, a transition to an alternative material state of affairs in concert 
with a more radical democratic culture will better serve the political goal of human 
emancipation. 
Rosa observes that “in late-modern politics, it is no longer (if it ever was) the force 
of the better argument which decides on future politics, but the power of resentments, 
gut-feelings, suggestive metaphors and images” (Rosa 2010, 56), and it could be ar-
gued that this political discourse that Rosa considers a cultural consequence of social 
acceleration, is increasingly and more commonly articulated and circulated on social 
media. 
6. On Socialist Acceleration v Socialist Deceleration 
As many readers will be familiar with theories on the contemporary left, it is here where 
the difference between Rosa’s account of acceleration and the accounts of left-accel-
erationism as a political stance become more explicit. When Nick Srnicek and Alex 
Williams (2013) refer to "accelerationist” politics, they are referring to the notion that 
capitalism, and its associated productive and distributive processes, should be accel-
erated instead of overcome, in order to reach socialist ends. In this sense, acceleration 
is posited as the harnessing of technological capacities that are limited by the capitalist 
paradigm, rather than being linked to more general understandings of social and cul-
tural change. By characterising technological acceleration in its contemporary form as 
distinctively neoliberal, they are ostensibly politicising the very framework used in the 
sociology literature, and ironically, policies that I term “digital decelerationist” for the 
purposes of thinking within the framework could well be considered accelerationism in 
the context in which Srnicek and Williams use the term. 
Both Rosa and left-accelerationists agree that capitalism alone is not responsible 
for our contemporary situation: “left-accelerationism begins with the premise that the 
deterritorializing force is not capitalism itself, but the transition from feudalism to capi-
talism was the expression of an emancipatory drive that capitalism’s reterritorialising 
dynamics has systematically (but never wholly) suppressed” (Wolfendale 2019). How-
ever, where they separate from each other is in political praxis: where Rosa and others 
see an unstoppable problem that inevitably unfolds from modern life, Srnicek, Williams 
and other left-accelerationists see an opportunity: but why? The key difference be-
tween the sociology literature and the left-accelerationist position is that the latter do 
not perceive the process of techno-social acceleration as a continuous path through 
modernity, but rather characterise our contemporary situation as approaching a crisis-
point, a rupture, a disruption: for example, Aaron Bastani (2019) argues that we are 
approaching the third disruption of capitalism (where the first was the agricultural rev-
olution and the second was the industrial revolution) and that our world must confront 
the following five crises and its consequence: "climate change, resource scarcity, ever-
larger surplus populations, ageing and technological unemployment as a result of au-
tomation – are set to undermine capitalism’s ability to reproduce itself” (Bastani 2019, 
48). In other words, whereas Rosa sees a world that may collapse because of its com-
mitment to acceleration, left-accelerationism is more cynical (of capitalism) and less 
pessimistic (about prospects for the future): 
Capitalism has begun to constrain the productive forces of technology, or at 
least, direct them towards needlessly narrow ends. Patent wars and idea mo-
nopolisation are contemporary phenomena that point to both capital’s need to 
move beyond competition, and capital’s increasingly retrograde approach to 
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technology. The properly accelerative gains of neoliberalism have not led to less 
work or less stress (Williams and Srnicek 2013). 
Left-accelerationists want to push techno-social acceleration further because they per-
ceive capitalism as a limiting, binding agent that is restricting our technological capac-
ities. The existing infrastructure of the global economy ought not to be destroyed, ra-
ther harnessed for the purpose of meeting human needs and launching us towards a 
post-capitalist future. However, given the previously described account of hypermodu-
lation as the subjectivity produced by our contemporary social media systems, I believe 
that a digital socialist approach must be decelerationist in nature to counteract such 
tendencies. As shall be demonstrated in the conclusion, the digital decelerationist pol-
icies that I conclude by advocating are plausibly compatible with broader left-acceler-
ationist projects in other sectors, although locating compromise between these posi-
tions and these different interpretations of “acceleration” as a concept was not an ex-
plicit aim of the paper. Given the recent prominent of accelerationism as an in-vogue 
concept on the both the contemporary left and right, and its specific prominence 
amongst political circles on the Internet, I believe there is value in distinguishing be-
tween Rosa’s account of social acceleration and the implications that emerge from his 
framework, and the way “accelerationism” is interpreted as a process by a distinct, if 
occasionally overlapping, literature. 
7. Conclusion: Towards A Socialist Digital Deceleration 
In the language that Rosa has given us, therefore, a socialist politics is a politics that 
wishes to “decelerate” society, insofar as it wishes to undermine the capitalist logic of 
continuous growth, and undercut the anxious subjectivity driven to action by frenetic 
standstill. There may be many instances within a broader socialist project where argu-
ments for acceleration hold water (for example, technological progress in renewable 
energies; AI-driven bureaucracy to support a streamlined and robust welfare state, 
etc.), but for the limited purposes of this paper, I shall focus on the socialist response 
to the problem that social acceleration causes for social media, and how best to coun-
teract such tendencies. 
If we accept the view that our social media activity provides the illusion of mean-
ingful critical engagement, whilst also reinforcing the hegemonic profitability and ubiq-
uity of the universal platforms, and that hypermodulation induces the kind of passivity, 
uncertainty and disorientation that Pettman describes, then any attempt to undermine 
these effects would be a small but substantial contribution to a project of digital decel-
eration, and thus a rollback of the affective conditions that serve to reproduce the cap-
italist status quo of contemporary modernity.  
On the individual level, Marcus Gilroy-Ware, in his 2017 book Filling The Void: 
Emotion, Capitalism & Social Media, concludes by offering suggestions to counteract 
what Pettman would term hypermodulation, as well as undermine the dominance of 
these digital institutions. Gilroy-Ware suggests limiting the time spent on the Internet, 
spent time researching and using independent/ethical/decentralised alternative digital 
products, limiting the amount of data that you consent to give away, corrupt the data 
by providing false information to undermine the predictive potential of universal plat-
form algorithms, and resist the urge to care too much about being present and visible 
on social media (Gilroy-Ware 2017, 188-191). Unfortunately, it’s easier said than done, 
given that the very network effects that encourage one’s participation in social media 
would be lost the moment one turns to more obscure services. In terms of proposals 
for collective action, he suggests putting public pressure on social media companies 
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to change their ways, build your own open technologies and support others in building 
ethical social media businesses and “reclaim the idea of social media by producing 
media and culture that use these hallmarks to undermine the artificial, cruel stability of 
late capitalism and build something better” (Gilroy-Ware 2017, 191). 
Digital deceleration, in practice, is a conscious rejection of the valorisation of a 
productivity-driven, individualist culture, because it is a rejection of the conditions that 
produce frenetic standstill. Digital deceleration, therefore, would operate as a practical 
principle of insuring that reforms to digital platforms, networks and data laws would be 
designed with an overarching commitment to undermine the disorientating experience 
of digital subjectivity, reducing the hypermodulation of social media users, and building 
a new relationship between digital consumers and their tools incongruous with the ide-
ological reproduction of capitalist sentiment. Writing with very broad strokes, below are 
some examples that may correspond to a notion of digital socialist deceleration: 
 
x digital spaces of egalitarian discussion for an indefinite period supported by interac-
tion with an audience (co-operative software model for live streaming as opposed 
to corporate-owned social media reaction); 
x socialist regulation that turns certain apps into non-profits to maximize value, allow 
for peer-to-peer connection and services to be rendered at lower cost without capi-
talist extraction (e.g. TFL (Transport for London) needs to produce an Uber app); 
x an independent, regulated and verified non-profit Twitter-style social media applica-
tion in which libel law applies and which is monitored by press regulators (i.e. a slow, 
factual Twitter that operates as a co-op in which users are paid for both viewing and 
contributing to the feed); 
x an international supreme court composed of technological innovators, IP lawyers 
(or lawyers that previously worked on the defunct concept of IP, given the scale of 
our socialist ambitions) and ethicists that can make decisions to limit the scope, 
scale and application of emergent technologies, to counter the acceleration of ex-
ploitative models through rapid corporate investment. 
 
A digital socialist project wishes to advance the cause of democratic socialism, under-
mine the capitalist relations between human beings when they engage with digital com-
munications, and create conditions for the critical interrogation of ideology on an indi-
vidual and collective level. A socialist project must acknowledge and respond to the 
constitutive role that the digital plays in the process of subject formation. A democratic 
socialist social media, therefore, would be “decelerationist” in this context, by which is 
meant it would advocate changes in the material life of social media in particular, and 
the internet in general, that would reduce hypermodulation, caused by the digital ac-
celeration of the pace of life endemic to social media subjectivity. A working principle 
of digital deceleration is, therefore, merely the idea that any socialist political project 
oriented towards the digital ought to consider how its prospective interventions 
(whether they be alternative platforms, legislative agendas or otherwise) serve to influ-
ence the subjectivity of its users, and keep in mind the notion that current social media 
trends in platform design, network effects and content production is skewed towards 
enabling and augmenting the frenetic standstill of modern capitalist subjectivity. A so-
cialist social media, therefore, must be a decelerated social media. 
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Abstract: Communism arrived in the south Indian state of Kerala in the early twentieth century 
at a time when the matrilineal systems that governed caste-Hindu relations were crumbling 
quickly. For a large part of the twentieth century, the Communist Party – specifically the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) – played a major role in navigating Kerala society through 
a developmental path based on equality, justice and solidarity. Following Lefebvre’s 
conceptualisation of (social) space, this paper explores how informal social spaces played an 
important role in communicating ideas of communism and socialism to the masses. Early 
communists used rural libraries and reading rooms, tea-shops, public grounds and wall-art to 
engage with and communicate communism to the masses. What can the efforts of the early 
communists in Kerala tell us about the potential for communicative socialism? How can we 
adapt these experiences in the twenty-first century? Using autobiographies, memoirs, and 
personal interviews, this paper addresses these questions. 
 
Keywords: social spaces, communism, Kerala, modernity, autogestion, Henri Lefebvre  
1. Introduction 
Kerala – a state that lies on the south-western end of the Indian peninsula – has re-
mained a distinct part of India owing to its unique physical, cultural, and political char-
acteristics. The Arabian Sea on its west and the Western Ghats (mountains) on its east 
have led to the evolution of a kind of insularity which has given it immunity from the 
political convulsions of Indian history which shook northern India (A. Menon 2015, 14; 
Damodaran and Vishvanathan 1995, 1). Until about two centuries ago, Kerala was 
among the most traditional regions of the country, with deep caste cleavages and rigid 
laws of purity and pollution that divided the populations. But over the twentieth-century, 
Kerala went on from being tagged as a “mad-house” of caste, to one of the most polit-
ically charged, secular and developed states in the country1. Although religion contin-
ued to influence basic attributes of Malayali identity, direct forms of oppression were 
less prevalent in Kerala’s public sphere than any other states by the 1970s (Nossiter 
1982, 33).  
Kerala also remains one of the few parts of India where the left-parties play an 
active and important socio-political role. Electorally, an alliance of left parties called the 
Left Democratic Front was formed post-independence, of which the Communist Party 
of India (Marxist) (hereafter CPI(M)) continues to be the largest political party. More 
importantly, the left has played a pivotal role in shaping public discourse and con-
sciousness in Kerala since the 1930s, building on the religious and political reform 
movements initiated in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-centuries. Yet, this con-
trol of the communists over the public sphere has come under severe strain over the 
                                            
1 Kerala was called a “mad-house” of caste by Swami Vivekananda – Hindu monk, and na-
tionalist. See Nossiter (1982, 25-26), Gopakumar (2009, 393-406) 
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last few decades as forces of capitalism and religion threaten the secular social fabric 
of the society. At this critical juncture in history, this paper looks back at the twentieth-
century and tease out the importance of social spaces in communicating communism 
to the masses in Kerala. The next section lays out the theoretical framework used for 
this paper. Section 3 describes briefly the context in which communism arrived in Ker-
ala, before exploring the important role played by informal everyday social spaces. 
Although many such spaces emerged in post-independence Kerala, this paper focus-
ses on two specific ones that have etched their place in popular imagination but have 
received little academic attention:  reading-rooms and tea-shops. The last section dis-
cusses the changing nature of social spaces in the 21st century and communist re-
sponses. 
The data presented here is a collection of content analysis of autobiographies and 
semi-structured personal interviews conducted over two periods of field visits in 2017 
and 2018. A total of fourteen interviews were conducted and respondents were chosen 
using snowball sampling. Although no specific measures were taken to choose specific 
genders, religions or caste for the non-expert interviews, the fact that only two of the 
respondents were female reflects the fact that the public sphere in Kerala continues to 
be dominated by males. Autobiographies of E.M.S Namboodirippad and K. Madhavan, 
and a biography of Krishna Pillai – all communist leaders from Kerala – have been 
used. 
2. Social Spaces and the Public Sphere 
Space – as an analytical tool – re-entered social theory in the last decades of twentieth-
century after being treated as dead, fixed and immobile for generations (Foucault 1980, 
70). Over the last three to four decades, many geographers, sociologists, and political 
scientists like David Harvey, Derek Gregory, Doreen Massey, Edward Soja, Laura Bar-
raclough, Philip Howell, Christian Fuchs, Neil Brenner, and others have revisited the 
importance of space in shaping discourse, public opinions, and social relations. Henri 
Lefebvre’s (1991) seminal work The Production of Space continues to be a point of 
departure directly or indirectly for a number of these studies. In his work, Lefebvre 
points out that “space” remains a concept never fully conceptualised in social sciences. 
It continues to be used in myriad ways without being critically engaged with, and we 
are confronted with a “multitude of spaces, each one piled upon, or perhaps contained 
within the next: geographical, economic, demographic, sociological, ecological, politi-
cal, commercial, national, continental, and global. Not to mention nature's (physical) 
space, the space of (energy) flows, and so on” (Lefebvre 1991, 2; 8).  
Yet, Lefebvre asks, why is it that there is no spatial criticism on par with the criticism 
of art, literature, or music? This question leads Lefebvre in his endeavour to theorise 
space, and to conceptualise a unitary theory that separates physical (nature), mental 
(including logical and formal abstractions) and the social space, to discern their mutual 
relationships and differences, and to open up space to critical enquiry. Such a critical 
enquiry was contingent on a Marxist analysis of society: 
the social relations of production have a social existence only insofar as they 
exist spatially; they project themselves into a space, they inscribe themselves 
in a space while producing it. Otherwise, they remain ‘pure’ abstraction, that is, 
in representations and consequently in ideology, or, stated differently, in verbal-
ism, verbiage, words (Lefebvre, translated and cited in Soja 1989, 127-128). 
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The idea is not to arrive at a universal theory but a unitary one – to force social sciences 
to think about space seriously – and think critically about the importance of spatiality 
in better understanding social relations (Lefebvre 1991, 89). 
We can begin to do this by separating space into three interconnected realms – 
representations of space (conceived space), spatial practice (perceived space), and 
representational space (lived space). Even as dominant power structures in society 
(colonial powers, higher castes, the State, capital) attempt to control representations 
of space and spatial practices, an absolute control remains unachievable, because the 
representational space remains subversive; “representational space is alive: it speaks” 
(Lefebvre 1991, 42). In other words, the lived spaces where human experience is 
shaped through the everyday social interactions also shape these interactions 
themselves. Especially in the modern state mode of production, a system where the 
State (and capital) increasingly control all spaces, Lefebvre argues that left forces must 
give up their utopianism and embrace the emancipatory potential of social spaces that 
arise from the constant contradictions between representations of space and 
representational spaces.  
This paper borrows from Lefebvre’s theory on the production of (social) spaces to 
focus on the everyday spaces as being important in communicating an ideology at a 
given time and space. Doing so would, on the one hand, bring space into analysis, 
while on the other it also allows for human experience as being considered central to 
understanding society, especially in extremely diverse and hierarchical societies like 
India (Guru and Sarukkai 2012; Guru and Sarukkai 2019; Mohan 2016).  
Fuchs (2019) has made a similar argument recently, pointing out that Lefebvre's 
humanist Marxism and the emphasis on human experience and social spaces can 
contribute to the foundations of a theory of communication. Here, I look at the case of 
the south Indian state of Kerala, where the political left has dominated the mainstream 
public sphere since the 1930s onwards2. For a revolution to be successful, it must 
create a new (social) space. When an ideology – any ideology – influences social re-
lations in a society, it does so by producing new spaces or appropriating existing 
spaces. What then can be said of the spatiality of socialism? As Lefebvre asks, “has 
state socialism produced a space of its own?” (Lefebvre 1991, 54). What role did (so-
cial) spaces play in communicating socialism in twentieth-century Kerala? How have 
these spaces transformed in the twenty-first century, and how must the left-parties re-
spond? These are the questions I address in this paper.  
3. Communism and (Social) Spaces in Kerala 
Communism arrived in Kerala3 in the early-twentieth-century, at a time when traditional 
social structures were being rapidly overthrown and a more progressive, modern, sec-
ular public sphere emerged. Pre-modern Kerala was organised in a Hindu Brahminical 
system4 and the Namboodiris (Kerala Brahmins) controlled the ideological sphere as 
                                            
2 The communist party adopted a social-democratic model in post-independent India and 
contested elections.  
3 Before Indian independence, Kerala comprised of the regions of Malabar (administered by 
the British), and the kingdoms of Cochin and Travancore. Malabar became a de facto part 
of the Indian Union in 1947, and Cochin and Travancore merged with India in 1949. Later, 
the three regions merged when Kerala was carved out as a result of the linguistic reorgan-
isation of states in 1956 
4 The Hindu caste system divided society into four castes based on hierarchy – the Brah-
mins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras – the Brahmins being considered the “purest” 
and the Shudras the “impure”.  Each caste had a set of laws of purity and pollution that 
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the repository of knowledge and discourse. Politically, land was divided into semi-au-
tonomous temple-centred villages. Means of production were controlled by the large 
temple corporations managed by Namboodiris or the socially next-lower Nair castes. 
All villagers across castes were thereby directly or indirectly dependent on the temple 
for employment. There was, in other words, a spatiality to how the society, resources 
and communities were arranged. The idea of “body as space” is vital here because we 
see that the purity of the Namboodiri body was the pivotal concept around which social 
– and consequently, material – relations were arranged. Social spaces were defined 
“outwards” from the Brahmin body, and analysing how spaces were distributed and 
controlled allows us – as Lefebvre attempts – to study space as itself. As Sanal Mohan 
(2016, 43) argues: 
Representations of space in traditional caste society were the exclusive privi-
lege of the upper castes. They in fact conceived and controlled it. Absolute con-
trol over space in the caste order that denied freedom to the slave castes was 
accomplished by exerting control over their spatial mobility. Stuck in the places 
where they lived, in most cases on the banks of rice fields or the borders of the 
landlords’ farms, the immutability of space was the experience of slaves. 
Yet, even as Namboodiris had controlled the representations of space (conceived 
space) and spatial practices (perceived space) through the caste system supported by 
the laws of purity and pollution, the spread of missionary activities and access of edu-
cation to the lower castes provided space for the traditional structures to be challenged. 
Meanwhile, social-reform movements that focussed on the idea of the body as space 
instilled in the lowered castes communities, an agency earlier denied to them. Parallel 
spaces that opened up courtesy of their conversion to Christianity further redefined 
their perceptions of space – and thereby the spatial practices which relied heavily on 
the adherence to them by the lower castes. Consequently, over the nineteenth and 
early-twentieth-century, struggles ensued that challenged the traditional social struc-
tures. And public (social) spaces remained very much pivotal to these struggles – 
spaces earlier reserved to higher castes were appropriated, while new social spaces 
of modernity opened up that allowed for new social relations and ideologies to be in-
troduced.  
By the 1930s, Kerala witnessed a social disintegration on a scale unequalled else-
where in India and the matrilineal systems that governed caste-Hindu relations crum-
bled quickly (Jeffrey 1978, 77; Nossiter 1982, 17). Traditional social order was in the 
decline and new social spaces were being created that drew out new spatial practices 
that governed social relations. Yet, the unresolved tensions with respect to gender – 
and specifically the attempt and a spatial divide between the domestic and public – 
meant that a simply reformed version of the traditional society would not suffice. The 
unresolved gender and religious reforms were subsequently replaced with the strug-
gles for economic equality and social justice. It is this ideological gap that Marxism 
came to fill in the 1930s in Kerala. It was assumed that solving the issue of class would 
automatically resolve the problem of caste and gender inequalities (Menon 1992, 2705; 
Devika 2012). The men and women who were unsettled with the changes turned to-
wards this ideology which appealed to thousands of literate, alienated people (Jeffrey 
1978, 78). When the left-leaning Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was formed in Bom-
bay in 1934, and its Kerala wing (KCSP) was founded by P. Krishna Pillai, E.M.S. 
                                            
governed their interactions with other castes. The lowest castes were treated as untouch-
ables – a segregation that also reflected in their expulsion from mainstream public sphere.  
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Namboodirippad and A.K. Gopalan in the same year. The communists in Malabar at 
the period attempted to create a community by renegotiating rural relations while or-
ganising mass agitations for the rights of the peasants (Menon 1994, 4). In the princely 
states, socialism developed within a framework of the struggles for responsible gov-
ernment that had shaped in the first decades of the twentieth century.  
Although a political front of communists also took shape in the 1930s, Marxist ide-
ology had been introduced into Kerala’s public sphere earlier when journalist Swade-
sabhimani Ramakrishna Pillai wrote a biography of Marx’s life in 1912 – arguably the 
first book on Marx published in any Indian language (Damodaran 1975, 98). Soon, 
periodicals such as Bhashaposhini and Vidyavinodini published articles on the new 
ideals of socialism5. But it is in the 1930s that we see clear indications of class replac-
ing caste as a visible social characterisation in the public sphere. More importantly, the 
first signs of this transition became visible in the new social spaces. A coir worker’s 
strike in 1933 raised the slogan: “Destroy the Nairs, destroy Nair rule, destroy capital-
ism” (Jeffrey 1976, 21).Three years later, when Bharatheeyan begins his speech at the 
first all-Malabar peasant meeting with the lines “there are only two castes, two religions 
and two classes – the haves and the have nots”, he was also alluding to a shift occur-
ring in Kerala’s popular imagination – the addition of class as a category different from 
caste (Menon 1992, 2706).  
E.M.S. Namboodirippad wrote in his autobiography, that despite having been intro-
duced to socialism through books while younger, it was only when he started to interact 
with people from diverse backgrounds that a sense of public responsibility was instilled 
in him. The importance of the new social spaces of early twentieth-century Kerala is 
undeniable. The reading rooms, tea-shops and trade unions were, as Lefebvre argued, 
new spaces that signalled and influenced a transformation in social relations. 
Early communists were quick to realise the importance of representational spaces 
(lived spaces) – both private and public – in communicating communism to the masses. 
The literate higher-caste members who were already attracted to Marxism saw such 
engagements with the peasant and labourers – most of whom belonged to the lower 
castes – as being important to win their trust. For this, they were asked consciously to 
break those spatial practices that had defined traditional caste hierarchies. Visiting the 
huts of the labourers and dining with them were revolutionary social changes that 
served a symbolic and a social purpose. K. Madhavan (1915-2016) who belonged to 
the first file of communists in Kerala, notes in his autobiography that to earn the trust 
of the lowered caste members in society, early communists were asked to visit the huts 
of the peasants, and “ask for water to drink before leaving”, to earn their trust 
(Madhavan 2014, 16). Such acts had a profound impact in winning the social and po-
litical support of the lowered-caste communities (Kunjaman 1996).  
Soon, the communists also appropriated and used public spaces such as the vil-
lage-squares and public grounds to reach out to the common masses. In as early as 
in 1934 when the young critics were denied a space at the main literary conference in 
Tallicherry, socialist P. Krishna Pillai invited Kesav Dev to deliver a speech at a Youth 
Conference that he organised in an open market near a kavala6.  
In his speech, Dev came down heavily on the mainstream literary sphere, arguing that 
it was time for the writers to move away from the palaces to write about the toiling 
masses, their poverty and their struggles. It was a speech that reflected the socialist 
                                            
5 During my archival work, I came across two articles in Bhashaposhini and one in Vidya-
vinodini, all published in the 1920s.  
6 (Kunhiraman 2013, 86-87); a kavala is a foursquare and acted as the node of activity in the 
villages or neighbourhoods (see Figure 1). 
tripleC 18(1): 268-285, 2020 273 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2020. 
ideology that was to spread quickly in the following decade, and it was befitting that it 
was delivered in the kavala to an eager, diverse and enthusiastic crowd. By the end of 
the decade, kavalas had emerged as social spaces of importance. Rifts within the 
KCSP after the outbreak of World War II led to socialist leaders being expelled from 
the party and forced to go into hiding. When the Communist Party was formed in Kerala 
in January 19407, their leaders were in hiding. However, they decided that the an-
nouncement had to be made publicly. The solution suggested by the leaders was to 
paint communist messages on the walls in public spaces and kavalas of north Malabar 
(Kunhiraman 2013, 63-64). The slogans “Long Live the Communist Party” and “May 
Feudalism and Imperialism Perish” that appeared on the walls and kavalas of Malabar, 
Travancore and Cochin in 1940-41 announced the emergence of the Communist 
Party, but also the secularisation and democratisation of public spaces in Kerala’s pub-
lic sphere. By the mid-twentieth century, they also managed to create a strong network 
of new social spaces which constituted informal but vibrant associational spaces for 
the youngsters, predominantly male. In the second half of the twentieth century, Com-
munist party-led trade unions, arts and cultural associations, literary and science fo-
rums all inundated the public sphere, taking communism to the common masses 




Figure 1: A Kavala near Velinellur, Kerala, Picture by author, 03 July 2018 
This research looks at the less formal social spaces that coexisted in twentieth-century 
Kerala, where informal associations formed through everyday interactions. These were 
not spaces maintained or controlled exclusively by the political party structures, but 
neither can they be brushed aside as inconsequential. Two such spaces stand out as 
                                            
7 In Malabar, and a year later, on 26 January 1941 in Travancore and Cochin. 
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important when one studies the case of Kerala – libraries/reading rooms and tea-
shops.  
3.1. Libraries and Reading Rooms 
By the 1930s, Namboodiri students had started studying in public schools along with 
students from the lower castes. E.M.S. Namboodirippad, who went on to become the 
first Chief Minister of Kerala and one of India’s foremost Communist leaders, writes in 
his autobiography about how his admission to a public school in 1925 changed his life: 
This was an important turning point in my life...joining school felt like beginning 
a new life – an environment entirely different from the one I had been accus-
tomed to. Friends and teachers were from different castes and religions. And 
one didn’t study by oneself or with two or three other classmates, but in class-
rooms with twenty-five to thirty students” (Namboodirippad 1995, 77). 
The school also gave him access to a reading room and library in an adjacent building 
where he read books, periodicals, magazines and engaged in discussions with peers. 
The establishment of libraries and reading rooms ushered in a new space in the mod-
ern public sphere that eventually shaped (mostly male) mini-publics where matters of 
social importance were discussed and debated8. It was often here – in the local reading 
rooms – that later political leaders began their association with the cultural, literary and 
political institutions; with the public sphere. Namboodirippad noted in an interview that 
the early communist leaders made a conscious effort to establish a reading room and 
a night-school in every village by the end of the 1930s (Namboodirippad 1992). 
Although the establishment of public libraries started in Kerala in the nineteenth 
centuries, it was by the 1930s that they had permeated into all corners of the state with 
the efforts of locals (Nair 1998, 175). The library movement in Malabar was slower as 
compared to the rest of Kerala, because British authorities were wary of political activ-
ities surrounding libraries, and tried to minimise spaces of socialising (Ranjith 2004, 
10; Lenin 2017, 9; Karat 1976, 38-39). Public libraries in Tallichery, Calicut, and Can-
nanore were established in 1901, 1924, and 1927 respectively. Small rural libraries 
began to appear in villages thereafter (Bavakutty 1982, 252). Soon, plays written by 
communists like  K. Damodaran, Thoppil Bhasi, and others that discussed the social, 
political, and economic conditions of the people were often staged by the libraries, 
generating discussions and forming public opinions. The reading rooms that were es-
tablished by themselves or as attached to a library were used by the KCSP to spread 
socialist ideas9.  
The 1960s and 1970s were a golden period for the library movement, and the number 
of public libraries in Kerala continued to grow. Influenced by the left-leaning public 
sphere, they were centres where social consciousness was “created” and “recreated” 
at a rural level. As P. Achuthan (born 1945) who worked with the Local Library Authority 
for about four decades points out in an interview with the author: 
                                            
8 Libraries and Reading Rooms are often used synonymously in Kerala. In literature and from 
interviews, it was observed that the word Vayanashala (Reading Room) was used more 
generally to mean even Libraries (Granthashala). On the (in)difference between the two, 
E.M.S. Namboodirippad writes, remembering his experience of setting up a Library in his 
village in 1934: :Back then, we didn’t call it a library; we called it a reading room. A reading 
room is also a library” (Namboodirippad 2017, 11). 
9 Raimon (2006) lists the main ones to be established in Malabar in the 1930s. For a com-
plete list, see Lenin (2017) 
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Truth is, in almost all regions across Kerala, libraries had started functioning 
much before independence […] In small villages as well, reading rooms were 
set up. The educated people succeeded in attracting and involving others too, 
through public discussions, talks and interpretations of ancient texts, poetry 
reading, etc […] Often, libraries organised events where the local people partic-
ipated in songs and theatre. The scriptwriters, directors, actors all came from 
among the village. These were all attempts to bring people into this [the public 
sphere]. 
Any study of the public sphere in Kerala inevitably has a section that discusses the 
importance of the reading rooms and libraries in forming public opinions and helping 
transcend political and religious differences10. In a sense, reading rooms epitomised 
the true nature of social spaces during the second half of the twentieth century in that 
apart from being important spaces of socialising themselves, reading rooms also facil-
itated other spaces where groups of people socialised in Kerala. Consequently, there 
emerged a number of youth clubs, theatre clubs, and associations that were attached 
to, and worked closely with the reading rooms. This allowed reading rooms to function 
as “cultural centres” of the community at large – a feature peculiar to Kerala (Bavakutty 
1982, 254).  
Although some of these extended spaces accommodated female participation, the 
reading rooms themselves remained, to borrow J. Devika’s (2013) term, “homoaes-
thetic circles”. In her interview, Hema (born 1973) remembers being strictly warned by 
her brother against going to the library as a teenager, because it “was not a space for 
girls to go”11. She defied such opposition and continued to visit the library, was the first 
female to apply for a membership there and was the only woman to periodically issue 
books at the library; reading rooms were still inaccessible to her. 
The affiliated associations and clubs were relatively more diverse. A number of the 
respondents who were middle-aged or higher spoke of the Clubs and Associations that 
functioned closely with the reading rooms in their neighbourhood. Irrespective of polit-
ical differences, their perception of reading rooms reflected a democratic and plural 
nature. This was because the spaces were conceived – since the time they were en-
couraged by reformers like Sree Narayana Guru, but later also under the Congress 
and Communist parties – as spaces where public deliberation was encouraged. Reg-
ular users also perceived these spaces as such, as Ajikumar (born 1978) recollects in 
an interview with the author: 
It's been an active space. It is a centre of discussions and conversations. Some-
times, discussions get out of hand...like they do in our villages. We'd talk about 
an issue and sometimes it ends up in an argument [...] never in violence. Then 
it'd be resolved and they would talk about something else the next day – the 
same group.  
This repetitive nature of public spaces is important to note. In the past, the physicality 
of social spaces was an important component. This meant that the groups who fre-
quented the reading rooms and tea-shops were regulars. It encourages us to think of 
the influence of the increasingly “virtual” nature of public spaces. Ajikumar and his 
childhood friends from the reading room now have a WhatsApp group but he feels that 
this lacks the “personal attachment” that the physical spaces provided them.  
                                            
10 Gender still remained a marker of difference, as my female interviewees pointed out.   
11 Personal interview with Hema Joseph, 27 June 2018 
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On the other hand, they also encouraged an informal social-circle that extended to 
beyond the library. As Menon (1992) notes, one of the novelties of the reading rooms 
was the “communal drinking of tea, as one person read the newspaper and others 
listened. Tea and coffee lubricated discussions on the veracity of the news and of the 
political questions, and a new culture emerged out of the reading rooms” (Menon 
1992). P. Achuthan (born 1945) comments in an interview: 
When one speaks of a library in the rural areas, one must mention conversations 
from a tea-shop. Even after drinking their tea, people would stay around. There 
used to be a tea-shop next to the Desabandhu Vayanashala. People would 
come there for tea but the newspaper reading would continue even after the tea 
was done. This was when my uncle came up with an idea. There was our land 
nearby so he cleaned it and set up a little shed with palm leaves, put a bench 
and brought newspapers. So people who finished their tea could sit on the 
bench nearby and continue reading. 
The importance of wayside teashops in Kerala in creating a politically conscious work-
ing class remains under-explored. Yet, in archival research, autobiographies of early 
communists and personal interviews, tea-shops always are described as social spaces 
where people (almost exclusively men) engaged in political discussions and debates. 
As we shall see in the next section, they played an important role as spaces where 
communism was introduced to the public.  
3.2. Tea-Shops 
Tea-shops emerged in Kerala’s public sphere as representational spaces where the 
traditional social relations were openly challenged. Anybody with money could, in the-
ory, walk into a tea-shop and be served tea and snacks12. However, most tea-shops in 
Kerala had emerged by the 1930s as political spaces and had an extremely influential 
role in shaping the public consciousness and strengthening communist thought among 
the common people. K. Madhavan (1915-2016) remembers the tea-shop in his village 
as the “central office” of political activism and political discussions for the early social-
ists. It was also a space where people gathered for any updates on matters of im-
portance: “If any problem arose in the village […] people usually ran to Koman’s tea 
shop” (Madhavan 2014, 53). By the 1940s, the working classes and labourer in Kerala 
patronised the tea-shops with “stern resolve”, as tea, coffee and cocoa became in-
creasingly popular and substitutes to local drinks like buttermilk (Pillai 1940). One ob-
server notes of the tea-shops in Kerala in the mid-twentieth century that in his travels 
across south Asia, he had never seen anything like the little tea-shops of Kerala in the 
mornings 
crowded with coolies scanning the newspapers or listening while others read 
them aloud. More than 40 newspapers in the Malayalam language are published 
                                            
12 Even as anti-caste struggles by reformers like Ayyankali used tea-shops to challenge dom-
inant caste norms, teashops continued to be spaces of contestations, as two recorded inci-
dents that I came across suggest: one of a lowered caste Ezhava being fined for trying to 
buy tea from a Nair’s tea-stall in 1925 (Keralakaumudi, 1st January 1925); K.V Kannan’s 
(1988) recollection that as children, they were not allowed to “drink tea from the local tea-
shop” (p.295). 
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in Kerala; they are read and discussed by people of all classes and castes 
(Woodcock 1967, 35). 
As can be imagined, the presence of coolie labourers made such spaces important for 
communist leaders to tap into. By virtue of automatically being spaces that necessi-
tated interaction between the different castes, tea-shops could not be controlled by 
upper-caste Brahmins.  
The emergence of tea-shops as cosmopolitan social spaces that transcended not 
just caste and religion but also the limitations of spatiality reflects in a memory retold 
to the author by writer and critic M.N. Karassery (born 1951) from when an American 
academic Stephen F. Dale visited his village in the 1970s. The two heard a loud argu-
ment at a tea-shop near Karassery’s home. Karassery recalls: “I brought Dale home 
one day... ‘Are they quarrelling, what is going on there?’ he said to me. ‘No, no, it's a 
political discussion’, I said. ‘Political discussion?! What is there?’”13.  
When the two of them walked to the tea-shop nearby Karassery’s home, they real-
ised that there were a group of people having a heated debate about the American 
President John F. Kennedy's daughter's name! The interesting thing is it wasn’t be-
tween someone who knows the name and someone who doesn’t but between two 
people who thought that they had the correct name. “Dale exclaimed – ‘My gracious!’”, 
says Karassery, adding, “Caroline or something is her name”. Even Dale didn’t know 
it. In other areas such as Mattancherry near Kochi, K.P Ashraf’s (born 1954) recollects 
his engagement with the foreigners who frequented the tea-shops of the area in the 
1960s and 1970s. Other autobiographies and memoirs from the period also allude to 
the creation of social spaces that centred on tea-shops where sociabilities were trans-
cended14, ideas, exchanged, and opinions formed. Devika (2012) argues that the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century saw a striking cultural contrast – between a literary 
cosmopolitanism and alarmingly conservative social attitudes. That Ashraf and 
Karassery’s experiences coincide with this phase suggests that a study of locally 
rooted cosmopolitanisms in modern Kerala must take into consideration not just the 
literary sphere, but also that of social spaces15. 
Babu Purushottaman (born 1957), who set up a tea-shop near the famous Paragon 
Restaurant in Kozhikode four decades ago, believes that the discussions and friend-
ships he formed at his tea-shop in the 1980s drew him closer to active politics which 
he eventually joined: “Back then, we had crowds that would spend a lot of time as they 
had tea [...] not just here, really the Indian Coffee House was a left-leaning space that 
shaped many friendships”, he says16. He believes that such vibrant political engage-
ments were common across the tea-shops in the city and is what eventually drew him 
closer to active politics. Kureepuzha Sreekumar who belongs to the same generation 
as Ashraf, Babu Purushottaman and M.N. Karassery, points out that the vibrant tea-
shops17 belonged to a specific time period of Kerala’s political history when com-
munism and progressive ideals seemed attractive to the youngsters18.  
                                            
13 M.N. Karassery, Personal interview.  
14In his recent book, Jaaware (2019) has argued that society is not one homogenous entity, 
but must be seen as a number of “sociabilities” that are constantly traversed. 
15 Here, Menon (2010) and Devika’s (2012) works on the creation of a cosmopolitanism in 
modern Kerala are alluded to. Both mention a cosmopolitanism of ideas in early modern 
Kerala that Devika argues gave away to a more elite cosmopolitanism of objects. 
16 Babu Purushottaman, personal interview, 19 July 2018 
17 Also barber shops and toddy shops. 
18 Personal interview, 3 July 2018 
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Over the last few decades, socio-economic factors have resulted in certain character-
istic changes in the social nature of tea-shops. Babu, whose tea-shop is over three 
decades old, says that in the past, his customers were almost entirely writers, politi-
cians and thinkers. Over the years, the crowd from a nearby Income tax office became 
regulars, although some old crowds still come once in a while. A lot of the discussions 
now, Babu says in his interview with the author, surround official matters – promotions, 
office politics, etc.  
I ask them sometimes if they have nothing else to talk about. They flinch and 
say no. I become a listener. I focus on my work. I don't intervene. If there's a 
discussion on politics I intervene.  
Ajikumar (born 1978) who would have belonged to the next generation of youngsters 
who grew up during these changes says that people across ages still use the tea-shop 
in his village of Poothotta near Eranakulam. However, he also alludes to a de-politi-
cised nature of the space: 
Recently the tea-shop has put up a board saying "you can't talk politics here". 
Because many times, this gets down to issues between people sometimes. So 
they put up a board saying "Please don't talk politics" (laughs). People drink tea 
and leave their ways [...] it doesn't get down to discussions except during elec-
tion time. 
He says that the regular customers are older people who drop by for tea after their 
morning walk when they read the newspaper for some time. For the younger crowds 
such as himself, he says the tea-shop is a space where they go and sit sometimes 
after playing, “because it's near the lake and it's nice.” 
3.3. State-Socialism and the Struggle for Control 
The emergence of a nation-state, Partha Chatterjee (1993) argues, “cannot recognise 
within its jurisdiction any form of the community except the single, determinate, demo-
graphically enumerable form of the nation” (Chatterjee 1993, 238). Lefebvre argues 
that the state attempts to do this by seeking to master social spaces, which, “in addition 
to being a means of production, is also a means of control, and hence of domination, 
of power” (Lefebvre 1991, 26). In other words, it is through an attempt at controlling 
social spaces – the “flattening of social and ‘cultural’ spheres – that nation-states at-
tempt to promote itself as the stable centre (Lefebvre 1991, 23; see also Fuchs 2019). 
New social spaces were created in the early twentieth century in Kerala as spatiality 
of traditional social order was broken down. Post-independence, however, the consol-
idation of the state meant that there was a constant pressure on these spaces to be 
controlled or crushed. As Pandian (2002) notes, this contest between the state (and/or) 
capital and the community became an indispensable component of post-colonial India 
(Pandian 2002, 1738). This happens in all modern states – both state-capitalisms and 
state-socialisms.  
In Kerala, the struggle between the state’s attempt to control social spaces and 
resistance from the communities became increasingly clear by the 1970s. Already by 
then, a section of the authors, poets, and thinkers who played an active role in the early 
stages of left-politics were either side-lined by the party or moved away from the party 
voluntarily. In a stark critique of the communist parties’ weakening ties with the literary 
and cultural movements at the time, Thoppil Bhasi wrote a strongly worded article in a 
Party Souvenir, blaming the Communist Party for distancing itself from the cultural 
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movement and reminding the important role played by writers like Thakazhi, Kesav 
Dev and others in shaping the progressive politics in the state (Bhasi 1966, 171-172). 
The response of the political left parties towards the radical left movement in gen-
eral and specifically to their cultural front – the Janakeeya Samskarika Vedi (1980-82) 
– further widened this divide. Emerged from the radical left movement as a cultural 
organisation that aimed to establish its own cultural sphere, the Vedi attracted many 
contemporary poets and artists who saw it as a space to fight for larger social issues 
that the organised political left had failed to raise (Sreejith 2005; Satchidanandan 2008, 
148-149). It was evident from interviews also that a number of the left sympathisers 
saw this as a failure of the Communist Party to correct its course. Ashraf from Mat-
tancherry, for instance, remembers that around the time he migrated to the Gulf in the 
1980s, many youngsters were disillusioned by the left parties’ stand on social issues. 
This period also saw the death of many youngsters, either from direct police brutality 
or suicides led by disillusionment (Satchidanandan 2008, 149)19; 
The “secular” nature even of informal associations was affected by excessive polit-
ical intervention by the late 1980s. One of my respondents, Hema (born 1973) recol-
lects that by the 1980s, the Arts Club near her home had split into two groups based 
on political differences and eventually, both shut down. Other younger respondents 
such as Sreerag and Jitheesh (both 25 years old) said that people their age group were 
not involved with Clubs in their respective villages because they were being hijacked 
by political parties. Jitheesh said that there is one Club near his home, but he wasn’t 
interested in joining it because its members – all aged under thirty, he said – are mem-
bers of the DYFI and “they go to stick posters [for the party]”. 
4. Capitalism, Communalism, and Social Spaces: The 20th Century and Beyond 
Even as communist forces struggled to resolve the contradictions of social spaces that 
had emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, economic and social changes as a result of both 
internal and external factors led to a radical redefinition of spatiality towards the end of 
the twentieth century. Capital emerged as a major player after the liberalisation of the 
Indian economy in 1991, leading to a rapid increase in urbanisation and privatisation 
of land. Also important are the economic changes that the Gulf boom brought to the 
purchasing power of the people, and the rapid growth of the culture industries which 
had already emerged since the sixties. Meanwhile, the spread of satellite television 
and media changed how news was consumed in Kerala, radically affecting the role of 
rural libraries, teashops and reading rooms as social spaces (Ranjith 2004, 14). 
 
                                            
19 Ashraf from Mattancherry mentioned this in his interview. He even named one Subrah-
manya Das in the area who took his own life because of such disillusionment.  
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Figure 2: Once active spaces for everyday political discussions among the youth, 
reading rooms have ceased to attract youngsters today, as news is increasingly “con-
sumed”, not “engaged with”. Seen here, Comrade Santo Gopalan Reading Room 
and Library, Fort Kochi. Picture by author, 16 January 2017.   
In the twenty-first century, the decline in conventional social spaces, along with the 
increased control of spaces by capital and religious forces has led to new challenges 
to the left. Responding to these changes in the 1990s, the left saw decentralization of 
power as the most effective way to combat narrow religious and communal interests 
and global capital. Consequently, the meaning of civil society was revised to accom-
modate broad alliances at the grassroots level that cut across religious, caste and gen-
der differences.   
This led to a new struggle, since on the one hand, they created autonomous civil 
societies at the local levels, while on the other, capital and religious spaces also mul-
tiplied like never before. Even as autonomous secular social spaces emerge, the sec-
ular response to these challenges has been two-fold and unconvincing. On the one 
hand, there was an attempt to dissociate from the religious in the cultural sphere. The 
left’s attempts to uphold the secular ideal have been met, on the other hand, by in-
stances where the Community Party resorts to over-accommodation of religious sen-
timents, rituals and practices. For instance, the celebration of “Krishna Jayanthi” (a 
religious festival celebrating the birth of Hindu god Krishna) in 2016 under the guise of 
Onam (secular harvest festival which, although with Hindu rituals and myths, is cele-
brated across the religions of the state) celebrations had drawn severe criticism to an 
extent where it “alienated true comrades from the party”20. The CPI(M)’s rallies on the 
                                            
20 Desperate Left Goes on Temple Run. The Times of India, 15 March 2016. 
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day have attempted to rival the right-wing Hindu nationalist organisations’ “Shobha-
yatra”s which continue to draw large crowds (see Figure 3)21. In another instance, one 
of the CPI(M) processions came under a row after it featured Thidambu Nritham, a 
temple ritual22. The unsaid rule of the communist party has urged its cadres to involve 
culturally” in temple festivals, while State Committee members have been asked to 
dissociate from going to temples23. 
 
 
Figure 3: The Shobha Yatras started in the 1980s by right-wing cultural organisations 
continue to draw large crowds. Seen here, the Yatra at Thrissur city. Picture by au-
thor, 12 September 2017. 
But these moves have come under criticism from the public across political ideologies. 
Criticising this attempted renaissance political analyst N.N.Pearson states: “How can 
a party that has diluted its own ideology for the sake of power lead a renaissance 
campaign? The politically enlightened people of Kerala can see through the games”24. 
Even in the 1990s, the equation of religion and politics came to become an important 
one to address.  
In 1997 – a decade after the CPI(M) laid out a policy that their only God was the 
‘Red God’ – the then Communist Chief Minister Nayanar’s meeting with the Pope be-
came a matter of much debate within Kerala. Opinion pieces were written criticising 
the gesture and to them, Nayanar quipped that the meeting was going to neither make 
the Pope a Communist nor make himself a non-Communist and that the matter needn’t 
                                            
21 Shobha Yatras are processions organised by the Hindu organisations to celebrate the birth 
anniversary of the Hindu god Krishna. Children are dressed up as characters from mytholog-
ical stories of Krishna and a procession is organised in the villages, towns or cities 
22 Mohamed Nazeer. 2016. Temple Ritual at CPI(M)’s Procession Triggers Row’, The Hindu, 
28 August 2016.  
23 Interview with M.G. Radhakrishnan on 12 January 2017. 
24 T. K. Devasia. 2016. (31st August 2016), Kerala: LDF Hopes to Curb RSS Making Inroads 
into Hindu Vote Bank. Firstpost, 31 August 2016. also see Menon (1995, 23) 
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be blown out of proportion25. Such tensions continue to persist into the twenty-first 
century, as many cases from the recent past – including the agitation against a caste-
wall in the temple at Vadayampady, the controversy following the Supreme Court ver-
dict allowing women of all ages entry into the Sabarimala temple which earlier had age 
restrictions of women, etc. show. As has been mentioned, these add to the ever-rising 
concern of creating secular progressive spaces despite the internet and media provid-
ing alternatives to the common masses.  
5. Conclusions  
Social spaces played an important role in helping early communists to reach out to the 
masses and in shaping a progressive public consciousness. Unlike institutional spaces 
that are maintained and work under rigid party guidelines, informal spaces like reading 
rooms and teashops enjoyed an autonomy that allowed them to create a broader net-
work of people cutting across party differences. A rigid party structure, the CPM’s fail-
ure to accommodate for alternate social spaces that emerged in the 1980s and a rapid 
change in the economic and social systems have radically reformed the spatiality of 
Kerala in the twenty-first century. The increase of capital and religion in the public 
sphere raise new challenges to the secular and progressive forces. This leads us to 
the question: What can the communist parties do to meet the challenges raised?  
In Lefebvre’s argument about the transition from social-democracy to decentralised 
state forms in contemporary times, he urged the political left to explore the potential of 
autogestion in asserting a counter-hegemonic use of space, since it is the “one path 
and one practice that may be opposed to the omnipotence of the State” (Lefebvre 
2009, 134; see also Butler 2010, 100). Lefebvre saw autogestion – most closely trans-
lated as grassroots democracy – as an essential basis for the democratisation of soci-
ety, born spontaneously out of the void in social life that is created by the state 
(Lefebvre 2009, 14-15). To him, it was the radical democracy that emerges with the 
withering away of the state in modernity.26 It is a redefinition of the state as an arena 
for “spatial autogestion, direct democracy, and democratic control, affirmation of the 
differences produced in and through that struggle” (Lefebvre 2009, 16). Although such 
movements may not have the continuous character and institutional promise of parties 
or trade unions, a decentralised state, Lefebvre argues that they have the power to 
reconstruct social space from “low to high”, as opposed to “high to low”; social needs 
would be determined here by the action of interested parties, and not by “experts” 
(Lefebvre 2009, 193).  
The ultimate aim of progressive movements must be to expand radical democracy 
to the deepest tiers of society. For this, they must aim not at narrow conceptions of 
controlling social spaces but must facilitate the creation of wide networks at the grass-
roots that may succeed in successfully challenging any attempts at control from above.  
In other words, Lefebvre’s work on decentralisation and autogestion can provide 
useful insights into understanding how communication strategies must change in con-
temporary societies. In Kerala, the autonomous, secular associational spaces at the 
grassroots continue to provide progressive, issue-based social spaces where people 
                                            
25 K. Govindankutty, K. 1997. Daivam Kallanaavumbol, India Today (Malayalam), 27 August 
1997, 24. M. Vijayachandran. 1997. Oru Paarshvaveekshanam, India Today (Malayalam), 
31 December 1997, pp.34-36. 
26 Lefebvre uses the “withering away of the state” in a different sense from Marx’s concept of 
the same. To Lefebvre, it is a way of conceptualising a decentralisation of the state; a dis-
placement of its nodes of control. See: Butler (2012), pp.100-101 
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can come together outside the “rigid structures” of party politics. The attempt must be 
to nourish such spaces without succumbing to the pressures to react to narrow reli-
gious pressures.  
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